Alston v. United States Department of Justice

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 6/11/2018. (fms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ESHED ALSTON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 18-302-LPS

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Civil Rights Division and
Administrative Management Section,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
1.

Introduction. Plaintiff EShed Alston ("Plaintiff''), who proceeds pro se and has paid

the filing fee, commenced this action on February 22, 2018, alleging violations of his constitutional
rights.
2.

Background. On March 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for recusal of the

undersigned Judge on the grounds that the Court demonstrated bias and violated a 2010 order by
repeatedly "with intent deliberately miss-spelling" Plaintiffs legal name, that was changed for
religious reasons. Plaintiff alleges this violates 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,242, and 101, as well as 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. He also complains of rulings made in Alston v. Verizon
Delaware LLC, Civ. No. 17-652-LPS (D. Del.). 1 Plaintiff states that the undersigned Judge is "the
object of a U.S. Department of Justice civil complaint filed as an example of the racial misconduct
complained of." (D.I. 6 at 2) He appears to accuse the undersigned Judge of bribery. Plaintiff
states that, because of this, it would be materially and pr9cedurally inappropriate for the undersigned
Judge to be a trier of fact in this case.

1

On March 12, 2018, the case was remanded to the Superior Court of the State of Delaware
in and for Kent County. See Civ. No. 17-652-LPS at D.I. 42, 43. The case is currently on appeal.
See id. at D.I. 47.
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3.

Discussion. A judge is required to recuse himself "in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The test for recusal under
§ 455(a) is whether a "reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned," In re Kensington Int'/ Lid., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d
Cir. 2004), not (only) "whether a judge actually harbors bias against a party," United States v. Kennedy,
682 F.3d 244,258 (3d Cir. 2012). Under§ 455(b)(1), a judge is required to recuse himself "[w]here
he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party."
4.

Under either subsection, the bias necessary to require recusal generally "must stem

from a source outside of the official proceedings." Uteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994);

see also Selkridge v. United of Omaha Ufa Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating beliefs or
opinions which merit recusal must involve extrajudicial factor). Hence, "judicial rulings alone almost
never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." Uteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Similarly,
claims of bias or partiality cannot be based on "expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction,
annoyance, [or] even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even
after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at
courtroom administration -- even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom
administration -- remain immune." Id. at 555-56.
5.

It is evident in reading Plaintiffs motion that he takes exception to this Court's

rulings and this serves as one of his reasons for seeking recusal. He makes conclusory allegations,
and provides no rational basis for his claims of alleged bias. A reasonable, well-informed observer
could not believe that the rulings were based on partiality, bias, or actual prejudice by the
undersigned Judge. Nor do the rulings demonstrate the Court acting in such manner when ruling in
the cases wherein Plaintiff is a party. After careful and deliberate consideration, the undersigned
Judge has concluded that the Court has no actual bias or prejudice towards Plaintiff and that a
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reasonable, well-informed observer would not question the Court's impartiality. In light of the
foregoing standard and after considering PlaintifPs assertions, the undersigned Judge concludes that
there are no grounds for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
6.

Conclusion. For the above reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiffs motion. (D.I. 6)

An appropriate order will be entered.

June 11, 2018
Wilmington, Delaware

HONORABLE LEONARD P. STARK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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