Paczkowski v. State Of Delaware et al
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 6/22/2018. (nms)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JOSEPH S. PACZKOWSKI,
Plaintiff,
: Civ. No. 18-352-RGA
V.
STATE OF DELAWARE, et al.,
Defendants.
Joseph S. Paczkowski , Sussex Correctional Institution, Georgetown, Delaware .
Pro Se Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
72 ,
2018
June
Wilmington , Delaware
Plaintiff Joseph S. Paczkowski , an inmate at Sussex Correctional Institution in
Georgetown, Delaware, filed this Complaint in March 2018 raising claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 1 (D.I. 1, 8, 9). He appears prose and has been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis.
(D .I. 7). He requests counsel.
(D.I. 4, 9, 11 , 12). The
Court reviews and screens the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(a).
I.
BACKGROUND
In August 1999, Plaintiff entered a Robinson plea in the Superior Court of the
State of Delaware to one count of unlawful sexual intercourse in the third degree.
Paczkowski v. State , 2001 WL 213354, at *1 (Del. 2001 ).
Pursuant to the plea
agreement, he was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, suspended after two years
for fifteen years' probation . Id.
In October 2011 , Plaintiff was charged with violation of
probation . (D.I. 8). Plaintiff was detained , and his VOP hearing was continued
pending an investigation.
(Id.).
Plaintiff asked to be released , but he remained
detained.
In December 2011 , Plaintiff was indicted on five counts of sex offender unlawful
sexual conduct against a child.
(D.I. 8 at p.1 ); see also State v. Paczkowski, ID Nos.
1112009385 & 9904022327 (Del. Super.) (D.I. 70) (decision denying motion for
1
When bringing a § 1983 claim , a plaintiff must allege that some person has
deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted
under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 , 48 (1988).
2
postconviction relief) (available at Paczkowski v. State , No. 17-1665 (D.I. 4-2) (D.Del.)).
Plaintiff contends that the grand jury should not have heard about his status as a sex
offender. (0.1. 8 at p.4) . He alleges prejudice and violations of his civil rights because
the grand jury heard this evidence.
(Id.).
On many occasions while awaiting the VOP hearing, Plaintiff requested a new
attorney. (Id. at p.1 ).
Plaintiff alleges his attorney had a conflict of interest and that
the Public Defender and the State of Delaware worked together to violate his civil rights.
Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the
criminal proceedings because his attorney waived Plaintiff's right to a preliminary
hearing. (Id. at p.3).
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Probation requested destruction of
evidence, the request was granted on September 7, 2012 , and he needed the evidence
for postconviction relief.
(Id. at p.1 ).
At Plaintiff's final case review on April 4, 2012, he pied guilty to one count each of
unlawful sexual contact in the first degree and to sexual solicitation of a child in addition
to admitting a violation of probation.
See Paczkowski, ID Nos. 1112009385 &
9904022327 (D.I. 70) (decision denying motion for postconviction relief).
14 at 6.
See a/so 0.1.
Plaintiff alleges that the VOP was "put on the plea deal," and he was
pressured into it without having an evidentiary hearing.
(D.I. 8 at p.4).
He alleges he
was denied the right to confront his accusers as to the VOP. Plaintiff was sentenced to
30 years at Level V, suspended after serving 15 years at Level V and completing the
family problems program for a lengthy period of probation.
See Paczkowski, ID Nos.
1112009385 & 9904022327 (D.I. 70) (decision denying motion for postconviction relief).
3
Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourth , Fifth , Sixth , and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.
He seeks damages, lost wages (D.I. 4 at 1), and
release from prison (D.I. 8 at 1). He also requests counsel.
II.
(D.I. 4, 9, 11 , 12).
LEGAL STANDARDS
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and§ 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief."
Ba// v. Famiglio , 726 F.3d
448 , 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see a/so 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28
U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
defendant). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and
take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff.
Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S . 89 , 93
(2007).
Because Plaintiff proceeds prose, his pleading is liberally construed and his
complaint, "however inartfully pleaded , must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94.
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. "
Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319 , 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and
§ 1915A(b)(1 ), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional"
factual scenario.
Neitzke , 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772 , 774
(3d Cir. 1989).
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The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and§ 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when
ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
Tourscher v. McCullough , 184 F.3d 236 , 240 (3d Cir.
However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim
1999).
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S .C. §§
1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp. , 293
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
Under Rule 12(b )(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief. " Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
"Though 'detailed factual allegations' are not required , a complaint must do more than
simply provide 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action."'
Davis v. Abington Mem1 Hosp. , 765 F.3d 236 , 241 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In addition , a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to
show that a claim has substantive plausibility.
See Johnson v. City of Shelby,
_U .S._ , 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not be dismissed, however, for
imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.
See id. at 346 .
When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court should follow a three-step
process:
(1) consider the elements necessary to state a claim; (2) identify allegations
that are merely conclusions and therefore are not well-pleaded factual allegations; and
5
(3) accept any well-pleaded factual allegations as true and determine whether they
plausibly state a claim.
See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp. , 809 F.3d 780 , 787 (3d Cir.
2016); Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014).
Deciding
whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 , 679 (2009).
Ill.
DISCUSSION
A.
Habeas Corpus
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to challenge his conviction and/or sentence,
his sole federal remedy for challenging the fact or duration of his confinement is by way
of habeas corpus.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); see a/so Torrence v.
Thompson, 435 F. App'x 56 (3d Cir. 2011 ).
A plaintiff cannot recover under§ 1983 for
alleged wrongful incarceration unless he proves that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal , expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 , 487 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that where success in a §1983 action would
implicitly call into question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the plaintiff
must first achieve favorable termination of his available state or federal habeas
remedies to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.
"[A] state prisoner's
§ 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)--no matter the relief sought (damages
or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to
conviction or internal prison proceedings)--if success in that action would necessarily
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demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration."
Wilkinson v. Dotson , 544
U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005)(emphasis omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged or proven that his conviction or sentence was
reversed or invalidated as provided by Heck.
To the extent he seeks damages for his
current incarceration, his claim rests on an "inarguable legal conclusion" and is,
therefore , frivolous.
B.
Neitzke , 490 U.S. at 326.
Statute of Limitations
In addition , the Complaint is time-barred . Plaintiff's claims are raised pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For purposes of the statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims are characterized as personal injury actions and are also subject to a two-year
limitation period.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 , 275 (1983); see 10 Del. C. § 8119 ;
Johnson v. Cullen, 925 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D. Del. 1996). Section 1983 claims accrue
"when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is
based."
Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia , 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that generally must be raised
by the defendant, and it is waived if not properly raised.
See Benak ex rel. Alliance
Premier Growth Fund v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P. , 435 F .3d 396, 400 n.14 (3d Cir.
2006); Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1167 (3d Cir. 1986). Where
"the [statute of limitations] defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no
further factual record is required to be developed" to determine whether dismissal is
appropriate , sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is permissible."
Davis v.
Gauby, 408 F. App'x 524, 526 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Fogle v. Pierson , 435
F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006)).
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Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 1, 2018. 2 In the Complaint, the last act
complained of by Plaintiff occurred in April 2012 , when Plaintiff entered his guilty plea .
Hence, it is evident from the face of the Complaint that the claims are barred by the two
year limitations period , having been filed four years after its expiration . Therefore, the
Court will dismiss the Complaint as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and§ 1915A(b)(1). Amendment of the claims would be futile .
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons , the Court will : (1 ) dismiss the Complaint as legally
frivolous as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b )(1); and
(2) dismiss as moot Plaintiff's requests for counsel (D.I. 4, 9, 11 , 12). The Court finds
amendment futile.
An appropriate order will be entered .
2
The computation of time for complaints filed by pro se inmates is determined
according to the "mailbox rule." A prisoner's filing is deemed filed as of the date it is
delivered to prison officials for mailing to the Court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266
(1988); Burns v. Morton , 134 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1998); Gibbs v. Decker, 234 F.
Supp. 2d 458 , 463 (D. Del. 2002).
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint is dated March 1, 2018. Therefore, the Complaint
was delivered to prison authorities for mailing on or after March 1, 2018 , the earliest
date possible that it could have been delivered to prison officials for mailing .
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