Smith III v. Coupe et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 6/6/2018. (fms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
KENDALL MAURICE SMITH, III,
Plaintiff,

v.
ROBERT COUPE, et al.,
Defendants.

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) Civ. Action No. 18-387-GMS
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MEMORANDUM

I.

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Kendall Maurice Smith, III ("Smith"), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn

Correctional Center ("VCC") in Smyrna, Delaware, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 1 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (DJ. 3, 11.) He appears prose and was
granted permission to proceed informapauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. He has also filed
a request for counsel. (D.I. 8.)

II.

BACKGROUND
Smith alleges that he suffered for a number of years from an extreme delay and denial of

medical care. He explains that in 2013, he was seen by an optometrist who examined him.
Smith was later given a pair of prescription eyeglasses. However, the new glasses did not correct

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When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived
him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state
law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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his vision, and he was not able to see properly. Smith complained to the nurse who urged him to
wait to allow his eyes to adjust to the new eyeglasses. He waited, but his eyes did not adjust.
Smith submitted a sick call slip and was seen by a nurse in August 2014 who tested and
examined Smith. The nurse indicated that Smith should again see an optometrist so that he could
be properly prescribed a new pair of eyeglasses. Smith submitted a sick call slip on March 29,
2016, and was seen by a nurse. Smith alleges that it was not until June 14, 2016, when he was
finally seen by an optometrist and provided new eyeglasses a few weeks later.
Between August 2014 and June 2016, Smith submitted the following grievances
complaining about the optometrist/eyeglasses issues:
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Grievance 290794, submitted September 13, 2014, was investigated by Deborah Snow
("Snow") who requested an optometric evaluation for Smith. Smith did not sign off on
the grievance because his requests remained unresolved.
Grievance 321826, submitted November 2, 2015, raised the same eyeglasses and
optometrist issues. Investigator Lisa Ulsh ("Ulsh") who requested that Smith be seen for
vision testing. On December 9, 2015, the matter was heard by grievance committee
members Katrina Burley ("Burley"), Stacie Collins-Young ("Collins-Young"), Penny
Davis-Wipf ("Davis-Wipf'), and Adina Negoita ("Negoita"). The committee denied the
grievance on the grounds that Smith had not submitted a sick call slip. Plaintiff did not
appeal.
Grievance 334538, submitted April 10, 2016, complaining that Grievance 321826 was
denied in error and asking that it be granted, that he had been charged a $4.00 medical fee
and that he had yet to see an optometrist or receive newly prescribed eyeglasses. Ulsh
investigated the matter, but the grievance remained unresolved. The grievance
committee, consisting of Laura Brackett ("Brackett"), Burley, Collins-Young and DavisWipf heard the matter on May 6, 2016, but they did not grant Smith's request for an
optometric evaluation and new eyeglasses. Smith appealed. 2 Grievance 334538 was
upheld on the fee charge and denied on all other issues.

Smith alleges that the defendants former Delaware Department of Correction ("DOC")
Commissioner Robert Coupe ("Coupe"), DOC Correctional Healthcare Services Bureau Chief

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Smith was seen by an optometrist on June 14, 2016, while the matter was on appeal.
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Marc Richman ("Richman"), John/Jane Doe medical director ("Director Doe"), and John/Jane
Does Grievance Committee members and investigators are either directly or indirectly
responsible for the more than two-year delay and denial of medical treatment, and are
responsible for further damage to Smith's vision and caused mental discomfort. He seeks
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions

of28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and§ 1915A(b) if"the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball v. Famig/io, 726 F.3d 448,452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(informapauperisactions);28U.S.C. § 1915A(actionsinwhichprisoner
seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § l 997e (prisoner actions brought with
respect to prison conditions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true
and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County ofAllegheny,
515 F.3d 224,229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Smith
proceeds prose, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully
pleaded, must be ~eld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and§ 1915A(b)(l), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-

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28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and§ 1915A(b)(l) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under§ 1915(e)(2)(B)).
However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the court
must grant Smith leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.

See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A
plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See

Johnson v. City ofShelby, _U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 346,347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed,
however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at
346.
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: ( 1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must
plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly

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give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir.
2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the
facts in the complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense." Id.
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Respondeat Superior/Personal Involvement

The allegations indicate that Coupe is named as a defendant based upon his supervisory
position. There are no allegations lodged against Director Doe.
There is no respondeat superior liability under§ 1983. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d
313,330 (3d Cir. 2016). A defendant in a civil rights action "cannot be held responsible for a
constitutional violation which he [ ] neither participated in nor approved"; personal involvement
in the alleged wrong is required. Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007); see
also Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, (1981) (liability in a§ 1983 action must be based

on personal involvement, not respondeat superior). Such involvement may be "shown through
allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence." Evancho v. Fisher,
423 F.3d 347,353 (3d Cir. 2005). With regard to Coupe, a non-medical prison official must
either actually know, or have reason to believe, that prison doctors are mistreating or not treating
the prisoner to be liable for deliberate indifference. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir.
2004).

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It is clear that Smith's claim against Coupe is based on a theory of respondeat superior
which is insufficient to state a claim under§ 1983. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 325. Smith does not
allege that Coupe participated in or approved of any alleged wrongdoing, or that Coupe actually
knew, or had reason to believe, that Smith's eye care was delayed or denied by medical staff.

See Baraka, 481 F.3d at 210; Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. Finally,
dismissal of Director Doe is appropriate given that, although listed as a defendant, Smith made
no specific allegations against Director Doe. See Sims v. Piazza, 462 F. App'x 228 (3d Cir.
2012) (unpublished) (when screening complaint pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), district
court also did not err in dismissing the defendant because the plaintiff did not lodge specific
allegations against the defendant).
Therefore, the Court will dismiss Coupe and Director Doe, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and§ 1915A(b)(l), as the claims raised against them are legally frivolous.
B.

Grievance

To the extent Smith attempts to raise claims regarding the grievances he submitted, the
claims are not cognizable. Smith specifically refers to Richman as ruling on Grievance 334538.
He also mentions Burley, Collins-Young, Davis-Wipf, Negoita, and Brackett as serving on
grievance committees that denied his grievances.
The filing of prison grievances is a constitutionally protected activity. Robinson v.

Taylor, 204 F. App'x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2006) (unpublished). To the extent that Smith bases his
claims upon his dissatisfaction with the grievance procedure or denial of his grievances, the
claims fail because an inmate does not have a "free-standing constitutionally right to an effective
grievance process." Woods v. First Corr. Med, Inc., 446 F. App'x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011)

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(unpublished) (citing Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991)). Notably, the denial of
grievance appeals does not in itself give rise to a constitutional claim as Smith is free to bring a
civil rights claim in District Court. Winn v. Department of Corr., 340 F. App'x 757, 759 (3d Cir.
2009) (unpublished) (citing Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d at 729).
Smith cannot maintain a constitutional claim based upon his perception that his
grievances were not properly processed, that they were denied, or that the grievance process is
inadequate. Smith's grievance claims are frivolous. Therefore, they will be dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and§ 1915A(b)(l).

C.

Medical Needs

The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that
prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103-105 (1976). In order to set forth a cognizable claim, an inmate must allege (i) a serious
medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to
that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.
1999). A prison official is deliberately indifferent ifhe knows that a prisoner faces a substantial
risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825,837 (1994). A prison official may manifest deliberate indifference by
"intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 10405.
Liberally construing his allegations, Smith has raised what appear to be cognizable
medical needs claims against Brackett, Burley, Collins-Young, and Davis-Wipf. Although these
individuals are named as John/Jane Does (those responsible for grievance committees) in the

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case caption and list of defendants, they are specifically referred to in the body of the complaint.
The Clerk of Court will be instructed to substitute their names for the John/Jane Doe defendants.
With regard to the other individuals named in the complaint, the John/Jane Doe
investigators recommended optometric treatment for Smith, the December 2015 grievance
committee members advised Smith on the steps required to receive treatment, and Richman had
no involvement in the matter until after Smith had seen an optometrist. The allegations against
the foregoing individuals do not rise to the level of constitutional violations.
Therefore, the medical needs claims raised against the December 2015 grievance
committee members, John/Jane Does investigators, and Richman will be dismissed as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and§ 1915A(b)(l). Smith will be allowed to proceed
with the medical needs claims against Brackett, Burley, Collins-Young, and Davis-Wipf.

D.

Request for Counsel

Smith seeks counsel on the grounds that he does not have the ability to present his own
case, is unskilled in the law and the issues are complex, the case may tum on credibility
determinations, expert witnesses will be necessary, he cannot attain and afford counsel on his
own behalf, counsel would serve the best interest of justice, and his allegations if proven would
establish a constitutional violation. (D.I. 4.) A prose litigant proceeding informapauperis has
no constitutional or statutory right to representation by counsel. 3 See Brightwell v. Lehman, 63 7
F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2011); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). However,

3 See

Mallardv. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. ofIowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989)
(§ 1915(d) (now§ 1915(e)(l)) does not authorize a federal court to require an unwilling attorney
to represent an indigent civil litigant, the operative word in the statute being "request.").

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representation by counsel may be appropriate under certain circumstances, after a finding that a
plaintiffs claim has arguable merit in fact and law. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155.
After passing this threshold inquiry, the court should consider a number of factors when
assessing a request for counsel. Factors to be considered by a court in deciding whether to
request a lawyer to represent an indigent plaintiff include: (1) the merits of the plaintiff's claim;
(2) the plaintiff's ability to present his or her case considering his or her education, literacy,
experience, and the restraints placed upon him or her by incarceration; (3) the complexity of the
legal issues; (4) the degree to which factual investigation is required and the plaintiffs ability to
pursue such investigation; (5) the plaintiff's capacity to retain counsel on his or her own behalf;
and (6) the degree to which the case turns on credibility determinations or expert testimony. See

Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498-99 (3d Cir. 2002); Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-56. The
list is not exhaustive, nor is any one factor determinative. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157.
After reviewing the plaintiff's request, the court concludes that the case is not so factually
or legally complex that requesting an attorney is warranted. To date, the filings in this case
demonstrate the plaintiff's ability to articulate his claims and represent himself. In addition, the
defendants have not been served. Thus, in these circumstances, the court will deny without
prejudice to renew the plaintiff's request for counsel. (D.1. 4.) Should the need for counsel arise
later, one can be sought at that time.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will: (1) dismiss the defendants Robert Coupe, Marc

Richman, Jane/John Doe medical director, and John/Jane Does investigators, the grievance
claims, and medical needs claims raised against the December 2015 grievance committee

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members pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and§ 1915A(b)( l); (2) direct the Clerk of
Court to reflect on the Court docket that the John/Jane Does parties responsible for grievance
committees have been identified as Laura Brackett, Katrina Burley, Stacie Collins-Young, and
Penny Davis-Wipf; (3) allow Smith to proceed with the medical needs claims against Laura
Brackett, Katrina Burley, Stacie Collins-Young, and Penny Davis-Wipf; and (4) deny Smith's
request for counsel without prejudice to renew (D.I. 4).
An appropriate order will be entered .

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2018
Wilmingto1 Delaware
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