Stanford v. Akinbayo et al
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 9/20/2021. (nms)
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 1 of 41 PageID #: 754
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
SHAMAR STANFORD,
Petitioner,
Civil Action No. 18-550-RGA
V.
KOLA WOLE AKINBA YO, Warden,
and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Shamar Stevens. Pro se Petitioner.
Carolyn Shelly Hake, Deputy Attorney General of the Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.
iJ ,
September
2021
Wilmington, Delaware
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 2 of 41 PageID #: 755
;f<'
Petitioner Shamar Stanford filed an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 and four supplements/amendments to the application (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "Petition"). (D.I. 1; D.I. 3; D.I. 6; D.I 7; D.I. 13) The State filed an Answer in
opposition. (D.I. 14) For the reasons discussed, the Court will deny the Petition.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On the morning of November 19, 2015, Delaware State Police Detective Linus, who was
assigned to the FBI Safe Streets Task Force, and other officers executed a residential search
warrant at an apartment along Philadelphia Pike in Claymont. (D.I. 15-2 at 5) While waiting for
Petitioner to answer the door, officers heard noises coming from a window air conditioning unit
in the rear bedroom of the apartment. (D.I. 15-9 at 34) Prior to executing the search warrant,
officers took Petitioner, who answered the door holding his daughter in his arms, into custody
inside the apartment pursuant to a Pennsylvania fugitive warrant. (D.I. 15-2 at 5; D.I. 15-9 at 34)
During the search of Petitioner's apartment, Detective Linus found a loaded Ruger 95 9
millimeter handgun concealed in the top vent of a window air conditioning unit. (Id.)
Police also found a loaded Raven Arms MP-25 .25 caliber handgun in a purse in the master
bedroom. In the kitchen, officers discovered a green leafy substance in a clear plastic bag on top
of the refrigerator, next to a metal grinder, black scale, and clear plastic baggies; the substance
weighed .65 grams and field-tested positive for marijuana. (Id.) As a result of a computer
inquiry, officers learned that Petitioner had a prior felony conviction in January 2015 for
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. (Id.)
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 3 of 41 PageID #: 756
On the same day, police also executed a search warrant for an Infiniti FX35, which the
FBI had observed Petitioner driving on November 16, 2015 , which was parked outside the
apartment building. (Id.) During the search, police found a brown cloth bag concealed
underneath the center console and that contained a white rock substance in a clear plastic bag;
the substance weighed 17.3 grams and field-tested positive for crack cocaine. (Id. ) In the glove
box, officers found $3, 100 in twenty dollar bills, broken into three bundles. (Id. )
B. ProceduralBackground
Following a preliminary hearing on December 9, 2015, Petitioner was indicted on two
counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited ("PFBPP"), one count of endangering
the welfare of a child, and three drug offenses. (D.I. 15-1 at l); see Stanford v. State , 186 A.3d
800 (Table), 2018 WL 2230702, at *1 (Del. May 15, 2018). In January 2016, Petitioner was
appointed counsel. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry No. 3) At his final case review on May 31 , 2016, Petitioner
rejected a plea offer, and the case was set for trial on July 6, 2016. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry No. 10) At
the State' s request, the case was continued two times because more time was needed for DNA
testing to be completed. (D.I. 14 at 2-3 ) In September 2016, the Superior Court granted
appointed counsel ' s motion to withdraw, permitted Petitioner to proceed pro se, and granted
Petitioner' s request to continue the trial date until December 13, 2016 to allow him time to find
other counsel. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29) On October 6, 2016, Petitioner moved for
the appointment of new counsel. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry No. 30) The Superior Court denied the
motion. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry No. 31) Petitioner retained private counsel ("defense counsel"), who
entered an appearance on October 21 , 2016. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry No. 32)
2
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 4 of 41 PageID #: 757
On December 12, 2016, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of PFBPP and endangering
the welfare of a child, in exchange for which the State entered a nolle prosequi on the four
additional charges. (D.I. 15-6 at 18) That same day, the Superior Court sentenced Petitioner as
follows: (1) for the PFBPP conviction, to fifteen years at Level V incarceration, suspended after
five years for two years of Level III probation; and (2) for endangering the welfare of a child, to
one year at Level V incarceration suspended for one year of Level III probation. See State v.
Stanford, 2017 WL 2484588, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 7, 2017). Petitioner did not appeal his
conviction or sentences. (D.I. 15-4 at 1; D.I. 15-7 at 2)
On December 28, 2016 and January 12, 2017, Petitioner filed prose motions to modify
his sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b). (D.I. 15-1 , Entry Nos. 44, 46) In
January 2017, Petitioner filed prose motions for post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry Nos. 51 , 52) In February 2017, Petitioner
filed prose motions to "amend and appeal" the denial of a second suppression hearing and for
the transcript of the suppression hearing. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry Nos. 54, 55) On March 2, 2017, the
Superior Court denied Petitioner' s request for a second suppression hearing and his request for a
transcript. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry No. 56) On March 27, 2017, the Superior Court denied Petitioner' s
Rule 35(b) motions and his motions to withdraw his guilty plea and to "amend and appeal."
(D.I. 15-1 , Entry Nos. 59-61) Petitioner did not appeal the Superior Court's March 2 or 27
decisions.
On April 10, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended Rule 61 motion ("first Rule 61 motion")
and filed a second amended Rule 61 motion on May 17, 2017 ("supplemental Rule 61 motion").
(D.I. 15-1 , Entry Nos. 62, 65) The Superior Court denied the first Rule 61 motion on June 7,
3
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 5 of 41 PageID #: 758
2017. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry No. 67) Petitioner appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court
remanded the case back to the Superior Court to consider the claims in the supplemental Rule 61
motion. See Stanford v. State, 2017 WL 3165454 (Del. July 25 , 2017). On remand, the Superior
Court denied Petitioner's supplemental Rule 61 motion. See Stanford v. State , 2017 WL
3706959 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2017). On May 15, 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the Superior Court's denial of both the first and supplemental Rule 61 motions. See
Stanford v. State , 2018 WL 2230702, at * 1.
On July 12, 2018, Petitioner filed another pro se motion for transcripts of the suppression
hearing and sentencing, which the Superior Court denied. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry Nos. 76, 77)
Petitioner did not appeal that decision.
On July 26, 2018, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to amend his July 12, 2018 request for
transcripts. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry No. 78) On October 1, 2018, Petitioner filed a second Rule 61
motion, along with motions to appoint counsel and for transcripts. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry Nos. 79, 82,
83)
On December 21, 2018, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus in the
Delaware Supreme Court, seeking to compel the Superior Court to provide free transcripts of the
suppression and preliminary hearing, and his sentencing, which that court denied. See In re
Matter ofStanford, 204 A.3d 828 (Table), 2019 WL 494456, at *1-2 (Del. Feb. 7, 2019). In
March 2019, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to compel the State or defense counsel to produce
materials related to his case. (D.I. 15-1, Entry No. 87)
On March 8, 2018, a Superior Court Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation
that Petitioner' s second Rule 61 motion should be summarily dismissed as barred under Rules
4
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 6 of 41 PageID #: 759
61 (i)( 1)-(4) and that his motions to appoint counsel, to compel, and for transcripts at the State' s
expense should be denied See State v. Stanford, 2019 WL 1110902, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar.
8, 2019). Petitioner appealed the Commissioner's Order to the Delaware Supreme Court, which
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Stanfordv. State, 210 A.3d 144 (Table), 2019
WL 1762693 (Del. Apr. 18, 2019) Petitioner then appealed the Commissioner' s Order in the
Superior Court. (D.I. 15-1 , Entry No. 90) On June 5, 2019, the Superior Court adopted the
Commissioner' s Report and Recommendation and denied the Rule 61 motion. (D.I. 15-11 at 4049) The Superior Court also denied Petitioner' s motion to amend his request for transcripts,
interpreting that request as a motion for reargument of the Court' s July 2018 order. (Id. at 8-9)
The Superior Court also denied Petitioner' s motion to amend, motion to compel, and motion to
appoint counsel. (Id. at 9-10) The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court' s June
5, 2019 decision. See Stanford v. State, 222 A.3d 1044 (Table), 2019 WL 6048918 (Del. Nov.
14, 2019).
II.
GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
Absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the
petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b);
O 'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-44 (1999); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275
(1971 ). The AEDPA states, in pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State; or
5
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 7 of 41 PageID #: 760
(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the applicant.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l).
The exhaustion requirement is based on principles of comity, requiring a petitioner to
give "state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one
complete round of the State' s established appellate review process." O 'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at
844-45; see Werts v. Vaughn , 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A petitioner satisfies the
exhaustion requirement by demonstrating that the habeas claims were "fairly presented" to the
state' s highest court, either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding, in a procedural
manner permitting the court to consider the claims on their merits. Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447,
451 n.3 (2005); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). A federal legal claim is "fairly
presented" to state courts when there is: " (1) reliance on pertinent federal cases employing
constitutional analysis; (2) reliance on state cases employing constitutional analysis in like fact
situations; (3) assertion of the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right
protected by the Constitution; [or] (4) allegation of a pattern of facts that is well within the
mainstream of constitutional litigation." McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255,261 (3d Cir.
1999).
A petitioner' s failure to exhaust state remedies will be excused if state procedural rules
preclude him from seeking further relief in state courts. See Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160
(3d Cir. 2000); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). Although treated as technically
exhausted, such claims are nonetheless procedurally defaulted. See Lines, 208 F.3d at 160;
Colemanv. Thompson,501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991). Similarly,ifapetitionerpresentsahabeas
6
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 8 of 41 PageID #: 761
claim to the state' s highest court, but that court "clearly and expressly" refuses to review the
merits of the claim due to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, the claim is
exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.
255, 260-64 (1989).
Federal courts may not consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless the
petitioner demonstrates either cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting
therefrom, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the court does not review the
claims. See McCandless, 172 F.3d at 260; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. To demonstrate cause
for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the
defense impeded counsel' s efforts to comply with the State' s procedural rule." Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To demonstrate actual prejudice, a petitioner must show
"that [the errors at trial] worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire
trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Id. at 494.
Alternatively, a federal court may excuse a procedural default if the petitioner
demonstrates that failure to review the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 224 (3d
Cir. 2001). A petitioner demonstrates a miscarriage of justice by showing a "constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray, 477
U.S. at 496. Actual innocence means factual innocence, not legal insufficiency. See Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). In order to establish actual innocence, the petitioner
must present new reliable evidence - not presented at trial - that demonstrates "it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
7
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 9 of 41 PageID #: 762
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537-38 (2006); see Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 522-24 (3d
Cir. 2002).
B. Standard of Review
If a state ' s highest court adjudicated a federal habeas claim on the merits, the federal
court must review the claim under the deferential standard contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas relief may only be granted if the state court's
decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or the state court's decision was
an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence adduced in the trial. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(l) & (2); see also Williams v. Tay lor, 529 U.S. 362,412 (2000); Appel v. Horn , 250
F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2001). A claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" for the purposes of
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) if the state court decision finally resolves the claim on the basis of its
substance, rather than on a procedural or some other ground. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105,
115 (3d Cir. 2009). The deferential standard of§ 2254(d) applies even "when a state court' s
order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied."
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). As explained by the Supreme Court, "it may be
presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication
or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Id. at 99.
Finally, when reviewing a habeas claim, a federal court must presume that the state
court's determinations of factual issues are correct. See 28 U.S .C. § 2254(e)(l). This
presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact, and is only
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(l);
8
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 10 of 41 PageID #: 763
Campbell v. Vaughn , 209 F.3d 280,286 (3d Cir. 2000); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341
(2003) (stating that the clear and convincing standard in§ 2254(e)(l) applies to "factual issues,"
whereas the unreasonable application standard of§ 2254(d)(2) applies to "decisions").
III.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner asserts the following nineteen claims for relief: (1) he was deprived of his
Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel (D.I 1 at 5; D.I. 3 at 5; D.I. 6 at 7) ("Claim One
(A)"); (2) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him of the
advantages and disadvantages of the plea agreement, appeal rights, and appeal waiver ("Claim
One (B)") (D.I. 1 at 5; D.I. 1-1 at 1; D.I. 3 at 5); (3) his guilty plea was involuntary because he
was not provided competent legal advice and did not understand he was waiving his right to
appeal by pleading guilty ("Claim Two") (D.I. 1 at 7; D.I. 1-1 at 1; D.I. 3 at 7; D.I. 7 at 1); (4)
the police search of his apartment violated Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights because they
lacked probable cause to do a "protective sweep" ("Claim Three") (D.I. 1 at 8; D.I. 1-1 at 23 ;
D.I. 3 at 8; D.I. 6 at 2-4); (5) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by not filing a
direct appeal and an appeal from the suppression hearing ("Claim Four") (D.I. 1 at 10; D.I. 1-1 at
1; D.I. 3 at 10; D.I. 6 at 4; D.I. 6 at 5); (6) Detective Linus committed perjury during the
suppression hearing ("Claim Five") (D.I. 1 at 16; D.I. 1-1 at 2; D.I. 3 at 16); (7) defense counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to uncover relevant evidence at the "evidentiary
[suppression] hearing" ("Claim Six") (D.I. 1-1 at 2); (8) defense counsel and the attorney who
represented Petitioner at the preliminary hearing provided ineffective assistance by failing to
cross examine Detective Linus when he committed perjury ("Claim Seven") (D.I. 1-1 at 2; D.I. 6
at 1); (9) "Moorish Americans" are not governed under the same laws as blacks and other slaves
9
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 11 of 41 PageID #: 764
and courts lack jurisdiction to convict Petitioner ("Claim Eight") (D.I. 1-2); (10) the Superior
Court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner' s suppression motion because of bias ("Claim
Nine (A), (B)") 1 (D.I. 6 at 1; D.I. 13 at 7); (11 ) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance
by failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct ("Claim Ten") (D.I. 6 at 5); (12) defense counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to advocate for a reasonable continuance and insisting
that Petitioner accept the plea ("Claim Eleven") (D.I. 6 at 5); (13 ) defense counsel provided
ineffective assistance by not advising Petitioner that he may have a particular defense available if
he proceeded to trial ("Claim Twelve") (D.I. 6 at 5); (14) defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a motion to dismiss ("Claim Thirteen") (D.I. 6 at 5); (15) the Superior Court' s
participation in the plea negotiations amounted to judicial misconduct ("Claim Fourteen") (D.I. 6
at 6); (16) the Superior Court engaged in judicial misconduct by conducting an improper plea
colloquy ("Claim Fifteen") (D.I. 6 at 6); (17) Petitioner was constructively denied counsel at his
plea hearing ("Claim Sixteen") (D.I. 6 at 6); (18) the Delaware Supreme Court violated
Petitioner' s due process rights by dismissing his untimely appeal ("Claim Seventeen") (D.I. 6 at
7); (19) the Superior Court violated Petitioner' s due process right to trial transcripts on appeal
("Claim Eighteen") (D.I. 6 at 8); and (20) Petitioner' s plea agreement was involuntary because
he entered into it under duress ("Claim Nineteen"). (D.I. 7 at 1).
1
The Court liberally construes Claim Nine as alleging two different-but-related arguments: (1)
the Superior Court violated Petitioner' s Fourth Amendment rights by denying his suppression
motion (Claim Nine (A)); and (2) the Superior Court engaged in judicial misconduct and violated
his due process rights by denying his suppression motion due to bias (Claim Nine (B)). The
Court analyzes these two variations separately.
10
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 12 of 41 PageID #: 765
A. Claims Eight and Eighteen: Not Cognizable
In Claim Eight, Petitioner contends that the Delaware state courts did not have
jurisdiction to convict him because he is a "Moorish American." (D.I. 1-2) This argument has
no basis in law or fact. Petitioner is subject to the laws of the jurisdiction in which he resides,
regardless of his nationality or religion. See e.g. , Jones-Bey v. Alabama, 2014 WL 1233826, at
*3 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2014) ("There is no basis in the law for such a claim" that the State of
Alabama did not have jurisdiction to prosecute and imprison petitioner based on his ancestry as a
"Moorish American."); Bey v. Bailey, 2010 WL 1531172, at *4 (S .D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2010) ("the
suggestion that Petitioner is entitled to ignore the laws of the State of New York by claiming
membership in the Moorish-American nation is without merit and cannot be the basis for habeas
relief."); Osiris v. Brown, 2005 WL 2044904, at *2-3 (D. N.J. Aug. 24, 2005); see also Byrd v.
Blackman, 2006 WL 2924446, at *l n.l (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2006) (explaining the background of
the Moorish beliefs). Therefore, Petitioner' s status as a "Moorish American" does not provide a
viable challenge to his convictions.
In Claim Eighteen, Petitioner contends that the Superior Court violated his due process
rights when it denied his July 2018 motion for transcripts of the December 2016 suppression
hearing and sentencing. According to Petitioner, he needed the transcripts in order to draft the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims he wanted to raise in his state post-conviction
proceedings.
The argument in Claim Eighteen alleges a state law error that is not cognizable on federal
habeas review, because Petitioner's ultimate criticism is with the Superior Court's action in a
state collateral proceeding. See Hassine v. Zimmerman , 160 F.3d 941 , 954 (3d Cir. 1998)
11
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 13 of 41 PageID #: 766
("[The] federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what
occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioner's conviction; what
occurred in the petitioner's collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas proceeding."); see
also Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210,247 (3d Cir. 2004) ("alleged errors in (state] collateral
proceedings ... are not a proper basis for habeas relief'). Accordingly, the Court will deny Claim
Eighteen for failing to assert a proper basis for federal habeas relief.
B. Claims Three and Nine (A): Fourth Amendment Violations
Claims Three and Nine (A) allege that Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by the police search of his apartment and the Superior Court' s denial of his suppression
motion. For the following reasons, the Court concurs with the State that Claims Three and Nine
do not warrant federal habeas relief.
Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review if the petitioner
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the state court. See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 494 (1976); see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,293 (1992). A petitioner is
considered to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate such claims if the state has an
available mechanism for suppressing evidence seized in or tainted by an illegal search or seizure,
irrespective of whether the petitioner actually availed himself of that mechanism. See US. ex
rel. Hickey v. Jeffes, 571 F.2d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1978); Boydv. Mintz, 631 F.2d 247,250 (3d Cir.
1980). Conversely, a petitioner has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth
Amendment claim, and therefore avoids the Stone bar, if the state system contains a structural
defect that prevented the state court from fully and fairly hearing the petitioner's Fourth
Amendment argument. See Marshall v. Hendricks , 307 F.3d 36, 82 (3d Cir. 2002). Notably, "an
12
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 14 of 41 PageID #: 767
erroneous or summary resolution by a state court of a Fourth Amendment claim does not
overcome the [Stone] bar." Id.
In this case, Petitioner filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the
search of his apartment pursuant to Rule 41 of the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The Superior Court denied the suppression motion after conducting a hearing, and he
did not appeal that decision. See Stanford, 2017 WL 2484588, at *5 n.43.
This record demonstrates that Petitioner was afforded a full and fair opportunity in the
Delaware state courts to litigate his Fourth Amendment argument. The fact that Petitioner
disagrees with the state court decisions and the reasoning utilized by the state courts is
insufficient to overcome the Stone bar. Therefore, the Court will deny Claims Three and Nine
(A) as barred by Stone.
C. Procedurally Barred Claims
1. Claim One (A)
In Claim One (A), Petitioner contends that state action deprived him of his Sixth
Amendment right to choose counsel because the State opposed, and the Superior Court denied,
his request for a continuance on the day before trial to allow him to find different counsel.
Petitioner wanted a different attorney to represent him because he believed his first counsel had
been ineffective during his suppression hearing.
The record reveals that Petitioner did not exhaust state remedies for Claim One (A)
because he did not fairly present the issue contained therein to the Delaware Supreme Court on
direct appeal 2 or on post-conviction appeal. At this juncture, any attempt by Petitioner to present
To the extent Petitioner may have raised Claim One (A) in the prose notice of appeal he
allegedly mailed to the Delaware Supreme Court in December 2016, that action on his part did
13
2
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 15 of 41 PageID #: 768
Claim One (A) in a new Rule 61 motion would dismissed as time-barred under Rule 6l(i)(l),
and as procedurally defaulted under Rule 61 (i)(3) for failing to raise it in the proceeding leading
to his conviction. See DeAngelo v. Johnson , 2014 WL 4079357, at* 12 (D. Del. Aug. 15, 2014)
(Rule 61(i)(l)); Gattis v. Snyder, 46 F. Supp. 2d 344,367 (D. Del. 1999) (Rule 61(i)(3)).
Although Rule 61 (i)(l) provides for an exception to the one-year time limitation if the untimely
Rule 61 motion "asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the
judgment of conviction is final," no such right is implicated in the instant Claim. Similarly, the
exceptions to the bars in Rule 61(i)(l) and (3) contained in Rule 61(i)(5) and (d)(2) do not apply
to Petitioner' s case, because he does not allege actual innocence, lack of jurisdiction, or that a
new rule of constitutional law applies to the instant arguments. Given these circumstances, the
Court must treat Claim One (A) as exhausted but procedurally defaulted, meaning that the Court
cannot review the merits of the Claim absent a showing of cause-and-prejudice or a miscarriage
of justice.
To the extent Petitioner attempts to establish cause by blaming defense counsel for failing
to file a direct appeal and/or advise him about his appeal rights, the attempt is unavailing. The
plea transcript contains Petitioner's statements that he desired to go forward with the plea and
that trial counsel "fully advised" him of his rights. (D.I. 15-11 at 62) During his plea colloquy,
Petitioner stated that he understood he was waiving his right to an appeal by pleading guilty, he
had an opportunity to discuss the matter with trial counsel, and he was satisfied with trial
counsel' s representation. (Id. at 74-75) Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
not exhaust state remedies because the Delaware Supreme Court did not receive the notice of
appeal within the thirty-day appeal period. (See D.I. 15-10 at 34)
14
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 16 of 41 PageID #: 769
(none of which is presented here), Petitioner is bound by the representations he made in the plea
agreement and the truth-in-sentencing guilty plea form, and during the plea colloquy. See
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 , 73 (1977); Thomas v. Snyder, 2001 WL 1297812, at *3 (D.
Del. Oct. 3, 2001) (holding that statements made under oath in open court carry a strong
presumption of verity on federal habeas review). Moreover, by pleading guilty, Petitioner
waived any claim of constitutional error related to government conduct in his case prior to the
entry of the plea See Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018) (concluding that "[a]
valid guilty plea . . . renders irrelevant - and thereby prevents the defendant from appealing - the
constitutionality of case-related government conduct that takes place before the plea is entered").
To the extent Petitioner attempts to establish cause under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1,
16-17 (2012) because the Superior Court did not appoint counsel to represent him in his Rule 61
proceeding, the attempt fails. In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that inadequate assistance or
the absence of counsel during an initial-review state collateral proceeding may (under certain
circumstances) establish cause for a petitioner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 12, 16-17. Since Martinez can only apply to excuse the default
of claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it does not provide a method of
establishing cause for the freestanding claim for relief asserted in Claim One (A).
The absence of cause obviates the Court's need to address the issue of prejudice.
Nevertheless, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice from his default. The Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee a defendant the unqualified right to the services of a particular
lawyer. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1980) ("[W]hile the right to select and
be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the
15
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 17 of 41 PageID #: 770
essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal
defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer
whom he prefers."). At most, the Constitution prohibits only arbitrary or unreasonable
interference with a defendant's selection of counsel. See generally Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S.
575, 589 (1964) ("The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial
judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the
party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel."); see also United States
v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489-92 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Once a fair and reasonable initial opportunity
to retain counsel has been provided, and adequate counsel obtained, the court, mindful of the
accused's interest in having counsel in whom he has confidence, is free to deny a continuance to
obtain additional counsel if, upon evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, it reasonably
concludes that the delay would be unreasonable in the context of the particular case."). Although
the right to counsel is absolute, there is no absolute right to a particular attorney. See US. ex rel
Carey v.Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3d Cir. 1969).
In tum, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, "a trial [court has] wide
latitude in balancing [a defendant' s] right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and
against the demands of its calendar." United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152
(2006). "[W]hen a defendant requests substitution of counsel on the eve of trial," or raises
concerns about counsel's representation, the court has the "'duty to inquire into the basis for the
client's objection to counsel. "' McMahon v. Fu/comer, 821 F.2d 934,942 (3d Cir.1987).
16
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 18 of 41 PageID #: 771
The following factual summary and review of the plea colloquy transcript demonstrates
that the Superior Court satisfied its duty of inquiry and then properly concluded that Petitioner
was knowingly and voluntarily proceeding with defense counsel to enter a guilty plea.
Initially, [Petitioner] was appointed counsel following his
indictment in January 2016. On May 31, 2016, [Petitioner]
rejected a plea agreement at his final case review and the
matter was set for trial on July 6, 2016. However, on June
6, 2016, [Petitioner] filed a pro se "Motion to Dismiss
Current Counsel and/or Appoint New Counsel."
Simultaneously, [Petitioner] filed a pro se Motion to
Suppress. [The Superior] Court then granted the State's
continuance request on two occasions for more time to
obtain DNA laboratory results from the FBI. Meanwhile,
[Petitioner' s] then-counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel stating that he and [Petitioner] disagreed on whether
there existed a good faith basis to file a suppression motion
in this matter. The Motion to Withdraw as Counsel was
granted on September 28, 2016. [Petitioner's] request for
new appointed counsel was denied.
On October 21 , 2016, while trial was fast approaching,
[Petitioner' s] new counsel entered his appearance. He filed
a Motion to Suppress on behalf of Defendant on November
14, 2016 and a suppression hearing was held on December
2, 2016. The Court heard testimony from the arresting
officers and argument fro~ both the State and defense
counsel. The Motion was denied on the record.
Stanford, 2017 WL 2484588, at *5 n. 43.
The day before Petitioner' s trial was to begin, Petitioner and defense counsel appeared
before the Superior Court to enter a guilty plea. (D.I. 15-11 at 51-54) During the colloquy,
Petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with defense counsel' s performance at the suppression
hearing, and requested a continuance. (Id. at 51) The State opposed the continuance, explained
the procedural history of the case, and asserted, "[T]he State would argue [Petitioner] has three
options. He can take the plea today, he can go to trial today with [defense counsel], or he can go
17
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 19 of 41 PageID #: 772
to trial tomorrow prose. The State is ready to go. Although there are no civilian witnesses,
there are out-of-state witnesses, again, because this was done through the FBI." (Id. at 55)
The Superior Court agreed with the State that Petitioner had three options, "especially
because [the prior judge] previously approved [Petitioner' s] application to go prose." (Id. at 57)
The Superior Court continued to explain:
So when you decided to go pro se or when you asked the [prior
judge] if you could represent yourself, at that time, you were
represented by someone from the Public Defender' s Office? Okay.
So, you had appointed counsel and you didn't like - you didn't like
him, her, and therefore, the [prior judge] allowed you to proceed pro
se. All right? So, you had that request granted. And, now, when
you were going prose, you needed a continuance so you could hire
private counsel. You were able to hire private counsel and the [prior
judge] then gave you time, right, to continue your case so that you
could get yourself established with your private attorney. And
you've had an opportunity to do that. And at the suppression
hearing, there was, I guess, sufficient information presented where
the State was successful in being able to move forward in the way
that they wished to proceed with this case.
(Jd. at 56-57) Petitioner was provided time to confer with defense counsel, after which he
decided to resolve his case through a plea agreement. (Id. at 59)
This record demonstrates that Petitioner was afforded due process. The Superior Court
conducted a thorough inquiry into Petitioner' s reasons for a continuance request, and provided an
accurate description of Petitioner' s options. Moreover, when viewed in context with
Petitioner's prior continuance request, prior change of counsel, and the late timing of the
continuance request at issue on the eve of trial, the Superior Court did not err by denying
Petitioner' s motion for a continuance. See Fischetti v. Johnson , 384 F.3d 140, 145-46 (3d Cir.
2004) (although finding error in the state court requiring habeas petitioner to proceed pro se at
trial, noting that "[a] defendant' s right to counsel is not without limit and cannot be the
18
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 20 of 41 PageID #: 773
justification for inordinate delay or manipulation of the appointment system," and that "the need
for an orderly and expeditious trial may require that a defendant proceed with counsel not of his
preference"). In short, Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty with
defense counsel's assistance, after having been given the choice of proceeding to trial (either pro
se or with counsel) or accepting the State' s plea offer, and time to consider these options. (D.I.
15-11 at 9-27)
Finally, given Petitioner's failure to provide new reliable evidence of his actual
innocence, Petitioner's procedural default cannot be excused under AEDP A's miscarriage of
justice exception. Accordingly, the Court will deny Claim One (A) as procedurally barred from
federal habeas review.
2. Claims One (B), Two, Four, Six, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen
Claims One (B), Two, Four, Six, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen assert various
instances of defense counsel's ineffective assistance. The record reveals that Petitioner
presented all eight Claims to the Superior Court in his first Rule 61 motion and supplemental
Rule 61 motion. The Superior Court denied all eight Claims, but Petitioner only appealed the
denial of Claim Eleven See Sanford, 2019 WL 1110902, at *3-4 (describing the claims raised in
Petitioner's first Rule 61 proceeding).
In these circumstances, Claims One (B), Two, Four, Six, Ten, Twelve, and Thirteen are
unexhausted because Petitioner did not present them to the Delaware Supreme Court on postconviction appeal. At this juncture, any attempt by Petitioner to present Claims One (B), Two,
Four, Six, Ten, Twelve, and Thirteen in a new Rule 61 motion would be time-barred under Rule
61(i)(l). See DeAngelo v. Johnson , 2014 WL 4079357, at *12 (D. Del. Aug. 15, 2014).
19
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 21 of 41 PageID #: 774
Although Rule 61(i)(l) provides for an exception to the one-year time limitation if the untimely
Rule 61 motion "asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the
judgment of conviction is final," no such right is implicated in the instant Claims Similarly, the
exceptions to Rule 61(i)(l)'s time-bar contained in Rule 61(i)(5) and (d)(2) do not apply to
Petitioner' s case, because he does not allege actual innocence, lack of jurisdiction, or that a new
rule of constitutional law applies to the instant arguments. Given these circumstances, the Court
must treat Claims One (B), Two, Four, Six, Ten, Twelve, and Thirteen as exhausted but
procedurally defaulted, meaning that the Court cannot review the merits of the Claims absent a
showing of cause-and-prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.
As for Claim Eleven, even though Petitioner presented this Claim to the Delaware
Supreme Court on post-conviction appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior
Court's denial of Claim Eleven as time-barred under Rule 61 (i)( 1), successive under Rule
61(i)(2), and procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3). See Stanford, 2018 WL 2230702, at *1.
By applying the procedural bars of Rule 6l(i)(l), (2), and (3), the Delaware Supreme Court
articulated a "plain statement" under Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263-64 (1984) that its
decision rested on state law grounds. In turn, this Court has consistently held that Rule 6l(i)(l)
and (3) are independent and adequate state procedural rules. See Simmers v. Akinbayo, 2021 WL
1092577, at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 22, 2021) (Rule 6l(i)(3); Trice v. Pierce, 2016 WL 2771123, at *4
(D. Del. May 13, 2016). Therefore, the Court also cannot review the merits of Claim Eleven
absent a showing of cause for the default, and prejudice resulting therefrom, or that a miscarriage
of justice will occur if the claim is not reviewed
20
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 22 of 41 PageID #: 775
Petitioner has not asserted any cause for his default of the instant eight Claims. To the
extent the Court should liberally construe Petitioner' s contentions as an attempt to rely on
Martinez v. Ryan to excuse his _ efault, his reliance is misplaced. Pursuant to Martinez, a
d
petitioner demonstrates that a state court's failure to appoint counsel to represent him in an initial
collateral proceeding should excuse his default by establishing that the underlying ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims are substantial or, in other words, have "some merit."
Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14. "To demonstrate that his claim has some merit, a petitioner must show
that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should
have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further." Workman v. Sup't Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928, 938 (3d Cir.
2019) (cleaned up).
Here, Petitioner's eight Claims alleging that defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance are not "substantial" under Martinez because they are conclusory and belied by the
record. For instance, Petitioner affirmed during the plea colloquy that defense counsel advised
him about the plea, that he was satisfied with defense counsel's representation and advice, and
that defense counsel was not forcing him to enter the plea. (D.I. 15-11 at 67, 74-76) Petitioner
also voluntarily corrected his response on the truth-in-sentencing form to indicate his satisfaction
with defense counsel's representation and that defense counsel had fully advised him of his
rights. (D.I. 15-11 at 66-67; D.I. 15-13) Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
(none of which is presented here), Petitioner is bound by the representations he made during the
plea colloquy and on the truth-in-sentencing form. See Blackledge, 431 U.S . at 73; Hammons v.
State, 884 A.2d 511 (Table), 2005 WL 2414271 , at* 1 (Del. Sept. 28, 2006). Further,
21
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 23 of 41 PageID #: 776
Petitioner' s knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel involving counsel' s performance prior to the entry of the guilty plea that do not
challenge the voluntariness of his plea. See Winchester v. Aldnbayo, 2020 WL 3269050, at *6
(D. Del. June 17, 2020).
Moreover, Petitioner has failed to establish prejudice from any alleged error of counsel in
view of the substantial benefits he derived by pleading guilty. Petitioner was originally charged
with two counts of PFBPP, endangering the welfare of a child, and three drug offenses. Because
he had one prior violent felony conviction within the previous ten years, Petitioner faced
between seven and approximately forty-nine years of Level V incarceration ifhe was convicted
of all charges. (See D.I. 15-17) Defense counsel, however, successfully negotiated a plea
agreement whereby Petitioner pled guilty to one count of PFBPP and endangering the welfare of
a child, which reduced Petitioner' s potential imprisonment to a minimum of five years and a
maximum of sixteen years. In short, none of Petitioner' s assertions regarding counsel's
performance establish that he would have proceeded to trial and that he would have accepted the
risk ofup to about forty-nine years of imprisonment.
The miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default doctrine is also
inapplicable to excuse his default, because Petitioner has not provided any new reliable evidence
of his actual innocence. Accordingly, the Court will deny Claims One (B), Two, Four, Six, Ten,
Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen as procedurally barred.
3.
Claim Five
In Claim Five, Petitioner contends that Detective Linus committed perjury in the affidavit
of probable cause and while testifying during the suppression hearing. Petitioner presented this
22
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 24 of 41 PageID #: 777
argument in his second amendment to his first Rule 61 motion, and the Superior Court denied the
argument under Rule 61(i)(3) as procedurally defaulted. (D.I. 15-16); see Stanford, 2017 WL
3706959, at *4. The Superior Court held that Petitioner "waived his right to challenge the
accuracy of the police's account of the charges when he entered his guilty plea and forwent
trial." Id. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. See Stanford,
2018 WL 2230702, at *1.
Petitioner also raised his argument concerning Detective Linus's alleged perjury in his
second Rule 61 motion. (D.I. 15-11 at 24-39) The Superior Court Commissioner recommended
denying the second Rule 61 motion as untimely under Rule 61(i)(l), as successive under Rule
61(i)(2), and as formerly adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(4). See Stanford, 2019 WL 1110902, at
*4. The Superior Court adopted that recommendation and summarily dismissed the second Rule
61 motion, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision. (D.I. 15-11 at 40-49); see
Stanford, 2019 WL 6048918, at *1.
Claim Five is procedurally defaulted as a result of the Delaware Supreme Court's
separate denials of Claim Five as barred by the independent and adequate state Rules 61 (i)( 1)
and (3). Petitioner has not alleged any cause for his default of Claim Five, and the Martinez rule
cannot be used to establish cause for the freestanding constitutional violation asserted in Claim
Five. Given Petitioner' s failure to demonstrate cause, the Court will not address the issue of
prejudice. In addition, Petitioner's failure to provide new reliable evidence of his actual
innocence precludes the Court from reaching the merits of the Claim to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. Accordingly, the Court will deny Claim Five as procedurally barred.
23
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 25 of 41 PageID #: 778
4.
Claims Nine (B), Fourteen, and Fifteen
In Claims Nine (B), Fourteen, and Fifteen, Petitioner contends that the Superior Court
engaged in the following judicial misconduct: (1) denied his suppression motion due to bias
which, in turn, violated his due process rights; (2) participated in the plea negotiations; and (3)
failed to conduct a proper plea colloquy. Petitioner presented these three Claims in his second
Rule 61 motion, and the Superior Court denied the Claims as untimely under Rule 61 (i)(l ),
successive under Rule 61(i)(2), and defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3) because Petitioner did not raise
the claims during his criminal proceeding. See Stanford, 2019 WL 110902, at *4-5. The
Supreme Court affirmed that decision. See Stanford, 2019 WL 6048918, at * 1. Given the
Delaware state courts' application of the independent and adequate state Rules 61 (i)( l) and (3),
Claims Nine (B), Fourteen, and Fifteen are procedurally defaulted.
Once again, Petitioner has not asserted any cause for his default, and Martinez cannot be
relied on to establish cause for these three freestanding constitutional arguments. Although the
Court does not need to address the issue of prejudice, the Court nevertheless concludes that
Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice for the reasons set forth below.
a. Judicial bias
It is well-settled that the Due Process Clause requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal, before a
judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of a particular case.
See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997). Significantly, there is a presumption that
judges as public officials properly discharge their official duties, and a habeas petitioner must
rebut this presumption by showing actual bias. Id. at 909. A petitioner demonstrates actual bias
by showing that he was treated "unfairly" by the trial judge, and ''there must be an extremely
24
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 26 of 41 PageID #: 779
high level of interference by the trial judge which creates a pervasive climate of partiality and
unfairness." Marshall v. Hendricks, 103 F. Supp. 2d 749, 799 (D.N.J. 2000), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 207 F.3d 36 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that
there are some instances where a judge's implied bias creates such a high probability of actual
bias that it violates the Constitution. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 46 (1975). "Among
these cases are those in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in
which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him." Id. at 47.
Implied judicial bias may be found if the judge had significant prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions in the same case. See In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 134-36 (1955). The Supreme
Court has indicated that the proper "generalized" inquiry into implied judicial bias is "whether
sitting on the case . . . would offer a possible temptation to the average . .. judge to .. .lead him
not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true." Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co ., 556 U.S. 868,
883 (2009).
Here, Petitioner has failed to provide any facts to support his speculative assertion that
the denial of his suppression motion was due to the trial judge' s bias. "The fact that the judge
ruled adversely to the defense on various motions or objections does not establish any bias,
regardless of the correctness of the decision." Pitts v. Redman, 776 F. Supp. 907, 927 (D. Del.
1991). Notably, nothing in the record even remotely suggests that the trial judge harbored any
personal or implied bias against Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that he will
suffer prejudice from the default of this conclusory and unsupported allegation of judicial
bias/due process violation in Claim Nine (B).
25
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 27 of 41 PageID #: 780
b. Judicial participation in plea negotiations
The record belies Petitioner' s allegation that the trial judge participated in the plea
negotiations. (D.I. 15-11 at 50-81) As previously explained, during the beginning of the plea
colloquy on December 12, 2016, Petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with defense counsel's
performance during the suppression hearing and requested a continuance. Petitioner had also
expressed his dissatisfaction by writing on the truth-in-sentencing form that he was not satisfied
with defense counsel's representation of him. (Id. at 60-61; D.I. 15-13) After the continuance
issue was resolved, the judge informed Petitioner that she could not accept the plea based on his
written statements on the truth-in-sentencing form that he was not satisfied with his attorney and
that he was going to trial. (D.I. 15-11 at 61-62) Petitioner responded that he did not want to
proceed to trial. (Id. at 62-63) The judge asked Petitioner whether he wanted to accept the plea
offer, and he replied, "yes." (Id. at 63) The judge proceeded to tell Petitioner that he could enter
his plea pro se to avoid answering questions about his counsel's representation. (Id. at 63-64)
Petitioner answered that he was "ready to go forward with this plea," with the assistance of
defense counsel, and voluntarily corrected his response on the truth-in-sentencing form. (Id. at
64-65, 67) This record shows that the judge did not participate in plea negotiations by providing
Petitioner with the opportunity to go to trial, or accept the plea with or without the assistance of
counsel. Therefore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by his default of Claim Fourteen.
c. Improper plea colloquy
Petitioner contends that the Superior Court's plea colloquy was improper because the
judge failed to inquire about the attorney-client relationship. Once again, the record belies
Petitioner's assertion. The plea colloquy transcript reveals that the Superior Court conducted a
26
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 28 of 41 PageID #: 781
careful and thorough inquiry. (D.I. 15-11 at 50-81) After he initially voiced his displeasure with
defense counsel to the Superior Court, Petitioner voluntarily corrected his initial answer on the
truth-in sentencing form to reflect that: (1) he was, in fact, satisfied with his counsel' s
representation; and (2) his counsel had fully advised him of his rights. (Id. at 65-67) The
Superior Court then questioned Petitioner as to whether he was now voluntarily answering yes to
that question, and Petitioner responded affirmatively. (Id. at 66-67) Defense counsel informed
the Superior Court that he had reviewed the guilty plea form with Petitioner, advised Petitioner
of all of his constitutional and trial rights that he was forfeiting by entering into the plea, and
answered any questions Petitioner had. (Id. at 70-71). Defense counsel also told the Superior
Court that he believed that Petitioner was answering the questions on the revised truth-insentencing form truthfully and that Petitioner was entering the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. (Id.) During the subsequent plea colloquy, Petitioner confirmed that defense
counsel's statements were correct. (Id. at 71) Petitioner also told the Superior Court, among
other things, that no one was forcing or threatening him to plead guilty and that he had an
opportunity to discuss the matter fully with his counsel and that he was satisfied with defense
counsel ' s representation. (Id. at 74-75) To summarize, the transcript of the plea colloquy reflects
that the Superior Court judge properly accepted Petitioner' s guilty plea as knowing and
voluntary. Therefore, Petitioner cannot establish that he will suffer prejudice as a result of his
default of Claim Fifteen.
In addition to not demonstrating cause and prejudice, Petitioner' s failure to provide new
reliable evidence of his actual innocence precludes the Court from reaching the merits of the
27
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 29 of 41 PageID #: 782
three Claims to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court will deny Claims Nine
(B), Fourteen, and Fifteen as procedurally barred.
5.
Claim Sixteen: Constructive Denial of Counsel
In Claim Sixteen, Petitioner contends that he was constructively denied his right to the
assistance of counsel during his plea hearing. According to Petitioner, defense counsel acted as a
mere spectator and did not offer any assistance during the plea proceeding.
Petitioner did not exhaust state remedies for Claim Sixteen because he did not present the
Claim to the Delaware Supreme Court on post-conviction appeal At this juncture, any attempt
by Petitioner to present the instant Claim Sixteen in a new Rule 61 motion would be time-barred
under Rule 61 (i)(l ), and the exceptions to Rule 61 (i)(l ) are inapplicable in this case.
Consequently, the Court must treat Claim Sixteen as procedurally defaulted. Petitioner does not
assert any cause for his default, and the Martinez rule cannot be relied upon to establish cause to
excuse Petitioner' s failure to raise this freestanding constitutional claim to the Delaware state
courts.
In the absence of cause, the Court need not address the issue of prejudice. Nevertheless,
as discussed above, the transcript of the plea colloquy demonstrates that defense counsel
conferred with Petitioner and advocated for him during the plea hearing. As a result, Petitioner
has not demonstrated that he will suffer prejudice as a result of his default.
Finally, Petitioner has not demonstrated that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will
occur if the Court does not review this Claim. Therefore, the Court will deny Claim Sixteen as
procedurally barred from federal habeas review.
28
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 30 of 41 PageID #: 783
6.
Claim Seventeen: Dismissal of Untimely Appeal
In Claim Seventeen, Petitioner contends that the Delaware Supreme Court violated his
due process rights by dismissing his direct appeal pursuant to Delaware Supreme Court Rule
29(b) due to his failure to respond to that court' s notice to show cause. According to Petitioner,
the appeal was timely filed in December 2016 because he timely mailed his pro se notice of
appeal, and he never received the Delaware Supreme Court' s April 4, 2018 notice to show cause
as to why his appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Petitioner asserts that the prison sent
the notice to show cause back to the Delaware Supreme Court because it mistakenly believed
that he had been released. The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the appeal after he failed to
respond to the notice. See Stanford, 2018 WL 2254 783 , at * 1.
Petitioner presented Claim Seventeen to the Delaware Superior Court in his second Rule
61 motion. The Superior Court dismissed the Claim as untimely under Rule 61 (i)(l ), as
successive under Rule 61(i)(2), and as defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3) because Petitioner had
failed to previously raise the claim. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision.
The fact that the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Claim Seventeen under the
independent and adequate state rules of Rule 61(i)(l ) and (3) means that the Claim is
procedurally defaulted.
Petitioner has not explicitly alleged any cause for his default. To the extent Petitioner
attempts to establish cause for his procedural default by asserting that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to appeal, that argument is unavailing. An attorney' s error can constitute
cause for a procedural default, but only if the petitioner first presented that ineffectiveness claim
to the state courts as an independent claim, and it was determined that the attorney' s error
29
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 31 of 41 PageID #: 784
amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-89. In turn, an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot constitute cause if the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is itself procedurally defaulted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453-54
(2000).
As previously discussed, Petitioner procedurally defaulted his argument alleging that
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by not filing a direct appeal (Claim Four). See
supra Section III.C.2. Therefore, defense counsel ' s alleged ineffectiveness cannot excuse
Petitioner's default of Claim Seventeen.
To the extent Petitioner attempts to establish cause by relying on Martinez, his attempt is
unavailing because his underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not substantial.
During his plea colloquy, Petitioner stated that he was satisfied defense counsel' s representation
and advice, that he understood that he was waiving his constitutional right to appeal to the
Delaware Supreme Court, and that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. (D.I. 15-11 at 7176) As previously discussed, given the absence of any clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, Petitioner is bound by these representations. See supra Section III.C.l , 2, 4(c), (d).
In the absence of cause, the Court is not required to address the issue of prejudice.
Nonetheless, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. Petitioner was sentenced on December 12,
2016. Pursuant to Delaware Supreme Court Rule 6, a timely notice of appeal should have been
filed in his case on or before January 5, 2017. See Del. Sup. Ct. R. 6 (establishing a thirty day
deadline to file a notice of appeal). Although Petitioner alleges that he filed the prose notice of
appeal on December 14, 2016, within the requisite thirty-day period, he does not proffer any
evidence that his notice of appeal was actually received by the Delaware Supreme Court by the
30
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 32 of 41 PageID #: 785
deadline. Nor could he. The record establishes that Petitioner actually filed his notice of appeal
on March 19, 2018, 437 days after expiration of the thirty-day appeal period. (D.I. 15-10 at 3235). Furthermore, Petitioner's own pleadings refute his claim that his notice of appeal was
timely filed. For instance, in his opening briefs appealing the Superior Court' s denial of his
second Rule 61 motion, Petitioner admitted that he "backdated" the notice of appeal in 2018,
which he "assume[d] that the Supreme Court deem[ed] untimely." (D.I. 15-9 at 7; D.I. 15-10 at
7) This record does not demonstrate that the Delaware Supreme Court actually received
Petitioner's notice of appeal in December 2016 or early January 2017. Consequently, given the
absence of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the Delaware Supreme Court' s
factual determination that the notice of appeal was received, and therefore, filed on March 19,
2018, is presumptively correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(l).
Petitioner has failed to establish cause and prejudice, and his failure to provide new
reliable evidence of his actual innocence prevents him from satisfying the miscarriage of justice
exception to the procedural default doctrine. Accordingly, the Court will deny Claim Seventeen
as procedurally barred.
D. Claims Seven and Nineteen: Meritless
1. Claim Seven
In Claim Seven, Petitioner contends that defense counsel and the attorney who
represented him during the preliminary hearing provided ineffective assistance by failing to
object to or adequately cross-examine Detective Linus when he allegedly committed perjury
about the probable cause that existed to search Petitioner' s apartment. According to Petitioner,
Detective Linus stated in the probable cause affidavit that he was part of the protective sweep
31
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 33 of 41 PageID #: 786
looking for an additional occupant in the apartment when the search uncovered the handgun, but
Detective Linus stated during the suppression hearing that he was not part of the protective
sweep. (D.I. 1-1 at 2) Petitioner asserted a substantially similar argument in his second amended
first Rule 61 motion, which the Superior Court denied as meritless. See Stanford, 2017 WL
3706959, at *3-4. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed "on the basis of the Superior Court' s
well-reasoned decision." Stanford, 2018 WL 2230702, at *l. Therefore, Claim Seven will only
warrant habeas relief if the Superior Court' s decision was either contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1193-94
(2018) (reiterating that when a higher court affirms a lower court' s judgment without an opinion
or other explanation, federal habeas law employs a "look through" presumption and assumes that
the later unexplained order upholding a lower court' s reasoned judgment rests upon the same
grounds as the lower court judgment); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991) (under the
"look through" doctrine, "where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal
claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the
same ground.").
The clearly established Supreme Court precedent governing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims is the two-pronged standard enunciated by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984) and its progeny. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). Under the first
Strickland prong, a petitioner must demonstrate that "counsel' s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness," with reasonableness being judged under professional
norms prevailing at the time counsel rendered assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Under the second Strickland prong, a petitioner must demonstrate ''there is a reasonable
32
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 34 of 41 PageID #: 787
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id. In the context of a guilty plea, prejudice is demonstrated by
showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the petitioner would not have pied
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 4 74 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985).
Finally, in order to sustain an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must
make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.
See Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253, 259-60 (3d Cir. 1991); Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885,
891-92 (3d Cir. 1987). Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly
demanding and leads to a strong presumption that the representation was professionally
reasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S . at 689.
Turning to the first prong of the § 2254( d)(l) inquiry, the Court notes that the Superior
Court correctly identified the Strickland/Hill standard applicable to Petitioner' s ineffective
assistance of counsel allegations. Consequently, the Superior Court's decision was not contrary
to clearly established federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 ("[A] run-of-the-mill state-court
decision applying the correct legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases to the facts of a prisoner' s
case [does] not fit comfortably within§ 2254(d)(l)'s ' contrary to ' clause").
The Court's inquiry is not over, however, because it must also determine if the Superior
Court reasonably applied the Strickland/Hill standard to the facts of Petitioner' s case. See
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105-06. When performing this inquiry, the Court must review the
Superior Court' s denial of Petitioner' s ineffective assistance of counsel allegations through a
33
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 35 of 41 PageID #: 788
"doubly deferential" lens.3 Id. " [T]he question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable,
[but rather] , whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's
deferential standard." Id. When assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is "whether it
is reasonably likely the result would have been different" but for counsel' s performance, and the
"likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Id. And finally , when
viewing a state court' s determination that a Strickland claim lacks merit through the lens of §
2254(d), federal habeas relief is precluded "so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the
correctness of the state court' s decision." Id. at 101.
In his second amendment to his first Rule 61 motion, Petitioner alleged that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to "challenge or object" to Detective Linus' perjurious
statements made during the suppression hearing. (D .I. 15-16 at 5) More specifically, Petitioner
asserted that Detective Linus "made some contradicting statements" in the affidavit of probable
cause and preliminary hearing, and that Detective Linus lied during the suppression hearing by
saying "that a fugitive could have fled to [the] residence earlier the day of arrest when there were
no indications [that] this particular incident [occurred] before arrest took place[. A]lso officers
were conducting surveillance at 6:00 a.m. or sometime before that morning. Officer also stated
that I have a prior weapon offense which I do not have." (Id.) Bypassing the first prong of
3
As explained by the Richter Court,
The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both "highly
deferential," and when the two apply in tandem, review is "doubly"
so. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of
reasonable applications is substantial. Federal habeas courts must
guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under
Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d).
Richter, 562 U.S . at 105 (internal citations omitted).
34
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 36 of 41 PageID #: 789
Strickland and Hill, the Superior Court summarily dismissed this Claim on the basis that
Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proving "that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel' s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Stanford, 2017 WL 3706959, at *5 . The Superior Court explained that Petitioner did not identify
the particular prejudice he experienced. Id.
As previously discussed, Petitioner "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" pled
guilty. By doing so, he waived his right to challenge the alleged defects that occurred prior to
the entry of his plea that do not implicate the voluntariness of his guilty plea, including the
legality of the search conducted in his case. Given this record, the Court concludes that the
Superior Court reasonably applied Strickland and Hill when determining that Petitioner did not
demonstrate prejudice resulting from defense counsel ' s failure to object to the instant pre-plea
matter. Accordingly, the Court will deny Claim Seven for failing to satisfy§ 2254(d).
2. Claim Nineteen: Meritless
After he was sentenced, Petitioner filed in the Superior Court a Rule 35(b) motion to
modify his sentence. Petitioner contended that, during the plea colloquy, he was given an
ultimatum to go to trial with representation he was uncomfortable with, go to trial unprepared
prose, or take a guilty plea that he believed was only favorable to the State. See Stanford, 2017
WL 3706959, at *3. The Superior Court denied the Rule 35(b) motion. Id.
In Claim Nineteen of this proceeding, Petitioner contends that he was forced to enter the
plea agreement under duress. He alleges that the duress was caused by the State's "unjust
ultimatum" and the Superior Court's refusal to grant a continuance that would have enabled him
to seek new counsel. (D.I. 7 at 1) Petitioner presented this argument in his second amendment to
35
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 37 of 41 PageID #: 790
his first Rule 61 motion, 4 and the Superior Court denied the argument as barred by Rule 61(i)(4)
for being formerly adjudicated. See Stanford, 2017 WL 3706959, at *3. The Superior Court
explained that it had previously rejected this argument when it denied Petitioner's Rule 35(b)
motion, and that the Rule 35(b) decision,
not[ed] that there was no "duress" where the agreement reached
between [Petitioner] and the State was merely a function of the
"give-and-take" process of plea-bargaining. Quoting Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, the Court noted that the "acceptance of the basic
legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any
notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense
simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process."
Stanford, 2017 WL 3706959, at *3. After setting forth this description when dismissing Claim
Nineteen in Petitioner's Rule 61 motion, the Superior Court also noted that "a plea colloquy
occurred on the record in open court according to Rule 1 l(e). The record reflects that Defendant
entered his plea 'knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily."' Id. at *3 n. 26.
Here, the State incorrectly asserts that the Superior Court's application of Rule 61(i)(4) to
Claim Nineteen demonstrates that the Claim is procedurally defaulted. Although a formerly
adjudicated claim barred by Rule 61 (i)(4) is defaulted for Delaware state court purposes, on
federal habeas review the fact that the claim was formerly adjudicated means that it was decided
on the merits. See Trice v. Pierce, 2016 WL 2771123, at *4 n.4 (D. Del. May 13, 2016). As
explained by the United States Supreme Court, "[w]hen a state court declines to review the
merits of a petitioner' s claim on the ground that it has done so already, it creates no bar to federal
habeas review. " Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S . 449, 466 (2009) ("A claim is procedurally barred when it
4
In his second amendment to his first Rule 61 motion, Petitioner stated he was "subjected to an
ultimatum," and he was "wrongfully denied a continuance in order to obtain[] new counsel." He
also stated that, since he "did not wish to go trial pro se" due to his ignorance of the law, he was
under "duress circumstances [and] only had one option." (D.I. 15-6 at 5)
36
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 38 of 41 PageID #: 791
has not been fairly presented to the state courts for their initial consideration - not when the
claim has been presented more than once."). Given these circumstances, the Court must review
Claim Nineteen under§ 2254(d)(l) to determine whether the Superior Court' s decision 5 was
either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
A guilty plea is invalid if it is procured "by actual or threatened physical harm or by
mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
750 (1970). Not all inducements to plead, however, are illegal. Threatening harsher penalties is
a normal negotiating tactic during plea bargaining. See id. at 750. As explained in
Bordenkircher:
Plea bargaining flows from "the mutuality of advantage" to
defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting
to avoid trial. Defendants advised by competent counsel and
protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable
of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion, and
unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation. Indeed, acceptance
of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies
rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a
constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the
bargaining process. By hypothesis, the plea may have been induced
by promises of a recommendation of a lenient sentence or a
reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater
penalty upon conviction after a trial.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes , 434 U.S . 357, 363 (1978) (cleaned up). Plea negotiations satisfy due
process when a prosecutor does "no more than openly present[] the defendant with the
unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to
prosecution." Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365. The voluntariness of a plea "can be determined
5
The record does not contain a copy of the Superior Court' s Order denying Petitioner' s Rule
35(b) motion. Therefore, when performing the instant§ 2254(d) analysis, the Court refers to the
excerpt from the Rule 35(b) Order in the Superior Court' s Rule 61 decision, along with the
Superior Court's reference to the plea record.
37
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 39 of 41 PageID #: 792
only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it." Brady, 397 U.S. at 749.
As explained by the Third Circuit, "The ritual of the [plea] colloquy is but a means toward
determining whether the plea was voluntary and knowing. A transcript showing full compliance
with the customary inquiries and admonitions furnishes strong, although not necessarily
conclusive, evidence that the accused entered his plea without coercion and with an appreciation
of its consequences." United States v. Stewart, 977 F .2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1992).
Turning to the first prong of the§ 2254(d)(l) inquiry, the Court notes that, while the
Superior Court cited Bordenkircher, it did not cite Brady. Nevertheless, the Superior Court' s
statement that the plea "occurred on the record in open court according to Rule 1 l(e)," and that
the "record reflects that [Petitioner] entered his plea 'knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,'
indicates that the Superior Court performed an inquiry consistent with the standard articulated in
Brady. See Fahy v. Horn , 516 F.3d 169, 196 (3d Cir. 2008) (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's
decision was not "contrary to" clearly established Federal law because it appropriately relied on
its own state court cases, which articulated the proper standard derived from Supreme Court
precedent); Williams , 529 U.S. at 406 ("(A] run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the
correct legal rule from (Supreme Court] cases to the facts of a prisoner's case (does] not fit
comfortably within§ 2254(d)(l)'s 'contrary to ' clause.").
The Court also concludes that the Superior Court' s decision did not involve an
unreasonable application of Brady and Bordenkircher. To begin, to the extent Petitioner asserts
he was coerced into pleading guilty by the Superior Court's refusal to continue the trial and the
three-choice "ultimatum" by the State, the assertion is belied by the transcript of the plea
colloquy. As previously discussed, the Superior Court' s thorough inquiry and Petitioner' s clear
38
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 40 of 41 PageID #: 793
and explicit statements made in open court support the Superior Court' s conclusion that his
guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. See supra Section III.C.1 , 2, 4( c), (d).
Similarly, to the extent Petitioner alleges that he was coerced into pleading guilty out of fear of
receiving a greater sentence, the argument fails under Bordenkircher. During the portion of the
colloquy concerning Petitioner' s request for a continuance, the State asserted that "the plea today
was to the minimum-mandatory time on the firearm charge which would be five years. That plea
will not be offered again." (D.I. 15-11 at 55) The State also asserted, "[I]f the State is successful
[at trial], he'll be looking at, I believe, seven years minimum mandatory. And I just want
[Petitioner] to know that, if the State is successful at trial, the State will probably be asking for
over that." (Id. at 56) The State further stated that if Petitioner was found guilty on all charges
he could be sentenced "upwards of 40 years." (Id.) The State' s explanation of the different
potential sentences did not constitute coercion; rather, it was an accurate evaluation of the two
possible sentences Petitioner could receive. Choosing between a lighter sentence resulting from
a plea and possibly a more significant sentence resulting from a trial is the type of choice that is
part and parcel of the plea process. Thus, the Court will deny Claim Nineteen as meritless.
IV.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A district court issuing a final order denying a § 2254 petition must also decide whether
to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011); 28 U.S .C. § 2253(c)(2). A
certificate of appealability is appropriate when a petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right" by demonstrating "that reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." 28 U.S.C . § 2253(c)(2);
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 , 484 (2000). If a federal court denies a habeas petition on
39
Case 1:18-cv-00550-RGA Document 19 Filed 09/20/21 Page 41 of 41 PageID #: 794
procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claims, the court is not
required to issue a certificate of appealability unless the petitioner demonstrates that jurists of
reason would find it debatable: (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right; and (2) whether the court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id
The Court has concluded that Petitioner' s habeas claims do not warrant relief. In the
Court' s view, reasonable jurists would not find it debatable that the arguments in Claims Seven
and Nineteen fail to make "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," or that
the remaining Claims are either procedurally barred or not cognizable on federal habeas review.
Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court will deny the Petition without holding an evidentiary
hearing.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
40
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?