Noble v. Stark et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 4/27/2018. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
In re:
THOMAS E. NOBLE,

Misc. Action No. 18-111-RGA

Movant.

THOMAS E. NOBLE,
Plaintiff,

v.
CHIEF JUDGE LEONARD STARK,
et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
1.

Introduction. Movant Thomas E. Noble, a pro se litigant incarcerated at

FDC Philadelphia in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, has engaged in filing numerous
lawsuits that contain frivolous legal arguments that are vexatious and abuse the judicial
process. 1 On September 13, 2004, then United States District Judge Kent A. Jordan
entered an order enjoining Movant from filing any pro se civil rights complaints without
prior approval of the Court. See Noble v. Becker, Civ. No. 03-906-KAJ, D.I. 12. In
Noble

v. Becker, Civ. No. 03-906-KAJ, Movant was given notice to show cause why

injunctive relief should not issue. See Gagliardi v. McWil/iams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir.
1987). He responded to the show cause order, but "did not show cause" why the order

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has described Movant
as a serial litigator, filing over five dozen lawsuits in federal district courts, including over
thirty complaints in this District Court. In re Noble, 663 F. App'x 188, 189 (3d Cir. 2016)
(per curiam).

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should not be entered. (See Civ. No. 03-906-KAJ, D.I. 7 & D.I. 12 at 4). The barring
order issued, and Movant did not appeal. In 2016, Movant filed various civil rights
claims, which the District Court dismissed pursuant to the filing injunction. Movant
sought mandamus relief. On October 6, 2016, the Third Circuit held that Movant was
not entitled to mandamus relief vacating the district court's filing injunction, and he was
not entitled to a writ of mandamus for review of the district court's enforcement of the
filing injunction. In re Noble, 663 F. App'x at 190.
2.

Discussion. Movant requests leave, "under protest," to file a complaint

attacking the barring order as unconstitutional. (D.I. 1). Chief Judge Leonard Stark is
named specifically as a defendant and is referred to in the body of the proposed
complaint. (D.I. 1 at Ex. 8). The caption of the proposed complaint also names as
Defendants, "All Other Judges of the District of Delaware and All Judges of the Third
Circuit and the Other District Courts in its Jurisdiction." (Id.).
3.

Movant does not explain why he should be given leave to commence a

new action. The proposed complaint alleges civil rights violations. It alleges a
conspiracy to rob Movant of his constitutional rights. It refers to actions taken by federal
district and appellate judges, Delaware judges, and Chief Judge Stark. The proposed
complaint alleges that judges have "serially obstructed justice for well over three
decades" and his constitutional rights have been violated by Delaware and
Pennsylvania officials. As in other filings, the proposed complaint takes exception to
the barring order entered in 2004, claiming it was never served upon him, and it has no
legitimate force. The proposed complaint alleges the order was "a falsified document,

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filed clandestinely" and the "judge outright lied about [his] many meritorious claims
falsely labeling them frivolous." (D.I. 1 at Ex. Bat p.4).
4.

It is evident that Movant seeks leave to file a new complaint because he

believes the 2004 barring order is unconstitutional and he is unhappy with rulings from
various federal and state judges in Delaware and Pennsylvania. The proposed
complaint seeks declaratory relief vacating the "unserved unconstitutional order dated
2004." (D.I. 2 at Ex. B. at p.4.) As previously discussed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, Movant could have challenged the 2004 barring order
through the normal appeal process. In re Noble, 663 F. App'x at 190. He did not.
5.

The proposed complaint states, "judicial immunity does not bar

declaratory relief." (D.I. 1 at Ex.Bat p.4). The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity
does not bar claims against judges for declaratory relief. See Larsen v. Senate of
Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1998). The declaratory relief sought

in the proposed complaint, however, is not "declaratory relief in the true legal sense."
Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 F. App'x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Fed. R.

Civ. P. 57). A declaratory judgment "is meant to define the legal rights and obligations
of the named parties in anticipation of future conduct." O'Cal/aghan v. Honorable X,
661 F. App'x 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004)). The proposed complaint seeks a

declaration that the 2004 barring order is unconstitutional. Asking a court to proclaim
that one's rights were violated is not a proper basis for declaratory relief. See Corliss,
200 F. App'x at 84 (finding declaratory relief to be inappropriate where a plaintiff asked

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"the District Court [to] 'declare' that his constitutional rights were violated"); accord
O'Ca/laghan, 661 F. App'x at 182 ("O'Callaghan's complaint sought a declaration that

Honorable X had previously violated his rights. That is not a proper use of a declaratory
judgment. ... "). In reviewing the allegations, it is clear that the proposed complaint
does not state a cognizable claim.
6.

Because the claim for declaratory relief is not cognizable, the Court will

deny the motion for approval to file a complaint. See, e.g., Gochin v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ., 2017 WL 2152177, *8 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2017), app. pending, No. 17-2260. The

proposed complaint raises claims that are legally frivolous and permitting a curative
amendment would be futile.
7.

Conclusion. Therefore, in accordance with Judge Jordan's September

13, 2004 order that enjoins Movant from filing new civil rights cases, Movant's motion
for leave to file a complaint (D.I. 1) will be denied and all other motions will be
dismissed as moot (D.I. 2, 3). See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)
(the court has inherent authority "to manage [its] own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."). A separate order shall issue.

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