Law v. Pierce et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Maryellen Noreika on 11/19/2020. (kmd)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
WARDEN DAVID PIERCE, et al.,
C.A. No. 19-924 (MN)
Darrell Law, Smyrna, Delaware – Pro Se Plaintiff
November 19, 2020
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NOREIKA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff Darrell Law (“Plaintiff”), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center
(“JTVCC”), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 17, 2019, and amended his
complaint on May 27, 2020. (D.I. 2, 22). He has also filed a motion for emergency injunctive
relief. (D.I. 21). Plaintiff appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
This Court proceeds to review and screen the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A(a).
When Plaintiff commenced this action he named three defendants: Warden David Pierce
(“Pierce”), Warden Dana Metzger (“Metzger”), and Commissioner Perry Phelps (“Phelps”).
(D.I. 2) The Amended Complaint adds 25 defendants. (D.I. 22 at 2-4). Plaintiff alleges
Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and pursuant to Article 1, § 11 of the Delaware Charters, Prisoner Health Care Clause 1
when Defendants exposed him to dangerous and harmful housing conditions and health care
providers covered-up his diagnosis, delayed treatment, and contributed to the development of his
chronic health problems. (D.I. 22 at 2).
Plaintiff alleges that he was housed in Building 22, B tier, cell 9 at JTVCC from
November 6, 2016 until September 2017 where he was “excessively exposed to harmful and
dangerous allergens and carcinogens” due to Defendants’ failure to maintain and/or upkeep the
ventilation and air systems in Building 22. (D.I. 2 at 3; D.I. 22 at 6). Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants were “given notice” via his grievance submissions. (D.I. 22 at 6). Plaintiff alleges
Presumably Plaintiff is referring to Article 1, Section 11 of the Delaware Constitution.
Plaintiff’s Delaware constitutional claims are premised on the same operative facts as his
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that he contracted chronic hypersensitivity pneumonitis 2 due to consistently breathing and inhaling
contaminated air supplies. (D.I. 2 at 3). As early as May 2017, he began complaining of breathing
difficulties and shortness of breath through sick call slips. (Id.)
In September 2017, Plaintiff was transferred to Building D-East. (Id.). Plaintiff submitted
medical grievances on December 11, 2017 and April 12, 2018 complaining of general difficulties
that included shortness of breath. (D.I. 3 at 1-7; D.I. 22 at 6). Plaintiff alleges that his breathing
problems and complaints persisted up to July 2018 and that JTVCC medical staff and Connections
Community Program (the medical contract provider at the time) “grew more negligent, indifferent
and reluctant towards his medical needs and complaints.” (D.I. 2 at 3; D.I. 22 at 6). Plaintiff was
transferred to the JTVCC infirmary in July 2018 “under a pretense of pneumonia, according to
Defendant Dr. Jackson (“Dr. Jackson”).” (D.I. 22 at 6). Plaintiff was transferred to B-Building,
A Tier several days later and remained there until March 2019. (Id.)
Plaintiff hospitalized in March 2019, and a March 11, 2019 surgical pathology report
indicates a history of pulmonary fibrosis with a diagnosis of “usual interstitial pneumonia pattern
with focal bronchiolocentricity and occasional interstitial granulomas, most suggestive of chronic
hypersensitivity pneumonitis.” (D.I. 3 at 8).
Plaintiff alleges that he was diagnosed with
pulmonary fibrosis, “more likely than not, due to being excessively exposed to harmful and
dangerous allergens carcinogens of which also caused [his] allergic reactions.” (D.I. 22 at 6). He
also alleges that the pulmonary fibrosis is “derived from chronic hypersensitivity.” (D.I. 2 at 3).
Plaintiff alleges that in April or May 2019, Defendants misdiagnosed him with autoimmune
disease. (D.I. 22 at 7). Plaintiff commenced this action on May 17, 2019. (D.I. 2).
Hypersensitivity pneumonitis is a common interstitial lung disease resulting from
inhalation of a large variety of antigens by susceptible individuals. See https://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5036552/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020)
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In his amendment, Plaintiff refers to matters that occurred following the filing of his
original complaint. (D.I. 22 at 7). He alleges that August 2019 medical reports revealed a
progression of pulmonary fibrosis and that in November 2019 Defendants prescribed him
medication that was not beneficial and may have caused him further harm. (Id.). It also alleges
that Plaintiff expressed his concerns to Defendants Sergeant Cain (“Cain”), Lieutenant Buckles
(“Buckles”), and Lieutenant Burman (“Burman”) about effects of the COVID-19 virus and its
impact upon him because of his pulmonary condition. (Id.). On March 20, 2020, Plaintiff asked
Defendants to medically quarantine him as a precautionary measure. (Id.). His request was
ignored and closed on April 3, 2020.
Plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19 on
April 11, 2020, was taken to the hospital on April 12, 2020 for treatment, discharged on
April 27, 2020, and returned to JTVCC where he was housed in the infirmary under medical
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief including release from custody of the Delaware Department
of Correction and medical care upon his release, 3 as well as compensatory damages. (D.I. 2 at 34; D.I .22 at 8). On April 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief that
appears to seek medical treatment. (D.I. 21). The motion will be addressed in Section V. of this
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if “the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
Plaintiff is scheduled for release in April 2021. See https://vinelink.vineapps.com/persondetail/offender/2591271;tabIndexToSelect=0 (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
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immune from such relief.” Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect
to prison conditions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take
them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds
pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at
94 (citations omitted).
A complaint is not automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim. See Dooley v.
Wetzel, 957 F.3d. 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 331 (1989));
see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112 (3d Cir. 2002). “Rather, a claim is
frivolous only where it depends ‘on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless”
or “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario.’” Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d. at 374 (quoting Mitchell
v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (2003) and Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when deciding Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240
(3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A,
this Court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d at 114.
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A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes
that those allegations “could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint
must do more than simply provide “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Williams v. BASF
Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim
has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014). A complaint may
not be dismissed for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id.
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must
plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations,
assume their veracity and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a “contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
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Personal Involvement/Respondeat Superior
Plaintiff has named many individuals as defendants based upon their supervisory positions.
Many allegations are directed towards the “all encompassing” Defendants, and not to a specific
individual. And, there are no allegations directed to most of the defendants who are identified in
the “Parties” section of the Amended Complaint.
It is well established that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See Parkell
v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016). A defendant in a civil rights action “cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional violation which he [ ] neither participated in nor approved”;
personal involvement in the alleged wrong is required. Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210
(3d Cir. 2007); see also Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, (1981) (holding that liability in a
§ 1983 action must be based on personal involvement, not respondeat superior). Such involvement
may be “shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that supervisory officials were aware of unlawful conditions
of confinement 4 by reason of his grievance submissions (see D.I. 22 at 6), the claim fails. 5 The
This Court does not address whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged a conditions of
confinement claim other than in the context of Plaintiff’s failure to assert such a claim
against a specific defendant.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to raise claims based upon his dissatisfaction with the
grievance procedure or denial of his grievances, the claims fail because an inmate does not
have a “free-standing constitutionally right to an effective grievance process.” Woods v.
First Corr. Med., Inc., 446 F. App’x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d
728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991)). In addition, the claim against Defendant Medical Grievance
Committee fails as it is not a person as is required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989); Evancho v. Fisher,
423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005).
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grievances Plaintiff provides this Court to support his claims are medical grievances that sought
medical care and do not speak to the issue of conditions of confinement. Nor is there any indication
that non-medical supervisory officials, including past and present JTVCC wardens and DOC
Commissioners, were aware of the grievances Plaintiff submitted. And, even were they aware of
the grievances, participation in the after-the-fact review of a grievance is not enough to establish
See, e.g., Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006)
(allegations that prison officials and administrators responded inappropriately to inmate’s laterfiled grievances do not establish the involvement of those officials and administrators in the
underlying deprivation). See also Cole v. Sobina, C.A. No. 04-99J, 2007 WL 4460617 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 19, 2007); Ramos v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, C.A. No. 4:CV-06-1444, 2006 WL
2129148 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2006); Jefferson v. Wolfe, C.A. No. 04-44 ERIE, 2006 WL 1947721
(W.D. Pa. July 11, 2006). Moreover, with regard to Plaintiff’s medical claims, a non-medical
prison official must either actually know, or have reason to believe, that prison doctors are
mistreating or not treating the prisoner to be liable for deliberate indifference. Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). There are no such allegations directed towards non-medical
With regard to non-supervisory defendants, the general standard for liability requires a
showing that each defendant was personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing. Evancho v.
Fisher, 423 F.3d at 353 (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).
“Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence.” Id. The mere naming of an individual as a defendant without facts
supporting any type of claim simply does not suffice to meet federal pleading standards. The only
Defendants to whom allegations are specifically directed are Dr. Jackson, Cain, Buckles, and
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Burman. The claims against these defendants are discussed in a later section of this Memorandum
Plaintiff has failed to plead facially-plausible claims against Defendants Pierce, Metzger,
Phelps, Commissioner DeMattias, Warden May, Captain Burton, Unknown Unit Commanders 1
and 2, John Doe Corrections Officers/Maintenance Workers 1 and 2, Cpl. Dutton, Cpl. Burley,
Unknown Medical Director, Dr. Heresniak, Dr. Adai, Unknown Doctor, Consultant Coordinator
Lisa, Medical Provider Hollis, Medical Provider Charles, Medical Provider Monica, Unknown
Medical Provider, Medical Provider Wilson, Medical Provider Williams, and Medical Grievance
Committee. The foregoing Defendants will be dismissed as the claims against them are deficiently
Plaintiff alleges that health care providers covered-up his diagnosis, delayed medical
treatment, and contributed to the development of his chronic health problems. A prison official’s
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” is a kind of cruel and unusual
punishment “proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
See also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011) (when a prison deprives a prisoner of adequate
medical care, Courts have a responsibility to remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment violation);
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (under the Eighth Amendment prisons officials must
ensure inmates receive adequate medical care).
In order to set forth a cognizable claim, an inmate must allege (i) a serious medical need
and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A prison official is
deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fails
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to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official may
manifest deliberate indifference by “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care.”
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
Here, the only medical provider against whom any allegations are directed is Dr. Jackson.
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Jackson transferred Plaintiff to the JTVCC infirmary in July 2018 “under
a pretense of pneumonia.” This allegations does not allege deliberate indifference. To the
contrary, it alleges that Dr. Jackson transferred Plaintiff to the infirmary to treat a medical
Plaintiff’s other allegations and, more particularly, when considered with the exhibits
Plaintiff submitted to support his claims, do not rise to the level of constitutional violations under
the Eighth Amendment. Rather, the allegations and exhibits indicate that Plaintiff has, and
continues to receive medical treatment. See Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1186 (3d Cir. 1978)
(“Where the plaintiff has received some care, inadequacy or impropriety of the care that was given
will not support an Eighth Amendment claim.”) (quotation marks omitted). To the extent there
may have been a misdiagnosis, at most, this implies negligence.. Merely negligent treatment does
not give rise to a constitutional violation. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235. Also, although Plaintiff may
not agree with the treatment he has received, he has no right to choose a specific form of medical
treatment so long as the treatment provided is reasonable. Lasko v. Watts, 373 F. App’x 196, 203
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138-140 (2d Cir. 2000)).
With regards to the medical needs claims, the allegations are insufficient to state a plausible
constitutional violation and will be dismissed. Plaintiff will, however, be given leave to amend
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In the Amended Complaint Plaintiff raises claims against Cain, Buckles, and Burman,
alleging that on March 20, 2020, Plaintiff asked Defendants to medically quarantine him as a
precautionary measure, his request was ignored and closed on April 3, 2020. He alleges that on
April 11, 2020 he tested positive for COVID-19 and was taken to the hospital on April 12, 2020
for treatment, discharged on April 27, 2020, and returned to JTVCC where he was housed in the
infirmary under medical quarantine.
Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the permissive joinder of parties
in an action. Rule 20(a)(2) allows persons to “be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any
right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P.
20. Joinder of claims, parties, and remedies is “strongly encouraged” when appropriate to further
judicial economy and fairness. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724,
218 (1966); Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 2009). The policy behind Rule 20 is not
a license to join unrelated claims and defendants in a single lawsuit. See Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill,
252 F. App’x 436, 437 (3d Cir. 2007).
The claims against Cain, Buckles, and Burman do not arise out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, occurred during a different time-frame than
the claims raised in the original Complaint, and lack a question or law or fact common to all
Defendants. As such, the claims do not satisfy the requirements for joinder, even under a liberal
application of Rule 20. Plaintiff may not raise the coronavirus claim in the instant action. Should
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he wish to raise this claim, he should file a new lawsuit against Cain, Buckles, and Burman. Thus,
this claim will be dismissed.
MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. (D.I. 22). The motion states that Plaintiff’s “originally
filed civil rights complaint of May 17, 2019 implies the necessity for (preliminary) injunctive relief
. . . in light of . . . misconduct of which has caused the Plaintiff’s exposure to ‘contaminated air
supplies’ and the significant injury to his lungs.” (Id. at 1, 2). The motion reiterates claims Plaintiff
has raised and contends that he is not administered appropriate medication for his condition. (Id.
at 2, 3). It also references Plaintiff’s March 20, 2020 request for isolation due to the coronavirus.
(Id. at 3).
It is not clear from the motion what injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks. Plaintiff, however,
clarified the relief sought in his reply to the response to the motion filed by Warden Robert May
(“Warden May”). (D.I. 34, 36). He states that he seeks “variable forms of medical treatment and
necessary release from prison due to his declining health and necessity for a lung transplant
assessment.” (D.I. 36 at 1, 2).
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting
preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the
public interest favors such relief. Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708
(3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Preliminary injunctive relief is ‘an extraordinary remedy’ and
‘should be granted only in limited circumstances.’” Id. (citations omitted). Because of the
intractable problems of prison administration, a request for injunctive relief in the prison context
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must be viewed with considerable caution. Abraham v. Danberg, 322 F. App’x 169, 170 (3d Cir.
2009) (citing Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Warden May opposes the motion and argues that Plaintiff cannot meet the requirements
for injunctive relief. Warden May provided the Court with the declaration of Dr. Awele MadukaEzeh (“Dr. Maduka-Ezeh”) who has reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records. (D.I. 35). Dr. MadukaEzeh states that: (1) Plaintiff has been seen by pulmonologists and primary care providers who
have been managing him with medications (steroids, methotrexate, inhalers); (2) Plaintiff has had
flare-ups since his diagnosis and in the past nine months appears to have had a more rapid decline;
(3) Plaintiff was hospitalized in January 2020 for an infection, diagnosed with COVID-19 in
April 2020 and hospitalized, and following discharge housed in the JTVCC infirmary to manage
his medical conditions; (4) Plaintiff has become oxygen dependent since the COVID diagnosis, is
administered high doses of steroids, and would be considered by most infectious disease experts
to be significantly immunosuppressed; (5) Plaintiff was hospitalized again in August 2020 due to
a flare-up; (6) consideration is being given to refer Plaintiff to a transplant center to evaluate for
possible lung transplant; and (7) as of August 24, 2020, Plaintiff continues on supplemental oxygen
and high dose steroids.
The portion of Plaintiff’s motion seeking medical care will be denied. The record evidence
is that Plaintiff’s serious lung condition is continually monitored and treated. Although Plaintiff
may not agree with the treatment he receives, it cannot be said that Defendants are deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical condition and needs.
As to Plaintiff’s request that he be released from prison, the Court cannot provide the relief
Plaintiff seeks in his motion. Plaintiff may seek release by filing a petition for habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. A “habeas corpus petition . . . under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the only proper
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mechanism for a state prisoner to challenge the ‘fact or duration’ of his state confinement.” See,
e.g., McKnight v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 3d 575, 587 (D.N.J. 2014) (quoting Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498–99 (1973)); see also Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir.
In addition, in Delaware, motions for reduction or modification of sentence are governed
by Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) and Delaware Courts will consider a Rule 35(b) motion
under 11 Del. C. § 4217. Under § 4217, the Department of Correction may seek modification of
an inmate’s sentence for good cause, including “a serious medical illness or infirmity.” See
Egleston v. State, No. 160, 2018, 2019 WL 343669 (Del. Jan. 24, 2019) (table) (citing 11 Del. C.
§ 4217(c)); Hernandez-Vargas v. State, No. 191, 2020, 2020 WL 5951372, at *2 (Del. Oct. 7,
2020) (The decision of whether the early release of low-risk offenders would lessen the dangers
posed by COVID-19 to the general prison population is best left to the discretion of the Department
of Correction, which may move for the modification of any prisoner’s sentence for good cause
under 11 Del. C. § 4217); See State v. Hampton, ID No. 1601004059, 2020 WL 4284327 (Del.
Super. Ct. July 21, 2020) (“As this Court has recently and oft noted, no special early release rule
or procedure has been created to address the current COVID-19 health crisis.).
Plaintiff has not met the requirements for injunctive relief. His motion will be denied.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court will: (1) deny Plaintiff’s emergency motion for
injunctive relief (D.I. 21); (2) dismiss the Complaint/Amended Complaint pursuant 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(i) and (ii) and § 1915A(b)(1); and (3) give Plaintiff leave to file a second amended
complaint to cure his pleading defects. An appropriate Order will be entered.
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