Wilmer-Williamson v. Centurion Managed Care et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Jennifer L. Hall on 1/29/2025. (ceg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
LAMERE WILMER-WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CENTURION MANAGED CARE, et al.,
Defendants.
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) C.A. No. 21-1327 (JLH)
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lamere Wilmer-Williamson, Smyrna, Delaware – Pro Se Plaintiff
Scott G Wilcox, GIORDANO, DELCOLLO, WERB & GAGNE, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware – Counsel
for Defendants Centurion Managed Care, Anthony Jacobs, William Ngwe, and Matthew Wofford
January 29, 2025
Wilmington, Delaware
HALL, U.S. District Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
On September 20, 2021, pro se Plaintiff Lamere Wilmer-Williamson, an inmate at James
T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC) in Smyrna, Delaware, filed a Complaint against
Defendants Centurion Managed Care, Anthony Jacobs, William Ngwe, and Matthew Wofford.
(D.I. 2.) The Complaint is the operative pleading. It alleges that Plaintiff has sickle cell anemia
and that Defendants’ “denials and unnecessary delays” in providing care violated Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.)
Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (D.I. 43), to which
Plaintiff responded in opposition (D.I. 51; see also D.I. 55 (Defendants’ reply); D.I. 57, 58
(Plaintiff’s sur-replies)).
Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motions requesting
discovery (D.I. 60) and appointment of counsel (D.I. 61). The Court addresses all pending motions
below.
II.
BACKGROUND
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has hereditary sickle cell anemia. (D.I. 44 at 1.)
Plaintiff alleges, and Defendants do not dispute for purposes of the pending summary judgment
motion, that Plaintiff experienced serious medical issues, including jaundice and pain, while he
was incarcerated. (Id.)
Defendants submitted Plaintiff’s medical records to the Court, which appear to confirm
that, during the time period alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff placed sick calls and grievances,
and that Plaintiff had both on and off-site medical appointments, including consultations with a
specialist. (D.I. 45.) The evidence of record does not reflect that Plaintiff was denied any
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medication due to cost or that any prescribed medication regimen was ignored. (Id.) Plaintiff has
provided no evidence to suggest that the treatment he received fell below the standard of care.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86
(1986). A fact in dispute is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law” and is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “In
considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party’s
evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v.
Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). A
court’s role in deciding a motion for summary judgment is not to evaluate the evidence and decide
the truth of the matter but rather “to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249.
Where the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the non-moving party, then the moving
party may satisfy its burden of production by pointing to an absence of evidence supporting the
non-moving party’s case, after which the burden of production shifts to the non-movant to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586–87; Williams
v. West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460–61 (3d Cir. 1989). A non-moving party asserting that a fact
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is genuinely disputed must support such an assertion by “(A) citing to particular parts of materials
in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations, . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing
that the materials cited [by the moving party] do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute
. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The non-moving party’s evidence “must amount to more than a
scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance.” Williams,
891 F.2d at 460–61.
The court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may
not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). “[T]he facts asserted by the nonmoving party, if supported by affidavits
or other evidentiary material, must be regarded as true . . . .” Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp.,
85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996). If “there is any evidence in the record from any source from
which a reasonable inference in the [nonmoving party’s] favor may be drawn, the moving party
simply cannot obtain a summary judgment.” Id. at 1081 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Conversely,
Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party, there is no “genuine issue for trial.” The mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact. When opposing parties tell two different stories,
one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling
on a motion for summary judgment.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).
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IV.
DISCUSSION
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that
prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–
05 (1976). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, the inmate must demonstrate (i) a serious
medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to
that need. Id. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A prison official is
deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm
and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
A prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical treatment. Lasko v. Watts,
373 F. App’x 196, 203 (3d Cir. Apr. 10, 2010) (citing Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d
Cir. 2000)). “Mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment is insufficient” to state a
constitutional violation. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Treatment is presumed
to be proper, absent evidence that there was a violation in the standard of care. Pearson v. Prison
Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017).
Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court cannot reasonably
infer from the evidence of record that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
medical needs. Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests that he disagrees with the medications prescribed
to him, but there is no evidence of any violation of the standard of care. On the contrary, the
uncontroverted evidence of record demonstrates that Plaintiff’s medications were reviewed and
approved by offsite providers. (See D.I. 45.) The Court finds no genuine issue for trial based on
the evidence presented; accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.
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On July 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for discovery. (D.I. 60.) The Court’s Scheduling
Order (D.I. 36) set a December 18, 2023 deadline for discovery; accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion
for discovery will be denied.
On November 6, 2024, months after the briefing closed on Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting the appointment of counsel. (D.I. 61.)
Having determined that summary judgment for Defendants is appropriate, Plaintiff’s motion for
the appointment of counsel is denied. 1
V.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(D.I. 43), deny Plaintiff’s request for discovery (D.I. 60), and deny Plaintiff’s request for
appointment of counsel (D.I. 61). The Clerk of Court will be directed to enter judgment in favor
of Defendants and against Plaintiff and to mark this case closed.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
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A pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis has no constitutional or statutory right to
representation by counsel. See Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456–57 (3d Cir.1997). Having
considered the relevant factors, see Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 156–57 (3d Cir. 1993), and it
appearing from the uncontroverted evidence of record that Plaintiff received medical care for his
condition, the Court exercises its discretion not to appoint counsel.
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