Talley et al v. Horn et al

Filing 55

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Maryellen Noreika on 2/7/2024. ***Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiffs 2/7/2024*** (dlw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
KENNETH R. TALLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JUDITH C. HORN, et al.,
Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kenneth R. Talley, Janice A. Talley, and Kristina Karen Talley, Milton, DE – Pro Se Plaintiffs.
Tyler Friedman, SERGOVIC CARMEAN WEIDMAN MCCARTNEY & OWENS, P.A., Georgetown, DE
– Attorney for Judith C. Horn, Darren W. Horn, Sr., Sergovic Carmean Weidman McCartney &
Owens, P.A., and David Wiedman.
Caneel Radinson-Blasucci, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, DE – Attorney for
Defendants Court of Chancery of The State of Delaware, Patricia W. Griffin, Superior Court of
the State of Delaware, and Judge Mark H. Conner.
Matthew P. Donelson and John A. Elzufon, ELZUFON AUSTIN TARLOV & MONDELL PA,
Wilmington, DE – Attorneys for Defendant Community Legal Aid Society, Inc. and Olga
Beskrone.
David J. Soldo, MORRIS JAMES LLP, Wilmington, DE – Attorney for Defendant Rob Book.
Kevin R. Talley – Pro Se Defendant.
Darren W. Horn, Jr. – Pro Se Defendant

February 7, 2024
Wilmington, Delaware

NOREIKA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiffs Kenneth R. Talley, Janice A. Talley, and Kristina Karen Talley, proceeding pro
se, filed this lawsuit against several family members, two private practice attorneys, a law firm, a
legal aid organization, two state court judges, two state courts, and an electrician. (D.I. 1).
Plaintiffs’ allegations arise from a dispute with their family members over the ownership of a
home, and related state-court litigation. Defendants, in different pairings, move for dismissal of
the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.I. 8, 9, 10, 14, 23).
I.

BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2023, Plaintiffs initiated this action. At the time, Delaware state courts had

issued two judgments against them related to a home ownership dispute with their family.
Specifically, on October 21, 2022, the Court of Chancery issued an order entering judgment
in favor of Judith and Darren Horn, and holding that Kenneth and Janice have no interest in the
property at issue. (D.I. 8-1 at 15-39). On February 3, 2023, the Delaware Superior Court entered
an ejectment order, directing Kenneth and Kristina to vacate the property by March 17, 2023. (Id.
at 66-68). On February 13, 2023, Plaintiff appealed the ejectment order to the Delaware Supreme
Court. (Id. at 70-71).
Plaintiffs’ March 23, 2023 Complaint brings a Fifth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a claim for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, and several state law claims, including conspiracy,
fraud and misrepresentation, elder abuse, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. They
seek damages and injunctive relief.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the dismissal of an action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or
factual challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d
333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack contests the sufficiency of the pleadings, whereas a factual
attack contests the sufficiency of jurisdictional facts. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC,
800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015). When considering a facial attack, the court accepts the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations
in the plaintiff’s favor. See In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach Litigation,
846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017).
B.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Because Plaintiffs proceeds pro se, their pleading is liberally construed and their
Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When presented with
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), district courts conduct a
two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the Court
separates the factual and legal elements of a claim, accepting “all of the complaint’s well-pleaded
facts as true, but [disregarding] any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11. Second, the Court
determines “whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show . . . a ‘plausible claim
for relief.’” Id. at 211 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that ‘raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true (even
if doubtful in fact).’” Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl.
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if a
complaint does not contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Court is not obligated to accept as true “bald assertions” or “unsupported conclusions
and unwarranted inferences.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997);
Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997).
Instead, “[t]he complaint must state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element” of a plaintiff’s claim. Wilkerson v. New Media
Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
complaint may not be dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting
the claim asserted. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam).
III.

DISCUSSION
Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil actions where the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between
citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This is often referred to as diversity jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs assert in their briefing that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over their claims against
some of the Defendants whom they assert are citizens of states other than Delaware. That,
however, is not how diversity jurisdiction is applied; it is an all or nothing enterprise. See Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005) (explaining that, when the state
of citizenship of a single defendant is the same as the plaintiff's state of citizenship, this fact
“deprives the district court of original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action”) (emphasis
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added). Accordingly, because at least one Defendant is a Delaware resident, this Court lacks
diversity jurisdiction over this matter in its entirety.
Federal courts also have jurisdiction over all actions “arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This is sometimes referred to as federal
question jurisdiction. Plaintiff attempts to brings claims under a federal statute, § 1983, against
the State Court Defendants. State courts themselves, however, are immune from suit in federal
court under the Eleventh Amendment, see Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 23940 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that Pennsylvania’s First Judicial District is a state entity entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity), and the judges are entitled to judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s
allegations, see Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“A judicial officer in the performance of [her] duties has absolute immunity from suit and will
not be liable for [her] judicial acts.”) (quoting Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)).
With regard to the claims against the remaining Defendants, all of whom are private
citizens or entities, to the extent that this Court has federal question jurisdiction, 1 Plaintiffs have
failed to state any claims because none of these Defendants acted under the color of state law for
purposes of § 1983. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Webb v. Chapman, 852 F.
App’x 659, 660 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
Furthermore, the Third Circuit has long held that § 242 is a criminal statute, which does
not confer a private right of action. See United States v. City of Phila., 644 F.2d 187, 198-99
(3d Cir. 1980) (holding that there is no private right of action under § 242); see also Davis v.

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See Itiowe v. Trentonian, 620 F. App’x 65, 67 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (noting that
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be appropriate
where a plaintiff brings constitutional claims against non-state actors without plausibly
alleging that they acted under the color of state law); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528, 536-37 (1974).
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Warden Lewisburg USP, 594 F. App’x 60, 61 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (noting that “§ 242
is a criminal statute, through which no private cause of action is created”).
To the extent that the Court has the option of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ state law claims, 2 it will decline to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Sarpolis v.
Tereshko, 625 F. App’x 594, 598-99 (3d Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs’ state law claims will be dismissed,
without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Amendment

is futile. All state law claims are dismissed without prejudice to the extent that they would be more
appropriately brought in state court.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

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Defendants suggest that this Court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine,
which precludes federal court consideration of “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when four requirements are met: (1) the federal
plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court
judgment, (3) that judgment issued before the federal suit was filed, and (4) the plaintiff
invites the district court to review and reject the state-court judgment. Phila. Entm’t &
Dev. Partners, LP v. Dep’t of Revenue, 879 F.3d 492, 500 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Great W.
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010)). Here,
Plaintiffs clearly seek review of at least two state-court judgments which they lost. When
the Complaint was filed in this action, however, Plaintiffs’ appeal to the Delaware Supreme
Court of the Delaware Superior Court’s ejectment order was pending. Accordingly, the
Court will decline to apply Rooker-Feldman.
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