Lewis v. Murphy et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Colm F. Connolly on 1/29/2025. ***Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff on 1/29/2025*** (mws)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ROBERT CHARLES LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
V.
EMILY R. MURPHY, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civ. No. 23-1199-CFC
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Robert Charles Lewis, Deptford, New Jersey-Pro Se Plaintiff
Maria R. Granaudo Gesty, BURNS WHITE, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware - Counsel
for Defendants Emily R. Murphy and Steven B. Gable
January 29, 2025
Wilmington, Delaware
C~ g ' ,L~
I.
Judge:
INTRODUCTION
On October 23, 2023, Plaintiff Robert Charles Lewis filed this civil action pro
se. (D.1. 2). Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed informa pauperis. (D.I. 5).
The Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b).
II.
BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges that this action raises a claim under the Constitution,
law, or treaties of the United States. (D.I. 2 at 3.) Specifically, the Complaint alleges
that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs "freedom to [pursue] happiness, freedom
from want, freedom from fear, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, [and]
freedom to receive healthcare [while] homeless."
(Id.)
The civil cover sheet
submitted with the Complaint indicates that the case presents a personal inju1y medical malpractice claim. (D.I. 2-2.)
According to the Complaint, between October 14, 2023, and October 22,
2023, Plaintiff (then a resident of Delaware) was wrongfully discharged from St.
Francis Hospital in Wilmington, Delaware, and was refused proper care by
Defendants Emily R. Murphy and Steven B. Gable (also residents of Delaware).
Plaintiff alleges he was refused care because he is homeless. (D.1. 2 at 4.)
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Plaintiff alleges that unidentified others were involved in these actions by
Defendants, and that these actions resulted in "further health problems [that] have
developed in [Plaintiffs] pressure wound, [his] right foot, [his] emotional wellbeing, and in [his] overall physical health." (Id. at 5, 7.) Based on the foregoing,
Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $400,000.00 and additional
"punitive damages to be awarded by a jury." (Id.)
III.
SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening
provisions of28 U.S.C. § I 915(e)(2)(B) if"the action is frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F .3d 448, 452
(3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (informa
pauperis actions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v.
County ofAllegheny, 515 F .3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds
prose, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
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A complaint is not automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim.
See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d. 366,374 (3d Cir. 2020). Rather, a claim is deemed
frivolous only where it relies on an "'indisputably meritless legal theory' or a 'clearly
baseless' or 'fantastic or delusional' factual scenario."' Id.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on
Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,240 (3d Cir. 1999).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive
plausibility. See Johnson v. City ofShelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam). A
complaint may not be dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal
theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 11.
A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1)
take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify
allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016).
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Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint "show" that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
IV.
DISCUSSION
The civil cover sheet clearly indicates that the nature of the suit is personal
injury-medical malpractice (see D.I. 2-2), which arises from Delaware state law, see,
e.g., Del. Code 18 § 6802 {"The Superior Court of the State shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions alleging health care medical negligence."). Generally,
diversity jurisdiction is required for this Court to hear a state law claim. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(l). Diversity jurisdiction exists when the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the suit is
between citizens of different states. See id. In this case, Plaintiff does not allege
diversity jurisdiction, and the allegations in the Complaint do not establish diversity
jurisdiction, because Plaintiff and Defendants were all residents of Delaware at the
time of the events alleged. (See D.I. 2 at 2.)
To the extent that Plaintiff intends to raise additional federal claims based on
the violation of Plaintiffs "freedom to [pursue] happiness, freedom from want,
freedom from fear, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, [and] freedom to receive
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healthcare [while] homeless," (id at 3.), the sparse factual allegations in the
Complaint fail to establish that Plaintiff's discharge from St. Francis Hospital, or the
care he received from Defendants, were in any way improper or actionable (see id.
at 4-7). The Court cannot credit Plaintiffs bald assertions and legal conclusions
against Defendants without facts alleged to support them. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662;
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff intends to raise 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims by way of this action, the Complaint fails to identify a viable defendant for
this type of claim. When bringing a§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some
person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the
deprivation acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
To act under "color of state law" a defendant must be "clothed with the authority of
state law." Id. at 49. The Complaint names private physicians working at a private
hospital as the sole Defendants in this case. 1 Defendants are not "clothed with the
authority of state law." Id. at 49; see Henry v. Balas, No. 03-771-GMS, 2004 WL
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The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Saint Francis Hospital is part of
Trinity Health, a private not-for-profit Section 50l{c)(3) regional health care system.
See
Trinity
Health
Mid-Atlantic,
https://www.trinity-health.org/ourimpact/community-health-and-well-being/community-benefits/trinity-health-midatlantic (last visited Jan. 23, 2025); Facts and Figures, https://www.trinityhealth.org/about-us/facts-and-figures-financial-strength (last visited Jan. 23, 2025).
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2211956, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2004) (finding that private hospital and private
physician defendants were not "in any way clothed with the authority of state law")
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, amendment appears futile for any
§ 1983 claims.
Employing the less stringent standard afforded to pro se litigants, see
Erickson, 55 l U.S. at 94, the Court cannot discern from the allegations in the
Complaint, without more, a basis for any federal claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Plaintiffs state law medical malpractice claim also appears to be deficiently pied,
and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear it.
See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(l). Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). As amendment is futile, the Court will dismiss the case
with prejudice and close the case.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
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