PURCELL, et al v. MWI CORPORATION, et al

Filing 472

MEMORANDUM OPINION to the Order granting Plaintiffs a Judgment. Signed by Judge Gladys Kessler on 2/10/14. (CL, )

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.. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. ROBERT R. PURCELL, Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 98-2088 (GK) MWI CORPORATION, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter comes before the Court for ruling after a jury trial. The jury found Defendant MWI Corporation ("Defendant" or "MWI") liable for violations of the False Claims Act U.S.C. § The 3729(a) (1), parties (2). were ordered to addressing the issue of damages. Government") ("FCA"), 31 submit supplemental briefs Plaintiff United States filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment ("the ("U.S. Mot.") [Dkt. No. 458]. Defendant MWI Corporation ("Defendant" or "MWI") filed a Memorandum Calculation of Subsequently, Memorandum Purcell Points Damages the ("U.S. of ( "MWI Government Resp. ") ("Relator" Government and MWI' s or and Authorities Mem. ") filed a No. [Dkt. 463], [Dkt. "Purcell") filed Regarding Response Relator a No. the 459] . to MWI' s Robert Response to R. the Calculation of Damages Regarding Entry of Judgment ("Relator Resp. ") [Dkt. Response to United States' 465] . After of the 464], Submissions consideration representations No. of parties and ( "MWI Resp. ") the filed [Dkt. submissions, those at MWI damages hearing a No. the held December 19, 2013, and the entire record herein, the Court will now address the issues raised and determine the amount of damages. A. In Factual Background 1992, MWI, a Florida corporation, arranged to sell irrigation pumps and other equipment to seven Nigerian states. The total sale price was $82.2 million dollars. To Nigeria finance these ("Nigeria") sales, sought MWI and and the received eight Export- Import Bank of the United States the United States that Federal finances and Republic of loans from the ("Ex- Im") , an agency of facilitates transactions between U.S. exporters and international buyers. Ex-Im agreed to finance the deal and loan Nigeria $74.3 million dollars. Nigeria would pay back the $74.3 million dollars, and fees, and the individual Nigerian as well as interest states would pay the Nigeria, it remainder of the $82.2 million dollar price. Before required Ex-Im MWI to would submit approve a the "Letter loans of to Credit Supplier's Certificate" for each of the eight loans. On each of those eight -2- Letter of Credit Supplier's Certificates, MWI attested that it had only paid "regular commissions" in connection with the pump sales. After Ex-Im approved the loans, but before it disbursed any funds, it required Certificate." Certificates MWI that MWI to attested it had submit on a fifty paid only "Disbursement Supplier's Disbursement Supplier's "regular commissions" in connection with the pump sales. Thus, MWI submitted eight Letter of Credit Supplier's Certificates and fifty Disbursement Supplier's Certificates to Ex-Im. 1 In 1998, Relator Robert Purcell, a former employee of MWI, filed this action against MWI under the FCA [Dkt. No. 1] He alleged that MWI paid commissions in excess of 30 percent of the contract prices for the irrigation pumps and equipment to its long-time Nigerian ,, 35-37. Purcell "irregular" sales agent, alleged that Alhaji those Mohammed Indimi. Id. commission payments were and thus should have been disclosed on all of the Supplier's Certificates that MWI submitted to Ex-Im. Id. 1 MWI argued for the first time in its Response that the Complaint identified only 48 Disbursement Supplier's Certificates and did not identify any Letter of Credit Supplier's Certificates. MWI Resp. at 10. At trial, MWI did not challenge the Government's evidence or testimony regarding 58 total Supplier's Certificates, and therefore the Court accepts these figures as correct. -3- In April of 2002, and filed a ("Complaint") the United States decided to intervene, complaint which [Dkt. 18] . No. commissions paid to Indimi, then Based governed in part the proceedings on the amount of which at the time was estimated to be approximately $28 million dollars, 2 the Complaint alleged two violations of the FCA (Counts I and II) and two claims for unjust enrichment and payment by mistake common law (Counts III and IV) The case was litigated for several years before Judge Ricardo M. Urbina. After Judge Urbina's retirement, the case was reassigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, and then to this Court. After resolving many pre-trial motions, the case went to trial on November 6, 2013. Counts I and II of the Complaint, the FCA violations, were to be decided by the jury. It was instructed that, that MWI had violated the FCA, if it found it was to identify the specific number of false claims and then "assess the amount of damages, 2 At trial, the Government argued that MWI had paid $25 million dollars in commissions to Indimi, not $28 million. See, e.g., Pls. Opening St., Trial Tr. Nov. 8, 2013, A.M. Session at 25:912 (telling jury it needed "to decide whether MWI knew or should have known that the $25 million payment to Mr. Indimi was irregular and that it should have been disclosed"); Pls. Closing Arg., Trial Tr. Nov. 21, 2013, A.M. Session at 50:20-22 ("$25 million in Ex-Im funds went into the bank account of MWI's Nigerian agent Alhaji Indimi."); id. at 76:10-12 (suggesting that amount United States "unknowingly paid to Mr. Indimi," $25 million, be considered as measure of damages) . -4- if any, that the [G] overnment sustained because of MWI' s acts." Closing Instructions, 41:13:18 (quoting Trial Tr. 31 U.S.C. Nov. 21, 2013 A.M. 3729(a) (1), § which Session at states that defendant is liable for "3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person"). Iri order to assess the appropriate amount of damages, the jury was instructed, under United States v. Science Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1278-79 (D.C. Cir. 2010), that damages were "the amount of money the government paid because of the false claims over and above what it would have paid had MWI not made the false claims," and that it would need to "set an award that puts the would have been in false." Closing [G] overnment if the in the defendant's Instructions, Trial Tr. same position claims Nov. had 21, as it not been 2013 A.M. Session at 41:19-24. 3 On November Plaintiffs on 25, both dismissed Counts III 2013, Counts the I jury and and IV of returned II. The the Complaint, a verdict Government for then its common law claims, with prejudice. Trial Tr. Nov. 25, 2013, A.M. Session at 22:18-20. 3 The Government did not object to the damages instructions. MWI objected, arguing that the Court should instruct the jury that the Government also had to prove proximate causation and actual reliance. Closing Instructions, Trial Tr. Nov. 20, 2013, P.M. Session at 121:22-25. It had no other objections to the instruction. Id. 122:10-12. -5- B. Standard of Review Under the FCA, [the "if finds jury] liability, its instruction is to return a verdict for actual damages, for which the court court alone alone then sets determines any any multiplier, separate penalty." Cook U.S.C. § calculate 3729(a)). the Thus, it as the Ill. Cty., United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 132 31 just v. (2003) is now the Court's "civil penalty of not less than $5,000 (citing job to and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government § sustains because of" MWI' s actions. See 31 U.S. C. 3729 (a) The "chief purpose of the (Act's civil penalties) was to provide for restitution to the government of money taken from it by fraud, and that the device of [treble] damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure that the government would be made completely whole." United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 314 317 U.S. (1976) 537, (citing United States ex rel. ·Marcus v. 551-52 (1943)). Hess, In order to make the Government "whole," the Supreme Court has instructed that "the Government's actual damages are to be made for compensatory [trebled] payments before any subtractions are previously received Government from any source." Bornstein, 423 U.S. at 316. -6- by the C. Actual Damages First, the jury found that MWI knowingly presented 58 false or fraudulent claims for payment to the Government, in violation of 31 U.S.C. Second, it § 3729(a) (1). found that Verdict Form, the amount of at 1 [Dkt. damages No. the 453]. Government sustained because of those claims was $7,500,000. Id. The records jury and/or Government's claims Verdict also for false decision payment, Form, Government found at that MWI statements to pay or in found that sustained that because were approve violation It 2. knowingly of of or U.S.C. § amount those 58 material false 31 the made of false to the fraudulent 3729(a) (2). damages records false the or statements was $7,500,000. The Government concedes that the damages for both counts is $7,500,000. total U.S. only party that disagrees is the Relator, amount Mot. of 3 at actual 1. The who argues that the jury intended to award $7.5 million in damages for each count, for a total of $15 million. Relator Resp. at 2-3. Relator's argument that the jury split the amount of damages between the two counts is nothing more than speculation. Relator ignores the important fact that the jury identified the same 58 Supplier's Certificates for both Counts. At trial, Government argued that each of the -7- 58 the Supplier's Certificates constituted a Closing Arg., false claim and/or Trial Tr. Nov. 21, a false statement. Pls.' 2013, A.M. Session at 62:12-13 ("MWI's certifications on the 58 Supplier's Certificates that it submitted to Ex-Im were false."). Thus, jury determined that the same conduct, Supplier's Certificates, was a it is clear that the the submission of the 58 violation of both Count I and Count II. To aggregate the two sums would be to punish MWI twice for the same conduct, which would "amount to a double recovery." See Kakeh v. 122 (D.D.C. permitted United Planning Org., 2009) to Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 107, ("It is well-settled that a plaintiff is not recover multiple awards for the same injury.") (citing supporting cases) . The jury found that the 58 false certifications damaged the Government by $7,500, 000 and therefore that is the amount of actual damages. D. Treble Damages An entity found liable for a violation of the FCA is liable for "3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person." 31 U.S. C. § 3 72 9 (a) . The parties agree that the first step in calculating treble damages is to treble the actual damages amount. at 316. Thus, the treble damages $22,500,000. -8- See Bornstein, 423 U.S. amount is $7,500,000 x 3 E. Offset for Compensatory Payments Under Bornstein The real and difficult issue in the calculation of total damages is whether, under Bornstein, MWI is entitled to an offset of the $108 received from the million dollars federal that the Ex-Im eventually Nigerian government as repayment of the loans at issue. 1. Bornstein United States v. Bornstein involved with a prime contractor, a Government contract Model Engineering. for 423 U.S. radio kits at 307. A subcontractor, United, knowingly sold Model Engineering electron tubes for inclusion in the radio kits that did not conform to the specifications Government of discovered the the Government nonconforming After contract. electron tubes, the Model Engineering paid the Government the difference in value between the radio kits as specified in the contract and the radio kits as supplied with the nonconforming electron tubes. Id. Subsequently, the Government sued United under the FCA and prevailed. Id. at 308. A key issue before the Supreme Court was whether the amount of damages owed by United to the Government should be offset by the amount of Model Engineering's payments to the Government, or whether the amount of damages should be -9- doubled 4 before Engineering's Government any subtractions should Id. 314. payments. did not argue at that Model be made for Model Significantly, Engineering's the payments should not be deducted at all -- the question was when to deduct the payments. "abandoned" See the id. at position n. 9 314 that (noting that "any Government compensatory payments had it received should not be deducted from its statutory damages at all"). After evaluating the "language and purpose" of the FCA, the Supreme Court concluded that, "in computing the double damages authorized by the Act, the Government's actual damages are to be doubled before any subtractions are made for compensatory payments previously received by the Government from any source." Id. at .316-17. 2. Issue Presented It is undisputed that Nigeria eventually paid approximately $108 million to the Ex-Im on the loans at issue the $74.3 million dollar principal and $33.7 million dollars in interest and that fees. MWI Nigeria argues paid that, the under Bornstein, Government 4 should the be $108 million considered The FCA was amended in 1986 and now provides for treble, not double, damages. See Cook Cty., Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 129-30 (2003) (discussing Congressional modernization of FCA in 1986, including raising the ceiling on damages from double to treble) . -10- "compensatory from any payments source" previously subtracted and received from damages MWI owes the Government. exceeds damages, the $22.5 MWI million MWI insists that, by the the Government amount of treble Because the $108 million far owes the government as after applying the offset, treble it owes nothing to the Government in damages. MWI also argues that an offset for these payments is mandatory under Bornstein and that the Court has no discretion about whether or not to apply it in this case. MWI Mem. at 2-4. That is incorrect. Bornstein did not define what constituted a "compensatory payment," nor did it address the argument raised by the Government in this case that certain compensatory payments need not be deducted from statutory damages. at 314 n.9. Moreover, the Bornstein Court did not 423 U.S. address a situation where the compensatory payments to be subtracted are larger than the single damages amount, much less, as in this case, entirely dwarf the treble damages amount. Thus, there are several questions raised in this case that were neither raised nor addressed in Bornstein. that Bornstein resolves this issue ignores the complexity of the issue. -11- without MWI' s argument further analysis 3. MWI's Alleged "Influence" of Nigeria's Repayment The Government's first argument is that the Nigerian loan repayments were not "compensatory payments" because they were only made after MWI lobbied Nigeria to repay its loans at the expense of other loans due the Ex-Im. U.S. Mot. at 3-5. For the reasons set out below, failed to government prove to the Court concludes that the Government that repay MWI the did MWI in fact loans lobby after the learning Nigerian that its conduct was being investigated. Nor has the Government provided any evidence that Nigeria would have paid off other loans to the Ex-Im if it had not paid off the MWI loans. The primary evidence the Government identifies in support of its argument is the deposition testimony of Steve Ahaneku, a Nigerian attorney. Ahaneku did not testify at trial, nor did the Government call him as a witness at the damages hearing. Instead, the Government relies on Ahaneku's deposition testimony that "someone at Nigerian officials [MWI] talked to [him] specifically about about repaying talking the to the EXIM loans that related to the Eight-State Projects." U.S. Mot. Ex. 2 at 3. 5 Based on this deposition testimony, that after MWI "became aware of a 5 the Government argues criminal investigation into Though the parties did not raise the issue, this testimony would likely have been inadmissible at trial as hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 802. -12- their conduct," MWI paid Ahaneku "to convince Nigerian officials to pay off the MWI loan while other Exim loans were in default." U.S. Mot. at 3. The testimony clearly does not support this having these allegation. The Government's conversations assertion that Ahaneku was "right around the time" investigation is incorrect. that MWI discovered the Ahaneku identified the time period when he was asked to speak to Nigerian officials about repaying the loans as between 1995, 1996, and 1997. Id. at 2. Although the parties dispute when MWI became aware of the investigation into its conduct, the Government does not suggest that MWI was aware of any investigation prior to December 1998. U.S. Resp. 7 n.3. That discussing date is in his well after deposition. the Thus, period that Ahaneku' s Ahaneku was testimony about speaking to Nigerian officials in the mid-1990s does not support the Government's assertion about what MWI did after it became aware of the investigation in the late 1990s. Second, Ahaneku's testimony does not support the Plaintiffs' argument that MWI lobbied Nigerian officials to pay off the MWI loans because MWI feared future liability. Ahaneku testified that MWI sought to discuss the Instead, loans with Nigerian officials because "officials come and go." Id. Ex. 2 at 2. Ahaneku noted that MWI was interested in assuring that the -13- loans were repaid because outstanding obligation. "it is an obligation, it's an The name is associated with it so they would like it to be tidied up." Id. at 3. The Government did not cite to any other portions of Ahaneku's deposition that impeach the credibility of cite to any this other witness testimony or his or testimony, evidence that nor did contradicts it the testimony. 6 Consequently, Court that Ahaneku' s the fact that, conduct, the Government testimony has failed stands for to persuade anything other the than before MWI knew about any investigation into its its agent spoke to Nigerian officials in an attempt to ensure that loans that involved MWI were repaid. Other supports evidence its testimony of allegations. James stated that Nigeria U.S. there Mot. at 4, was marshaled by the Ex. "nothing Hess, The Government Government Ex- Im' s "singled out" Chief However, improper" about the Financial the MWI 3 at 1. notes also loans fails to deposition Officer, who for repayment. Hess also testified that Nigeria choosing to make those payments, and that the Ex-Im would "rather have that money than not have it." Id. at 2. The lawsuit, 6 Government in 2002, emphasizes that after MWI knew about it retained an American lawyer, Naturally, there was the deposition. an opportunity for -14- this Warren Glick, cross-examination at to determine Nigeria's indebtedness on the MWI loans. U.S. Mot. at 4. The Government argues that MWI paid Glick to request information about the loans from the Ex-Im under the Freedom of Information Act ( "FOIA") , information used remaining and balance. it Id. at and to insinuates influence 4-5. Again, that MWI Nigeria the took to repay the does not evidence that support the Government's chain of inferences. The record shows that the vast majority of the loans were repaid well in advance of Glick's FOIA request. 7 Indeed, Ex-Im's response to Glick's FOIA request states that the remaining balance on the loans was approximately $270,000. U.S. Mot. Ex. 5 at 2. That constitutes less than 1% of the entire amount of the loans in question. In addition, the Government has presented no evidence that anyone from MWI interacted-with Nigerian officials about the MWI loans after the FOIA request was made. Thus, the evidence its cited by the Government simply does not support allegations. In addition, the Court notes that, even if the Government had identified evidence that MWI petitioned Nigeria to pay off 7 Approximately 42% of the loans were repaid by December 1998, the earliest date the Government suggests MWI could have known about an investigation into its conduct. See Def. Exs. 321, 331, 364, 370, 382, 397, 416, 424. The loans were almost entirely paid off by May 3, 2001, over seven months before MWI received a copy of the Relator's Complaint and sent its FOIA request to the Ex-Im. See id.; see also U.S. Mot. Ex. 5 at 2 (Glick's FOIA request, dated January 16, 2002). -15- the MWI loans, such actions would not have been inappropriate. The Government cites no law, from lobbying Nigeria to regulation, or case precluding MWI take particular actions within Nigeria 1 s discretion. 8 See MWI Mem. at Ex. 3 at 6 (Hess testimony that there was nothing "inappropriate or impropertt about Nigeria choosing to repay the MWI loans) . The Government fails to acknowledge the indisputable fact that Nigeria has the right to pay off its debts in whatever order it chooses. The Government tries to avoid this fact by inferring that, had MWI not petitioned the Nigerian government to pay off the MWI loans,· Nigeria would have applied those funds to other Ex-Im loans. Again, proposition. it Thus, provides the no evidence Government 1 S to support argument is that pure speculation. Since the Government has failed to provide a factual basis for its allegation that Nigeria repaid the loans in question at MWI, s behest, or that Nigeria did so at loans to the Ex-Im, the expense of other the Court rejects the Government,s argument that Nigeria 1 s repayments were not "compensatory payments. 11 8 Moreover, the evidence at trial showed that the Ex-Im actually required MWI to lobby Nigeria to repay other loans it owed to the Government as a prerequisite to granting the loans in this case. Test. of William Bucknam, Trial Tr. Nov. 8, 2013 P.M. Session at 51:7-53:2 (testifying that Ex-Im officials required MWI to collect unrelated arrearages from Nigeria in order to make credits operative) . -16- 4. "Compensatory Payments" The next issue that Nigerian loan repayments must are be addressed "compensatory is whether payments'' the under Bornstein. 9 Neither the parties nor the Court have identified any factually-comparable provides helpful case guidance under on the this False issue. Claims In Act that the absence of specific guidance, the Court looks to Bornstein and its progeny. As noted above, the Government did not argue in Bornstein that prime contractor Model Engineering's settlement payments to the Government Government argue were that not compensatory payments, compensatory payments nor did should not the offset 9 MWI claims that the Government is judicially estopped from • arguing that the Nigerian repayments are not "compensatory." MWI Resp. at 2-3. A court may invoke judicial estoppel "where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, succeeds in maintaining that position, and then, simply because his interests have changed, assumes a contrary position." Moses v. Howard Uni v. Hosp., 606 F. 3d 789, 798 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) . MWI points out that the Government argued before trial that evidence of Nigerian repayment should not be presented to the jury specifically because the repayments were compensatory payments under Bornstein. Id. (citing United States' Mot. Seeking Reconsideration of the Court's Damages Rulings, at 4-5 [Dkt. No. 416] ) This Court did not adopt the Government's position that the Nigerian repayments were "compensatory payments" that would necessarily offset any damages. See Order on Mot. for Reconsideration at 8 [Dkt. No. 425] (noting that if the jury determined the Government suffered damages, "the Court will then decide" whether MWI is entitled to a reduction based on Nigeria's repayments) (emphasis added) . Thus, the Government did not "succeed" in maintaining its position, and judicial estoppel is inapplicable. -17- the FCA liability of the subcontractor. The only question was when the payments should be used to offset liability -- before or after calculation of treble damages. See 423 U.S. at 314 n.9 (noting that Government compensatory payments "abandoned" it the position that "any received should not be deducted from its statutory damages at all"). The Supreme abandoned this Court posited position that "for the the Government reason that may have since United is liable to Model for Model's payment to the United States, United would in effect be assessed triple damages under such a rule." Id. ThGs, case the Court recognized the basic principle that, involving Government is accordingly. joint a See shared United tortfeasors, liability States the that ex to liability must rel. be Bunk in a the apportioned Birkart v. Globistics, Nos. 1:02-cv-1168, 1:07-cv-1198, 2011 WL 5005313, at *16 (E.D. Va. Oct. 19, 2012) ("It is generally agreed that when a plaintiff settles with one of several joint tortfeasors, non-settling settlement.") v. defendants are entitled (citation omitted); Bill Harbert Int'l Constr., (D.D.C. 2007) to a credit for United States ex rel. Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 51, the that Miller 54-55 (noting that "where there is a settlement between the plaintiff and one defendant, the liability of the remaining non-settling defendants must be calculated with reference to the -18- jury's allocation responsibility") of the (internal defendant's non-settling quotation citation and marks omitted). That reasoning could be used to distinguish this case, because no evidence was presented nor argument made that Nigeria should be jointly or severally liable for MWI' s See United States v. Iowa 2008) for anothe~ 562 F. Supp. 2d 1017, claims. 1025 (N.D. (noting that Bornstein does not stand for "the broad proposition that credit Hawley, false any party," proposition a defendant amounts but that a in a recovered instead FCA case by the "stands tortfeasor, for such is United the as entitled to a States quite a from different subcontractor, is entitled to a credit for compensation that the United States has recovered from another tortfeasor, such as a prime contractor"). However, the majority of post-Bornstein cases have not made this distinction. Rather, the cases have applied Supreme the Court's statement in Bornstein that the offset encompasses "compensatory payments previously U.S. 316 at arisen in received (emphasis cases where from In added) loans made payments on loans, the -19- source" particular, individuals fraudulently procuring federal those any were literally. this found issue liable 423 has for but the beneficiaries of underlying loans to the Government. See United States 49253, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, entitled offset to v. Heck, 1987) including No. 08-0875, 1987 WL (holding that defendant was "amounts recovered from other parties"); United States v. Ekelman & Ass'n, Inc., 531 F.2d 545, 547 (6th Cir. 1976) (decided holding that offset the should include veteran-mortgagor Globe Remodeling Co., pre-Bornstein, that immediately after by the 196 F. offset "any amount government") ; Supp. for Bornstein and 652 United (D. Vt. "repayments recovered from States 1960) to the v. (finding, government from the borrowers who defaulted" should be made "after doubling the original losses"). Evaluating this line of cases, the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico observed: Nothing in these cases holds or suggests that Bornstein's recoupment rule turns on the nature or sdurce of the particular recoupment. Indeed, Bornstein itself forecloses such an interpretation. Bornstein twice emphasized that its holding applies to subsequent payments received from the government "from any source." United States v. at *11. (D.P.R. Irizarry-Colon, June 9, 2006) No. 05-1607, 2006 WL 6911517, (quoting Bornstein, 423 U.S. at 316) The Government has brought no case to the attention of this Court that underlies holds that third-party payments on a loan that FCA liability should not be considered "compensatory -20- payments." In the absence of any contrary precedent, this Court finds that previously Nigeria's received repayments from any "compensatory are source," and payments should thus offset MWI's liability. 5. The Limitation on the Amount Loss" Government repayments are argues that, of if even "compensatory payments" Offset and to "Original loan Nigeria's should offset the amount MWI owes in damages, the Court should limit the amount of the offset to the "original loss" of $7.5 million dollars. To justify its Court must amount reasoning, the Government segregate Nigeria's repayment repaid and the amount it into the repaid portion of the loan." U.S. Resp. at 2-3. otherwise would allow separate obligations "doublecounting," argues that on the "legitimate" "the fraudulent It insists that to do because there are two -- Nigeria's original obligation to repay the loans and MWI's new obligation to pay damages. Id. The Government has identified no precedent from either the Supreme Court or our Court of Appeals that has applied such an analysis. courts Its argument evaluated Defendant had restitution how rests to on calculate pleaded guilty prior to a two and civil a in which Bornstein paid FCA -21- cases an suit. offset amount U.S. in Resp. district when a criminal at 5-6 (discussing United States ex rel. Schaefer v. ContiMed Concepts No. II 04-400 11 ) Cal. 2010 WL 1485660 1 and United States v. 2007)) (W.D. Ky. Apr. 12 Eghbal These cases are 475 F. 1 2010) 1 Supp. 1 ("Schaefer 2d 1008 (C.D. factually distinguishable and do not provide sufficient support for the Government s position. 1 Eghbal pleaded guilty to criminal charges of conspiring to defraud the United States by fraudulently assisting purchasers to obtain mortgages insured by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in connection with the sale of 62 properties. Eghbal, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. He paid $1,346,220 in criminal restitution based on those 62 properties. Amended Judgment and Commitment Order/ Cal. Jan. 27 The 1 United States v. 1 No. 03-cr-465 (C.D. 2004). Government then brought based on 27 of the 62 properties. Government Eghbal sought damages of an FCA suit against Eghbal 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. The $2.8 million, trebled to $8.4 million/ less $2.1 million it recovered on re-sale and "Eghbal's restitution payments of $499,387. The Government argues district court compensatory has payment that discretion as an Id. 11 this to case demonstrates apply offset. The only a Court that portion of disagrees. a a The parties in Eghbal did not dispute that the portion of the $1.3 million restitution payment that -22- related to the 27 loans at issue in the civil suit was $499,387. Id. This comports with the facts underlying the Government's civil suit the FCA suit only related to 27 of the 67 loans at issue in Eghbal's criminal proceeding. Thus, the district court was not choosing to apply a portion of Eghbal's compensatory payments -- the court was only applying the portion of Eghbal's restitution that was, in fact, compensatory, based on the scope of the FCA case. Schaefer is similar. Defendant Conti pleaded guilty to one count of altering a prescription in 2007. See United States ex rel. Schaefer v. ContiMed Concepts, No. 04-400, 2009 WL 5104149, at *2 (W.D. almost Ky. Dec. $80,000 in 17, 2009) criminal ("Schaefer I"). restitution Conti then paid to the Center for Medicare Services and the State of Kentucky for various schemes and conspiracies to alter and falsify medical records, including the altered prescription underlying Judgment and Commitment Order, cr-152 his criminal United States v. Conti, No. 06- (W.D. Ky. March 24, 2008); Order, United States v. Conti, No. 06-cr-152 (W.D. Ky. July 27, 2009). The Government brought a civil FCA suit, Court found that, from liability. denying the based on the guilty plea, elements prescription under 31 U.S.C. 5104149, at *6. of § one Conti was estopped claim 3729(a) (2). and the District of Schaefer I, The court later found that the -23- falsifying a 2009 WL "actual damages from that single count [were] $404.24. Schaefer II, 11 2010 WL 1485660, at *3. It trebled that amount, and found that Conti was liable for $1212.72, in addition to a civil penalty of $5,500, for a total of $6,712.72. Id. Conti argued that the approximately $80,000 he had paid in criminal restitution should offset his entire civil judgment. Id. The Government argued that "only the compensatory portion of the judgment should be offset, id., 11 and the Court subtracting only "the compensatory component, $404.24, 11 agreed, from the civil judgment. Id. at *4. Thus, the Schaefer and Eghbal courts portion of factual conduct subsequent the criminal restitution underlying FCA case the payment false claim related at issue should be offset under Bornstein. the excess amounts paid in criminal unrelated conduct, found that only the to the in the Because restitution were paid for the Court refused to apply those amounts as an offset. Here, the Government argued, and the jury found, that Defendant was liable for its certifications on all 58 Supplier's Certificates related to the eight Nigerian loans. repayments were related to those same eight The Nigerian Nigerian loans. Thus, Schaefer and Eghbal do not provide guidance in a situation -24- such as this one, where the entire amount paid by Nigeria is unquestionably related to the underlying false claims. The Government makes a public policy argument that allowing Nigeria's will repayments "severely accountable to offset undermine for the entirety Congress's defrauding the intent United However, to States from engaging in similar misconduct." U.S. omitted). into Court payments will made and defendants deter at 6 others (citation and to divide Nigeria's non-compensatory payments in that the jury found liability for all of the loans in their entirety. this liability neither the language of the statute nor any compensatory light of the fact MWI hold Resp. prior case provides support fdr this Court repayments of Thus, subtract by the Nigeria instructed in Bornstein. in accord with the cases cited, full from amount the 423 U.S. at of trebled 316 the damage compensatory amount, (holding that as "actual damages are to be doubled before any subtractions are made for compensatory payments previously received by the Government from any source") (emphasis added) . This result accords with the Supreme Court's declaration in Bornstein that "the device of [treble] sum was chosen to make sure that completely whole." taken by MWI to Id. at persuade 314. the damages plus a the government would be made Despite Government -25- specific the to fraudulent make these actions loans, •· they were Indeed, in fact paid back the Government in full received a with total interest o"f and fees. approximately $108 million on these loans from Nigeria -- $33.7 million more than the largest amount it pursued in damages, $74.3 million. That $33.7 million alone exceeds the $22.5 million in treble damages owed by MWI. Thus, the Government has whole" because of Nigeria's repayments, been and, "made thus, completely granting MWI an offset for those payments does not conflict with Bornstein. The Court also notes that this outcome is in accord with United States ex rel. Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 679 F.3d 832 (D.C. Columbia Cir. 2012). Davis submitting a supporting documentation. however, Medicaid sued the District reimbursement Id. at claim 834. Davis of without did not for adequate allege, that any medical services that the Government paid for were not provided. Id. at 840. Thus, because the only defect was documentary, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court's conclusion that "[t]he Government got what it paid for and there are no damages." Id. Although the factual and procedural posture of that case is very different, Davis still stands for the proposition that there are cases where fraud on the Government has occurred but, because the Government has gotten what it paid for, the Government's recovery is limited to civil penalties. -26- In short, the Court concludes that, contradictory precedent, dollars repaid by in the absence of any the Court will apply the $108 million Nigeria against the $22.5 million trebled damage amount. Thus, MWI owes nothing in damages. 10 F. Civil Penalties The Court now turns to the appropriate amount of statutory civil penalties which should be imposed. 11 The FCA establishes a statutory penalty of $5,000 to $10,000 for each false claim or false statement. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (establishes that liable entity must pay "civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000"). 10 The jury identified 58 false claims. 12 If Congress agrees with the Government that this result is undesirable, it could change either the wording of the treble damage provision or increase the civil penalties, as it has done in the past. See, e.g., False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L .. 99-562, § 2 (7), 100 Stat. 3153 (raising the civil fines and changing the multiplier for damages from double to treble). 11 MWI did not argue that it was entitled to any offset against the amount it owes in statutory civil penalties. 12 MWI initially agreed with Plaintiffs that the jury's determination that MWI made 58 false claims provided the appropriate number of penal ties. However, in its Response, MWI argued for the first time that the Complaint did not identify the eight Letter of Credit Supplier's Certificates and only identified 48 Disbursement Supplier's Certificates, and now argues that 48 was the appropriate number of false claims for the Court to use in setting civil penalties. MWI Resp. at 10. As noted above, see supra note 1, MWI did not challenge the Government's testimony or evidence at trial identifying 58 total Supplier's Certificates issued on the underlying loans at issue in this case. The jury found each of those documents to be a false claim and/ or false statement. Thus, MWI' s belated challenge to the jury's finding will be denied, and the Court -27- The parties agree that the appropriate range for the statutory penalties is $5,000 to $10,000. 13 The determination of the appropriate statutory civil penalty is firmly discretion of the district court. Bill Harbert, at 56 (citing Cook County, agree that the circumstances" Court in 538 U.S. should determining the 501 F. Supp. 2d at 132) . The parties also consider the within the "totality appropriate of the amount of penalties. U.S. Mot. at 7; MWI Mem. at 16. As the district court observed in Bill Harbert: Though there is no defined set of criteria by which to assess the proper amount of civil penal ties against the defendant, the Court finds that an approach considering the totality of the circumstances, including such factors as the seriousness of the misconduct, the scienter of the defendants, and the amount of damages suffered by the United States as a result of the misconduct is the most appropriate. will set civil penalties based on the 58 false claims identified by the jury. 13 The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 ("Adjustment Act"), Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 5, provides for periodic increases to civil monetary penal ties. In 1996, the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 was passed, and it included the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 ("Improvement Act"). Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 31001. The Improvement Act amended the Adjustment Act to require the head of each agency to regularly adjust civil penalties for inflation. Id. § 13001(s) (1) (A). In 1999, the Department of Justice complied by issuing regulations raising such penalties, including False Claims Act penalties. 64 Fed. Reg. 47,099, 47,903-04 (Aug. 30, 1999). However, the regulations specified that the increase was only "effective for violations occurring on or after September 29, 1999." Id. 47,903. The parties agree that the conduct at issue here took place before that date, and, thus, MWI is not subject to the increased penalties. -28- 501 F. Supp. 2d at 56 the circumstances, factors, (citation omitted). Under the totality of including consideration of the enumerated the Court finds that the appropriate penalty is $10,000 per false claim for the following reasons. First, the Court finds that the evidence regarding scienter weighs in favor of a high penalty in this case. the Court President finds of that there was had actual knowledge MWI, evidence Specifically, that that the Mr. Eller, commissions should have been disclosed. When repeatedly asked whether or not Indimi's commissions were disclosed on Supplier's the Certificates, Eller refused to answer directly. Instead, he kept repeating that MWI "would have never done anything wrong." Test. of David Eller, 108:17; Trial Tr. 111:10-112-1 Nov. 8, 2013, A.M. Session at 106:6- (the Court asking Eller the question). insisted he was "just an engineer," id. at 109:21, He and claimed that he signed the Supplier's Certificates on the advice of his attorney, William Bucknam, or his Chief Financial Officer, Thomas Roegiers. Id. at 107:6-13; 109:10-21; 111:2-3; 113:12-14. However, approved MWI every employees commission testified MWI that personally including Indimi's Trial Tr. Nov. 19, 2013, paid, commissions. Test. of Thomas Roegiers, Eller A.M. Session at 20:9-23; Test. of Juan Ponce, Trial Tr. Nov. 13, 2013, A.M Session at 9:22-10:8, -29- 14:14-21. Moreover, Eller testified that MWI never paid any other agent on any other combined project a total commission of more than $5 million, far less than some of projects. would the commissions Indimi was paid for single Id. at 120:11-22. Thus, despite his protests that MWI never engage in wrongdoing, several signed Eller Supplier's Certificates declaring that no irregular commissions had been paid even though he knew that Indimi's commissions were significantly higher than average commission rates, even within MWI. Second, deliberate the evidence misconduct, of which actual goes to suggests knowledge the seriousness of the offense. Juan Ponce, MWI's Vice President of International Sales and a credible witness, "we testified, knew that we were violating . the rules. We just hoped that we would never get caught." of Test. Juan Ponce, Trial Tr. Nov. 13, 2013, A.M. Session at 35:3-4. This evidence that MWI deliberately withheld information about acquire financing Indimi' s supports commissions a finding from Ex-Im in order to that "the conduct was deliberate and serious enough to weigh in favor of applying the maximum civil penalty." Bill Harbert, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 56. Third, the Court considers the "amount of damages suffered" by the Government. The harm to the Government was more than monetary -- it went to the integrity and purposes of the Ex-Im's -30- programmatic goals. See Test. of Rita Rodriguez, Nov. 14, 2013, A.M. Session at 20:1-7 (discussing Ex-Im's goals to support U.S. jobs and to avoid any involvement with bribery) . Given that approximately a third of the total loan amount went to a single Nigerian individual, the goal of the Ex-Im to finance loans that primarily benefit U.S. exporters and workers was not achieved. Test. of David Chavern, Trial Tr. Nov. 12, 2013, A.M. Session at (noting that 70:16-21 primarily to "purpose of the bank's financing finance commissions; it's to is not finance the export of goods and services"); see also Ab-Tech Const., Inc. v. United States, 31 (noting that are the penal ties costs of Fed. Cl. 429, intended to corruption," (Fed Cl. 434-35 1994) "compensate the Government which include the associated with abuse of a federal program) "societal for cost" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) . The Court also notes that the Government expended a massive amount of resources to pursue this case over the years. In the damages hearing, Government counsel represented that over 11,000 hours had been spent on the case. This consideration is relevant to determining the appropriate civil penalty. Int'l, 2007) Inc. v. United States, (considering investigating that 79 Fed. Government and prosecuting this -31- See Morse Diesel Cl. 116, 125-26 had case to "spent date" (Fed. Cl. 13 in years deciding maximum civil Peters, 927 penalties F. Supp. were 363, "the costs of detection, of appropriate civil warranted); 368-69 (D. United Neb. States v. (considering 1996) investigation and prosecution" as part penalties); Ab-Tech, 31 Fed Cl. at 435 (determining that maximum civil penalty was "fully justified in light of the extensive diversion of resources" that uncovering defendant's fraud necessitated). Considering the concludes that a totality of civil penalty the of circumstances, $10,000 per the Court false claim provides appropriate deterrence, reflects the seriousness of the misconduct actual and evidence of knowledge, and helps compensate the Government for the incredible amount of resources invested in identifying and litigating this lengthy case to successful conclusion. G. Conclusion The jury found that MWI violated the False Claims Act by making 58 false claims and that the Government suffered $7.5 million dollars in damages. Even after the damages are trebled, the amount its loss. that Nigeria repaid compensated the Government MWI is responsible, however, penalties. -32- for $580,000 for in civil An Order directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion. ~~~· February 10, 2014 Gla ys Kess er United States District Judge Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF -33-

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