FENWICK v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

Filing 94

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting defendants Pudimott and Fischer's Motion for Entry of Judgment; judgment is entered for Deputy Pudimott on Count I of Fenwick's complaint; and judgment is entered for Deputy Fischer on Count I of Fenwick's complaint. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on March 24, 2016. (MA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., )
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )
MICHAEL FENWICK,

Civil Action No. 07-2330 (PLF)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Andrew Pudimott and Jeremy
Fischer’s Motion for Entry of Judgment [Dkt. 86]. The Court will grant the motion.`
Count I of plaintiff Michael Fenwick’s Complaint seeks damages for alleged
violations of his Fourth Amendment rights and the common law torts of false imprisonment,
assault, and battery from three individual defendants — Deputy United States Marshalls Andrew
Pudimott, Jeremy Fischer, and John Mickle — under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Complaint ¶¶ 1, 39-40 [Dkt. 1]. Count II seeks
damages for the common law torts from the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (“FTCA”). Complaint ¶¶ 41-42.
The Court previously dismissed the common law tort claims against the
individual officer defendants, but allowed all other claims to proceed to discovery. Fenwick v.
United States, 691 F. Supp. 2d 108, 114 (D.D.C. 2010). The Court then granted summary
judgment to the United States on Fenwick’s FTCA claim for false imprisonment in Count II, and
to Deputy Mickle on Fenwick’s Bivens claim in Count I, the only remaining claim against

Deputy Mickle. Fenwick v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 2d 201, 223 (D.D.C. 2013). But the
Court also denied summary judgment to Deputies Pudimott and Fischer on Fenwick’s Bivens
claim in Count I because a genuine issue of material fact precluded the Court from determining
that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 225-230. The Court found that Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Fenwick from attempting to prove facts in the present
federal civil rights action that contradict those that Judge Broderick found in Fenwick’s juvenile
proceeding in District of Columbia Superior Court. Fenwick v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 2d at
218. The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that, “unlike the district court, we see no
genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment for the deputies based on
qualified immunity” because Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004), “makes clear that the
deputies’ use of deadly force violated no law that was clearly established at the time of the
shooting.” Fenwick v. Pudimott, 778 F.3d 133, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
On remand, Fenwick informed the Court that he had filed a petition asking the
Juvenile Division of the District of Columbia Superior Court to rehear his juvenile adjudication,
in order to upset the factual findings that are the basis for the Heck v. Humphrey bar. See
Fenwick’s Most Recent Update at 1-2 (Aug. 31, 2015) [Dkt. 80]. Also on remand, Deputies
Pudimott and Fischer move for the “[e]ntry of [j]udgment” and “dismiss[al]” of Count I with
prejudice. See Motion for Entry of Judgment at 1 (Jan. 29, 2016) [Dkt. 86]. Fenwick opposes
the motion because he argues that dismissal should be “without prejudice” so that he can later
file a new complaint or motion for the Court to reconsider its opinion on summary judgment —
Fenwick v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2013) — pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the event that he obtains a reversal of his juvenile

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adjudication in the District of Columbia Superior Court. See Plaintiff Fenwick’s Opposition at
2-4 (Mar. 11, 2016) [Dkt. 92].
As an initial matter, the issue of “prejudice” is only relevant if the Court chooses
to dismiss the Bivens claim in Count I against Deputies Pudimott and Fischer, not if it enters
judgment in their favor. Here, the D.C. Circuit determined, on summary judgment following full
discovery, that “it was not clearly established that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment.”
Fenwick v. Pudimott, 778 F.3d at 139. This was a full adjudication on the merits and it is now
appropriate to enter judgment in favor of Deputies Pudimott and Fischer on the only remaining
claim against them, the Bivens claim in Count I. In any event, Fenwick cannot file a new
complaint because “res judicata generally prevents parties from relitigating issues that were or
could have been raised in a prior action.” See Lauterbach v. Huerta, No. 15-1163, 2016 WL
1104793, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 22, 2016) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Nor is
there any need for him to file a new complaint. As the Court previously explained, Fenwick has
“all of the time he may need to attempt to reverse his juvenile adjudication in the District of
Columbia Superior Court,” a precondition to his filing a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for
reconsideration in this Court. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2-3 (Feb. 3, 2016) [Dkt. 87];
see also Memorandum Opinion and Order at 1 (Feb. 29, 2016) [Dkt. 90].
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants Pudimott and Fischer’s Motion for Entry of
Judgment [Dkt. 86] is GRANTED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered for Deputy Pudimott on Count I
of Fenwick’s Complaint; and it is

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FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered for Deputy Fischer on Count I of
Fenwick’s Complaint.
SO ORDERED.

/s/_________________________
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
United States District Judge
DATE: March 24, 2016

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