IN RE: NAVY CHAPLAINCY
Filing
237
MEMORANDUM OPINION to the Order denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for Modification and/or Clarification. Signed by Judge Gladys Kessler on 2/9/16. (CL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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IN RE: NAVY CHAPLAINCY
Case No. 1:07-mc-269 (GK}
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs,
65 current and former Non-liturgical Protestant
chaplains in the United States Navy, their endorsing agencies, and
a fellowship of non-denominational Christian evangelical churches,
bring this consolidated action against the Department of the Navy
and several of its officials.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
discriminated against Non-liturgical Protestant chaplains on the
basis of their religion,
maintained a culture of denominational
favoritism in the Navy, and infringed on their free exercise and
free speech rights.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs'
Modification
Dismiss
Certain
("Motion")
Motion,
and/or
[Dkt.
and
Clarification
Plaintiffs
No.
203 J
Plaintiffs'
under
of
the
to
Limitations
Upon consideration of
Plaintiffs'
[Dkt.
Opposition to the Motion [Dkt. No. 208],
______ No._ :212L and the entire record herein,
Statute
Decision
of
Errata
the
Court's
Motion for
No.
206],
Defendants'
Plaintiffs' Reply [Dkt.
and for the reasons set
forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion shall be denied.
- - -
I .
BACKGROUND
A brief
recitation of
the
facts
is
necessary
to
resolve
Plaintiffs' Motion. For a more detailed summary of the facts and
procedural history, see this Court's September 26, 2014 Memorandum
Opinion resolving the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No.
194] .
This consolidated case is composed of three cases filed by
the same counsel: Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England,
Civ.
No.
99-2945
("Adair");
and
("CFGC");
Gibson
v.
Adair v.
Dep't
England,
of
Navy,
Civ.
Civ.
No.
No.
00-566
06-1696
·("Gibson"). CFGC and Adair were filed in this Court on November 5,
1999, and March 17, 2000, respectively, and were consolidated for
pretrial purposes on September 26,
April 28,
2006,
Plaintiffs'
2000
[Adair Dkt. No.
21]. On
counsel filed Gibson as a separate
putative class action in the Northern District of Florida,
and
that case was subsequently transferred to this District pursuant
to 28 U.S.C.
§
1404. See Mem. Order, dated August 17, 2006, at 1
[Gibson Dkt. No. 1].
On June 18, 2007, the Court consolidated all three actions,
concluding that they raise "substantially similar constitutional
challenges to the Navy Chaplaincy program." Mem. Order, dated June.
18, 2007, at 4
[Dkt. No. 11]. Between 2002 and 2009, the parties
conducted discovery,
interspersed with collateral litigation and
- 2 -
three interlocutory appeals to the D.C.
request,
on October
3,
2012,
Circuit. At the Court's
Plaintiffs
filed
a
Consolidated
Complaint [Dkt. No. 134] comprised of all the claims at issue in
the consolidated case.
On September 26,
2014, the Court granted Defendants' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment,
finding that many of Plaintiffs'
claims were time-barred. 1 See Memorandum Opinion on Motions for
Partial Summary Judgment
("Summary Judgment Opinion") [Dkt.
No.
194] . The Court also ordered the parties to submit a joint Notice
identifying the
remaining
claims
following
its Order.
Id.
The
parties submitted their Notice on October 24, 2014 [Dkt. No. 199]
and a Status Conference was held on November 5, 2014.
On November 19,
2014, Plaintiffs filed their present Motion
for Modification and/or Clarification [Dkt. No.
filed
their
Opposition
on
December
18,
2014
203]. Defendants
("Opp'n")
No. 208] ,
and Plaintiffs filed their Reply on January 12,
("Reply")
[Dkt.
2015
[Dkt. No. 212].
Specifically, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants
on: "all CFGC claims based on policies or personnel actions
---fi.naI1 zea-pr ior ~Novem15er 5-,-r9-9-3;-ai-1-Aacrtr-c1.-a:.tm-s-rra:s-e-d-on
policies or personnel actions finalized prior to March 17, 1994;
and all Gibson claims based on policies or personnel actions
finalized prior to April 28, 2000." Order dated September 26, 2014
[Dkt. No. 193]
1
- 3 -
...
II.
LEGAL STANDARD 2
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (b)
discretion
to
reconsider
justice requires
at
adjudicating
the
all
its
own
interlocutory
"any time before
claims
and
the Court has
decisions
entry of
a
the
parties'
rights
held
all
the
that
as
judgment
and
liabilities[,]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Our
Court
has
consistently
Rule
54(b)
reconsideration may be granted "as justice requires.# Cobell v.
Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Judicial Watch v. Dep't
of Army,
466 F.
Supp.
2d 112,
123
(D.D.C.
2006).
Under the "as
justice requires" standard, a court may consider whether it "has
patently misunderstood a party,
has made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented to the
[c]ourt by the parties, has
made an error not of reasoning, but of apprehension, or where a
controlling
or
significant
change
in
the
law
or
facts
[has
occurred] since the submission of the issue to the court." Judicial
Watch, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 123 (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D.
2
Plaintiffs state in the first sentence of their Motion that they
also seek reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, but fail to
mention Rule 59 at any other point in their Motion or Reply. In
light of Plaintiffs' failure to pursue their Rule 59 argument and
because this Motion is more appropriately viewed as a Rule 54(b)
- ·--- ---Mori on, -Ene-Court: wi-1-1-1-i-m-1t-1c-s-arra-i-y-s-i-s--t-o-Ru-1-e-s-4-(-b-)-.--:rn-any-- ··
event, "courts have more flexibility in applying Rule 54(b) than
in determining whether reconsideration is appropriate under Rule
59(e) ." Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
- 4 -
'·
266,
272
(D.D.C.
2004)).
"Errors of apprehension may include a
Court's failure to consider
'controlling decisions or data that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by
the court.'" Singh v. George Washington Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99,
101 (D.D.C. 2005)
(quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d
255, 257 (2d Cir.1995)).
Ultimately,
determining
the
"whether
"as
justice requires"
reconsideration
is
standard amounts
necessary
under
to
the
relevant circumstances." Judicial Watch, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 123.
While the court has a great deal of discretion under 54(b), it is
limited by the law of the case doctrine and "subject to the caveat
that, where litigants have once battled for the court's decision,
they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted,
to battle for it again."
Singh,
383 F.Supp.2d at 101
(internal
citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The Court
Correctly
Jurisdictional
A.
Plaintiffs
argue
that
conclusion that 28 U.S.C.
permit
class
arguments
as
action
to
why
§
the
Court
Section
was
2401(a)
incorrect
To
in
Be
its
2401(a) is jurisdictional and does not
tolling.
the
Held
While
Court's
Plaintiffs
Summary Judgment
make
several
Opinion was
incorrect, they do not directly address why this Court is not bound
- 5 -
by our Court of Appeals' decision in Mendoza v.
1002 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Perez,
754 F.3d
3
As discussed in the Summary Judgment Opinion that Plaintiffs
ask the Court to reconsider,
that Section 2401(a)
our Court of Appeals has long held
is unlike a "normal statute of limitations"
because it "'creates a jurisdictional condition attached to the
government's waiver of sdvereign immunity" that "cannot be waived
by
the
parties"
and
is
not
subject
to
equitable
extensions.
Mendoza, 754 F.3d at 1018 (quoting P & V Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 516 F.3d 1021, 1026
(D.C. Cir. 2008)
Under this clear and controlling precedent,
(citing cases)).
the Court lacks any
authority to extend the limitations period for claims governed by
Section 2401(a).
Id.; see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 552 U.S. 130, 134 (2008)
statute
of
limitations
(observing that a "jurisdictional"
"forbid [s]
a
court
to
consider whether
certain equitable considerations warrant extending a limitations
period") .
Plaintiffs cite to Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United
States, 614 F.3d 523 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("Menominee I") and Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 764 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir.
2014) ("Menominee II"), but neither case is applicable, as they
------de-a-1-wtt_h_a_a-1f-f-ere-nt-statut-e-o-f-i-±mttattorrs--p1'.'0Vrs±-on-.-r;n-- ----- --addition, Mendoza was decided only a few months after Menominee
II; presumably the Court of Appeals was aware of its recent
decision in Menominee I I when it held that Section 2401 (a) is
jurisdictional.
3
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The Court of Appeals has acknowledged that it has "recently
questioned the continuing viability of this holding in light of
recent
Supreme
Court
decisions"
holding
that
statutes
of
limitations in actions against the Government are subject to the
same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable
suits against private defendants.
(citing P
&
to
Mendoza, 754 F.3d at 1018 n.11
V Enters., 516 F.3d at 1027
&
473 F.3d 1255, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
on the present Motion was complete,
n.2; Felter v. Kempthorne,
In addition, after briefing
the Supreme Court held that
the statute of limitations with respect to the Federal Tort Claims
Act in 28 U.S.C.
§
240l(b) was not jurisdictional because Congress
had "provided no clear statement indicating that
rare
statute
of
limitations
that
jurisdiction." United States v.
can
240l(b) is the
§
deprive
Kwai Fun Wong,
a
court
135 S. Ct.
of
1625,
1632 (2015).
However,
that
§
because our Court of Appeals has explicitly held
240l(a) is jurisdictional, and because the Supreme Court's
holding in Kwai
Fun Wong is
limited to
§
2401 (b),
this
Court
remains bound by Circuit precedent as it currently exists.
B.
The Court Correctly Denied
Limitations Period
Equitable
Tolling
of
the
Plaintrfl:s--argue that -D~~-Circui t preceaent------ariows Secc.fon-- - 240l(a)
to tolled, even if it is jurisdictional.
-
7 -
See Pls.' Mot.
at
5-8.
Plaintiffs
rely
exclusively on our
Court
of Appeals'
decision in Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
vacated and remanded on other grounds,
Hohri,
482 U.S.
64
(1987).
In
the Circuit Court held that fraudulent concealment will
toll Section 2401(a) 's six-year statute of limitations. Hohri, 782
F.2d at 247. The Circuit Court's opinion was vacated by the Supreme
Court on unrelated jurisdictional grounds. Hohri, 482 U.S. at 68.
Since
Hohri
was
vacated,
courts
in
this
circuit
have
continuously held that because Section 240l(a) is jurisdictional,
they lack the power to toll its limitation period. See W. Virginia
Highlands Conservancy v. Johnson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 125, 138 (D.D.C.
2008)
(Section 2401 (a)
has
been construed as
a
jurisdictional
statute of limitations and cannot be overcome by the application
of judicially recognized exceptions such as equitable tolling or
fraudulent
concealment) ;
Conservation Force v.
Supp. 2d 18, 27, 28 n.4 (D.D.C. 2011)
on other grounds,
1200, 1202
Salazar,
811 F.
(same), vacated and remanded
Conservation Force,
Inc.
v.
Jewell,
733 F.3d
(D.C. Cir. 2013); Appalachian Voices v. McCarthy, 989
F. Supp. 2d 30, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2013)
(same); see also John R. Sand
& Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134 (2008)
(observing
that a "jurisdictional" statute of limitations "forbid[s] a court
to
consider
whether
certain
equitable
extending a limitations period").
- 8 -
considerations
warrant
Therefore,
the Court correctly denied Plaintiffs'
requests
for equitable tolling.
C.
Amending the Complaint
Plaintiffs request the opportunity to amend their Complaint
prior to dismissal of the time-barred chaplains. Pls.' Mot. at 11.
Plaintiffs contend that amendment of the Complaint "to further
specify and clarify their continued injury by successive failures
of selection
( "FOS")
and bias
in the Reserves"
will allow six
chaplains to continue as plaintiffs. Id.
Plaintiffs'
argument
is
unavailing.
The
Consolidated
Complaint was filed in October 2012 and is over 200 pages long,
including a 75 page appendix of very detailed information of the
claims for each plaintiff. Any claims Plaintiffs thought they had
should have been included in the Consolidated Complaint.
Plaintiffs argue that they did not include subsequent FOS by
various
boards
because
they
thought
it unnecessary under D. C.
Circuit law and the law of the case. Pls.' Mot. at 11. Necessary
or not, Plaintiffs made a conscious decision not to include all of
their claims in the Consolidated Complaint or to seek amendment at
an earlier date. Although Plaintiffs may regret their decision to
omit claims by these six plaintiffs now that their claims have
been dismissed,
that is not sufficient reason to permit them to
amend their Complaint to assert the previously omitted claims.
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Plaintiffs also contend that twelve chaplains should have
been permitted to join Adair v. England as additional plaintiffs
in 2002-03, and had they been permitted to do so, they would fall
within Adair's statute of limitations. Pls.' Mot. at 14. Plaintiffs
wish to file a motion "addressing the Court's failure to allow
additional plaintiffs to join in 2002-03," but at no point do they
state what the motion will consist of or what relief they will
seek. See Pls.' Mot at 14-15, 17; Pls.' Reply at 2-6.
Given Plaintiffs' lack of specificity for why the Court should
further
delay dismissing
the
twelve
chaplains
who
purportedly
sought to join the Adair case in 2002, the Court sees no reason to
withhold dismissal
of
those
plaintiffs
whose
claims are
time-
barred.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For
the
Modification
foregoing
and/or
reasons,
Clarification
Plaintiffs'
of
the
Court's
Motion
for
Decision
to
Dismiss Certain Plaintiffs under the Statute of Limitations shall
be denied.
An Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
February 9, 2016
GladySKeSer
United States District Judge
Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF
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