HOWARD v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Filing 113

MEMORANDUM OPINION accompanying final order issued separately this day. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 6/6/13.(ah)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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GREGORY T. HOWARD,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Civil Action No. 09-1633 (EGS) (DAR)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Defendant.
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__________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action captioned “Complaint for the Tort of Negligence” [Dkt. # 1] brought pro se
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80, was referred to
Magistrate Judge Deborah Robinson for a Report and Recommendation (“Report” or “R&R”).
Judge Robinson considered Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability
[Dkt. # 77] and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 88]. In her Report issued on
March 8, 2012, Judge Robinson finds that this Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s “claim of
negligent interference with his rights under his student loan contract” and, thus, recommends
granting defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and denying as moot both
parties’ motions for summary judgment. Report [Dkt. # 102] at 4-5.
Defendant filed a timely objection, Def.’s LCvR 72.2 Objection to the R&R Ruling
Submitted by the Hon. Deborah Robinson, U.S.M.J. (“Def.’s Obj.”) [Dkt. # 103], and plaintiff
was granted leave to file his objection and response to defendant’s objection, Pl.’s Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(1) through (3) Objection to the R&R Ruling Submitted by the Hon. Deborah Robinson,

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U.S.M.J. and Response to Def.’s Obj. to the R&R Ruling Submitted by the Hon. Deborah
Robinson, U.S.M.J. (“Pl.’s Obj.”) [Dkt. # 106]. After careful consideration of the Report and
each party’s objections, the Court will sustain defendant’s objection, adopt the R&R with
modification, and overrule plaintiff’s objections. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss
will be granted and this case will be dismissed.
REVIEW STANDARD
This Court's review of the magistrate judge's R&R is governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72(b). “When a party files written objections to any part of the magistrate judge's
recommendation with respect to a dispositive motion, the Court considers de novo those portions
of the recommendation to which objections have been made, and ‘may accept, reject, or modify
the recommended decision[.]’ ” Robinson v. Winter, 457 F. Supp. 2d 32, 33 (D.D.C. 2006)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint, as supplemented [Dkt. # 9] and amended [Dkt. # 80], stems from the
Department of Education’s initial decision on August 28, 2007, to deny plaintiff’s request
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a) for a discharge of his student loans due to disability. 1 See
Compl. ¶ 4. The loans were “rightly” discharged on December 31, 2008, “based on Plaintiff’s
disability beginning September 30, 2005.” Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff claims that defendant
“administratively, negligently, and wrongfully” denied his application in August 2007, id. ¶ 4,
and seeks $12 million in damages for alleged emotional and financial injuries suffered as a result

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In the Amended Complaint, plaintiff incorporates the initial and supplemental complaints.
See Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 80] at 1. Hence the Court, consistent with its duty, where appropriate,
to read Aall of [a pro se] plaintiff=s filings together,@ Richardson v. U.S., 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), considers the original complaint operative.
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of the agency’s delay in discharging the student loans. See id. ¶¶ 8-10, 13, 16. The Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation is based solely on the FTCA’s provision excluding from suit “[a]ny
claim arising out of . . . interference with contract rights.” Report at 4-5 (citing 28 U.S.C. §
2680(h)).
Defendant’s Objection to the Report
Defendant states that it “does not object to [the] ruling or rationale” but rather asserts an
“additional rationale for dismissal” of the case. Def.’s Obj. at 1. Defendant then purports to
argue why the “complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim . . . .,” id. at 3, but it
invokes sovereign immunity, see id. at 3-4, which is a jurisdictional basis for dismissal. United
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be
sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”); see
Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. U.S., 569 F.3d 506, 512 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The extent of the
waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear the case.” ) (citation omitted). This misstep notwithstanding, the
Court agrees with defendant’s “additional rationale” for dismissing the case -- albeit under Rule
12(b)(1).
The FTCA confers in the district court jurisdiction over tort claims against the United
States for monetary damages “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The complaint alleges violations of the federal student loan
statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1087, which is administered by the U.S. Department of Education and has no
“analogous local law . . . that could support liability of a private party for similar actions . . . .”
Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 569 F.3d at 510. Hence, the Court sustains defendant’s

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objection and hereby MODIFIES Judge Robinson’s Report to include as an additional basis for
dismissal the complaint’s failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement set forth at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b).
Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report
Plaintiff asserts that Judge Robinson’s recommendation to deny his summary judgment
motion is “clearly erroneous and contrary to law” because he has stated a “claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress [“IIED”].” Pl.’s Obj. at 2. Judge Robinson notes the availability
of an IIED claim under the FTCA but suggests that dismissal of the claim is warranted under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Report at 5 n.3. However, as determined above,
the Court cannot consider the merits of the IIED claim because the statutory basis does not fit
within the limited waiver of sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and the Court “must
dismiss the action” when subject matter jurisdiction is found wanting. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff also asserts that “a reasonable fact finder could find that the Defendant acted
arbitrarily, capriciously and not in accordance with . . . the Administrative Procedure Act
[“APA”], 5 U.S.C. § 706, by not initially discharging Plaintiff’s loans . . . .” Id. (emphasis
added). The jurisdictional hurdle remains. First, the complaint seeks monetary damages, but the
sovereign’s immunity is waived under the APA for suits seeking “relief other than money
damages.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see Cohen v U.S., 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is no
doubt Congress lifted the bar of sovereign immunity in actions not seeking money damages.”)
(citation omitted). Second, the discharge of plaintiff’s student loans renders any claim for relief
under the APA moot. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“The reviewing court shall — compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . .
found to be — arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law.”).

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED, defendant’s objection
is SUSTAINED, and the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED as
modified. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
GRANTED and each party’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as moot. A separate
final order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion

DATE: June 6, 2013

SIGNED:
EMMET G. SULLIVAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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