CREECY v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al

Filing 68

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Rudolph Contreras on July 3, 2013. (lcrc2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
EDWIN CREECY,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM KELLIBREW,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil Action No.:

10-841 (RC)

Re Document No.:

62, 63, 65, 67

MEMORANDUM OPINION
DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE; GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT; ORDERING PARTIES TO MEET AND CONFER
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clerk of this Court entered default against defendant William Kellibrew
(“Kellibrew”) for torts allegedly committed against plaintiff Edwin Creecy. After entering
default, the Court scheduled a hearing for entry of final judgment against the defendant. The
defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside the default one day before the scheduled
hearing. The plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing for final judgment and consequently, the
Court ordered the plaintiff to show cause for why the case should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute. For the reasons explained below, the Court will discharge the order to show cause.
Further, the Court concludes that the defendant’s motion to aside default shall be granted.
Finally, the Court will order the parties to meet and confer pursuant to Local Rule 16.3, and
submit a written report to the Court within two weeks of the conference.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case stems from a series of events that occurred on or about May 20, 2010. See
generally Compl. (Dckt. #1). The plaintiff filed a complaint on the same day as the events, and a
1

summons was entered for five defendants the following day, May, 21, 2010. The claims against
four of the defendants were resolved, but the claims against defendant William Kellibrew
remain. This is partly due to problematic and conflicting assertions concerning service. The
original proof of service stated that the summons was left with a Mr. George Short on August 7,
2010 and did not list an address. See Proof of Service (Dckt. #29). An Amended Proof of
Service entered on April 21, 2011, stated that service was made at 613 Franklin Street, N.E.,
Washington, DC. See Am. Proof of Service (Dckt. #29). A final Amended Affidavit for Return
of Service was entered on or about May 7, 2013 stating that service was actually made upon Mr.
George Short at 630 Franklin Street, N.E., Washington, DC 20017, and that the previous
affidavit of service was mistaken. See Am. Aff. For Return of Service (Dckt. #66). In the midst
of these conflicting assertions, the plaintiff filed a memorandum for an order of default against
defendant Kellibrew on May 5, 2011 that noted the incorrect address mentioned in the amended
proof of service. See Pl.’s Mot. for Order of Default J. (Dckt. #34) at 1.
The following day, May 6, 2011, the Clerk of the Court entered default against defendant
Kellibrew. See Default Decl. (Dckt. #36). After this entry of default, the plaintiff pursued a
settlement with the four other defendants, eventually leading to voluntary dismissal of the case
on December 10, 2012. See Notice of Dismissal (Dckt. #57). Since the plaintiff did not reach a
settlement with defendant Kellibrew, the plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the case to set an ex
parte proof hearing to enter final judgment against Kellibrew. See Pl.’s Mot. to Reopen (Dckt.
#58) at 1. This hearing was scheduled for April 30, 2013. The day before this hearing, the
defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. See generally Def.’s Mot. to Set
Aside Default (Dckt. #63). The defendant was present at the hearing, but the plaintiff failed to
appear. As a consequence, the Court ordered the plaintiff to show cause for why the case should

2

not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff filed a reply to the show cause order one
day after the prescribed deadline, and also filed an opposition to the defendant’s motion to set
aside the default judgment.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Discharging the Order to Show Cause
The Court’s order to show cause for why this case should be dismissed for failure to
prosecute is pending. The plaintiff’s counsel states that they misread the show cause order to
read that the response was due in “14 days” instead of the 14th of the month of May. Pl.’s Mot.
for Leave (Dckt # 65) ¶ 4. Plaintiff’s counsel realized the error, and filed a reply to the show
cause order one day after the due date. See Pl.’s Reply (Dckt #65-2). The reply notes the
plaintiff’s continued interest in pursuing the matter against the defendant, and asks that the Court
not penalize the plaintiff for counsel’s oversight. Id. ¶ 4. The Court credits the plaintiff’s
response, and therefore discharges the order to show cause.
B. Setting Aside Default Against the Defendant
1. Legal Standard
“Default judgments are generally disfavored by courts, because entering and enforcing
judgments as a penalty for delays in filing is often contrary to the fair administration of justice.”
Int'l Painters and Allied Union and Indus. Pension Fund v. H.W. Ellis Painting Co., Inc., 288
F.Supp.2d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2003). With that said, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55,
“[t]he court may set aside an entry of default for good cause, and it may set aside a default
judgment under Rule 60(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 55. This Court has examined “good cause” to set
aside default by considering three factors: “(1) whether the default was willful, (2) whether a setaside would prejudice plaintiff, and (3) whether the alleged defense was meritorious.” Keegel v.

3

Key W. & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364
F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966), Erick Rios Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 210
(D.C. Cir. 1954). Importantly, “there is a distinction between the appropriate standard for setting
aside a default and that appropriate for setting aside a default judgment.” Jackson v. Beech, 636
F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Although both parties refer to there being a “default judgment,”
this is not the case. The hearing scheduled for April 30, 2013 was to put on evidence for
damages and to enter final judgment against the defendant. Since a final judgment was never
entered, this Court will consider defendant’s motion to set aside default under the “good cause”
Rule 55 analysis, as opposed to Rule 60(b), “Relief from a Judgment or Order,” which the
plaintiff offers in his opposition motion.
2. Granting Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
The defendant filed a pro se motion to set aside default judgment against him claiming
that he first learned about this case approximately one year ago through an online search of his
name. Def.’s Mot. (Dckt # 63) at 1. The defendant also states that he was surprised to see a
filing, claiming that he was never served. Id. As set forth above, given the confusing and
conflicting nature of the plaintiff’s various certificates of service, this claim is certainly
plausible. In contrast, the plaintiff states that the process server filed an amended proof of
service attesting to the fact that the defendant was served. Pl.’s Opp’n (Dckt #67) at 1. Despite
these conflicting facts, the Court granted a motion for order of default against the defendant. Id.
at 2. Since this entry of default, the plaintiff resolved the case against other defendants involved
in the matter, but the matter involving defendant Kellibrew was never resolved. Id. For this
reason, the Court must consider the defendant’s motion to set aside default under the three
factors of “good cause.”

4

The first factor to be considered is whether the default was willful. In determining
“willfulness,” the court has held that a defendant’s negligence does not justify denying a motion
to vacate default. Jackson, 636 F.2d at 837. The defendant acknowledges having conducted a
“Google search” that uncovered the case against him, but he stated that he was surprised and
does not mention acting upon this discovery. While this can be construed as negligent, it does
not rise to a level of “willfulness” and is not sufficient to justify denying the defendant’s motion
to set aside the default. Further, once the defendant received additional notification of the case
from his grandmother just over one month ago, the defendant followed through by filing his pro
se motion. Given the circumstances, the Court cannot reach a conclusion that the defendant
willfully defaulted.
The second factor to be considered is whether setting aside the default would prejudice
the plaintiff. The plaintiff argues that he would be severely prejudiced if the default was set
aside because the matter has been pending for two years and has been resolved favorably against
other defendants in this case. Pl.’s Opp’n (Dckt #67) at 6. The plaintiff also states that he has
put forth considerable time, energy, and money in prosecuting the case against the other
defendants, and granting the defendant’s motion would cost more time and money. Id.
Although the Court agrees that further investigation is needed to pursue this case, the defendants
from the previous resolution were police officers employed by the District of Columbia, whereas
this defendant is a private citizen. As such, the process for going forward with prosecution is
notably distinct. This is evidenced by the fact that the parties submitted a notice of dismissal of
the matter without resolving the matter against defendant Kellibrew. See Notice of Dismissal
(Dckt # 57). After filing the notice, the plaintiff filed a separate motion to reopen the case in
order to set ex parte proof hearing for entry of final judgment against the defendant. See Pl.’s

5

Mot. to Reopen (Dckt # 58). Although the defendants were accused of injuries against the same
plaintiff, it is evident from the complaint, subsequent notice of dismissal, and motion to reopen
that the claims against the defendant Kellibrew differ from those against the other defendants.
See generally Compl. (Dckt #1). That stated, the Court cannot say that setting aside the default
against the defendant would prejudice the plaintiff.
The chronology of the suit and the plaintiff’s minimal effort to pursue defendant
Kellibrew also leads the Court to believe that setting aside the default would not prejudice the
plaintiff. The complaint was filed on May 20, 2010 and yet the plaintiff did not seek entry of
default against the defendant until May 5, 2011, nearly one year later. Moreover, the plaintiff
did not seek default judgment until January 11, 2013. Although the plaintiff pursued the
settlement with the other defendants, it is evident that the plaintiff made minimal efforts to
pursue defendant Kellibrew. This was most recently evidenced by the plaintiff’s failure to
appear at the hearing scheduled for the entry of final judgment.
The final factor to be considered is whether the alleged defense was meritorious. In
determining whether an alleged defense is “meritorious,” the court has stated that, “[l]ikelihood
of success is not the measure. Defendants’ allegations are meritorious if they contain ‘even a hint
of a suggestion’ which, proven at trial, would constitute a complete defense. Keegel, 627 F.2d at
374. The defendant’s motion does give some hints that could possibly constitute a defense by
denying key aspects to the alleged claims, and providing minimal written evidence. Therefore,
the evidence from the defendant’s motion meets the basic requirement for the final factor.
All of the factors weigh in favor of setting aside the default against the defendant in
varying degrees. Moreover, as set forth above, there is uncertainty whether Mr. Kellibrew was
ever actually served. For all of these reasons, the Court will grant the defendant’s motion.

6

C. Ordering Parties to Meet and Confer
Since the Court is granting the motion to set aside the default, the parties must now
proceed under the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia’s Local Rules. Accordingly,
the parties are ordered to meet and confer as soon as practicable pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(f) and Local Rule 16.3. Additionally, within two weeks of conducting the
conference, the parties must submit a written report to the Court “outlining the discovery plan
and including a succinct statement of all agreements reached.” Local Rule 16.3(d).
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court discharges the order to show cause for the plaintiff. Further,
the Court finds that there is good cause to set aside the default against the defendant and
therefore grants the defendant’s motion. Finally, the Court will order the parties to meet and
confer pursuant to Local Rule 16.3 and submit a report to the Court within two weeks of their
conference. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued this 3rd day of July, 2013.
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge

7