MUNN-BEY v. UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION to the Order denying Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Signed by Judge Gladys Kessler on 11/15/11. (CL, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
WILLIE G. MUNN BEY,
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
Civil Action No. 10-1112 (GK)
)
UNITED STATES PAROLE
)
COMMISSION,
)
)
Respondent.
)
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Willie G. Munn Bey brings this action pro se
against the United States Parole Commission for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus. Upon consideration of the Petition, Opposition, Reply, and
the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Munn
Bey’s Petition is denied.
I. Background
On May 1, 1987, Munn Bey was sentenced by the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia to forty-six years in prison for
assault with the intent to rape, first degree burglary, and threats
to injure. Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 [Dkt. No. 10-1]. On October 9,
2008, Munn Bey was paroled.1 Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 2 [Dkt. No. 10-2].
1
It appears from the Record that Munn Bey has in fact been
paroled on several occasions, only to violate the terms of his
release and return to prison each time. See Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 1.
The only relevant parole date here is the most recent, i.e.,
October 9, 2008.
He was to remain under parole supervision for another twenty-seven
years, until October 23, 2035. Id.
On September 4, 2009, nearly a year after Munn Bey was
released from prison, his Community Supervision Officer (“CSO”)
informed the Parole Commission that Munn Bey had violated his
parole. Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 3, at 1 [Dkt. No. 10-3]. The CSO’s
report indicated that, two days earlier, Munn Bey had been arrested
for simple assault and felony threats. Id. at 2. Following that
arrest, the report states, Munn Bey tested positive for cocaine.
Id. Additionally, Munn Bey had failed to report for a prior drug
test
or
for
a
scheduled
supervision
and
was
“unsuccessfully
discharged” from his required sex offender treatment. Id. at 3.
On September 11, 2009, the Parole Commission issued a parole
violator warrant for Munn Bey. Resp’t’s Opp’n, Exs. 4-5 [Dkt. Nos.
10-4, 10-5]. In a memorandum accompanying the warrant, the Parole
Commission instructed the U.S. Marshal to assume custody of Munn
Bey as soon as possible, but to allow any criminal warrant to take
precedence. Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 6 [Dkt. No. 10-6]. In other words,
if the U.S. Marshal found that a criminal arrest warrant had been
executed or was outstanding or that Munn Bey had already been
sentenced for a new crime, the Marshal was to lodge the parole
violator warrant as a detainer. Id.
“Detainers” assure that parole violators serving a term for a
crime committed while on parole are not released from custody until
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the
Parole
Commission
has
had
an
opportunity
to
make
a
determination as to the parole violation. See Moody v. Daggett, 429
U.S. 78, 81 n.2 (1976). In practice, a detainer would allow the
Parole
Commission
to
defer
a
decision
on
Munn
Bey’s
parole
violation until he had served out his sentence for any criminal
conviction he received during the period was out on parole. At that
point, the
Commission
could decide
whether
he
should
be
re-
incarcerated for his parole violation or whether he should be
released.
On October 3, 2009, Munn Bey was arrested in the District of
Columbia for distribution of cocaine. Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 1, at 1.
On October 5, 2009, the U.S. Marshal Service lodged the parole
violator warrant as a detainer at the D.C. Jail. Resp’t’s Opp’n,
Ex. 7 [Dkt. No. 10-7]. Munn Bey was then sentenced to twenty-eight
months in prison for distribution of cocaine. Munn Bey was later
transferred to the Federal Correctional Institution, Talladega,
Alabama,2 to serve his sentence. Resp’t’s Opp’n, Exs. 8-9 [Dkt.
Nos. 10-8,
10-9].
The
detainer
for
his
parole
violation was
therefore lodged at the prison in Talladega. See Resp’t’s Opp’n,
Ex.
7.
The
Parole
Commission
has
yet
to
afford
Munn
Bey
a
revocation hearing to determine whether his parole will be revoked.
2
The
Parole
Commission
does
not
contest
personal
jurisdiction. See Resp’t’s Opp’n 4-5 n.1. The Court is satisfied
that it has subject matter jurisdiction.
-3-
On June 30, 2010, Munn Bey filed this Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [Dkt. No. 1], claiming that the Parole Commission has
denied him due process by failing to provide a hearing within a
reasonable time after his arrest. On August 30, 2010, the Parole
Commission filed its Opposition [Dkt. No. 10]. On September 10,
2010, Munn Bey filed a Reply [Dkt. No. 12].3
II.
Analysis
Munn Bey contends that “he is entitled to a prompt parole
revocation hearing within a . . . reasonable time following his
return
to
[custody].”
Pet.
3.
He
argues
that
the
Parole
Commission’s failure to afford him such a hearing on his parole
violator warrant has violated his due process rights. Id. He
requests, therefore, that the Court grant a Writ of Habeas Corpus
and quash the warrant for his detention. Id. at 2-3.
Munn Bey is correct that “[t]here must . . . be an opportunity
for a hearing, if it is desired by the parolee, prior to the final
decision on revocation” and that this “revocation hearing must be
tendered within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into
custody.”
Morrissey
v.
Brewer,
408
U.S.
471,
487-88
(1972).
However, it is equally well settled law that “execution of the
3
In the intervening time, Munn Bey filed an appeal
challenging an Order issued by then presiding Judge Rosemary M.
Collyer, which required a response by Munn Bey to the Parole
Commission’s Opposition pursuant to Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507
(D.C. Cir. 1988). The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on
January 21, 2011. Mandate of USCA, Jan. 21, 2011 [Dkt. No. 18].
-4-
warrant and custody under that warrant [is] the operative event
triggering any loss of liberty attendant upon parole revocation.”
Moody, 429 U.S. at 87. Hence, the right to a revocation hearing
within a
reasonable
time
is
only triggered
after
the
parole
violator warrant is executed, not when it is lodged, and when the
defendant is taken into custody under that warrant, not any other
criminal warrant. Id.
In
this
accordance
case,
with
the
Parole
applicable
Commissioner
regulations,
merely
permitting
acted
a
in
parole
violator warrant to be placed as a detainer, and permitting the
Commission to execute the warrant and hold a revocation hearing
when the parolee is later released. 28 C.F.R. § 2.100(a)-(b).
Indeed, this Court has previously approved the constitutionality of
that practice. Lyons v. CCA/Corr. Treatment Facility, Civil Action
No. 06-2008 (GK), 2007 WL 2007501, at *2 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007)
(“It is not a violation of a parolee's due process rights to lodge
a parole violator warrant as a detainer and execute the warrant
only after the new sentence is completed.”); see also, Ramsey v.
Reilly, 613 F. Supp. 2d 6, 11 (D.D.C. 2009) (“due process does not
require that a parole violator warrant be executed or that a parole
revocation hearing be conducted until after the expiration of the
new sentence.”).
Munn Bey argues that, as a result of the detainer, “he
suffer[s] a present inevitable loss of liberty interests,” which
-5-
includes “a higher security level of incarceration,” “denial of
pre-release
classification
and
programs,”
“denial
of
halfway
house,” and “denial of early home detention.” Pet’r’s Reply 2.
However, “[w]ith only a prospect of future incarceration which is
far from certain, we cannot say that the parole violator warrant
has any present or inevitable effect upon the liberty interests
which Morrissey sought to protect.” Moody, 429 U.S. at 87; see
also Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 (discussing relevant liberty
interests, such as being “gainfully employed and . . . free to be
with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments
of normal life.”).
In short, the law is clear that due process affords Munn Bey
no right to a revocation hearing until his parole violator warrant
is executed. Therefore, his Petition is denied.
November 15, 2011
/s/
Gladys Kessler
United States District Judge
Copies via ECF to all counsel of record
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