MOORMAN v. US BANK, NA et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly on 07/10/10. (mmh, )

FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JUL 2 0 2010
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy Courts for the District of Columbia

Percy Moorman, Plaintiff,

v.
US Bank, NA, Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Civil Action No.

10 1219

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on consideration of plaintiff s pro se complaint, motion for temporary restraining order ("TRO"), and application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). The Court will grant the application to proceed IFP, deny the motion for TRO, and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff was sued in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Civil Division, Landlord-Tenant Branch, in a dispute over ownership of real property located in the District of Columbia. See Mot. for TRO, Exhibit. After an unfavorable decision, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on June 29, 2010. See Compi. at 1. Because the motion for reconsideration is, apparently, scheduled for hearing on July 19,2010, see id., and has not been decided, and a writ for possession could possibly be executed at any time after July 8, 2010, see Mot. for TRO at 1, the plaintiff filed this complaint in an effort to "appeal a Superior Court order by Judge Richter of the D.C. Superior Court," see Compi. at 1, and filed a motion for a TRO in an attempt to stay the execution of a writ for possession, see PI.' s Mot. for TRO at 1. In short, no

matter how it is characterized, the plaintiff asks this court to intervene in a case that is currently proceeding in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. This court does not have jurisdiction to review of orders issued by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and, in the interests of comity, will not intervene in a case pending before the Superior Court. Plaintiffs immediate recourse lies with the Superior Court and its reviewing court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In addition, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not granted a IRO, which is a threshold requirement to justify granting a TRO. See Chaplaincy
of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290,297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). "Irreparable harm" is

an imminent injury that is both great and certain, and that legal remedies cannot repair.
Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Here, there is no showing that

legal remedies would be inadequate to redress any alleged wrongdoing. Accordingly, the motion for a IRO will be denied, and the complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. A separate order of dismissal accompanies this memorandum opinion.

United States District

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