UZOUKWU v. METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS et al

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: DENYING Plaintiff's 62 MOTION for Reconsideration re 61 Order on Motion to Dismiss and GRANTING Plaintiff's 63 MOTION to Appoint Counsel. Signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins on 2/24/2014. (tcb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CHINYERE UZOUKWU,
Plaintiff,
vs.
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON
COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, et
al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 11-cv-391 (RLW)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, who is pro se, has filed two pleadings that are presently before the Court for
consideration. She has styled the first pleading as “Plaintiff’s Affidavit and Request for
Appointment of Counsel.” (Doc. 63.) In that document, Plaintiff not only requests appointment
of counsel, but she also spells out her present financial circumstances, including a recent
bankruptcy filing. The Court has reviewed her motion and her bankruptcy documents and hereby
grants Plaintiff permission to proceed with this action in forma pauperis.
Additionally, for good cause shown, Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is
hereby granted. In granting Plaintiff’s request, the Court does not express any viewpoint on the
ultimate merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Instead, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are not
patently frivolous, that she has demonstrated an inability to retain counsel by other means, and
that the nature of her claims, though not particularly complex, are difficult to litigate without
benefit of counsel. Additionally, appointing counsel will allow this matter to proceed more

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efficiently, thereby benefitting the Court and serving the interests of justice. See LcvR
83.11(b)(3).
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.11, the Clerk shall appoint counsel from the Court’s Civil
Pro Bono Panel to represent the Plaintiff. The scheduling conference previously set for February
28, 2014, is hereby vacated and the proceedings in this action are hereby stayed pending
completion of the appointment process.
In her second pleading, Plaintiff seeks relief from an order dismissing her state law
claims. (Doc. 62; see Docs. 60-61.) In response to Plaintiff’s amended complaint, (Doc. 52),
Defendants filed a motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 53.) The Court then
entered an order advising the Plaintiff that failing to respond to the motion in a timely fashion
could lead to dismissal of her case. (Doc. 54.) In that order, the Court limited Plaintiff’s
response to 23 pages, the same number of pages used for the Defendants’ motion. (Id.)
Additionally, the Court prohibited Plaintiff from filing any supplemental or “further” responses
without leave of Court. (Id.) The Court imposed these requirements because Plaintiff has
repeatedly filed voluminous redundant pleadings and, without seeking leaving of court,
proceeded to file numerous supplemental pleadings that were also voluminous and that often
raised new or conflicting arguments, thereby prejudicing the Defendants and burdening the
Court.
In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a timely response in which she
repeatedly and clearly asked that her state law claims be withdrawn: “Through this opposition . . .
plaintiff withdraws Count III [Tortious Interference], VII [Tortious Interference], and XVI
[Negligent Retention/Supervision].” (Doc. 56 at 2; see id. at 3, 11, 20.) Further, at the hearing
on the motion to dismiss, the Court inquired as to Plaintiff’s reason for writing in her responsive
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brief that she wished to withdraw her state law claims. Plaintiff responded by indicating that her
goal was to make a “limited concession,” so as to focus her arguments on defending her federal
claims. At no time during the hearing, however, did she actually raise any arguments addressing
the legal bases upon which Defendants sought dismissal of her state law claims. Instead she
merely indicated that she had hoped to develop factual support for those claims during discovery.
Further, Plaintiff never actually expressed a desire to proceed with those claims - - even after
Defendants questioned whether she intended to pursue the state law claims. Accordingly, the
Court dismissed Plaintiff’s state law claims based on her withdrawal of the claims. (See Docs.
60, 61.)
In her current motion, she seeks reconsideration and argues that she raised the issue of the
“limited concession” during the hearing. She now provides a citation to a case that purports to
support this “limited concession” theory. See Shankar v. ACS-GSI, 258 F. App’x. 344, 345 (D.C.
Cir. 2007). That case, however, actually works in favor of the Defendants. In Shankar v. ACSGSI, the District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim because he filed several responses to
dispositive motions without addressing the argument raised by the Defendant.
Plaintiff next asserts that at the hearing she believed her “limited concession” argument
was sufficient to defend her claims and that, after the Defendants questioned whether she planned
to continue with those claims, she was “unaware that she had a further opportunity to respond
and re-argue.” (Doc. 62, Pl’s Mot. ¶ 5.) The Court notes however, that after the Court adjourned
the hearing, Plaintiff did seek permission to ask additional questions. After going back on the
record, Plaintiff inquired as to whether she would have to file a motion in order to obtain a
scheduling conference and she asked whether she was allowed to begin discovery. Although
Plaintiff (who has some paralegal training) is in need of legal counsel, she has demonstrated
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throughout these proceedings that she is familiar with legal principles and rules beyond what one
would expect from an ordinary pro se plaintiff. But more to the point, Plaintiff had an
opportunity to “reargue” the issue, and she failed to do so.
Finally, in her current pleading, Plaintiff asserts that she filed a supplemental brief in
which she indicated that she had concentrated her arguments in her primary brief on the federal
claims, in an effort to comply with the Court’s page limits. (See Doc. 59.) She also points out
that in the supplemental brief she indicated she wished to retain the right to “re-plead/renew” her
state law claims after discovery. (Doc. 59 at 1.) The Court ultimately entered an order striking
that brief, which was submitted after the Defendants had filed their reply.
The Court is not convinced by Plaintiff’s arguments. With respect to the page limits,
Plaintiff’s 23 page primary brief contained a great deal of unnecessary and/or redundant
discussions about her federal claims. Thus, Plaintiff’s inability to address the arguments relating
to her state law claims was a product of her own making. Moreover, the Court notes that her
supplemental brief solely and unconvincingly addressed, in two very short sentences, a statute of
limitations arguments raised by Defendants relating to her state law claims. The supplemental
brief did not address the substantive viability of the state law claims.
Therefore, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s brief and the entire course of proceedings in
this litigation, the Court finds that Plaintiff has waived her right to proceed with her state law
claims. Even after being warned that failure to defend those claims could lead to dismissal, in
her brief Plaintiff never attempted to address the substantive arguments raised by Defendants.
Even at the hearing, she failed to address the state law substantive issues and, when Defendants
questioned whether she intended to pursue her state law claims, she never indicated she wished
to proceed. Indeed, even though she claims to have believed she was not permitted to respond to
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the Defendants’ inquiry, she was savvy and confident enough to ask relevant questions about
discovery and scheduling conferences - - even after the Court first adjourned the hearing. As
such, she has now forfeited her right to pursue her state law claims. See LCvR 7(b); Fox v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004)(upholding district court’s grant of a motion
to dismiss where Plaintiff failed to file a response to the motion); Twelve John Does v. D.C., 117
F.3d 571, 577-78 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(upholding order of the District Court entered upon motion of
a party without any written or oral objection from opposing counsel and reasoning that “[w]here
the district court relies on the absence of a response as a basis for treating the motion as
conceded, we honor its enforcement of the rule.”).
Pending appointment of counsel, Plaintiff shall refrain from further filings absent leave of
the Court.
The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this order to the Plaintiff:
CHINYERE UZOUKWU
10105 Towhee Avenue
Adelphi, MD 20783

SO ORDERED.
February 24, 2014

Digitally signed by Judge Robert L.
Wilkins
DN: cn=Judge Robert L. Wilkins,
o=U.S. District Court, ou=Chambers
of Honorable Robert L. Wilkins,
email=[e-mail], c=US
Date: 2014.02.25
___________________________ 08:19:44 -05'00'

Robert L. Wilkins
United States Circuit Judge
(Sitting by designation as United States
District Judge for the District of Columbia)

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