ANDREWS v. MV TRANSPORTATION INC.

Filing 63

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 52 defendant's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Ellen S. Huvelle on September 1, 2015. (lcesh2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RONNIE ANDREWS, et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-01089-ESH

MV TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Ronnie Andrews, Patricia James, Thomas James, Kelley Johnson, Clarence
Holbrook, and Mario Bonds (“plaintiffs) bring this action against MV Transportation, Inc.
(“defendant”) alleging that they were exposed to tuberculosis by Henry Chase, a MetroAccess
driver infected with the disease. (Amended Complaint, Jan. 3, 2012, ECF No. 29 (“Compl.”) ¶
5.) Before the Court is defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment based on
plaintiffs’ failure to produce any material evidence showing that the driver was negligent.
BACKGROUND
This case had been proceeding concurrently with a related matter before D.C. Superior
Court, McKissick et al. v. MV Transportation, Inc. No. 11-8681, when this Court stayed the
federal proceedings pending the resolution of McKissick. (Stay Order, April 30, 2013, ECF No.
58.) In consideration of the fact that there were only eight plaintiffs in this matter—compared to
sixty in Superior Court—and discovery in the federal case was relatively immature by
comparison, the Court felt that it would be inappropriate, at that time, for the smaller subset of

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plaintiffs to “essentially take the lead so as to overshadow the pending suit in Superior Court”
when the facts and claims were effectively identical. (Memo. Op., April 30, 2013, ECF No. 57.)
Judge Anita Josey-Herring of D.C. Superior Court entered summary judgment for
defendant MV Transportation on the grounds that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that a
dispute as to a material fact existed as to whether Mr. Chase (“driver”) or MV Transportation
had notice of any possible infection with tuberculosis. McKissick, et al. v. MV Transportation,
Inc., No. 11-8681 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2013). Plaintiffs appealed, and the D.C. Court of
Appeals affirmed. McKissick et al. v. MV Transportation, No. 13-cv-1506, 107 A.3d 1119 (D.C.
Dec. 9, 2014). The appellate panel added that, apart from Mr. Chase’s lack of actual or
constructive knowledge of his condition, plaintiffs had also failed to demonstrate any evidence
that Mr. Chase was actually infected with a serious disease while driving passengers. Id. at *2
(“[T]here is also no evidence that Mr. Chase actually had TB, or another serious communicable
disease, during the relevant period. Indeed the only credible medical evidence in the record is
that Mr. Chase was suffering from bronchitis during that period of time.”).
Following the appellate decision, this Court lifted the stay on the federal case to consider
this motion. In response, plaintiffs simply re-filed their Opposition pleading from D.C. Superior
Court as an exhibit, providing no additional evidence to consider. For the reasons explained
herein, this Court agrees with the analysis of the D.C. courts, and defendant’s motion will be
granted.
ANALYSIS
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a motion for summary judgment shall be

granted if the pleadings, discovery, and any affidavits show that “there is no genuine dispute as

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to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, could support a reasonable jury’s verdict for the non-moving party.”
Brooks v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Hampton v. Vilsack, 685
F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2012)) (internal citation marks omitted). To defeat a summary
judgment motion, however, “the non-movant must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts; [i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Gibbs v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 48 F. Supp. 3d 110, 121 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. 242, 249-250 (1986).
II. NEGLIGENCE
In light of the fact that this issue is relatively straightforward, and has already benefitted
from well-reasoned judicial treatment, this opinion can be brief. To establish negligence, “the
plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the applicable standard of
care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between the
deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.” Varner v. Dist. of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 265 (D.C.
2006). Under principles of vicarious liability, an employer is held liable for the actionable
conduct of its employees performed in the scope of their employment. Black’s Law Dictionary
1055 (10th ed. 2014).
Plaintiffs allege that during 2008, Mr. Chase was actively displaying symptoms of
tuberculosis while driving MetroAccess routes. (Compl. ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Chase
was negligent in continuing to attend work when he knew or should have known that he was
seriously ill and posed a risk to MetroAccess passengers, and that MV Transportation is

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vicariously liable for his negligence under the theory of respondeat superior. (Compl. ¶¶ 40, 42.)
There is no factual dispute that Mr. Chase was not diagnosed with the disease until after he was
no longer driving passengers. (Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, March
27, 2013, ECF No. 52 (“Mot.”), Ex. 4.) Plaintiffs’ case instead rests upon the theory that, due to
Mr. Chase’s financial motivations to stay at work and “get paid,” he misled his employer and
doctors when he knew he was seriously ill, thereby avoiding a positive diagnosis whilst
irresponsibly exposing others. (Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Amended Motion for
Summary Judgment, July 8, 2015, ECF No. 61 (“Opp’n”), Ex. 1, at 4.) Defendant, in turn,
maintains that a claim of negligence based on exposure to an infectious disease requires a
showing that the driver had actual or constructive knowledge of the presence of the disease, and
that plaintiffs fail to make such a showing. The Court agrees with defendant.
To hold an individual negligent for transmitting an infectious disease, “it must be proved
that the defendant knew of the presence of the disease.” See, e.g., Earle v. Kuklo, 98 A.2d 107,
109 (N.J. 1953) (collecting cases from New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Missouri, New York,
Kansas, and Texas). Plaintiffs do not produce any evidence suggesting that Mr. Chase actually
knew he had tuberculosis or any other serious, infectious illness that should have precluded him
from going to work. Quite the opposite: the very same medical records relied upon by plaintiffs
show that Mr. Chase sought medical care when he felt ill, was diagnosed with bronchitis on two
separate occasions, and was repeatedly cleared to return to work after treatment. (Opp’n, Ex. 1,
at 25, 26.) Plaintiffs place great emphasis on a piece of evidence showing that a doctor
examined Mr. Chase on one occasion for a “respiratory condition” and advised him not to return
to work until further evaluation. (Opp’n, Ex. 1, at 26.) First, there is no evidence that Mr. Chase
ignored that advice, and second, such a diagnosis is plainly too vague to demonstrate the Mr.

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Chase learned that he had contracted a condition as serious as tuberculosis or some other
sickness that would risk passengers’ health.
Plaintiffs further argue that a reasonable juror could infer from the fact that Mr. Chase
was suffering from a persistent cough that he knew—or should have known—that such a cough
was likely tuberculosis or an equivalently noxious disease. (Opp’n., Ex. 1, at 4-9.) Such an
inference is unreasonable on its face, and especially incongruous when one considers the
contrary medical advice from his healthcare provider, Dr. Hejl. A patient “who seek[s] medical
care [is] not responsible for diagnosing their own condition, but must rely on the physician’s
expertise to determine the cause of the problem and provide treatment.” Hardi v. Mezzanotte,
818 A.2d 974, 980 (D.C. 2003); see also Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 568 (D.C.
1979) (noting that “the nature of the physician-patient relationship… requires the patient to rely
on the learning and judgment of the doctors”).
Because there is no evidence that Mr. Chase had actual or constructive knowledge that he
had contracted tuberculosis, plaintiffs argue that Mr. Chase had a history of failing to disclose
unfavorable information, and had a financial motive for misleading his doctors as to the severity
of his illness. (Opp’n, Ex. 1, at 29.) In plaintiffs’ view, a jury should be entitled to weigh the
possibility that Mr. Chase effectively self-diagnosed the seriousness of his illness, knew that he
was likely infected, and lied to his doctors in order to stay on the job. (Opp’n, Ex. 1, at 23.)
Summary judgment requires this Court to draw all possible inferences in favor of the plaintiffs; it
does not require it to treat bare speculation as circumstantial evidence. Absent any independent
evidence to corroborate such a theory, it is insufficient grounds for defeating a motion for
summary judgment.

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CONCLUSION
Because plaintiffs have presented no colorable evidence that Mr. Chase knew or should
have known that he was infected with a communicable disease, no reasonable juror
could find him guilty of negligence. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. 1

/s/ Ellen Segal Huvelle
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
United States District Judge

Date: September 1, 2015

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This Court has no occasion to reach the question of whether Mr. Chase actually had
tuberculosis at the time he was at work, given plaintiffs’ inability to marshal any evidence of
negligence. It is well established that “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” MosbyNickens v. Howard Univ., 864 F. Supp. 2d 93, 97 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). There is no basis, however, to disagree with the D.C. Court
of Appeals’ finding that plaintiffs presented no material evidence of infection during the relevant
time period.
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