GREENE v. SHEGAN
Filing
31
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER overruling Shegan's objections 26 to Magistrate Judge Kay's memorandum order, granting Greene's motion 16 to have the docket reflect that the District of Columbia is a defendant in this matter, and denying Shegan's motion 27 to stay Magistrate Judge Kay's September 21, 2012 memorandum order or, in the alternative, for a protective order. Signed by Judge Richard W. Roberts on 1/22/13. (lcrwr2)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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JODY SHEGAN,
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Defendant.
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______________________________)
ABDUL GREENE,
Civil Action No. 12-109 (RWR)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Abdul Greene brings various claims of misconduct
against Metropolitan Police Department Officer Jody Shegan.
Shegan objects to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay’s memorandum order
granting Greene’s motion to compel discovery from the District of
Columbia.
Shegan also moves for a stay of Magistrate Judge Kay’s
memorandum order pending resolution of Shegan’s objections to the
memorandum order, or in the alternative, for a protective order.
In addition, Greene moves to have the docket reflect that the
District of Columbia is a defendant in this matter.
Because the
magistrate judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous or contrary
to law, Shegan’s objections will be overruled.
Since Shegan
fails to demonstrate good cause for a protective order, his
motion will be denied.
Because the District of Columbia is a
defendant, Greene’s motion will be granted.
-2BACKGROUND
Greene filed a complaint against Shegan in both Shegan’s
individual and official capacities in the D.C. Superior Court.
Compl. ¶ 4.
Greene’s complaint did not name the District of
Columbia as a defendant.
However, Greene served Mayor Vincent
Gray and District of Columbia Attorney General Irvin Nathan with
a copy of the summons and complaint.
Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n
to Mot. to Compel D.C. to Respond to Pl.’s Disc. Reqs., Ex. 1.
Shegan removed the case to this court.
Greene served discovery requests on the District of
Columbia.
Pl.’s Mot. to Compel D.C. to Respond to Pl.’s Disc.
Reqs., Ex. 1.
The District of Columbia refused to respond to the
requests arguing that it is not a party in this matter.
2.
Id., Ex.
Greene filed a motion to compel the District of Columbia to
respond to his discovery requests.
In his memorandum order,
Magistrate Judge Kay found that the District of Columbia had
notice of the action, having been timely served with a copy of
the summons and complaint.
He also held that since Shegan was
sued in his official capacity, the District of Columbia is a
defendant in this matter, citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159
(1985), and Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
Mem. Order, Sept. 21, 2012 at 3-4.
Shegan now objects to the magistrate judge’s ruling on the
motion to compel for three reasons.
First, Shegan argues that
-3service of the complaint and summons on the District of Columbia
alone did not give the District of Columbia notice of Greene’s
suit.1
Shegan’s Obj’ns to and Mot. for Review of Magistrate
Judge Alan Kay’s Sept. 21, 2012 Order at 6–7.
Second, Shegan
argues that Magistrate Judge Kay erred in applying Graham to this
case because Graham is meant to apply only to suits against
officials who hold positions at a level high enough that the
official may be considered the alter ego of the State.
8–10.
Id. at
Third, Shegan urges that the District of Columbia did not
have an opportunity to respond to Greene’s complaint since Greene
did not name the District of Columbia as a defendant and, as an
unnamed party, the District of Columbia could not make filings
through the electronic case filing system.
Id. at 7.
Greene
counters that the District of Columbia had notice of the suit
because it was served with a copy of the summons and the
complaint that named Shegan in his official capacity.
Pl.’s Mem.
of P. & A. in Opp’n to the Obj’ns of Jody Shegan to the
Magistrate’s Order Granting Pl.’s Mot. to Compel at 2.
Greene
further argues that the District of Columbia had an opportunity
to respond to his complaint by filing a responsive pleading in
person at the Clerk’s Office.
1
Id. at 2–3.
Greene urges that
Before Magistrate Judge Kay, Shegan maintained that the
District of Columbia had not been “served with the Summons and
Complaint as a party.” Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Compel at 4.
Now, however, Shegan’s argument assumes that the District was
served with a copy of the summons and the complaint.
-4Shegan misinterpreted Graham and that a suit against Shegan in
his official capacity is a suit against the District of Columbia.
Id. at 3–4.
Shegan also moves for a stay of Magistrate Judge Kay’s
memorandum order pending resolution of Shegan’s objections to the
memorandum order, or in the alternative, for a protective order.
Greene opposes.
Greene meanwhile moves to have the docket reflect that the
District of Columbia is a defendant in this matter.
Shegan
argues that the motion should be denied because the District of
Columbia is not a defendant.
See Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to
Have the Docket Reflect that the D.C. is a Def. at 2.
DISCUSSION
I.
OBJECTIONS, AND LISTING THE DISTRICT AS A DEFENDANT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) and Local Civil Rule
72.2(b) allow a party to object to a magistrate judge’s decision.
“[A] district judge may modify or set aside any portion of a
magistrate judge’s order . . . found to be clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.”
LCvR 72.2(c); see also Payne v. District of
Columbia, 859 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130-31 (D.D.C. 2012) (“A
magistrate judge’s findings are entitled to great
deference, . . . and may be modified or set aside only if found
to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law[.]” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
-5Official capacity suits “‘generally represent only another
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent.’”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66 (quoting
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55
(1978)).
“As long as the government entity receives notice and
an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all
respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity.”
Id. at 166.
A court treats suits against officials in
their official capacities as suits against the state because an
official capacity suit “is not a suit against the official
personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.”
Id.;
see also Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 424.
Shegan maintains that serving the District of Columbia in
line with the procedure set forth in the rules of the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia2 did not provide the District
of Columbia with sufficient notice or an opportunity to respond.
Shegan does not identify any authority to support his novel
position, and case law in this district is to the contrary.
See,
e.g., Waker v. Brown, 754 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64-65 (D.D.C. 2010)
(substituting the District of Columbia for defendants sued in
their official capacities although the plaintiff had served the
2
D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1) (“Service shall be made upon
the District of Columbia by delivering . . . or mailing . . . a
copy of the summons, complaint and initial order to the Mayor of
the District of Columbia (or designee) and the [Attorney General]
of the District of Columbia (or designee).”).
-6Mayor of the District of Columbia but not the Attorney General
for the District of Columbia); Bennett v. Henderson, Civil Action
No. 10-1680 (RWR), 2011 WL 285871 at *1 n.3 (D.D.C. Jan. 28,
2011) (“Because the plaintiff served the . . . Attorney General,
the District of Columbia [had] sufficient notice of this action.”
(citing Henderson v. Williams, Civil Action No. 05-1966 (RWR),
2007 WL 778937 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2007))).
Likewise, Shegan did
not cite any precedent to support his assertion that Graham
applies only to high level officials under an alter ego theory.
Moreover, Shegan errs in asserting that the District of Columbia
could not file a responsive pleading without being a named
defendant in this matter.
See United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, Electronic Case Filing System User’s
Manual at 22-23 (2010).
Third parties can submit civil documents
to the Clerk’s Office by email and, when electronic case filing
is not available, users may bring “a hard copy and electronic
version of the pleading to the Courthouse and file it in
person[.]”
Id.
Here, Officer Shegan was sued in his official capacity, the
District of Columbia received notice of the suit when Greene
served the Mayor and the Attorney General with a copy of the
summons and complaint, and the District of Columbia had an
opportunity to respond.
While Greene could easily have avoided
all ambiguity by simply naming the District of Columbia in the
-7complaint as a defendant from the beginning, the District of
Columbia is a real party in interest.
It was not clearly
erroneous for the magistrate judge to find that the District of
Columbia is a defendant in this matter and grant Greene’s motion
to compel discovery from the District of Columbia.
In addition,
the District of Columbia shall be listed on the docket as a
defendant.3
3
Shegan opposes Greene’s motion to list the District of Columbia
on the docket as a defendant claiming that Greene failed to
comply with Local Civil Rule 7(m) before filing this motion.
Local Rule 7(m) requires that
[b]efore filing any nondispositive motion in a civil
action, counsel shall discuss the anticipated motion
with opposing counsel . . . in a good-faith effort to
determine whether there is any opposition to the relief
sought and, if there is opposition, to narrow the areas
of disagreement. . . . A party shall include in its
motion a statement that the required discussion
occurred, and a statement as to whether the motion is
opposed.
LCvR 7(m). Greene’s motion states that “[p]rior to filing this
motion, plaintiff’s counsel discussed this matter with opposing
counsel and they take the position that the District is not a
defendant in this case.” Pl.’s Mot. to Have the Docket Reflect
that the D.C. is a Def. at 2. Shegan states, and Greene does not
rebut, that although the parties discussed whether the District
of Columbia is a defendant, Shegan “did not know that Plaintiff
intended to file the instant motion until it was received through
the electronic filing notice.” Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to
Have the Docket Reflect that the D.C. is a Def. at 1. While
Greene’s counsel could have avoided any ambiguity by plainly
stating in the discussion that he would file this motion, he did
include in his motion that he discussed with opposing counsel the
subject of the motion, and determined that his position was
opposed. As Shegan does not contest the accuracy of Greene’s
representations, Greene’s motion will not be dismissed on this
ground.
-8II.
MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that upon a
motion, a “court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense[.]”
showing good cause.
The movant bears the burden of
Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 247 F.R.D.
19, 22 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 71, 75
(D.D.C. 1998)).
Here, Shegan offers no good cause or explanation
as to why the court should issue a protective order.
His motion
for a protective order, then, will be denied.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Because Magistrate Judge Kay’s memorandum order granting
Greene’s motion to compel discovery from the District of Columbia
was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law, Shegan’s objections
will be overruled.
Because the District of Columbia is a
defendant, Greene’s motion to name the District of Columbia as a
defendant on the docket will be granted.
Since Shegan fails to
allege good cause for a protective order under Rule 26(c), his
motion will be denied.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Shegan’s objections [26] to Magistrate Judge
Kay’s memorandum order be, and hereby are, OVERRULED.
It is
further
ORDERED that Greene’s motion [16] to have the docket reflect
that the District of Columbia is a defendant in this matter be,
-9and hereby is, GRANTED.
The Clerk is directed to list the
District of Columbia as a defendant on the docket in this matter.
It is further
ORDERED that Shegan’s motion [27] to stay Magistrate Judge
Kay’s September 21, 2012 memorandum order or, in the alternative,
for a protective order be, and hereby is, DENIED.
SIGNED this 22nd day of January, 2013.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge
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