ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Filing 10

REPLY to opposition to motion re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction and Opposition to to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed by ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER. (Rotenberg, Marc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________________
)
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION
)
CENTER
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________________)

Case No. 12-206 (ABJ)

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
On March 1, 2012, Google, Inc. proposes to make substantial changes in its business
practices. EPIC alleges that the company’s actions violate a 2011 FTC Consent Order that arose
from EPIC’s 2010 complaint. EPIC brought this action to enforce the FTC’s order. The
government has opposed this motion and moved to dismiss EPIC’s complaint because “FTC
Enforcement Decisions are Not Subject to Judicial Review.” Def. Mem. at 5. The government
provides no authority for this extraordinary proposition.1 Indeed, the cases cited by the

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Courts in this Circuit begin with “the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review
of administrative action . . . and that the court will not deny review unless there is persuasive
reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.” Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Babbitt,
87 F.3d 1338, 1343-44 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Courts asked to consider whether agency action is
unreviewable “consider each argument in light of ‘the strong presumption that Congress intends
judicial review of administrative action.’ . . . Accordingly, each category of non-reviewability
must be construed narrowly.” Amador County v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing
Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) and Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)) (finding that a district court erred in holding that the APA
precludes judicial review of enforcement action.); accord Mistick PBT v. Chao, 440 F.3d 503
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (affirming a district court that found agency enforcement action subject to
judicial review).
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government, as well as additional authority set out below by EPIC, point to the opposite
conclusion: the FTC’s failure to enforce a final order under the FTC Act (“FTCA”) is subject to
judicial review. EPIC’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
should be granted, and the government’s motion to dismiss should be denied.
I.

Chaney Does Not Preclude Judicial Review of This Matter
To begin, the Chaney Court did not “h[o]ld” that “agency decisions not to initiate

enforcement actions are not subject to judicial review: . . .” Def. Mem. at 6. The Court
“conclude[d]” that “the presumption that agency decisions to institute proceedings are
unreviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) is not overcome by the enforcement provisions of the
[Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act].” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985)
(emphasis added). The Court’s actual holding provides three distinct reasons to distinguish the
matter now before this Court.
First, Chaney did not bar judicial review of agency action. See Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d
1078, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“The presumption against judicial review in Chaney is not
irrebuttable.”). The Court said that if Congress has “provided meaningful standards for defining
the limits of that discretion, there is ‘law to apply’ under § 701(a)(2), and courts may require that
the agency follow that law.” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 835-36. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97,
100 (D.C. Cir. 1987). (“an agency, even one that enjoys broad discretion, must adhere to
voluntarily adopted, binding policies that limit its discretion.”)
Section 45(l) of the FTCA and the FTC Consent Order provide the “law to apply” in this
matter. The enforcement provision in the FTCA states unambiguously that a person “who
violates an order of the Commission after it has become final” shall pay a civil penalty. 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(l). The Consent Order is a final order of the Commission that sets out specific terms, the

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violation of which would trigger the enforcement provision. The text of the Consent Order
provides the “meaningful standard” that the courts can apply. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834.
The government’s opposition does not even address the “law to apply” doctrine, see
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971), but the Chaney court did at length, Heckler, 470 U.S. at 826, 834-36, as has the
DC circuit court and DC district courts when confronted with the question of whether final rules
are subject to judicial review. See, e.g. Mistick PBT, 440 F.3d at 509; Giacobbi v. Biermann, 780
F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 1992). Agency regulations provide “law to apply” if they “set out
specific criteria that are capable of review.” Mistick PBT, 440 F.3d at 509 (conformance
regulations set out specific criteria that are capable of review.); Giacobbi, 780 F. Supp. at 37
(finding that the agency enforcement provision and the agency regulation constitute law to
apply.)2
Significantly, the Chaney Court dismissed a “policy statement” as “law to apply” because
it was “vague,” not an agency rule, unrelated to enforcement power, and contrary to “express
assertion of unreviewable discretion.” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 836. On each point, the FTC Consent
Order produces the opposite conclusion: it is precise, made final through a public-rulemaking,
directly tied to the agency’s enforcement power, and explicitly described in the agency’s
enforcement provision. Further, the Chaney Court’s analysis of the policy statement
acknowledged that the agency itself could generate the “law to apply” on which a court could
rely. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 839.

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To the extent that the government steers near this territory, it asserts the “presumption of
unreviewability ‘may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the
agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers.’ Id. at 833. The FTC Act provides no
such guidelines.” Def. Mem. at 7. The government simply ignores the significance of the
Consent Order as “law to apply” and the cases, including Chaney, which establish that agency
policies, and most certainly final orders, provide meaningful standards for courts to apply.
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The presence of “law to apply” is sufficient to overcome the presumption against
unreviewability in Chaney. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834-35. That is enough to answer the
government’s opposition in this matter. There are two additional reasons to distinguish Chaney.
The Chaney court was concerned about judicial review of decisions by agencies to
initiate actions. The Court repeatedly used the phrase “institute proceedings,” including
investigations, Heckler, 470 U.S. at 825, 832, and 835-36, to emphasize that the question before
the Court was whether the FDA could be compelled to begin an enforcement action. Indeed,
Respondent in Chaney had urged the FDA to “take various investigatory and enforcement
actions” which the FDA Commissioner declined to do.3
EPIC has not asked the FTC to “institute proceedings;” it has asked the agency to enforce
a final order that resulted from the agency’s own prior investigation and enforcement actions. Far
from the analogy to prosecutorial discretion that the government proffers, the much closer
analogy is to enforcement of a breach of contract, as the Consent Order constitutes a “legally
binding commitment enforceable under § 706(1).” See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,
542 U.S. 55, 71-72 (2004) (a land use plan is not a binding commitment because it creates future
obligations without necessary funding, however action “may be compelled when the plan merely
reiterates duties the agency is already obligated to perform, . . .”) This is not a question that is
subject to a wide variety of answers as may be the case when the agency seeks to decide which
matters to pursue or how best to pursue them. This is a “discrete agency” action. As the Court

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Respondents had asked the FDA to “affix warnings to the labels of all the drugs stating that
they were unapproved and unsafe for human execution, to send statements to the drug
manufacturers and prison administrators stating that the drugs should not be so used, to adopt
procedures for seizing the drugs from state prisons and to recommend the prosecution of all
those in the chain of distribution who knowingly distribute or purchase the drugs with intent to
use them for human execution.” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 824.
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also explained in Utah Wilderness Alliance, “The important point is that a ‘failure to act’ is
properly understood to be limited . . . to a discrete action.” Norton, 542 U.S. at 63.
Third, the enforcement statute at issue in Chaney is very different from the one before
this Court. That statute contained vague terms and was “drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Heckler, 470
U.S. at 830. In contrast, Section 45(l) could hardly be more precise.
II.

The Enforcement Provision in 15 USC 45(l) is Nondiscretionary
The government contends that section 45(1) is permissive and turns to Chaney for

support. “[T]he statute at issue in Chaney was similar to the FTC Act.” Def. Mem. at 6, 8. The
government confuses the plain terms of that statute and misconstrues the Supreme Court’s
reasoning. The Chaney Court, reviewing the enforcement provision in the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), emphasized that the “Act’s general provision for enforcement provides
only that ‘[the] Secretary is authorized to conduct examinations and investigations . . .’
(emphasis added).” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 835. The Court also noted the “shall” language on
criminal sanctions “is commonly found” in the criminal code. Id. The Court further found that
the FDCA “charges the Secretary only with recommending prosecution; any criminal
prosecutions must be instituted by the Attorney General.” Id. at 836. On this basis, the Court
concluded, “The Act's enforcement provisions thus commit complete discretion to the Secretary
to decide how and when they should be exercised.” Id. at 835.
Correctly understood, the language in the FDCA highlighted by the government favors
EPIC. Section 45(l), in contrast to the FDCA, places the discretion with the Attorney General
and makes mandatory the duty of the Agency to enforce the Act:
Any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the Commission
after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to

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the United States a civil penalty of not more than $ 10,000 for each violation,
which shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil action
brought by the Attorney General of the United States.
15 U.S.C. 45(l) (“Penalty for violation of order”) (emphasis added). The government
contends that section 45(l) imposes no duty, “the alleged duty,” Def. Mem. at 7, on the
Federal Trade Commission to enforce the Federal Trade Commission Act. First, as the
government elsewhere notes, the FTC has sole authority to initiate enforcement under
section 45(l) of the FTCA. Def. Mem. at 2, 7 n.4. Second, no party would voluntarily pay
a civil penalty to the government absent an enforcement action, i.e. the enforcement
provision is not self-executing. Third, under the government’s reasoning, there would be
no circumstance, including outright bribery or other malfeasance, under which the
agency’s failure to pursue enforcement of a final order would be subject to judicial
review.
Remarkably, the government has also ignored this circuit’s recent holding in Sierra Club
v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2011), which addressed directly the significance of “shall”
and “may” in an enforcement provision. In that case, the court considered the express language
of 42 U.S.C. § 7447 (the Clean Air Act), which included the “close juxtaposition of the
mandatory ‘the Administrator shall’ with the permissive ‘the State may . . .” Sierra Club, 648
F.3d at 855. That construction is almost identical to the mandatory “shall” and the permissive
“may” found in section 45(l). Writing for the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Chief Judge
Sentelle stated that the Sierra Club’s textual argument that § 7447 places “a mandatory,
judicially-reviewable duty upon the Administrator . . . carries considerable weight.”
As we have repeatedly noted, “shall” is usually interpreted as “the language of
command.” See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1243 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935)); Allied Pilots Ass'n v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 334 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Southwestern Bell

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Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515, 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In addition, when a statute
“uses both ‘may’ and ‘shall,’ the normal inference is that each is used in its usual
sense—the one act being permissive, the other mandatory.” Oljato Chapter of the
Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting Anderson v.
Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947)).
Id. at 856 (internal citations omitted). The Court subsequently found that the qualifier “as
necessary” provided “no guidance to the Administrator or to a reviewing court” and concluded,
on that basis, that the provision left “to the Administrator’s discretion to determine what action is
‘necessary.’” Id. at 856. No similar term is found in §45(l). That provision carries at least as
much weight as did the provision in Sierra Club. The Attorney General “may” bring a civil
enforcement action; the district courts are empowered to grant such other relief “as they deem
appropriate.” Every term chosen by Congress with regard to the obligation of the Federal Trade
Commission to seek a penalty for a violation of a final order is set out in “the language of
command.” Sierra Club at 856.
Plainly, the enforcement provision in the FTCA before the court in this matter differs
significantly from the enforcement provision of the FDCA before the Supreme Court in Chaney,
following the reasoning of the D.C circuit in Sierra Club.
III.

The Government’s Motion to Dismiss Should be Denied
The government offers the court alternative theories to dismiss this matter. The 12(b)(1)

argument is cursory, cites authority contrary to the government’s position, and is readily put
aside. Def. Mem. at 3. In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1973), the Court reversed a court of
appeals that had ruled that “petitioners had not tendered a substantial constitutional claim and
ordered dismissal of the entire action for want of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 536. The
Court said:
Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated as respondents seem to contend, by the possibility
that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could

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actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of
action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of
jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could
be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be decided after
and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.
Id. at 542 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946))
The government’s citation to Oneida Indian Nation is equally odd since the Supreme
Court in that case included the qualifier, absent in the government’s memo, that the claim
“cannot be said to be so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or
otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy . . .” Oneida Indian
Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1973) (emphasis added). Even the
government’s reliance on Nietze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n. 6 (1989), on careful inspection,
refutes its own claim. There the Court pointed out that a 12(b)(6) motion operates “on the
assumption that the factual allegations in the complaint are true.” Nietze, 490 U.S. at 326. The
Court said “[w]hat Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge's
disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations. District court judges looking to dismiss claims on
such grounds must look elsewhere for legal support.” Id. With the ellipsis removed and the
complete text provided, this is how the footnote in Nietze cited by the government actually reads:
“A patently insubstantial complaint may be dismissed, for example, for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).” Nietze, 490 U.S. at 327 n.6.
The government’s 12(b)(1) motion proffers no theories that this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, and the cases it cites for its rhetorical flourishes refute its legal arguments. If the
government were actually interested in this Circuit’s standard to grant a 12(b)(1) motion in a
similar case involving the Administrative Procedures Act, it would have confronted Sierra Club
v. Jackson, 724 F.Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2010) aff’d on other grounds, 648 F.3d. 848 (D.C. Cir.

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2011). There the DC Circuit found that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under
12(b)(1). As Judge Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous panel, explained, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants
a district court “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States” and thereby “confer[s] jurisdiction on federal courts to review
agency action.” Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 524-25 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977) and Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 n.47 (1979)).
The government’s 12(b)(6) claim is simply that that the “APA precludes judicial review
of agency action ‘committed to agency discretion.’” Def. Mem. at 3. In support of this point, the
government cites two cases, Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. FERC, 252 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir.
2001) and Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In Baltimore Gas, the court found
“[a]t every turn, the [Natural Gas Act] confirms that FERC’s decision how, or whether, to
enforce that statute is entirely discretionary. Nowhere does the act place an affirmative obligation
on FERC to initiate an enforcement action, nor does it impose limitations on FERC's discretion
to settle such an action.” Baltimore Gas, 252 F.3d at 460-61. The panel repeatedly emphasized
the presence of “may” throughout the enforcement provision: “The NGA states that FERC ‘may
in its discretion bring an action’ against a violator of the act. . . . It also provides that the
Commission ‘may investigate’ any possible violations. . . . FERC's regulations contain equally
discretionary language: the Commission ‘may initiate administrative proceedings . . . or take
other appropriate action.’” Id. at 461 (emphasis in original, statutory citations omitted).
The language in section 45(l) of the FTCA could not be more different. As the Baltimore
Gas court itself stated, “[i]f Congress had intended to cabin FERC's enforcement discretion, it
could have used obligatory terms such as ‘must,’ ‘shall,’ and ‘will,’ not the wholly precatory

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language it employed in the act.” Id. at 461. That is precisely what the Congress did with the
enforcement provision of the FTC Act.
In Oryszak, the other case that the government cites, the circuit court affirmed a 12(b)(6)
dismissal where the district court concluded that the revocation of a security clearance was
committed to the discretion of the Secret Service. The court emphasized that “the grant of
security clearance to a particular employee, a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment
call, is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch.” Oryszak, 576 F.3d,
at 525 (Citing Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527(1988)). There is no indication in the
FTCA or elsewhere that any similar considerations weigh on the FTC’s decision to enforce a
final order.
Neither case cited by the government supports the conclusion that EPIC’s complaint
should be dismissed under 12(b)(6).
IV. The APA Provides the Court with the Authority to Act in this Case
The APA provides the legal basis for EPIC to challenge the FTC’s failure to act and
provides the Court with the authority to compel the Commission enforce the Consent Order.
Utah Wilderness Alliance states:
APA authorizes suit by “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Where no other statute provides a private right
of action, the “agency action” complained of must be “final agency action.” § 704
(emphasis added). . . .The APA provides relief for a failure to act in § 706(1):
“The reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed.”

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542 U.S. at 61-62. The enforcement of the Consent Order prior to a date certain constitutes the
agency action unreasonably withheld.4 The APA requires the reviewing court to compel agency
action.
The government citation to SEC v. Prudential Securities does not alter this rule. That case
concerned intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) and not the APA. 136 F.3d 153, 158 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). Similarly, Rafferty v. NYNEX Corp., 60 F.3d 844, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1995), involved a
third party beneficiary claim, wholly apart from the explicit language set out in section 702 of
the APA.
In Consumer Federation of America, 515 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the organization
sought judicial review of a challenge to an FTC cease and desist order. The DC Circuit,
following the admonition of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) that a
“statutory prohibition of judicial review will be found only upon a showing of ‘clear and
convincing evidence’ of legislative intent to prohibit review,” concluded that the 1914 legislative
debate constituted such clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 370. The court never reached the
question as to whether a party that initiated the action could seek enforcement of the agency’s
final order, nor was that issue before the court.
Section 706(1) of the APA authorizes a federal court to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. at 57, 62.
That case provides further clarification of the matter now before this court. “A ‘failure to act’ is
not the same things as a ‘denial.’ . . . The important point is that a ‘failure to act’ is properly
understood to be limited . . . to a discrete action.” Id. at 63 (emphasis in original). In Consumer

4
The government makes the surprising claim that EPIC is “forcing the Commission to bring a
particular enforcement action within an arbitrary time limit.” Def. Mem. at 11. If the government
is unaware that Google plans to make a substantial change in its business practices on March 1,
2012, it should turn on a computer connected to the Internet.
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Federation of America, the FTC denied the organization’s petition and the court concluded that
such a decision is not subject to judicial review. But where the matter involves a “failure to act,”
the focus of § 706(1), the court is authorized to compel agency action. That is the current case.
As to the 706(1) requirement that the action is “legally required,” Utah Wilderness
Alliance, 542 U.S. at 63 (emphasis in original), the plain language of section 45(l) makes clear
that Congress intended the FTC to enforce its final orders. Moreover, the Congress expressly
empowered the courts to enforce the final orders of the FTC. As a District of Columbia district
court recently stated: “[T]he FTC Act expressly provides district courts with the authority to
‘grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further relief as they deem appropriate in the
enforcement of such final orders of the commission.’” U.S.A. v. Daniel Chapter One, 793 F.Supp
2d 157, 162 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)).
The court in Daniel Chapter One had no difficulty assessing a complex Modified Final
Order and determining that “interim injunctive relief is warranted.” Id. at 163. The court
concluded:
The Court further finds that the equities weigh in favor of emergency injunctive
relief. Specifically, and in view of the fact that plaintiff is likely to succeed on the
merits, the Court finds that there is no strong interest in not granting the
preliminary relief sought here. Indeed, the Court agrees that “‘[t]here is no
hardship to [defendants] in requiring them merely to follow the law - to refrain
from making misrepresentations to consumers they contact.’”
Id. (quoting FTC v. City West Advantage, Inc., No. 08-609, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71608,
2008 WL 2844696, at *6 (D. Nev. July 22, 2008).
V.

Standard of Review
As this court has previously stated, the “frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs

seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an
injunction.” Defending Animal Rights Today and Tomorrow v. Washington Sports and

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Entertainment, 786 F.Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Winter v. Natural Resource
Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008) (emphasis in original). That is clearly the case here.
As EPIC has explained, a company subject to a final order of the Commission has
announced its intent to make sweeping changes in its business practices on March 1, 2012. The
date certain is significant to find a nondiscretionary duty. Sierra Club, 724 F. Supp at 38 n. 2.5
Even the company concedes that this is a sweeping change. It has engaged in its most
extensive advertising effort ever. Every single user of a Google service, and there are hundreds
of millions in the United States, is greeted now with the following message: “We’re changing
our privacy policy and terms. This stuff matters.”6
Assuming that EPIC is correct that the company’s changes violate the Consent Order and
that Google goes forward as planned, the irreparable injury alleged is not only “likely.” It is
certain. Moreover, this matter is not moot because it is “capable of repetition.” American Wild
Horse Preservation Campaign v. Salazar, 800 F.Supp. 2d 270, 274 (D.D.C. 2011). If the court
fails to act now, the combining of the “covered information” of “Google users” will “be
completed before the court can act.” Id. Consent Order at 2-3.
CONCLUSION
The government’s concluding argument sidesteps the claims that EPIC has put before this
Court. Whether or not the FTC “takes very seriously the need to protect the privacy of
consumers” or successfully pursues its various other programs and activities is not relevant, Def.
Mem. at 10-12; the question is whether the Commission’s failure to enforce a final order is
subject to judicial review. As the agency’s failure to act prior to March 1, 2012 would constitute

5
“A nondiscretionary duty of timeliness may arise even if a deadline is not explicitly set forth in
the statute, if it is readily-ascertainable by reference to some other fixed date or event.” Id.
(Quoting Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 790 (2nd Cir. 1987).
6
Just about every Google web site currently displays this message or a similar message.
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irreparable injury, EPIC respectfully asks this Court to deny the government’s motion to dismiss
and to grant EPIC’s motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

Respectfully submitted,
By:

____/s/ Marc Rotenberg________________
Marc Rotenberg, Esquire (DC Bar # 422825)
John Verdi, Esquire (DC Bar # 495764)
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION
CENTER
1718 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20009
[phone] (telephone)
[phone] (facsimile)

Dated: February 21, 2012

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned counsel certifies that on the 21st day of February, 2012, he caused the
foregoing OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION to be served by ECF on the following:
DRAKE CUTINI
Consumer Protection Branch
Civil Division
Department of Justice
P.O. Box 386
Washington, DC 20044
[phone]
[e-mail]

__/s/ Marc Rotenberg________________
MARC ROTENBERG
JOHN VERDI
Electronic Privacy Information Center
1718 Connecticut Ave. NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20009
[phone]
Counsel for Plaintiff

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