JOHNSON v. QUAKER OATS COMPANY

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION accompanying final order issued separately this day. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly on 1/2/13.(ah)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Duane Joseph Johnson,
Plaintiff,
v.
Quaker Oats Company,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 12-0587 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this action removed from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia under this
Court’s diversity jurisdiction, Not. of Removal [Dkt. # 4-1] ¶ 5, plaintiff sues the Quaker Oats
Company for allegedly misleading him “about the nutritional and health qualities of its chewy
granola bars and instant oatmeal products that contain partially hydrogenated oil.” Am. Compl.
[Dkt. # 4-1, ECF pgs. 12-28] at 1. Plaintiff claims that defendant’s “wide-spread marketing
campaign” touting the nutritional value of those products between November 1, 2005, and
November 2010 “caused” him to pay a premium price for the products he allegedly purchased
“from a vendor in the District of Columbia” or from “various individuals.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 8.
Plaintiff sues under the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”),
D.C. Code §§ 28-3901-13, for damages exceeding $90,000. Am. Compl. ¶ 6,
Pending before the Court is the Motion by Defendant the Quaker Oats Company to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint [Dkt. # 5], which plaintiff has opposed. Also pending are
plaintiff’s contested motion to voluntarily dismiss this action without prejudice under Rule 41
[Dkt. # 20], and a contested motion by Douglas Wardrick to intervene [Dkt. # 7]. Defendant
seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiff lacks
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standing and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Since the Court agrees that plaintiff has not established his standing to sue under the District’s
CPPA, it will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), deny the remaining two
motions as moot, and dismiss this case. See Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("The defect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction.").
“Article III of the Constitution limits the ‘judicial power’ of the United States to the
resolution of ‘cases' and ‘controversies.’ ” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). “In order to establish the
existence of a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, [a] party must meet certain
constitutional minima,” including “the requirement that . . . [he] has standing to bring the
action.” Gettman v. DEA, 290 F.3d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The “irreducible constitutional
minimum” of standing requires: (1) an injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see Little v. Fenty, 689 F. Supp. 2d 163,
168 (D.D.C. 2010) (“To satisfy this burden of establishing standing, ‘[a] plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.’ ”) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
Standing to assert a claim under the District’s CPPA “ ‘requires no more’ than payment for
services and pecuniary harm as a result of [unlawful trade] practices.” Silvious v. Snapple
Beverage Corp. 793 F. Supp. 2d 414, 417 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Shaw v. Marriott Intern., Inc.,
605 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff has not provided specific, or even approximate, dates when he made the alleged
purchases, and reality belies his allegations. Plaintiff is serving a Superior Court sentence of 30
years to life imposed on January 19, 1995. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4

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(D.D.C. 2010). A court may take judicial notice of public records, which include court dockets.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201(a),(b); Rogers v. District of Columbia, Civ. Action No. 11-1618, ___ F.
Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 3108873, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2012) (citing cases). A review of the
civil dockets of this Court, to which plaintiff is no stranger, places plaintiff at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Petersburg, Virginia, from 2006 to 2010. See, e.g., Johnson v.
EOUSA, Civ. No. 06-0424 (filed Mar. 8, 2006); Johnson v. Sullivan, Misc. No. 08-0457 (filed
June 26, 2008); Johnson v. Sullivan, Civ. No. 09-2056 (filed Oct. 30, 2009); Johnson v. McCool,
Civ. No. 10-0634 (filed Apr. 23, 2010). Plaintiff does not state where he was incarcerated on
November 1, 2005, when he alleges defendant launched the misleading marketing campaign, but
it is reasonably safe to assume that he was not in the District on that date either.
Regardless, plaintiff’s implication that he purchased defendant’s products in the District
of Columbia and thus suffered pecuniary injury simply strains credulity. Cf. with Silvious v.
Coca-Cola Co., Civ. No. 11-2113, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 4466854, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept.
28, 2012) (finding that a plaintiff incarcerated since February 11, 2005, could not “credibly
assert” that he had purchased defendant’s product in the District within the applicable three-year
statute of limitations). And as a lay person, plaintiff cannot advance the claims of vendors or
other consumers who may have purchased defendant’s products in the District of Columbia. See
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel . . . .”); Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (holding that a lay person cannot appear as counsel for others); Silvious, 2012 WL
4466854, at *2 (finding same); see also Maydak v. FCC, No. 98-1383, 1998 WL 938717 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 9, 1998) (per curiam) (“Appellant's alleged injuries ‘in his capacity as a consumer’ are
hypothetical and conjectural, not the concrete and actual or imminent injury that Article III

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requires. . . . Furthermore, appellant has not shown a fairly traceable connection . . . because the
injury depends on the choices of third parties not before the court.”). Accordingly, the Court will
grant defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

___________s/_______________
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
DATE: January 2, 2013

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