MOUNT v. NAPOLITANO

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION granting 7 motion to dismiss the complaint in part, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 4/10/2014. (lckbj3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
________________________________
)
JASON MOUNT,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
Civil Action No. 12-CV-1276(KBJ)
)
JEH JOHNSON,
)
Secretary, Department of
)
1
)
Homeland Security,
)
Defendant.
)
)
________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This employment discrimination case turns on a question of law regarding
whether alleged acts of retaliation that occur subsequent to the plaintiff’s filing of an
administrative Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) charge need to be exhausted
separately. Plaintiff Jason Mount (“Plaintiff” or “Mount”) filed the instant complaint
on August 27, 2013, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, alleging that his employer, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS” or
“Defendant”), wrongfully refused to select him for 43 different positions that he applied
for within the agency. (See Complaint, ECF No. 1.) Mount maintains that this
extensive series of non-selections was motivated by discriminatory and retaliatory
animus; specifically, Mount alleges that he was not promoted to any of the posts due to
discrimination based on his gender and race (id. ¶¶ 123-143 (Counts I and II)), and that
agency officials also refused to select him because he had previously filed an EEO
1

Mount filed this action against Janet A. Napolitano in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security. Jeh Johnson is substituted as defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

charge claiming gender and race discrimination on the basis of his supervisor’s
treatment of him (id. ¶¶ 144-151 (Count III)).
Before this Court at present is Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint in
part, or in the alternative, motion for partial summary judgment. (Def.’s Partial Mot. to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Partial Summ. J., (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 7.)
Offering additional documentation regarding the scope of Mount’s EEO charge,
Defendant argues that only one of the 43 alleged non-selection events listed in Mount’s
complaint was raised in the context of Mount’s EEO complaint; therefore, the rest of
the alleged instances of discrimination/retaliation must be dismissed from the complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. (Id. at 1.) 2 Because this Court agrees with Defendant that the
applicable legal standards regarding administrative exhaustion were not satisfied under
the circumstances presented here, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding Mount’s failure to satisfy Title VII’s exhaustion requirement
with respect to all but one of his non-selection retaliation allegations. Therefore,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint in part, or in the alternative, motion for
partial summary judgment, is GRANTED. As explained below, Counts I and II of the
complaint are dismissed in their entirety, and the only surviving non-selection event for
the purpose of Count III is Mount’s contention that the agency retaliated against him in
the spring of 2011, when officials did not select him for a posted agency position in Los
Angeles. A separate order consistent with this opinion will follow.

2

Page numbers throughout this opinion refer to the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic
filing system.

2

I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
For the purpose of the pending motion, the essential facts of this matter are not

in dispute. (See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 9, at 7.) Mount was hired in 2001 to serve as
an employee of the U.S. Customs Service, which is the predecessor agency to U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), a division of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security’s Investigations (“HSI”) unit. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13.) 3 By 2009, Mount
had been promoted to the position of Branch Chief/Supervisor Special Agent at ICE
headquarters in Washington, DC. (Id. ¶ 14.)
In November of 2010, Mount filed an administrative EEO complaint alleging
gender discrimination because his then-supervisor, Sharon Peyus, had decided to have
Mount work from a cubicle instead of an office, while giving offices to his female
coworkers. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 22; Ex. 6 to Def.’s Mot., Report of Investigation (“ROI”), ECF
No. 7-6, at 7, 22-24, 27-31.) Mount contends that, as a result of this EEO charge, Peyus
and other agency officials embarked on a series of retaliatory actions (mostly in the
form of non-selections) beginning in January of 2011, and continuing until April of
2012. Notably, as explained below, only some of these alleged retaliatory actions were
raised within the context of Mount’s EEO complaint.
First, in March of 2011, four months after the filing of his discrimination
complaint, Mount notified the agency that he believed Peyus had taken certain actions

3

When Mount was first hired, the agency was known as the “United States Customs Service.” (Compl.
¶ 13.) In 2003, the agency’s name was changed to United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”), which is part of the Department of Homeland Security. See Contreras v. Ridge,
305 F. Supp. 2d 126, 128 n.1 (D.D.C. 2004). The Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) unit is a
subdivision of ICE; as its name suggests, HSI is responsible for investigating “illegal movement of
people and goods into, within and out of the United States.” See http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/
homeland-security-investigations/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). HSI maintains offices all over the
country and abroad. Id.

3

in response to his having brought administrative charges, and he wanted this alleged
retaliation to be included in his EEO complaint. (ROI at 7.) Specifically, Mount
maintained that (1) the parties’ failure to settle the initial claims at mediation
constituted retaliation, and (2) Peyus had withheld training opportunities when she
cancelled Mount’s attendance at a leadership training program and did not permit him
to apply to an ICE fellowship program, and he requested a formal amendment to the
original EEO complaint to include these two new allegations. (Id.) Shortly after that
amendment and also in March of 2011, Mount filed a second EEO complaint, this time
alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race when he was not
selected for an Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (“ASAC”) position in Las Vegas,
Nevada. (ROI at 13 (“I believe I was not considered for the [Las Vegas] position based
on my race.”); Ex. 7 to Def.’s Mot., Report of Investigation (“Second ROI”), ECF No.
7-7, at 13-14.) Mount had apparently applied to the Las Vegas ASAC position on
October 15, 2010, and had learned that he was not selected for the position on
December 30, 2010. (Second ROI at 3; Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot., Decl. of Dinisha Brown
(“Brown Decl.”), ECF No. 7-3, at 2.) Claude Arnold, who was the Special Agent-inCharge of the Los Angeles HSI office, made the selection for that Las Vegas ASAC
position, which a three-member evaluation panel and HSI’s National Director for
Operations approved. (ROI at 54-57; Arnold Aff. ¶¶ 5, 13, 17-35, 28-31.) Mount, who
is Caucasian (Compl. ¶ 135), asserted in his second EEO complaint that the agency had
chosen an African-American man for the position instead of him solely because of race.
(ROI at 12-13.)

4

Mount then asked the agency to consolidate his two separate administrative
complaints. (See Second ROI at 13-14.) By letter of April 7, 2011, the agency notified
Mount that it had consolidated the complaints such that, with the exception of his
allegations regarding the purportedly retaliatory failure to settle at mediation, the
consolidated administrative complaint addressed all of Mount’s claims up to that point
in time (i.e., his claims that Peyus had discrimination against him on the basis of gender
and had retaliated against him for bringing that EEO charge, and that Arnold had
discriminated against him on the basis of race when he failed to select him for the Las
Vegas ASAC position). (Id. at 14; ROI at 22-24.) An EEO contractor was assigned to
investigate the claims in the consolidated complaint, and that investigator contacted
Mount on May 27, 2011. (Second ROI at 17-18.) An investigation of Mount’s
consolidated EEO complaint took place from May 31, 2011, through August 10, 2011.
(ROI at 4.)
On August 29, 2011, after the investigation of the claims in Mount’s
consolidated complaint had ended, Mount requested an amendment to his consolidated
EEO complaint. (Second ROI at 13-14.) Mount had applied for a Special Agent-inCharge position in HSI’s office in Los Angeles, California on March 21, 2011, and had
learned that he had not been selected on July 14, 2011. (Id.; Brown Decl. at 2.) 4 The
same person who had not selected Mount for the Las Vegas position (Claude Arnold)
also made the selection determination regarding the Los Angeles post. (Second ROI at
19-20.) Mount maintained that the only reason Arnold did not select him for the Los

4

In the complaint, Mount alleged that he was not selected for the Los Angeles position in February
2011 (Compl. ¶ 23), but it is clear from the record that this non-selection occurred on July 14, 2011.
(See Brown Decl. at 2; Ex. 5 to Def.’s Mot., Decl. of Janet White (“White Decl.”), ECF No. 7-5, ¶¶ 58.)

5

Angeles position was the fact that Mount had previously filed an administrative
complaint against Arnold; therefore, Mount requested that his consolidated EEO
complaint be amended in order to include an additional charge of retaliation based on
the Los Angeles non-selection. By letter dated November 14, 2011, the agency granted
his request. (Second ROI at 13-14.) Notably, the agency’s grant letter specifically
addressed the agency’s policy regarding such amendments:
While a complaint is pending, a Complainant may raise a new incident
of alleged discrimination that is not a part of the existing claim but
may be like or related to the pending claim. If the new claim is like or
related to claim(s) raised in the pending complaint, the pending
complaint may be amended to include the newly-raised allegation and
there is no requirement to seek counseling on the new claim. EEOC
Management Directive 110, Chapter 5; III B. Your client’s complaint
is hereby amended to include this issue.
(Id. at 14.)
Having amended Mount’s EEO complaint to include a retaliation allegation
stemming from the denial of the Los Angeles ASAC position, the agency then appointed
a new EEO investigator to inquire into this new charge. (Second ROI at 1.) The new
investigation commenced on May 17, 2012, and the record establishes that the
investigator contacted Mount’s attorney to seek information regarding the entirety of
the newly-amended administrative complaint—not just the added Los Angeles ASAC
non-selection event. (Id. at 1, 15-16.) Mount’s lawyer rebuffed the investigator’s
expansive inquiry, explaining that most of “the issues have already been covered by the
original [investigation,]” so “[t]he only issue you should be investigating is the LA
job[.]” (Id. at 16 (emphasis added)); see also id. at 15 (in an email to the investigator,
Mount’s attorney reiterates that “the only relevant issue that was not investigated in the
already completed [Report of Investigation]” is the Los Angeles position, so it is “the
6

only issue that you have a right to compel cooperation from Mr. Mount and it is the
only issue we’ve addressed”).) In addition, consistent with Mount’s attorney’s
statements, the declaration that Mount submitted in response to the investigator’s
inquiries provided information about the Los Angeles position only. (Id. at 19-20.)
The EEO investigation into Mount’s additional charge of retaliation as a result of his
non-selection for the Los Angeles ASAC position concluded on July 19, 2012. (Id. at
1.)
Mount filed the instant lawsuit on July 21, 2012. According to the complaint,
from January 19, 2011, to April 25, 2012—a period of time that spans the agency’s
months of investigation regarding the charges in the consolidated and amended
administrative complaint—Mount applied for and was not selected for more than 40
other vacancies within the agency in a wide variety of geographic locations. (See
Compl. ¶¶ 24-117.)

5

The complaint states that Mount “initiated this request because he

has not received fair consideration as a result of retaliation for his EEO activities and
discrimination for any of the forty-three lateral [ ] positions he has applied for since
October 15, 2010” (Id. ¶ 121 (emphasis in original)), and it claims that the listed series
of non-selections constituted gender (Count I) and race (Count II) discrimination, and
also retaliation (Count III) in violation of Title VII. (Id. ¶¶ 123-151.)
Significantly, Mount’s initial EEO charges (i.e., Peyus’s alleged discriminatory
refusal to give him an office and her alleged retaliatory denial of his requests for
5

For example, Mount applied to and was not selected for the following positions: Assistant Special
Agent-in-Charge of various HSI offices (Compl. ¶¶ 24 (Miami, Florida), 95 (Long Beach, California));
Deputy Special Agent-in-Charge positions in HSI offices around the country (see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 89
(Tampa, Florida), 101 (Miami, Florida)); Resident Agent-in-Charge of HSI’s Providence, Rhode Island
office (id. ¶ 39); Deputy Assistant Director of HSI’s Washington, D.C.-based Office of Intelligence (id.
¶ 33); Unit Chief in HSI’s Washington, D.C. office (id. ¶ 25); and ICE attaché positions abroad (id. ¶¶
42, 52).

7

training) do not appear in the instant complaint, nor does the complaint specifically
reference the Las Vegas non-selection incident. Instead, the complaint opens with the
general assertion that Mount “was involved in protected EEO activity on November 30,
2010[,]” and it then marches through a series of subsequent opportunities for vacant
positions, beginning in early January of 2011, that Mount purportedly applied for but
allegedly was denied due to discriminatory and retaliatory animus. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 16118.)
For the great majority of the non-selection allegations, the complaint alleges
generally that “HSI management” repeatedly “passed [him] over” for positions “in
retaliation for his EEO activity.” (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 23, 24, 27, 29, 31, 40, 43, 46, 50, 53,
56, 58, 59, 64, 69, 71, 73, 75, 79, 81, 87, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108,
110, 112, 114, 116, 118.) For just a handful of the claims, Mount provides more
information. For example, Mount alleges that he applied to a Deputy Assistant Director
position in the Washington, D.C.-based HSI Office of Intelligence in June 2011, and
that HSI Assistant Director James Chaparro informed him that he had not chosen Mount
for the position. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.) The complaint’s allegations regarding the vast
majority of the non-selection events do not include any information about the selecting
officer. Moreover, there is no dispute that the only non-selection event in the instant
complaint that Mount also specifically raised with the EEO was the July 14, 2011, nonselection for the Los Angeles ASAC position, and as noted, Mount’s specific EEO
charge was that the Los Angeles non-selection incident had occurred in retaliation for
prior EEO activity.

8

On March 4, 2013, Defendant filed the present motion to dismiss the complaint
in part, or in the alternative, motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the only
non-selection event in the complaint that was adequately exhausted was Mount’s
allegation that he was “passed over for an ASAC position in Los Angeles” in February
of 2011 (Compl. ¶ 23), and that, consequently, Mount’s remaining non-selection
allegations should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
(See Def.’s Mot. at 1.) This Court heard oral argument on Defendant’s motion on
August 27, 2013.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) For Failure To Exhaust
Administrative Remedies
“Before filing suit, a federal employee who believes that her agency has

discriminated against her in violation of Title VII must first seek administrative
adjudication of her claim.” Payne v. Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted), rev’d on other grounds by 619 F.3d 56 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see 42 U.S.C.
§1000e-16(c). The exhaustion requirements under Title VII, which are explained infra
in Part III.A, are mandatory but not jurisdictional. See Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d
549, 556 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Instead, these exhaustion requirements are akin to a
statute of limitations, and failure to exhaust is raised as an affirmative defense. See
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); Koch v. Walter, 935 F.
Supp. 2d 164, 170 (D.D.C. 2013). Accordingly, the defendant “bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.” Ndondji v. InterPark Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 263, 276 (D.D.C.
2011) (citing Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Moreover,
9

motions to dismiss Title VII claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies are
analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Porter v. Sebelius, 944 F.
Supp. 2d 65, 68 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Rosier v. Holder, 833 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.
2011)); see, e.g., Peters v. District of Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158, 178-79 (D.D.C.
2012); Noisette v. Geithner, 693 F. Supp. 2d 60, 65 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted).
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint[.]” Browning
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
In deciding whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court
“must treat the complaint’s factual allegations—including mixed questions of law and
fact—as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Epps v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 719 F. Supp. 2d 7, 13 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Holy Land
Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Moreover,
when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court generally does not consider matters
beyond the pleadings. Ward v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117,
119-20 (D.D.C. 2011). This means that the court may consider “the facts alleged in the
complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the
complaint, or documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies even if
the document is produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a
motion to dismiss[.]” Id. at 119 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
Vanover v. Hantman, 77 F. Supp. 2d 91, 98 (D.D.C. 1999) (same). However, if the

10

court considers documents outside this narrow orbit—i.e., if it considers documents
other than those attached to or specifically referenced in the complaint or those upon
which the complaint necessarily relies—the court must convert the motion from one
that is made under Rule 12(b)(6) to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as
one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”).
B. Conversion To Summary Judgment
In this case, the complaint does not contain any attachments; however, both
parties have attached a number of documents to their briefs regarding the instant motion
to dismiss. Defendant has submitted the following: (1) a statement of material facts
not in genuine dispute (ECF No. 7-1); (2) the agency’s Report of Investigation (“ROI”)
regarding Mount’s initial EEO case, which includes Mount’s first administrative
complaint and documents the agency prepared during their investigation (ECF No. 7-6);
and (3) the contractor’s ROI of Mount’s consolidated administrative complaint ,
including Moutn’s second EEO complaint (ECF No. 7-7). Defendant has also submitted
declarations of ICE employees Claude Arnold (ECF No. 7-2), Dinisha Brown (ECF No.
7-3), Katherine Pull (ECF No. 7-4), and Janet White (ECF No. 7-5). For his part,
Mount has submitted the following additional documents in conjunction with his
opposition to Defendant’s motion: (1) a statement of genuine issues (ECF No. 8-1); (2)
a Rule 56(d) affidavit of Plaintiff’s counsel, in which counsel states that discovery is
needed to identify the individuals involved in the selections (ECF No. 8-3); and (3)

11

excerpts from the same ROIs that are attached to Defendant’s motion (ECF Nos. 8-4, 85).
Because Mount’s complaint does not discuss or describe his EEO charge in any
respect, the ROIs from the agency and related documents that the parties have
submitted are not materials upon which the complaint “necessarily relies,” nor does the
complaint quote or refer to those materials. The Court’s consideration of these
additional materials thus implicates the conversion rule, and indeed, Mount appears to
agree with Defendant that conversion to summary judgment is appropriate. (See Pl.’s
Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative Mot. for Partial
Summ. J. (Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 8, at 9 (“Defendant’s motion cannot be decided on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion[.] . . . [T]his case must be decided under the Rule 56 standard.”
(citation omitted)).) At the same time, Mount contends in his Rule 56(d) affidavit that
summary judgment is premature at this stage of the litigation, because he wishes to take
discovery regarding certain non-selections in order to determine who made the
challenged hiring determinations. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 20; Rule 56(d) Aff. of Morris E.
Fischer, ECF No. 8-3.) Defendant maintains that no further discovery is needed
because the bulk of the case must either be dismissed, or summary judgment must be
entered in its favor, due to the exhaustion deficiency. (Def.’s Reply at 11-12.)
Exercising the considerable discretion that district courts are afforded when
deciding whether or not to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment, see Flynn v. Tiede-Zoeller, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 46, 50 (D.D.C. 2006)
(citation omitted); see also Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transp., Inc., 82 F.3d 484, 493 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), this Court

12

concludes that conversion is appropriate here and will treat Defendant’s motion as a
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 with respect to the exhaustion issue only.
See, e.g., Pintro v. Wheeler, No. 13-0231, 2014 WL 1315976, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 2,
2014) (converting defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to a motion for summary
judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
This Court concludes that such treatment is “fair to both parties[,]” Tele-Commc’ns of
Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1985), because both
parties here have had an opportunity to address the conversion question, and also
because the Court’s consideration of summary judgment at this juncture relates only to
the documents and materials that have been submitted to address exhaustion and will
not preclude further discovery on the merits of any surviving claims. Moreover, the
submitted materials, and in particular, the ROIs, are the only record evidence that
establishes the particular charges Mount brought in the EEO context, which means, as a
practical matter, that the only way to assess adequately Defendant’s exhaustion
arguments is to consider them. Cf. Ryan-White v. Blank, 922 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22-23
(D.D.C. 2013) (noting that “[i]f extra-pleading evidence is comprehensive and will
enable a rational determination of a summary judgment motion, a district court will be
more likely to convert to summary judgment” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Consequently, this Court will not exclude the agency ROIs and the
additional materials the parties have submitted insofar as they relate to the exhaustion
issue; hence, Defendant’s motion will be treated as one for summary judgment under
Rule 56 rather than as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

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C. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and [thus] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir.
2011). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law,’ and a dispute about a material fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Steele v.
Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)).
When Rule 56 is invoked, the moving party has the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden,
to defeat the motion, the non-moving party must designate “specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). While the Court must
view this evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, see, e.g., Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of
Governors, Chairman, 709 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the non-moving party must
show more than “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of” his or her
position—“there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [the nonmoving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Moreover, the non-moving party “may not
rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading but must present affirmative
evidence showing a genuine issue for trial.” Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236,
1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

14

The Court further notes that “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge at summary judgment.” Barnett v. PA Consulting Grp., Inc., 715 F.3d
354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Rather, the Court’s role in deciding a
summary judgment motion is not to “determine the truth of the matter, but instead
decide only whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citation omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION
A. Title VII Exhaustion Requirements

Defendant argues that it is entitled to entry of judgment in its favor with respect
to all of the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory non-selections in Mount’s complaint,
except for the non-selection for the Los Angeles ASAC position, because Mount failed
to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to all of the other alleged non-selection
events. (Def.’s Mot. at 1.) Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirement is clearly
established: an employee must contact an EEO counselor to initiate informal
counseling within 45 days of learning of the allegedly discriminatory event or adverse
personnel action. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105; see also Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 527
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Thereafter,
the employee must file a formal administrative complaint within 180 days of the event.
19 C.F.R. § 1614.106(a)-(c); see also Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1244, 1250-51
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 6 The employee may amend the administrative complaint at any time
prior to the conclusion of the agency’s investigation, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(d); however,
after receiving notice of the agency’s final action, the employee must file his or her
6

Although not at issue here, the time period is extended to 300 days if a parallel state agency was
investigating the claim along with the EEO office. See 19 C.F.R. § 1614.106(a)-(c).

15

civil action in federal court within 90 days. Id. § 1614.407; 42 U.S.C. § 42-2000e15(c); see also Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
“These procedural requirements governing [a] plaintiff’s right to bring a Title
VII claim in federal court are not trivial.” Rattigan v. Gonzales, 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 68
(D.D.C. 2007). Rather, administrative exhaustion is meant to give the “agency notice
of a claim and [the] opportunity to handle it internally,” Guerrero v. Univ. of District of
Columbia, 251 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2003) (alteration in original), which
preserves the court’s time and resources, Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1350-51.
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the Supreme Court addressed
the administrative exhaustion requirement as it relates to multiple allegations of
discrimination. 536 U.S. 101, 114-15 (2002). Prior to Morgan, an administrative
complaint was construed to encompass all incidents that are “‘like or reasonably related
to’ the allegations contained in the charge,” regardless of whether the specific incidents
of discrimination had been specifically brought to the investigating agency’s attention.
Smith-Thompson v. District of Columbia, 657 F. Supp. 2d 123, 136 (D.D.C. 2009)
(quoting Park, 71 F.3d at 907). This is known as the “continuing violation” doctrine,
and before Morgan, courts relying on this doctrine permitted a plaintiff to bring suit and
recover for all related incidents, even those that were not specifically exhausted. See
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-17. The Morgan Court rejected the “continuing violation”
doctrine insofar as it related to discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation, holding
that a Title VII plaintiff must file an administrative charge for each incident, even when
the other claims are like or related to acts alleged in a timely-filed administrative

16

complaint. Smith-Thompson, 657 U.S. at 136 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114-15). 7
Thus, as a general rule, a “Title VII plaintiff must timely exhaust administrative
remedies for each discrete act alleged[,]” even if the acts are related. Laughlin v.
Holder, 923 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209 (D.D.C. 2013) (emphasis added) (citing Morgan, 536
U.S. at 110, 115).
Morgan dealt specifically with a factual scenario involving allegations of
discrete discriminatory acts that had occurred before the plaintiff filed an administrative
complaint, and the Supreme Court did not address exhaustion in the context of
discriminatory or retaliatory incidents that occurred after an administrative complaint is
filed. See 536 U.S. at 115-16. Prior to Morgan, “courts generally held that a plaintiff
was not required to separately exhaust her administrative remedies for retaliation claims
arising after the filing of an administrative complaint.” Smith-Thompson, 657 F. Supp.
2d at 136 (collecting cases). But now, in the wake of Morgan, there is considerable
uncertainty regarding how such claims should be treated; even district judges within
this jurisdiction are at odds regarding “the extent to which Morgan [also] requires
exhaustion of claims based on discrete discriminatory [or retaliatory] acts that occurred
after the filing of an EEO charge.” Rashad v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 945 F.
Supp. 2d 152, 166 (D.D.C. 2013); see also Carson v. Sim, 778 F. Supp. 2d 85, 98

7

A different standard applies for hostile work environment claims, which necessarily involves a
pattern of conduct over a period of time. The acts that give rise to a hostile work environment—a claim
that Mount has not made in the instant case—need not be exhausted separately because they are not
considered to be discrete events. See Nichols v. Truscott, 424 F. Supp. 2d 124, 133 n.9 (D.D.C. 2006)
(“[A] plaintiff who has properly exhausted [a single hostile work environment] claim may in federal
court support it with related conduct that was not part of her administrative claim[.]” (citation
omitted)); see also Nguyen v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp. 2d 158, 172 (D.D.C. 2012) (same). To this extent,
even after Morgan, the “continuing violation doctrine” is alive and well with respect to hostile work
environment claims.

17

(D.D.C. 2011) (noting the “unresolved discord” within this circuit); Hernandez v.
Gutierrez, 656 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104-05 (D.D.C. 2009) (same).
In general, in the years since Morgan, judges in this district have traveled down
one of two paths when evaluating whether separate exhaustion is required for claims of
discrimination or retaliation that are based on events alleged to have occurred after the
filing of an administrative complaint. Many of the judges who have considered this
question have held that a plaintiff alleging discrete acts of discrimination or
retaliation—including those filed after an administrative complaint—must exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to the later-occurring incidents even if they are
related to the claims in the administrative complaint. Rashad, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 166
(Morgan “changed [the] generous assumption” that no separate exhaustion was
required); Romero-Ostolazo v. Ridge, 370 F. Supp. 2d 139, 149 (D.D.C. 2005)
(“Although Morgan bars recovery for, on its facts, discrete acts occurring before the
statutory time period, Morgan has, on the whole, been understood to also bar discrete
acts occurring . . . after the filing of an administrative complaint, when a plaintiff does
not file a new complaint or amend the old complaint but instead presents these acts for
the first time in federal court.” (citations omitted)). This appears to be the majority
view. See, e.g., Rashad, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 166-67 (Collyer, J.) (“This Court is of the
opinion that discrete acts of discrimination and retaliation require discrete charges and
an opportunity for investigation before litigation.” (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114));
Hunter v. District of Columbia, 797 F. Supp. 2d 86, 95 (D.D.C. 2011) (Berman Jackson,
J.) (noting that “[c]ourts in this district have applied Morgan in holding that a plaintiff
must exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to distinct acts that occurred after

18

the filing of an administrative charge” (citation omitted)); accord Reshard v. Lahood,
No. 87-2794, 2010 WL 1379806, at *13 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2010) (Walton, J.), aff’d, 443
F. App’x 568 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2442 (2012); Camp v. District of
Columbia, No. 04-234, 2006 WL 667956, at *7-8 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2006) (KollarKotelly, J.); Romero-Ostolazo, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 149 (Lamberth, J.); Keeley v. Small,
391 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2005) (Bates, J.); Coleman-Adebayo v. Leavitt, 326
F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2004) (Friedman, J.), amended in part on other grounds by 400
F. Supp. 2d 257 (D.D.C. 2005); Bowie v. Ashcroft, 283 F. Supp. 2d 25, 34 (D.D.C.
2003) (Facciola, M.J.). These cases tend to highlight Morgan’s “emphasis on strict
adherence to procedure and on the severability of discrete acts” of discrimination, and
also the Supreme Court’s “rejection of the various continuing violation doctrines of the
Circuit Courts[.]” Romero-Ostolazo, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 149. This approach also
underscores the recognized purposes of the exhaustion requirement, which are to
“ensure[] that only claims [that a] plaintiff has diligently pursued will survive” and to
“encourage[] internal, less costly resolution of Title VII claims.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
But there are other judges in this district who, under certain circumstances, have
not read Morgan to disallow unexhausted retaliation claims based on events that occur
after the filing of an administrative charge. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp.
2d 158, 183 (D.D.C. 2012) (Sullivan, J.); Pierson v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 821 F.
Supp. 2d 360, 365-66 (D.D.C. 2011) (Urbina, J.); Thomas v. Vilsack, 718 F. Supp. 2d
106, 121 (D.D.C. 2010) (Kay, M.J.); Hazel v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 021375, 2006 WL 362693, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2006) (Roberts, J). This line of cases

19

distinguishe[s] retaliation claims that arise after a plaintiff
has filed an administrative complaint [from those that arose
before the administrative complaint is filed], holding that
separate exhaustion is not required for those later acts of
retaliation that would have come within the scope of any
investigation that reasonably could have been expected to
result from the initial administrative charge[.]
Nguyen, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hazel, 2006
WL 3623693, at *8). Cases that follow this reasoning—which appears to be the
minority view in this jurisdiction—typically hold that no separate exhaustion is
required if subsequent alleged retaliatory acts are “of a like kind to the retaliatory acts
alleged in the EEOC charge” such that they necessarily would have come within the
“scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from
[the] initial charge of discrimination.” See Hazel, 2006 WL 3623693, at *5, 8 (citations
omitted). The rationale behind this viewpoint is that the administrative complaint puts
the agency on notice of the possibility of further retaliation; therefore, the agency
should be aware of any later-occurring incidents, and its investigation would be likely
to encompass such incidents. See id. (noting that a reasonable investigation “would
certainly have focused” on whether the retaliation alleged in the complaint “continue[d]
to exist at the time of the investigation” (citation omitted)). Thus, the “of a like kind”
analysis centers on whether the allegations that were specifically put before the agency
and the new allegations the plaintiff seeks to litigate constitute the same cause of action
and are factually similar such that they would be discovered during the agency’s
investigation.
Much like this doctrinal divide within the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, the Courts of Appeals are also split over whether a plaintiff must raise

20

subsequent, related retaliation claims in separate administrative complaints before
bringing them into federal court. Compare Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210
(10th Cir. 2003) (complainant must file a new administrative complaint for all acts of
retaliation that arise subsequent to the filing of the initial administrative complaint)
with Wedow v. City of Kansas City, 442 F.3d 661, 673-74 (8th Cir. 2006) (no need to
exhaust separately acts of retaliation subsequent to the initial administrative complaint
if they would be discovered during a reasonable investigation into the initial allegation)
and Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012) (no need for separate
exhaustion when “both the EEOC charge and the complaint included claims of
retaliation by the same actor”); see also Simmons-Myers v. Caesers Entm’t Corp., 515
F. App’x 269, 273 n.1 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We note that [the Fifth Circuit case waiving
separate exhaustion for subsequent claims of retaliation] may no longer be applicable
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan[.]”). The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly
declined to weigh in on this matter, see, e.g., Payne, 619 F.3d at 65 (declining to decide
whether Morgan “did in fact overtake th[e] line of cases” that held that plaintiffs may
still bring unexhausted claims that are “like or reasonably related to” claims they did
file with their agencies); Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 183-84 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(recognizing the circuit split but concluding that “we need not adopt either of the
forgoing views” to resolve the matter before it), which means that, to resolve the instant
dispute, this Court seemingly must make its own determination regarding whether or
not Morgan requires separate exhaustion of acts of alleged retaliation that occur
subsequent to the filing of an administrative action. Alternatively, as explained below,
this Court may reasonably conclude that this Rubicon need not be crossed in the context

21

of the instant case because Mount’s complaint misses the mark by any legal standard.
See, e.g., Coleman v. Johnson, No. 12-1352, 2014 WL 116150, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 14,
2014) (declining to decide whether the “like or reasonably related” standard is still
alive after Morgan because the plaintiff’s claims did not satisfy that standard).
B. Mount Was Required To Exhaust Each Of The Non-Selection
Retaliation Events He Alleges In His Complaint Under The
Circumstances Presented Here
As noted, the question for this Court is whether the series of allegedly
discriminatory or retaliatory non-selections that Mount lists in his complaint—which
occurred after he filed his first administrative action—needed to be exhausted
separately or whether it was sufficient for exhaustion purposes that Mount had
previously filed an EEO complaint that alleged, among other things, discrimination and
retaliation with respect to one non-selection event. Defendant would have this Court
conclude that, after Morgan, plaintiffs are required to exhaust separately all discrete
acts of discrimination or retaliation, including those that occur after a timely filed
administrative complaint. (Def.’s Mot. at 11.) Because it is undisputed here that
Mount did not file an EEO charge for any of the non-selections besides the Los Angeles
ASAC position, Defendant argues that the rest of the retaliatory non-selection claims in
the instant complaint must be dismissed as a matter of law. (Id. at 11, 18.) In response,
Mount asserts that his failure to exhaust does not warrant judgment for Defendant as to
any of the remaining non-selection allegations because the myriad non-selection
incidents arose after he filed an EEO complaint and are necessarily related to that
complaint such that they need not be exhausted separately. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 10.) In
other words, Mount asks the Court to find that Morgan does not apply to alleged acts of
22

retaliatory non-selection that occur after an administrative complaint alleging similar
retaliation is filed. (See id.)
Although the Court could resolve this matter by choosing sides in the debate
over the impact of Morgan, this Court declines to accept either party’s invitation to
decide the underlying legal issue because the Court concludes that resolution of that
dispute makes no difference in this case. Put bluntly, under the circumstances
presented here, Mount is in a ‘heads, you win; tails, I lose’ situation. There is no
dispute that Mount failed to exhaust each non-selection event separately; thus, the
unexhausted non-selection allegations must be dismissed from the complaint if Morgan
is interpreted to impose that legal requirement. On the other hand, if the legal rule is
that separate exhaustion is required only for those non-selection retaliation events that
were not “like or reasonably related” to Mount’s administrative action, those events
must be dismissed on exhaustion grounds as well because this Court discerns no such
“likeness” when it considers Mount’s specific EEO charge and the pertinent facts
regarding the non-selections at issue here.
With respect to the first side of Mount’s losing coin, Mount concedes that the
administrative complaints he filed pertained only to the following issues: the allegation
of gender discrimination based on his supervisor’s decision to deny him an office; the
allegation of retaliation based on his supervisor’s denial of training opportunities; the
allegation of race discrimination based on the Las Vegas ASAC non-selection; and the
allegation of retaliation based on the Los Angeles ASAC non-selection. (See Pl.’s Facts
¶¶ 15-16.) Of the exhausted issues, the instant complaint includes only the last event
charged in the EEO complaint—retaliation based on the Los Angeles ASAC non-

23

selection—and it also adds 42 subsequent non-selection events. Thus, the only nonselection allegation that was exhausted separately was the alleged retaliatory nonselection for the Los Angeles ASAC position, meaning that, even viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to Mount, he has failed to exhaust administrative remedies with
respect to the other discrete acts of retaliation and discrimination, if such separate
exhaustion is required. See Wedow, 442 F.3d at 673-75; Reshard, 2010 WL 1379806, at
*13; Camp, 2006 WL 667956, at *7-8; Romero-Ostolazo, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 149;
Coleman-Adebayo, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 132; Bowie, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
On the flip side of Mount’s losing situation is the fact that Title VII’s exhaustion
requirements would not be satisfied here even if this Court applied the minority legal
rule that permits subsequent claims of retaliation to be considered exhausted based on
the filing of a prior EEO complaint. The key to this Court’s conclusion in this regard is
its rejection of Mount’s contention that any and all subsequent retaliation claims are
necessarily and automatically “like or related” to a retaliation claim made in an EEO
complaint. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 18 (“[R]etaliation claims that are in response to an EEO
charge relate to that EEO charge and are therefore properly exhausted because they are
‘like or related’ to the original charge[.] All of Mount’s [ ] retaliation claims relate to
his EEO charge because they were in response to that charge and are therefore not
barred.”).) No court in this district has adopted an approach that is as sweeping as the
one Mount proposes. Instead, courts have required that the later-occurring incidents be
“of a like kind” to those in the administrative complaint, insofar as they involve the
same cause of action and similar facts such that the subsequent events would likely
have been discovered during the agency’s EEO investigation of the initial charge; and

24

in some cases, courts also require that the plaintiff specifically allege that the
subsequent incidents were part of the same “ongoing” conduct. See, e.g., Hazel, 2006
WL 3623693, at *8.
When this alternate legal standard is properly understood, it is clear that Mount’s
myriad non-selection retaliation claims cannot be deemed exhausted even under this
approach. As noted above, Mount’s first EEO complaint pertained to gender
discrimination based on Peyus’s refusal to give Mount an office and alleged retaliation
based on her refusal to allow Mount to participate in certain training programs. (ROI at
5-7 (initial EEO complaint regarding office denial); id. at 7-8 (amendment regarding
denial of training).) Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mount, as
summary judgment requires, the incidents reported in the EEO complaint and the
unexhausted non-selection allegations are not “of a like kind” as a matter of law,
because they involve entirely different causes of action. See Hazel, 2006 WL 3623693,
at *6 (noting that the subsequent acts of retaliation must match the retaliation alleged in
the EEOC charge); see also Koch, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 174 (noting that it “does not seem
reasonable to expect that [an] EEO Office would have examined” how certain actions
were retaliatory in their administrative investigation if the complaint only addressed
their “discriminatory nature”); Jones v. Bernanke, 685 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37 (D.D.C. 2010)
(same). Nor is there any reason to believe that the agency would have discovered the
later retaliatory non-selections during the course of an investigation into retaliation
allegations involving entirely different facts and individuals. See, e.g., Pierson, 821 F.
Supp. 2d at 366 (although both the exhausted claims and the subsequent claims alleged
retaliation, the agency’s investigation into a wrongful termination claim in the

25

administrative complaint would not reasonably have resulted in inquiry into denial of
vacation benefits). The agency cannot reasonably have been expected to inquire into
Mount’s applications for scores of jobs across the country in the course of investigating
a particular supervisor’s decisions regarding offices and training programs. Thus,
Mount’s many retaliatory non-selections cannot be deemed exhausted by virtue of his
initial gender discrimination administrative complaint and amendment.
To the extent that Mount’s exhaustion argument is based on his second EEO
complaint, which alleged that his non-selection for a Las Vegas ASAC position
constituted race discrimination (Second ROI at 8) and was eventually consolidated with
his initial EEO complaint, his argument fares no better. The connection between the
second administrative complaint and the unexhausted retaliation claims is certainly
closer: it involves a non-selection, as do the later retaliation claims; but in the
administrative complaint, Mount alleged that he was denied the selection due to race
discrimination, not retaliation. (See id.) The claims therefore allege different causes of
action, which is fatal to their classification as being “of a like kind.” See Jones, 685 F.
Supp. 2d at 37. Moreover, and in any event, given the timeframe of the agency’s
investigation of Mount’s race discrimination claim, Mount undoubtedly had an
obligation to mention other positions to which he had applied and not been selected for
during this same period, and the record establishes that, without such notice, the agency
would not reasonably have been aware of the fact that alleged discriminatory or
retaliatory non-selections were happening elsewhere.

8

8

Mount amended his EEO complaint to include the allegedly discriminatory non-selection for the Las
Vegas ASAC position on December 30, 2010, and the investigation into that claim took place from May
31, 2011, through August 10, 2011. (ROI at 4; Second ROI at 3.) In the complaint, Mount alleges that
he applied to and was not selected for over ten positions in other offices during that same period.

26

The last possible way in which Mount’s list of unexhausted non-selections could
be considered “like or related” to his pending EEO complaint is as a result of the final
amendment to the consolidated EEO complaint in which Mount alleged that his nonselection for an ASAC position in Los Angeles in July of 2011 constituted retaliation.
The Court finds that the agency had notice of Mount’s belief that his employer’s
decision not to select him for the Los Angeles position constituted retaliation for his
earlier EEO activity as of November 14, 2011, when the agency approved Mount’s
requested amendment. (See Second ROI at 19-20.) But with respect to the more than
25 retaliatory non-selections that occurred after Mount amended the administrative
complaint to include the Los Angeles non-selection (see Compl. ¶¶ 49-118), the
particular undisputed facts of the instant matter preclude a finding that these claims
were “like or related” to the EEO charge because they likely would have come within
the “scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from
[the] initial charge of discrimination.” See Hazel, 2006 WL 3623693, at *8. This is
because, even if a reasonable investigation would have uncovered the additional nonselection events, Mount and his attorney unequivocally cut off that investigation,
expressly limiting its scope to the Los Angeles non-selection. (See, e.g., Second ROI at
16 (“The only issue you should be investigating is the LA job[.]”).) Indeed, far from
bringing other retaliatory non-selection events to the agency’s attention in the course of
its investigation, Mount did precisely the opposite—stating (through his lawyer) that
the “only relevant issue” is “the job in CA[,]” and “[a]s such, that is the only issue that
you have a right to compel cooperation from Mr. Mount and it is the only issue we’ve

27

addressed.” (Id. at 15; see also id. at 19-20 (Mount’s declaration pertained only to the
Los Angeles position).)
Having effectively shut down any agency investigation into other non-selections,
Mount cannot now be heard to contend that, if such an investigation would have
proceeded, the agency would have discovered the other retaliatory non-selection events
and thus the complaint’s claims with respect to those incidents should be deemed
exhausted. In other words, regardless of whether the litany of non-selections that
appear in Mount’s complaint are “like or related” to the one he brought to the agency as
a matter of fact, the record here establishes that Mount has waived any argument that
they are, for the very simple reason that he told the agency that no other incidents were
relevant (like or related) to the course of its investigation of the Los Angeles nonselection event. When coupled with well-established principles of judicial estoppel,
Mount’s waiver is sufficient to dispose of his exhaustion argument, even if Morgan
permits “like or related” subsequent acts of retaliation to be deemed exhausted as a
matter of law. Cf. Moses v. Howard Univ., 567 F. Supp. 2d 62, 65 (D.D.C. 2008)
(“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents parties from abusing the legal
system by taking a position in one legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a position
taken in a later proceeding.” (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50
(2001)); see also, e.g., Moses, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (collecting cases in which
plaintiffs were barred from pursing certain employment discrimination allegations
because they failed to disclose them during bankruptcy proceedings).
In short, there is no genuine dispute over the fact that Mount’s attorney limited
the scope of the agency’s investigation. It is also clear beyond cavil that it is not likely

28

that the agency would have discovered the unexhausted non-selections during the
course of a reasonable investigation into the Los Angeles non-selection even, given that
Mount himself refused to raise or address any other non-selection incident during the
administrative process. On these facts, there is simply no basis to conclude that any of
the unexhausted retaliatory non-selection events should be deemed exhausted by virtue
of Morgan or any other applicable legal standard. 9
IV.

CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that Mount failed to exhaust separately any of the non-selection

allegations in his complaint other than the Los Angeles non-selection incident. There is
also no genuine dispute over the fact that Mount’s attorney limited the scope of the
agency’s investigation into the Los Angeles non-selection incident such that it is
unreasonable and unfair to assume that the agency would have discovered the other
non-selection events about which Mount now complains. Therefore, Defendant’s
motion to dismiss the complaint in part, or in the alternative, motion for partial
summary judgment is GRANTED. Counts I and II of the complaint are dismissed in
their entirety because there is no exhausted allegation of discrimination based on gender

9

Because the Court finds that Mount’s actions foreclosed the possibility that the EEO investigation of
the Los Angeles ASAC non-selection would uncover the other non-selection incidents, the identity of
the selecting officer for each unexhausted non-selection is of no consequence. Put another way, even in
the unlikely event that the selecting officer was the same individual in all of the unexhausted instances
such that the agency might have otherwise discovered those events based on their relatedness, that fact
is not material here, because Mount limited the scope of that investigation. For this reason, the Court
need not address the plaintiff’s counsel’s Rule 56 affidavit seeking additional discovery into the
identity of the selecting officer. (See ECF No. 8-3.)

29

or sex in the complaint. 10 With respect to Count III, which alleges retaliation, Mount
can only bring suit based on the Los Angeles non-selection event, and as set forth in the
accompanying order, the remaining non-selections are no longer to be considered part
of this action because Mount failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to those
incidents.

Ketanji Brown Jackson

Date: April 10, 2014

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge

10

As explained previously, Mount’s administrative complaint regarding the Los Angeles ASAC nonselection event alleged only retaliation, not discrimination based on gender or sex. (See Second ROI at
3 (noting that the accepted amendment to Mount’s administrative complaint pertained to whether the
agency “discriminated against [Mount] based on reprisal (prior EEO activity)” when it did not select
him for the Los Angeles position); id. at 14; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 (“Mount alleged that he was
retaliated against on July 14, 2011, when he was not selected for the [ ] Los Angeles position[.]”).)

30