GOLDBERG-BOTVIN et al v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION granting plaintiffs' motion for default judgment 13 . Signed by Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth on April 4, 2013. (lcrcl5)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JULIE GOLDBERG-BOTVIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,
Defendant.

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Civil No. 12-1292 (RCL)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action against the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”) arises from an act of statesponsored terrorism.

The decedent, a fourteen-year-old United States citizen named Yael

Botvin, was killed in a September 4, 1997, suicide bombing in the crowded pedestrian mall on
Ben Yehuda Street in downtown Jerusalem, Israel, by Hamas. In a previous action under the
former state-sponsored terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”),
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), the Court awarded $1.7 million in compensatory damages to Yael’s
estate against Iran and other defendants but denied other forms of requested damages, including
solatium damages for family member plaintiffs and punitive damages for all plaintiffs. Estate of
Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, 246 (D.D.C. 2012). Shortly after the
verdict in that case, the plaintiffs filed this suit under the updated state-sponsored terrorism
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, seeking the damages they had been denied under the old statute.
The Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, ECF No. 13, and awards solatium
and punitive damages as described below.

I.

BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 1
“Defendant Iran is a foreign state and has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism

pursuant to section 69(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2405(j),
continuously since January 19, 1984.” Botvin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
In Botvin, this Court drew on expert testimony given during an evidentiary hearing in
another § 1605(a)(7) case brought by individuals who were injured in the same bombing,
Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 (D.D.C. 2003) (Urbina, J.), to
find the following facts regarding Iran’s involvement in the September 4, 1997, bombing:
[T]he bombing was planned by a six-person Hamas cell organized by Mahmoud
Abu Hanoud—a senior commander in Hamas’ military wing. . . . [who] received
most of his explosives and military training in an Iranian-sponsored terrorist
training camp.
. . . Iran was encouraging and pushing Hamas’ leaders to carry out suicide
bombings as a policy, and that policy was approved by the highest authorities in
Iran. Iran’s relationship with Hamas began in the early 1990s. In 1994, Iran
received the first delegation of Hamas members who were trained directly by the
Iranians on Iranian soil.
As the Iran–Hamas relationship matured, the
involvement of Iran became stronger and stronger with Hamas and especially
with these terrorist activities . . . .
Abu Hanoud personally directed the scouting, planning, disguising, safe
housing, traveling, and purchasing involved in this sophisticated attack. . . .
Without Iran, Abu Hanoud would never have known how to build this type of
bomb and conduct this type of operation. Prior to the attack, Abu Hanoud
1

Under the FSIA, a court must, out of respect for the principle of sovereign immunity, ensure that plaintiffs
“establish [their] claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). To
satisfy this burden, plaintiffs in this action ask this Court to take judicial notice of prior findings of fact and evidence
related to the Ben Yehuda street bombing and Iran’s involvement in the attack. See Pls.’ Mot. 4–6. Earlier judicial
findings of fact “represent merely a court’s probabilistic determination as to what happened” and thus constitute
hearsay and are ordinarily inadmissible. Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.D.C.
2010). However, the FSIA “permits courts in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier
litigation . . . without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced.” Id.; see also Taylor, 811 F.
Supp. 2d at 6–7.

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assigned a Hamas member named Al Zaban—who disguised himself as a
surveyor—to scout areas of Jerusalem to find the most crowded, the most
effective places for . . . an attack. Al Zaban settled on the pedestrian mall because
of its crowds of people and its proximity to government buildings. . . .
On the afternoon of September 4, 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers with
cases of powerful explosive bombs arrived at the crowded Ben Yehuda Street
pedestrian mall in downtown Jerusalem. These bombs contained nails, screws,
pieces of glass, and chemical poisons to cause maximum pain, suffering, and
death. The bombs were intended to be detonated in intervals designed to inflict
maximum causalities on both civilians and responding rescue workers. The
explosion wounded nearly 200 civilians and killed five, including fourteen-yearold Yael Botvin, the daughter of plaintiff Julie Goldberg–Botvin and sister of
plaintiffs Tamar and Michal Botvin. Hamas publically claimed responsibility for
the bombing.
Botvin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 237–38 (internal quotations, modifications, and citations omitted).
This Court in Botvin found the following facts regarding the four plaintiffs, citing
deposition testimony of Yael’s mother, Julie Goldberg-Botvin, and sister Michal, an affidavit
from her sister Tamar, and other evidence:
Yael Botvin, a fourteen-year-old ninth grader, was on her way home from the
Emunah School for the Arts in Jerusalem, Israel, when she was killed by the
September 4, 1997 suicide bombing. Yael had stopped by the mall to buy school
supplies when the bombing occurred. . . . Yael survived approximately four hours
after the bombing, and died due to burns, puncture wounds, and other unspecified
internal injuries caused by the explosion. She was an American citizen at the time
of her death. . . .
Julie Goldberg–Botvin, Yael’s mother, spent “about two hours” not
knowing whether Yael was safe or whether Yael had been injured by the
bombing. She stated that “[i]t was horrible, but we didn’t know what to do with
ourselves so we just stayed there.” . . . Julie . . . [was] then driven by friends to
Bikur Cholim hospital where they were shown a picture of Yael’s face and asked
to identify her. [Julie testified that t]he first week “was very difficult because we
have people coming to the house from the early morning until night.” Life
without Yael was “very quiet . . . we still miss her.” . . . Julie reflected that “[w]e
might look okay on the outside, but on the inside we are not okay, even ten years
later. For me it's terrible to see Yael’s friends who are now 24, 25 years old, and
married and some of them have babies. It is very difficult.” . . . Julie was a citizen
of the United States at the time of Yael’s death and remains so today.
Tamar Botvin . . . , an American citizen at the time of the bombing and
today, was Yael’s older sister. . . . She was fifteen at the time of Yael’s death.
Since Yael’s death, Tamar has “found it very difficult to discuss the emotional
impact . . . and the best way for [her] to express [her] feelings is in writing.” On
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the day of the bombing, Tamar was returning from a school trip when a teacher
told her news Tamar described as the “worst of my life.” Her sister’s death came
“less than four years after [their] father died of coronary artery disease.” Tamar
stated that “[w]e were just beginning to feel like we were coming to terms with
the sudden loss of a parent when our family was torn apart again.”
Michal Botvin, Yael’s younger sister, was an American citizen at the time
of the bombing and remains so today. . . .
She was in seventh grade on
September 4, 1997 and was eleven-years old. When the bombing occurred,
Michal was home with her mother Julie; she later went with Julie to the hospital
where she learned of Yael’s death. Michael felt that “it was very hard for my
mother and me and Tamar to deal with Yael’s death, especially because my father
died a few years before . . . it is still hard . . . to continue living with the loss of
Yael.” Even after ten years had passed, Michal explained that “it is hard to live
knowing that Yael is not with us, and that she could have been with us.”
Botvin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (internal citations omitted).
B. Procedural Background
In Botvin, this Court entered default judgment against defendants Iran, the Iranian
Ministry of Information and Security, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Botvin, 873 F.
Supp. 2d at 240–43. On July 3, 2012, the Court awarded $1.7 million in compensatory damages
to Yael’s estate, but denied her family members’ claims for solatium damages. Id. The Court
denied these claims because, under the “pass-through” regime of the former state-sponsored
terrorism exception, they were based on Israeli law, which did not provide for this form of
recovery to persons in the family-member-plaintiffs’ positions. Id. at 244–45. The Court also
denied punitive damages, which plaintiffs had conceded were unavailable. Id. at 245–46.
Plaintiffs filed the present action on August 3, 2012, pursuant to the updated statesponsored terrorism provision, § 1605A, and named only Iran. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Yael’s
mother, Julie Goldberg Botvin, and her sisters, Tamar Botvin Dagan and Michal Botvin, seek
solatium damages. The plaintiffs also seek punitive damages. Service was effected on Iran on
November 7, 2012, via diplomatic channels pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). See Return of

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Service/Affidavit, ECF No. 10. The Clerk entered default, Jan. 22, 2013, ECF No. 12, and
plaintiffs moved for default judgment, ECF No. 13.
II.

ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity
The FSIA provides immunity to foreign states from suit and denies U.S. courts

jurisdiction over such actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Under certain conditions, however, courts
obtain original jurisdiction over suits against foreign states, and those states’ immunities are
waived by statute.
1. Original Jurisdiction
The state-sponsored terrorism exception provides that federal courts possess original
jurisdiction over suits against a foreign state only if (1) “money damages are sought” (2) “against
a foreign state” for (3) “personal injury or death” that (4) “was caused” (5) “by an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or
resources . . . for such an act . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1); see also Oveissi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 51 (D.D.C. 2012).
Here, each of these prerequisites is met. First, plaintiffs’ complaint only seeks “money
damages.” See Compl. ¶¶ 28, 31, 34, 37, ECF No. 1. Second, Iran is a foreign state. Third, the
Complaint contains claims arising out of the murder of Yael Botvin—claims that involve
“personal injury or death.” See Compl. ¶ 1. Fourth, as recognized in Botvin, the evidence
establishes that Iran provided substantial support for Hamas’ terrorist activities for the purpose of
undertaking attacks such as the September 4, 1997, bombing in which Yael Botvin was killed,
funneled money and material support to Hamas, and played necessary planning, logistical, and
support roles leading up the bombing. See Botvin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 237–38. This evidence

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satisfies the FSIA’s requirement of a causal connection between the act of the defendant and the
damages that the plaintiffs have suffered. See Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp.
2d 52, 66 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that FSIA requires only a “reasonable” connection, not “butfor” causation). Finally, the 1997 bombing constitutes an extrajudicial killing that occurred as a
direct and proximate result of Iran’s provision of assistance to Hamas and its operatives. The
Court has original jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims.
2. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
While this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over this action is a necessary prerequisite to
moving forward, foreign states remain immune from suit absent a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Oveissi, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 51–52. The state-sponsored terrorism exception provides that such
waiver occurs where (1) “the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the
time of the act . . . and . . . remains so designated when the claim is filed under this section . . . ,”
(2) “the claimant or the victim was, at the time of the act . . . a national of the United States . . . ,”
and (3) “in a case in which the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been
brought, the claimant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the
claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).
Here, the facts warrant waiver of Iran’s sovereign immunity.

First, Iran has been

designated as a state sponsor of terrorism continuously since January 1984 through the present.
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Determination Pursuant to Section 6(i) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979—Iran, 49 Fed. Reg. 2836-02, Jan. 23, 1984; U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of
Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm; see also Botvin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 237.
Second, decedent, Yael Botvin, was a United States citizen up to the time of her death. Id. at
238. Finally, the murder occurred in Israel, not Iran, so the FSIA’s requirement that defendant

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be given an opportunity to arbitrate this claim is inapplicable. Iran’s immunity is waived, and it
may be held liable.
B.

Liability

Section 1605A(c) creates a federal private right of action for victims of state-sponsored
terrorism.

A plaintiff can seek to hold a foreign state liable for (1) inter alia, an act of

“extrajudicial killing . . . or the provision of material support or resources for such an act” where
(2) the act was committed, or the provision provided, by the foreign state or agent of the foreign
state, and the act (3) “caused” (4) “personal injury or death” (5) “for which courts of the United
States may maintain jurisdiction under this section for money damages.”
1605A(a)(1), (c).

28 U.S.C. §

As the Court has discussed at length elsewhere, the third and fourth

elements—causation and injury—“require plaintiffs to prove a theory of liability” in which
plaintiffs justify the damages they seek, generally expressed “through the lens of civil tort
liability.” Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 176 (D.D.C. 2010).
1. Act
Through evidence presented in the first Botvin case, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, and another
case arising from the same bus bombing, Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, plaintiffs have
sufficiently established that Iran is culpable for both the extrajudicial killing of Yael Botvin and
the provision of material support to the Hamas members involved in the bombing, which
satisfies the first requirement of liability under § 1605A.
FSIA defines extrajudicial killing by reference to Section 3 of the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7). That Act defines an extrajudicial killing
as

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a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. The evidence summarized
above establishes that Yael Botvin’s death was caused by a willful and deliberate act resulting
from the detonation of powerful explosive bombs by Hamas members in a highly trafficked
civilian area designed to inflict the maximum amount of civilian death and pain. Botvin, 873 F.
Supp. 2d at 238–39. There is no evidence that this attack was sanctioned by any judicial body.
The murder of Yael Botvin constitutes an extrajudicial killing undertaken by Hamas acting as an
agent for Iran.
The FSIA declares that “material support or resources” is defined by reference to the
Federal Criminal Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(3). That definition states that support
means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel . . . and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). The evidence summarized above demonstrates that during the period
leading up to the bus bombing, Iran supported Hamas for the purpose of advancing its own
agenda. See Botvin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 237–38. At the time of the attack, Hamas was a terrorist
organization supported tangibly and financially by Iran. Id. These acts constitute the provision
of material support for FSIA purposes.
2. Actor
The evidence presented establishes that Hamas acted as an agent for Iran during the 1997
bombing. Id. Under such circumstances, Iran may be held vicariously liable for the extrajudicial
killing perpetrated by the Hamas suicide bombers.
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3. Theory of Recovery—Causation
The elements of causation and injury in § 1605A require FSIA plaintiffs “to prove a
theory of liability” which justifies holding the defendants culpable for the injuries that the
plaintiffs have allegedly suffered. Oveissi, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 53–54 (citing Valore, 700 F. Supp.
2d at 73); see also Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 175–76 (“[P]laintiffs in § 1605A actions . . . must
articulate the justification for such recovery, generally through the lens of civil tort liability.”).
District courts in this jurisdiction “rely on well-established principles of law, such as those found
in Restatement (Second) of Torts and other leading treatises, as well as those principles that have
been adopted by the majority of state jurisdictions” to outline the boundaries of these theories of
recovery. Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran (“Bodoff II”), 08-cv-547, 2012 WL 5995690, at *8
(D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2012); Oveissi, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (quoting In re Islamic Republic of Iran
Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 61 (D.D.C. 2009)).
This Court and others have frequently addressed the Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress (“IIED”) theory following the enactment of § 1605A.

See, e.g., Fain v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 856 F. Supp. 2d 109, 123 (D.D.C. 2012).

Relying principally on the

Restatement, courts have set forth the following standard: “One who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such
bodily harm.” Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1)). Here, this test is satisfied.
“First, a terrorist attack constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct.” See Bodoff v.
Islamic Republic of Iran (“Bodoff I”), 424 F. Supp. 2d 74, 85 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Stethem v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2002)).

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Second, as the Court recognized in Botvin, in the evidence summarized above, Yael’s
mother and sisters have established in great detail the severe emotional distress that resulted from
the attack. In her 2008 deposition, Julie Goldberg-Botvin, Yael’s mother, reflected that “[w]e
might look okay on the outside, but on the inside we are not okay, even ten years later. For me
it’s terrible to see Yael’s friends who are now 24, 25 years old, and married and some of them
have babies. It is very difficult.” Botvin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 239. Tamar testified that the news
of her sister’s death was the “worst of [her] life,” coming “less than four years after [her] father
died of coronary artery disease.” Id. She stated that “[w]e were just beginning to feel like we
were coming to terms with the sudden loss of a parent when our family was torn apart again.”
Id. Michal Botvin was just eleven-years old when the bombing occurred and accompanied her
mother to the hospital where she learned of Yael’s death. She explained that “it was very hard
for my mother and me and Tamar to deal with Yael’s death, especially because my father died a
few years before . . . it is still hard . . . to continue living with the loss of Yael.” Id.
Third, supporting and funding a terrorist attack designed to kill and injure innocent
civilians, as defendants did here, is at least reckless as to the prospects of causing severe
emotional distress in the family members of the victims of the attack. See Bodoff II, 2012 WL
5995690, at *9.
The scope of recovery under the IIED theory is limited by two qualifications: the plaintiff
must be “a member of [the injured person’s] immediate family” and must be “present at the
time.” Fain v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 856 F. Supp. 2d 109, 123–24 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(2)(a)–(b)). Plaintiffs are either the parents or siblings of the
decedent and thus fall within even the strictest definition of immediate family. See Valore, 700
F. Supp. 2d at 79 (noting that immediate family “is consistent with the traditional understanding

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of one’s immediate family” and includes “one’s spouse, parents, siblings, and children”). None
of the plaintiffs in this action were present and witnesses to the bus attack. However, this Court
has previously recognized that the presence requirement is subject to a caveat—specifically, the
Restatement “‘expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be other circumstances under
which the actor may be subject to liability.’” Heiser, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 26–27 (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46). As the Heiser Court explained: “Terrorism [is] unique
among the types of tortuous activities in both its extreme methods and aims. . . . All acts of
terrorism are by the very definition extreme and outrageous and intended to cause the highest
degree of emotional distress, literally, terror.” Id. at 27. Thus, the Court concluded that a
plaintiff “need not be present at the place of outrageous conduct, but must be a member of the
victim’s immediate family.” Id. Here, the non-present family member plaintiffs—Julie, Michal,
and Tamar—satisfy the causation requirement for an award against Iran under the federal cause
of action in FSIA §1605A(c).
4. Personal Injury
This Court has already determined that plaintiffs have brought an action for “personal
injury or death” by bringing a claim arising out of the extrajudicial killing of Yael Botvin.
5. Jurisdiction
The Court has already determined that it is proper to exercise jurisdiction over defendant
in this action, and that plaintiffs are only seeking monetary compensation. This final element of
liability is satisfied. Because all elements are satisfied, Iran is liable.
III.

DAMAGES
Damages available under the FSIA-created cause of action “include economic damages,

solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)(4). To obtain

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damages against defendants in an FSIA action, the plaintiff must prove that the consequences of
the defendants’ conduct were “reasonably certain (i.e., more likely than not) to occur, and must
prove the amount of the damages by a reasonable estimate consistent with this [Circuit’s]
application of the American rule on damages.” Oveissi, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 55. As found in the
initial Botvin litigation, plaintiffs have proved that Iran’s commission of acts of extrajudicial
killing and its provision of material support and resources for such killing were reasonably
certain to, and indeed intended to, cause injury to plaintiff. Thus, as a general matter, damages
are appropriate.
A.

Compensatory Solatium Damages

As a result of the severe emotional distress suffered by Yael’s mother and sisters as a
result of this attack, each is entitled to solatium damages. The general rule of this Court is that
parents of deceased victims should receive $5 million, and siblings receive $2.5 million. See
Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 269 (D.D.C. 2006). The Court
finds that these standard amounts are appropriate here and will award $5 million to Yael’s
mother, Julie, and $ 2.5 million to each of her sisters, Michal and Tamar—a total of $10 million
in solatium. This amount is in addition to the $1.7 million in compensatory damages awarded to
the estate of Yael Botvin previously.
B.

Punitive Damages

“Punitive damages, made available under the revised FSIA terrorism exception, serve to
punish and deter the actions for which they are awarded.” Oveissi, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 55–56
(citing In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 61; Heiser, 659 F.
Supp. 2d at 29–30; Acosta v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15, 30 (D.D.C.
2008); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1)). As Magistrate Judge Facciola explained in a

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recent opinion revising an award of punitive damages under § 1605A, “an award of punitive
damages is [not] designed to be particularized per victim. Rather, the court must arrive at a
number that will serve the interest of deterrence.” Estate of Buonocore v. Great Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 06-cv-727, 2013 WL 653921 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2013).
In Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, this Court held that “[w]here there is more than
one case arising out of the same facts, an analysis of the amount of punitive damages awarded
compared with the amount of compensatory damages awarded can be used to gauge the amount
of punishment and deterrence the Court considered necessary based on the injuries plaintiffs to
that case suffered.” 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 82 (D.D.C. 2010). Here, there is at least one other case
arising out of the same attack. In Campuzano, Judge Urbina awarded $300 million in punitive
damages to eight plaintiffs injured (but not killed) by the same bombing, a total of $98.96 million
in compensatory damages to those same plaintiffs, and $13.5 million in compensatory solatium
damages to their family members—a total of $113.46 million in compensatory damages. 281 F.
Supp. 2d at 279. Under the Murphy approach the Court will determine the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages in the earlier case, and apply the same ratio to determine the amount of
punitive damages to award in the present one. See Murphy, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 81–82. 2 From
Campuzano, the Court takes the $300 million as the numerator and $113.46 million as the
denominator and finds that this ratio is 2.64. In other words, in Campuzano, Judge Urbina felt
that for every $1.00 awarded in compensatory damages to the victims of the attack, the
defendants should be forced to pay punitive damages of $2.64.
The Court will apply the same ratio here. The Court previously awarded $1.7 million in
compensatory damages to the estate of Yael Botvin and now awards $10 million in
2

For other examples of the Murphy method, see, for example, Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 881 F. Supp. 2d
19, 24 (D.D.C. 2012) and Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 774 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2010).

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compensatory damages to her family members. The total compensatory damages awarded are
$11.7 million. Multiplying this number by the ratio of 2.64, plaintiffs are entitled to a punitive
damages award of $30.89 million—to be divided evenly among all four plaintiffs.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment shall be granted. An
order shall issue with this opinion.
Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, on April 4, 2013.

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