LETOURNEAU v. GATEWAY INN & SUITES et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying the plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction and for a temporary restraining order. Signed by Judge Reggie B. Walton on 11/5/12. (ms, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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GATEWAY INNS & SUITES, et al.,
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Defendants.
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_________________________________________ )
ELIZABETH LeTOURNEAU,

Civil Action No. 12-1632 (RBW)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff’s motions for a preliminary injunction and
a temporary restraining order. Specifically, she requests a court order barring the termination of
her residency at the Navy Gateway Inns & Suites (“Navy GIS”) on the grounds of Joint Base
Anacostia-Bolling (“JBAB”) in Washington, D.C. The motions will be denied.
The Navy GIS provides lodging “for service members and their lawful dependents.”
Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities [1] in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Injunctive Relief and [2] in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”),
Affidavit of Anthony T. Calandra (“Calandra Decl.”) ¶ 8. “[T]ravelers on official Department of
Defense business are permitted to stay for extended periods of time at [the Navy GIS],” and
guests without official travel orders may stay at the Navy GIS “on a space available basis only.”
Id., Affidavit of Jeanette Hudson-Gray (“Hudson-Gray Decl.”) ¶ 8. Ordinarily, space available
guests may reserve a room for no more than one week, id. ¶ 9, and “[e]mployees or military
members on official travel or business have priority over space available guests,” id. ¶ 8.

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The plaintiff “checked into” the Navy GIS on June 29, 2012, id., Calandra Decl. ¶ 9,
“under the name CPL Micah Lavigne,” id., Hudson-Gray Decl. ¶ 4, and represented herself as an
active-duty soldier in the United States Army, id., Calandra Decl. ¶ 14. 1 Although the plaintiff’s
initial reservation was for one week, through July 5, 2012, id. ¶ 6, she was allowed to stay for an
extended period based on her representation that “she had official travel orders,” id. ¶ 13, for
business at the Pentagon, id. ¶ 7. “At some point during her stay, [the plaintiff] also claimed she
was travelling on her husband’s official travel orders.” Id. ¶ 12. At no time did the plaintiff
present travel documents for herself or for her husband. See id. ¶¶ 7, 11-12.
“On August 23, 2012, [the plaintiff] was involved in a mutual assault incident with
another guest of the Navy GIS in the [facility’s] laundry room.” Id., Calandra Decl. ¶ 10. “As a
result of the August 23rd incident and the fact she had far exceeded the duration of stay permitted
for space available guests, [the plaintiff] was advised by [Navy GIS] management on August 27,
2012 that she had lost her privileges at the [Navy GIS] and was required to vacate her room.” Id.
¶ 12. The plaintiff requested, and Navy GIS management agreed, to allow the plaintiff to remain
(and leave her belongings) at the facility through September 10, 2012, with the understating that
she would be charged for the room. Id., Hudson-Gray Decl. ¶¶ 15-17. After an additional
request on September 13, 2012 to extend her stay at the Navy GIS, the plaintiff was authorized to
remain for only three additional days, until September 16, 2012, while she made alternate living
arrangements. Id., Calandra Decl. ¶ 16; see id., Attach. 1 (Letter to the plaintiff from Anthony T.
Calandra dated September 14, 2012). On September 16, 2012, because the plaintiff had not
removed her belongings and vacated the Navy GIS, “[s]he was escorted off the installation by

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The plaintiff “later clarified that she was married to an Army soldier, but was not sure of his whereabouts.”
Defs.’ Mem., Calandra Decl. ¶ 14. Micah Lavigne, a Corporal in the United States Army, “is in the process of
divorcing [the plaintiff],” presumably after having learned that the plaintiff “was married to another man at the time
of” her marriage to Corporal Lavigne, id. ¶ 15.

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base police.” Id., Calandra Decl. ¶ 18. Her belongings have been cleared from the room she had
rented, securely stored, and made available for the plaintiff to pick up at the base visitor center.
Id. ¶¶ 20-22.
“The standard for issuance of the extraordinary and drastic remedy of a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction is very high and by now very well established.”
RCM Techs., Inc. v. Beacon Hill Staffing Grp., LLC, 502 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2007)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To acquire such relief, the plaintiff must
“demonstrate 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, 2) that [she] would suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, 3) that an injunction would not substantially
injure other interested parties, and 4) that the public interest would be furthered by the
injunction.” Katz v. Georgetown Univ., 246 F.3d 685, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting CityFed
Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1995)); Washington
Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Failure
to demonstrate irreparable harm is an appropriate basis for refusing to issue an injunction, even if
the moving party makes an adequate showing on the remaining factors. See Chaplaincy of Full
Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[a] movant’s failure to show
any irreparable harm is therefore grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if
the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief”); CityFed Fin. Corp., 58 F.3d at
747. “In this circuit, injury is irreparable only if it is ‘both certain and great.’” Sociedad
Anonima Viña Santa Rita v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 193 F. Supp. 2d 6, 14 (D.D.C. 2001)
(quoting Wisconsin Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir.
1985)). Further, the moving party “must show that the injury complained of is of such

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imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.”
Wisconsin Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674 (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the plaintiff fails to allege whether and how she would be irreparably harmed if the
relief she has requested is not granted. Her access to the Navy NGIS was suspended as of
September 16, 2012. Any economic loss the plaintiff stands to suffer does not constitute
irreparable harm, because such losses generally can be addressed with monetary damages in the
ordinary course of litigation. Wisconsin Gas, 758 F.2d at 674.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motions for a preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

/s/
REGGIE B. WALTON
United States District Judge
DATE: November 5, 2012

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