STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. HOLDER et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judges Thomas B. Griffith, Emmet G. Sullivan, and Rosemary M. Collyer and posted by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on March 1, 2013. (lcegs2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,

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Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC HOLDER, in his official
capacity as Attorney General
of the United States, et al.
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12-1584
(EGS-TBG-RMC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THREE-JUDGE COURT
This case is before the Court on Proposed Intervenor Peter
Heilemann’s Motion to Intervene.

Movant seeks to intervene as

of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) or, in the
alternative, to intervene permissively under Rule 24(b).

For

the reasons explained below, the motion will be DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to “rid the

country of racial discrimination in voting.”
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).

South Carolina v.

Section 5 of the Act

requires certain “covered jurisdictions” to “preclear” every
proposed change in their voting procedures with either the
Attorney General or a three-judge panel of this Court.
U.S.C. § 1973c.

42

Certain jurisdictions were deemed “covered” by

Section 5 because they applied a “test or device” to determine

eligibility for voting and the jurisdiction had fewer than 50
percent of persons registered to vote or voting in the relevant
presidential election.

42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b).

At present, nine

states are covered as a whole by the Section 5 preclearance
requirement, while individual jurisdictions in seven other
states, including New Hampshire, are also covered.

Attorney

General’s Opp. to Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 9, at 2 (citing 28
C.F.R. Part 51, Appendix); Dep’t of Justice, Section 5 Covered
Jurisdictions, www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php
(last visited January 28, 2013).
Section 4(a) of the Act affords covered jurisdictions the
opportunity to remove themselves from Section 5 preclearance
requirements by bringing a statutory declaratory judgment action
and demonstrating that they satisfy certain criteria.
§ 1973b(a).

42 U.S.C.

These actions are commonly referred to as “bailout”

actions and are statutorily assigned to a three-judge court in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1), (a)(5); 28 U.S.C. § 2284.

The Attorney

General is the statutory defendant in bailout actions, and may
“consent[] to the entry of judgment if based upon a showing of
objective and compelling evidence by the plaintiff, and upon
investigation, he is satisfied that the State or political
subdivision has complied with the requirements” for bailout.
U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(9).
2

42

On November 15, 2012, the State of New Hampshire brought a
declaratory judgment action on behalf of ten towns within the
State that are “covered jurisdictions” under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act.

Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.

The State argued that its

covered political subdivisions were eligible for a “bailout”
from the preclearance requirements of Section 5.
41.

Compl. ¶¶ 30-

The State represented that it and its covered jurisdictions

had made numerous submissions over the years seeking
preclearance under Section 5 and none of the submissions had
ever received an objection from the Attorney General.
¶ 30.

Compl.

The State noted, however, that it had inadvertently

failed to obtain preclearance for certain minor changes in
voting procedures in the last ten years but that it had now
submitted those changes to the Attorney General for
preclearance.

Compl. ¶ 31.

On December 5, 2012, Proposed Intervenor Peter Heilemann
filed a Motion to Intervene.

Movant contends that he is a

“citizen of, and registered voter in, the State of New
Hampshire.”

Heilemann Statement ¶ 1.

He does not allege,

however, that he is eligible to vote in any of the ten covered
jurisdictions, nor does he allege that he is a member of any
racial or other minority group protected by the Voting Rights
Act.

He also has not alleged that any voting practice or change

in procedure has harmed him in any way.
3

Rather, he contends

that as a voter in the State of New Hampshire, he “receives the
benefit of the special remedial provisions of the Voting Rights
Act because every statewide law effecting any change in voting
in any of the Covered Towns must be ‘precleared’ under Section
5.”

Mot. to Intervene at 2.

Movant alleges that he is entitled

to intervene because he “wants to continue to receive the
benefit of such review.”

Id.

The motion is now ripe for the

Court’s decision.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court has held that “[p]rivate parties may
intervene in Section 5 actions,” and that such intervention is
controlled by Rule 24.
(2003).

Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 477

In this act, Movant seeks to intervene as of right

pursuant to Rule 24(a) or, in the alternative, permissively
pursuant to Rule 24(b).
Rule 24(a)(1) provides that on timely motion, the court
must permit anyone to intervene who “is given an unconditional
right to intervene by a federal statute.”

Rule 24(a)(2)

provides that the court must permit anyone to intervene who
claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is
so situated that disposing of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability
to protect its interest, unless existing parties
adequately represent that interest.

4

This Circuit has held that intervention as of right under Rule
24(a)(2) depends on “(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2)
whether the applicant ‘claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action’; (3)
whether ‘the applicant is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
applicant’s ability to protect that interest’; and (4) whether
‘the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by the
existing parties.’”

Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d

728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

A movant seeking

to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) must additionally
demonstrate Article III standing.

In re Endangered Species Act

Sec. 4 Deadline Litig., --- F.3d ----, No. 11-5274, 2013 WL
45871, *6 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (citing United States v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
Because a Rule 24(a)(2) intervenor seeks to participate on equal
footing with the original parties to the suit, he must satisfy
the standing requirements imposed on the parties.

Id. at *3

(citing City of Cleveland v. NRC, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir.
1994)).
Rule 24(b) sets forth the standard for permissive
intervention, and states in relevant part that “[o]n timely
motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who . . . has a
claim or defense that shares with the main action a common
5

question or law or fact.”

The grant of a Rule 24(b) motion is

left to the district court’s sound discretion.

E.E.O.C. v.

Nat’l Children’s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir.
1998).

“In exercising its discretion, the court must consider

whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the original parties’ rights.”

Fed. R. Civ. P.

24(b)(3).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 24(a)(1): Intervention by Statute
Movant argues that he may intervene as of right pursuant to
Rule 24(a)(1) and Section 4(a)(4) of the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(4), which states that “[a]ny aggrieved party
may as of right intervene at any stage in such action.” 1

The

issue, therefore, is whether Movant is an “aggrieved party”
under the statute.
The current bailout provisions of the Voting Rights Act
were revised in the 1982 amendments to the Act, and went into
effect on August 5, 1984.
Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b).

Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
In the amendments, Congress created

1

In a parenthetical, Movant also argues that he is entitled to
intervene under Section 4(a)(9), which states that any aggrieved
party may intervene as of right at any stage in an action where
the Attorney General has consented to a declaratory judgment
permitting bailout. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(9). Neither party
focuses on this subsection as the basis for Movant’s
intervention, nor has any party argued that the definition of
“aggrieved party” under this subsection differs from Section
4(a)(4).
6

a statutory right for aggrieved parties to intervene in those
cases.

As amended, Section 4(a)(4) provides that a covered

State or political subdivision bringing a bailout case “shall
publicize the intended commencement and any proposed settlement
of such action in the media,” and further provides that “[a]ny
aggrieved party may as of right intervene at any such stage in
such action.”

42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(4).

The Senate Report

accompanying the 1982 amendments states that:
The State [or] political subdivision seeking bailout
must give reasonable public notice of the commencement
and any proposed settlement of the bailout suit to
enable interested persons to intervene. An aggrieved
party is defined broadly to include any person who
would have standing under the law. Such persons may
intervene at any stage, including the appeal.
S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 74 (1982) (emphasis added).
Movant argues that he is entitled to intervene as an
“aggrieved party” because he is a registered voter in the State
of New Hampshire.

Mot. to Intervene at 3 (citing Trafficante v.

Met. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) disagreement
recognized by Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863,
869 (2011); Fed. Elec. Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998)).
In making this argument, Movant appears to allege that the
“aggrieved party” standard under Section 4(a)(4) goes beyond the
limits of Article III standing.
The cases Movant cites in support of his argument that he
is an “aggrieved party” are easily distinguishable.
7

Movant

cites Trafficante for the proposition that “the definition of
‘person aggrieved’ contained in the Fair Housing Act is broad.”
In that case, however, the Supreme Court stated that the
standard of “aggrieved persons” under the Civil Rights Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a), could extend only to the outer limits
of constitutional standing and not beyond it, and is thus not
helpful to Movant.

409 U.S. at 209.

Moreover, the limits of

“aggrieved persons” under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 have
since been clarified by the Supreme Court to be narrower than
the outer boundaries of Article III standing.

Thompson, 131 S.

Ct. at 869 (2011).
Movant also cites dicta from Federal Election Commission v.
Akins for the proposition that “aggrieved” goes beyond the
traditional limits of standing.

In that case, however, the

Supreme Court made clear that the plaintiff had alleged a
specific, concrete injury, rather than an abstract injury, in
seeking redress for the failure to receive certain materials
under the Federal Election Campaign Act.

Moreover, the Supreme

Court expressly found that the claims satisfied the requirements
of Article III standing.
Far more persuasive are the cases cited by the Attorney
General relating to Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act.

In all

of those cases, the word “aggrieved” has been interpreted to
require Article III standing.

See, e.g., Roberts v. Wamser, 883
8

F.2d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[S]tanding . . . under th[e]
[Voting Rights] Act is limited to the Attorney General and to
‘aggrieved persons,’ a category that we hold to be limited to
persons whose voting rights have been denied or impaired.”);
Perry-Bey v. City of Norfolk, 678 F. Supp. 2d 348, 362 (E.D. Va.
2009) (an “aggrieved person” under the Voting Rights Act is a
party that satisfies constitutional standing requirements)
(citing cases).
Notably, Movant does not allege that he resides in any of
the covered political subdivisions seeking a bailout, nor does
he allege that his voting rights have been infringed.

Rather,

Movant argues that he is an aggrieved party because he
would be deprived of the protection of the remedial
provisions of the Voting Rights Act were plaintiff
successful in obtaining the relief it seeks in this
lawsuit. That suffices to constitute an imminent
Article III injury, and, a fortiori, constitutes
sufficient harm to qualify as an aggrieved party for
purposes of intervention under the statute.
Mot. to Intervene at 3.

In this respect, Movant skips over the

Article III standing inquiry.

For the reasons explained above,

the Court finds that standing is required for Movant to proceed
as an “aggrieved party” under Section 4(a)(4) of the Voting
Rights Act.
1. Standing
Article III of the Constitution restricts the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to adjudicating actual “cases” and
9

“controversies.”

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).

This requirement has given

rise to “several doctrines ... ‘founded in concern about the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic
society.’”

Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464,
471 (1982).

One aspect of this “case-or-controversy”

requirement is that plaintiffs must have standing to sue, an
inquiry that focuses on whether the litigant is entitled to have
the court decide the merits of the dispute.

Allen, 468 U.S. at

750–51 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498).
To establish the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of
Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he has
suffered an “injury in fact” which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) there is a causal connection between the
alleged injury and the conduct complained of that is fairly
traceable to the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560–61 (1992) (citations omitted).

10

a. Procedural Standing
Movant argues that he has standing because he is seeking to
prevent a procedural injury. 2 Specifically, he argues that prior
changes were made to voting laws in covered jurisdictions in New
Hampshire without obtaining preclearance and that this failure
to submit a change “deprives those affected of a procedural
protection regardless of whether the process would have resulted
in an objection or a denial of declaratory judgment under
Section 5.”

Movant’s Reply, ECF No. 11, at 4.

Movant further

contends that if “New Hampshire is permitted to bail out, [he]
will be deprived of that procedural protection.”

Id.

This

argument fails.
The Supreme Court has afforded special treatment to
procedural injuries under Article III, “noting that ‘[t]here is
much truth to the assertion that “procedural rights” are
special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests can assert that right without
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy.’”

Sec. 4 Deadline Litig., --- F.3d at ----, No. 11-

5274, 2013 WL 45871, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (citing

2

Movant initially alleged that he had Article III standing,
without specific reference to procedural standing. In his
reply, Movant essentially concedes that his voting rights will
not be impaired by a bailout and he clarifies that he is seeking
to assert procedural standing, rather than constitutional
standing. Movant’s Reply at 4.
11

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7).

The doctrine “loosens the

strictures of the standing inquiry,” relaxing the immediacy and
redressability requirements.

Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572

n.7; Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)).

As

this Circuit has recognized, however, “where plaintiffs allege
injury resulting from violation of a procedural right afforded
to them by statute and designed to protect their threatened
concrete interest, the courts relax-while not wholly
eliminating-the issues of imminence and redressability, but not
the issues of injury in fact or causation.”

Center for Law and

Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Thus, the D.C. Circuit has held that a party has procedural
standing only if, inter alia, (1) the government violated its
procedural rights designed to protect a threatened, concrete
interest, and (2) the violation resulted in injury to that
concrete, particularized interest.

Id.

However, the procedural

standing doctrine “does not—and cannot—eliminate any of the
‘irreducible’ elements of standing[.]”

Fla. Audubon Soc'y v.

Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 3

3

The cases cited by Movant are not relevant as to whether
Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were designed to
protect Movant’s interests or whether the alleged violations of
those subsections caused Movant injury. See Nat’l Parks
Conserv. Ass’n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(holding that a plaintiff challenging an agency action need not
demonstrate that 1) the agency action would have been different
but for the procedural violation or 2) that court-ordered
12

As to the first element, Movant has failed to demonstrate
that any alleged procedural right to Section 5 preclearance is
designed to protect Movant’s particularized, concrete interests.
As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, not all procedural rights
violations are sufficient for standing: a plaintiff must show
that “the procedures in question are designed to protect some
threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis
of his standing.”

Center for Law and Educ., 396 F.3d at 1157

(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8); accord Sec. 4 Deadline
Litig., --- F.3d ----, No. 11-5274, 2013 WL 45871, *12 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 4, 2013).

“[D]eprivation of a procedural right

without some concrete interest that is affected by the
deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to
create Article III standing.”

Summers, 555 U.S. at 496.

In Lujan, the Supreme Court offered two examples of
procedures designed to protect a party's concrete interest: (1)
the requirement for a hearing prior to a denial of a license
application is designed to protect the applicant, and (2) the
requirement that a federal agency prepare an environmental
impact statement before conducting a major federal action such
compliance with the procedure would alter the final result);
Lemon v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1312, (D.C. Cir. 2008) (plaintiffs who
lived in the vicinity of Army base had standing to challenge
Army’s alleged failure to comply with NEPA impact statement
procedures even though they could not prove that the preparation
of the impact statement would have prevented the relocation of
the Army base).
13

as constructing a dam is designed to protect neighbors of the
proposed dam.

See 504 U.S. at 572.

In a subsequent case, this

Circuit held that a plaintiff who lived in the vicinity of a
proposed airport runway had procedural standing to challenge the
FAA’s alleged failure to authorize the runway without performing
an environmental assessment because “[t]he procedural
requirements of NEPA were designed to protect persons . . . who
might be injured by hasty federal actions taken without
regarding for possible environmental consequences.”

City of

Dania Beach v. FAA, 485 F.3d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted).

The Circuit found that the plaintiff had

“adequately demonstrated that the FAA’s failure to follow the
NEPA procedures pose[d] a ‘distinct risk’ to [plaintiff’s]
‘particularized interests’ [and] given the location of his home,
he is uniquely susceptible to injury resulting from increased
use of the secondary runways.”

Id.

Here, Movant generally claims that he receives a benefit
from the preclearance process, which determines that “statewide
laws affecting voting . . . do not have the purpose or effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on the basis of race or
color” in the covered communities.

Mot. to Intervene at 4.

Unlike the plaintiff in City of Dania Beach, however, Movant’s
alleged interests are no different than the benefit conferred
upon any New Hampshire voter.

Movant has thus failed to
14

establish that Section 5 preclearance was designed to protect
any threatened concrete interest of his.
Moreover, Movant has also failed to establish that the
bailout from the Section 5 preclearance procedures would result
in any injury to his interests.

“[T]he requirement of injury in

fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be
removed by statute.”

Summers, 555 U.S. at 497.

arguments are exceedingly vague as to this point.

Movant’s
For example,

he contends that he is entitled to intervene because he “wants
to continue to receive the benefit” of Section 5 preclearance in
New Hampshire.

Mot. to Intervene at 2.

He does not allege, for

example, that the bailout would have any negative impact on his
ability to vote, nor does he allege that he is a member of a
protected group who might be negatively impacted.

Indeed, he

does not even allege that he is eligible to vote in one of the
covered jurisdictions. 4

Essentially, the only injury that Movant

4

Movant argues that this Court recently permitted intervention
in a Voting Rights case by a person who did not live in any of
the relevant covered counties in Florida. Reply Br. at 7
(citing Florida v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 1428, ECF No. 42
(D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2011)). In particular, Movant cites the grant
of permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1) to Ion Sancho,
who was allegedly the Supervisor of Elections of a non-covered
county in Florida. In that case, however, permissive
intervention was not opposed by any of the parties. See id. ECF
No. 26 at 3. Even if permissive intervention had been
contested, Movant fails to explain how his interests as a voter
are analogous to those of a Supervisor of Elections. Similarly,
Movant argues that nonparties were granted intervention in
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District v. Gonzales. No. 06
15

has alleged is that the Attorney General may not apply the law
in the manner that Movant believes it should be applied.

That

is simply insufficient to allege an injury for standing
purposes.

See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 441-42 (2007)

(“The only injury that plaintiffs allege is that the law—
specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed.

This

injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized
grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused
to countenance in the past.”).
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that
Movant lacks standing in this action and is therefore not an
“aggrieved party” under Section 4(a)(4) of the Voting Rights
Act.
B. Rule 24(a)(2): Intervention as of Right
Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) depends on
“(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) whether the applicant
‘claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action’; (3) whether ‘the applicant
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
Civ. 01384, ECF No. 33 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2006). In that case, the
Court granted the motions to intervene without indicating
whether the parties were intervening permissively or as of
right, and without indicating whether the motions had been by
consent. See id. The Order also did not indicate—and Movant
does not allege—that any of the intervenors lived outside the
covered district. Movant cites this case only for the
proposition that the Court has permitted intervention in bailout
cases.
16

practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to
protect that interest’; and (4) whether ‘the applicant’s
interest is adequately represented by the existing parties.’”
Fund for Animals, Inc., 322 F.3d at 731 (citations omitted).

A

movant seeking to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) must
also establish Article III standing.

Sec. 4 Deadline Litig., --

- F.3d ----, No. 11-5274, 2013 WL 45871, *6 (citing United
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1146 (D.C.
Cir. 2009)).
As discussed above, the Court finds that Movant does not
have standing in this case.

For that reason, the Court finds

that Movant cannot intervene in this action as of right under
Rule 24(a)(2) and the Court does not reach the four-factor test
set forth in Fund for Animals.
C. Rule 24(b)(1): Permissive Intervention
Movant argues in the alternative that he should be allowed
to intervene permissively under Rule 24(b)(1).
Intervene at 9.

Mot. to

In order to permissively intervene under Rule

24(b)(2), the proposed intervenor must ordinarily present: (1)
an independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction; (2) a
timely motion; and (3) a claim or defense that has a question of
law or fact in common with the main action.
Center, Inc., 146 F.3d at 1046.

Nat’l Children's

The grant of a Rule 24(b)

motion is left to the district court’s sound discretion.
17

Id.

“In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the original parties’ rights.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).

The Court finds that permissive intervention under Rule
24(b) will unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the
original parties’ rights.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).

Here,

the parties have proposed a consent decree and requested that
the Court enter judgment as to that decree.

As such, all of the

disputes between the parties have been resolved and the only
thing standing between them and the resolution of the case is
the issue of Movant’s intervention.

Because there are no

remaining issues between the parties, Movant’s intervention will
only delay the action.

Likewise, the Court finds that Movant’s

intervention would prejudice the adjudication of the parties’
rights.

Movant does not allege any concrete injury to his

interests that would result from the bailout of the ten covered
jurisdictions in New Hampshire.

Rather, the only potential

injury that at issue here is to the parties, in the form of the
delay that would result if the consent decree were not entered.
As such, the Court finds, in its discretion, that intervention
should not be permitted under Rule 24(b) because it would unduly
delay and prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’
rights.

Accordingly, the Court will deny Movant’s request to

intervene permissively.
18

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Movant’s motion to
intervene is DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.

Signed:

March 1, 2013
/s/ Thomas B. Griffith
United States Circuit Judge
/s/ Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
/s/ Rosemary M. Collyer
United States District Judge

19