GHAFFARI v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION to 13 Order. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 4/5/13. (lcjeb4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTHONY GHAFFARI,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 13-115 (JEB)

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Anthony Ghaffari has filed this suit against the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Association,Wells Fargo Bank, and Phelan Hallinan, LLP, which acted as Wells
Fargo’s counsel in an earlier action against Plaintiff in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas
for Centre County. Phelan now moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim. As the Court agrees that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Phelan, it will grant the
Motion.
I.

Background
Plaintiff’s suit arises from foreclosure proceedings in Pennsylvania. The factual

allegations set forth in the Complaint are as follows: In January 2012, Plaintiff fell behind on
mortgage payments to Wells Fargo. See Compl. at 4. He contacted a loan-service officer, who
informed him that in order to qualify for a loan modification, Plaintiff needed to remain at least
90 days in arrears. Id. at 5. Although he remained in arrears for 90 days and provided the loan
specialist with all the information she had requested, in March 2012 he was nevertheless
informed that he was not eligible for a loan modification. Id. The specialist then told him that
his file had been sent to an attorney (presumably at Phelan) for foreclosure proceedings. Id. at 5-

6. Plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to speak with attorneys at Phelan and representatives of Wells
Fargo to avoid these proceedings. Id. at 6-7. Phelan, nevertheless, filed a foreclosure action on
behalf of Wells Fargo against Plaintiff in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas in central
Pennsylvania. Id. at 7-8.
Plaintiff’s Complaint here focuses on Wells Fargo. He first claims that the bank violated
several terms of a Consent Judgment issued in 2012. See id. at 9-12 (citing Consent Judgment,
ECF No. 14, United States v. Bank of America, No. 12-cv-00361 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012)).
Plaintiff next alleges that Wells Fargo “failed to offer or make Plaintiff aware of counseling
offered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development” in violation of 12 U.S.C. §
1701x(c)(5). See id. at 13. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Wells Fargo failed to comply with
certain unspecified provisions of an unidentified Pooling and Servicing Agreement. Id. at 13-15.
Plaintiff’s only allegations against Phelan are: (1) that it “was aware the Mortgage Complaint
was violating the Federal Consent Agreement” and (2) that the mortgage information in Phelan’s
original foreclosure complaint conflicts with unspecified “sworn testimony” of Phelan. Id. at 8,
12.
II.

Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a suit

if the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
personal jurisdiction, FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir.
2008), and the requirements for personal jurisdiction “must be met as to each defendant.” Rush
v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). In deciding whether the plaintiff has shown a factual
basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court resolves factual discrepancies in favor
of the plaintiff. Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). When

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personal jurisdiction is challenged, “the district judge has considerable procedural leeway in
choosing a methodology for deciding the motion.” 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller et
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351 (3d ed. 2004). The court may rest on the allegations
in the pleadings, collect affidavits and other evidence, or even hold a hearing. See id.
III.

Analysis
Phelan makes a number of arguments in support of dismissal, but the Court need only

address the issue of personal jurisdiction, which Phelan correctly claims is lacking here. A court
may exercise two forms of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: general and
specific. General jurisdiction exists where a nonresident defendant maintains sufficiently
systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state, regardless of whether those contacts
gave rise to the claim in the particular case. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 & n.9 (1984). “[B]ecause general jurisdiction is not related to the
events giving rise to the suit, courts impose a more stringent minimum contacts test than for
specific jurisdiction.” Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, “[u]nder the Due Process
Clause, such general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is only permissible if the defendant’s
business contacts with the forum are continuous and systematic.” FC Inv. Group, 529 F.3d at
1091-92 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff makes no
allegation (in either his Complaint or his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss) that Phelan has
had any contacts with this forum. Phelan, moreover, has submitted a declaration by a partner of
the firm to the effect that Phelan practices solely in Pennsylvania and has no contacts with the
District of Columbia. See Mot., Att. 2 (Decl. of Judith T. Romano), ¶¶ 1, 11-12. This Court,
therefore, cannot exercise general jurisdiction over Phelan.

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Specific jurisdiction, conversely, exists where a claim arises out of the nonresident
defendant’s contacts with the forum. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8; see also United
States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “A plaintiff seeking to establish specific
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant must establish that specific jurisdiction comports with
the forum’s long-arm statute and does not violate due process.” FC Inv. Group, 529 F.3d at
1094-95 (citation and internal citation omitted). The long-arm statute of the District of Columbia
extends personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where a claim arises from the
defendant’s
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the
District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission
outside the District of Columbia if [the defendant] regularly does or solicits
business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the
District of Columbia;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the District of
Columbia;
(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or risk,
contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within
the District of Columbia at the time of contracting, unless the parties
otherwise provide in writing; or
(7) marital or parent and child relationship in the District of Columbia . . . .
D.C. Code § 13-423(a) (2012). In order to comport with due process, a nonresident defendant
must have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Those
guarantees are satisfied “if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of
the forum,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)), and if “the litigation results from alleged
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injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Id. (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at
414).
The filings demonstrate that no specific jurisdiction exists here either. Again, Plaintiff
makes no allegation in his Complaint or Opposition that Phelan had any contacts – either related
to this claim or otherwise – with the District of Columbia. Plaintiff merely states that this Court
“has jurisdiction to enforce its own order,” which refers to the Consent Judgment, to which
Phelan was not a party. Opp. at 5-6. At the end of the day, Plaintiff cannot prevail where he
points to no contacts between Phelan and the District of Columbia.
IV.

Conclusion
Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over this Defendant, the Court will grant

Phelan’s Motion to Dismiss. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall
issue this date.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: April 5, 2013

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