SQUIRE v. FULWOOD

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION denying the Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. See attached Memorandum Opinion for details. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/26/2013. (lckbj1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________
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CALVIN SQUIRE,
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Petitioner,
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v.
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ISAAC FULWOOD., JR.,
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Respondent.
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_________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 13-0202 (KBJ)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Calvin Squire’s Complaint, which the Court
construes as a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus (“Pet.”) (ECF No. 1). The U.S. Parole
Commission has filed an Opposition to Petitioner’s petition (“Resp’t’s Opp’n”) (ECF
No. 8), and has also responded to the Court’s Order of September 20, 2013 (Resp’t’s
Resp.”) (ECF No. 12). For the reasons discussed below, the Petition will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1976, Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia of rape and simple assault and sentenced to five to 15 years of imprisonment.
(See Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 (“Face Sheet”), ECF No. 8-2; id., Ex. 3 (“Warrant & Charge
Sheet”), ECF No. 8-5.) The District of Columbia Board of Parole (“Parole Board”)
paroled Petitioner on April 3, 1979; he was to remain under supervision of the Parole
Board until January 28, 1989. (See id. at 1-2; see also Face Sheet; Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex.
2, ECF No. 8-4.)
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On December 19, 1980, the Parole Board learned both that Petitioner had been
arrested on October 8, 1980, in Anne Arundel County, Maryland and charged “with
felony murder and other related charges,” (Pet. at 2) and that he had an outstanding
robbery warrant in Prince George’s County, Maryland. (See Warrant & Charge Sheet;
Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 8 (“Prehearing Assessment”), ECF No. 8-10 at 2.) As a result, the
Parole Board issued a violator warrant on January 12, 1981, charging Petitioner with
violating the conditions of his release from D.C. custody. (See Warrant & Charge
Sheet.) Because Petitioner was in custody in Maryland at that time, the warrant was
lodged as a detainer. (Id.; see also Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 5, ECF No. 8-7; id., Ex. 6, ECF
No. 8-8.)
In January 1981, the Anne Arundel County court found Petitioner guilty of first
degree murder and use of a handgun during a felony and sentenced him to “Natural Life
and fifteen (15) years consecutive.” (Resp’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 4 (“Letter to Parole
Specialist”), ECF No. 8-6.) In July 1981, the Prince George’s County court found
Petitioner guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a handgun and imposed an
additional 20-year sentence. (Id.) The term of this latter sentence expired on October
23, 2000. (See Prehearing Assessment at 2.)
On March 19, 2012, Petitioner was granted a new trial on his Ann Arundel
County convictions, and he “plead[ed] guilty that same day . . . as a condition of being
granted a new trial.” (Pet. at 2; see also Prehearing Assessment at 2.) On October 10,
2012, the Ann Arundel County court resentenced Petitioner to a term of life
imprisonment, suspended all but 32 years and 100 days of that sentence, credited all
time served (11,690 days), and ordered Petitioner released from Maryland custody.

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(Pet. at 2.) Because of the 1981 DC parole violator warrant, however, Petitioner was
not released, and on October 16, 2012, the violator warrant was executed. (Resp’t’s
Resp. at 3.) 1
Petitioner’s parole revocation hearing took place on April 15, 2013, just over one
month after he initiated the instant proceedings. (See Pet.; Resp’t’s Resp. at 1.) The
Parole Commission found that Petitioner had violated the conditions of his 1979 parole
release based on his Maryland convictions. (Resp’t’s Resp., Ex. A, ECF No. 12-1 at 1.)
Accordingly, the Parole Commission revoked Petitioner’s 1979 parole, forfeited the
time Petitioner spent on parole release, and set September 16, 2013, as Petitioner’s
presumptive parole date. (Id.) Petitioner was released from custody to supervision on
September 16, 2013, and he is to remain under supervision through August 22, 2022.
(Id., Ex. B, ECF No. 12-2 at 1.)
II. DISCUSSION
When petitioner filed his petition for a writ of mandamus on February 4, 2013,
the Parole Commission had not yet conducted a parole revocation hearing. (Pet. at 3.)
He sought an order directing the Parole Commission either to conduct an immediate
revocation hearing or to release him from custody because of its failure to provide a
timely hearing. (See id.)
The “Commission acknowledge[d] that the petitioner ha[d] not received an
institutional revocation hearing within the time contemplated by [its] regulations”
(Resp’t’s Opp’n at 5 n.6), which require that an institutional revocation hearing be
1

In the interim, the Parole Board was abolished, see D.C. Code § 24-131(b), and the
United States Parole Commission (“Parole Commission”) was authorized to make
parole decisions for District of Columbia Code offenders. See generally D.C. Code
§ 24-404.
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conducted within 90 days of the execution of a violator warrant. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.101(e). 2 A delay in the revocation hearing, however, “is not itself a valid ground
for immediate release,” and instead a parolee’s “remedy . . . is an action to compel a
hearing.” Hill v. Johnston, 750 F. Supp. 2d 103, 105-06 (D.D.C. 2010); see also
Sutherland v. McCall, 709 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that the appropriate
remedy for a delayed parole revocation hearing “is a writ of mandamus to compel
[Parole Commission] compliance . . . not a writ of habeas corpus to compel release . . .
or to extinguish the remainder of the sentence.”). The record demonstrates that
Petitioner’s revocation hearing already has taken place, and therefore he is not entitled
to mandamus relief. Nor is Petitioner entitled to habeas relief because he does not
“establish[] that the Commission’s delay in holding a revocation hearing was both
unreasonable and prejudicial.” Sutherland, 709 F.2d at 732.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandamus and,
accordingly, his Petition will be denied. An Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.

DATE: November 26, 2013

Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge

2

Apparently the delay was due in part to some “difficulty identifying the correct parole file for the
petitioner due to his name change.” (Resp’t’s Opp’n at 3.) Petitioner is also known as Calvin
Robinson and Calvin Robinson-Bey. (See id. at 1; see also Warrant & Charge Sheet; Letter to Parole
Specialist.)

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