EDWARDS v. GRAY et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on December 20, 2013. (lcegs2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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VINCENT GRAY, et al.,
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Defendants.
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________________________________)
LEONARD EDWARDS,

Civil Action No. 13-236 (EGS)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Leonard Edwards brings this pro se action alleging
that his former employer, the District of Columbia Fire and
Emergency Medical Services Department (“Department”), refused
his request for a reasonable accommodation of his disability in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U.S.C. § 794; discriminated against him based on his race in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; and retaliated against him in
violation of the ADA and Title VII. Pending before the Court is
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate
and race-discrimination claims. Upon consideration of the
motion, the responses and replies thereto, the applicable law,
and the entire record, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN
PART defendants’ motion.

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an African-American male who has type-2 diabetes.

See Fifth Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 2. He was employed by the
Department until being terminated from employment on October 13,
2007. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. His complaint alleges a series of events in
which he feels the Department discriminated and retaliated
against him, leading to his termination.
The first such event occurred in early 2007, after Mr. Edwards
filed a complaint, the contents of which are unclear, with the
Department’s Equal Employment Office. Id. ¶ 11. Shortly after
Mr. Edwards filed the complaint, a Department officer ordered
him to take a fitness-for-duty physical. Id. ¶ 12.
The second event occurred in March 2007, when Mr. Edwards was
placed on personal sick leave after being injured on the job. On
March 13, 2007, Mr. Edwards sustained a back injury during a
Department training event. Id. ¶ 14. He was ordered to report to
the Department’s clinic on March 23, 2007 for evaluation. See
id. ¶¶ 15, 18. Upon arriving at the clinic, Mr. Edwards was
“ordered to sign a prewritten letter,” the contents of which are
unclear. Id. ¶ 19. For some reason, this letter prompted
plaintiff to file a complaint with the Department’s Office of
Risk Management, asserting that “his right to choose a physician
of his choice had been violated.” Id. ¶ 20. Four days after Mr.
Edwards filed this complaint, the defendants removed him from
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performance-of-duty sick leave and placed him on personal sick
leave, even though he had no accrued personal sick leave. See
id. ¶¶ 21-22. Mr. Edwards views his placement on personal sick
leave “as retaliation . . . for filing a complaint with Risk
Management,” id. ¶ 23, and appears to allege that he stopped
receiving his salary afterwards. See id. ¶ 41.
The third event occurred two months later, in May 2007. For
reasons that are not explained in the complaint, Mr. Edwards
appears to have returned to work by May 16, 2007, when he was
involved in a car accident while driving a Department vehicle.
See id. ¶ 25. After the accident, Mr. Edwards went to the
Department’s clinic, where he was asked to sign a “Disclosure
and Release” form and to take a psychological examination. Id.
¶¶ 28-31. He never took the examination because he “repeatedly
verbally asked to visit a private psychologist” rather than a
Department psychologist, but his requests were denied. Id. ¶¶
34(a), 34(b).
The final allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory event
occurred on October 13, 2007, when plaintiff was terminated from
employment. Id. ¶ 42. Although he does not explain the
circumstances of his termination, Mr. Edwards alleges that the
events described in the complaint “were committed by white
officers” whose “actions . . . were racially motivated” and that

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“he was treated differently from other firefighters in the same
predicament.” Id. ¶¶ 39, 50-51.
On November 5, 2007, Mr. Edwards filed a formal complaint of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), alleging that the Department discriminated against him
based on his race, age, and disability, and that the Department
retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity. Id.
¶ 7. On November 20, 2012, the EEOC determined that it could not
substantiate the charges. See Ex. A to Pl.’s Supplemental Opp.
to Mot. to Dismiss (“Suppl. Opp.”), Dkt. No. 28.
Mr. Edwards received notice of the EEOC’s determination on
December 14, 2012. Fifth Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 8. On February
25, 2013, he filed this pro se lawsuit, alleging that the
defendants denied him a reasonable accommodation of his
disability, discriminated against him because of his race, and
retaliated against him. Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Soon after bringing
this case, Mr. Edwards filed a series of amended complaints,
culminating in his Fifth Amended Complaint.
On March 28, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss Mr.
Edwards’s failure-to-accommodate and race-discrimination claims.
See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 20. Plaintiff
filed an opposition on April 2, 2013, in which he asserted that
he had successfully pled a claim under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, and did not defend his Title VII claim. See
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Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 24. Defendants noted in
their reply that Mr. Edwards did not respond to the substance of
any of their arguments. See Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss
(“Reply”), Dkt. No. 25.
On April 22, 2013, the Court issued an order advising
plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the defendants’
arguments and the consequences of failing to do so. See Order,
Dkt. No. 27 at 1. Mr. Edwards filed a supplemental response,
Suppl. Opp., to which defendants responded on June 7, 2013,
asserting that plaintiff still had not opposed any of their
arguments. See Defs.’ Suppl. Reply, Dkt. No. 29. Four days
later, Mr. Edwards filed yet another brief, which asserted that
“the legal standards imposed on a licensed attorney should not
totally apply to a Pro Se party,” but did not otherwise address
defendants’ arguments. Pl.’s Third Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt.
No. 30 at 1. On June 14, 2013, defendants reiterated that
plaintiff had not responded to their arguments. See Defs.’
Second Supplemental Reply, Dkt. No. 31. Defendants’ motion is
now ripe for the Court’s decision.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
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the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).
While detailed factual allegations are not necessary, a
plaintiff must plead enough facts “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id.
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider
“the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as
exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and
matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.”
Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002).
The Court must construe the complaint liberally in plaintiff’s
favor and grant plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable
inferences deriving from the complaint. Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns
Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Court must not
accept inferences that are “unsupported by the facts set out in
the complaint.” Id. “Nor must the court accept legal conclusions
cast in the form of factual allegations.” Id. “[O]nly a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“‘[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
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(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Even a pro
se complainant, however, must plead “‘factual matter’ that
permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.’” Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672,
681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that: (1) plaintiff failed to state a claim
for denial of a reasonable accommodation because he did not
demonstrate any connection between his alleged disability and
the accommodation he sought, and (2) he failed to state a claim
for racial discrimination because he alleged no facts to support
an inference that he was mistreated because of his race.1
A.

Plaintiff Failed to State a Claim for Denial of a
Reasonable Accommodation.

Mr. Edwards asserts that the defendants’ denial of his request
to take a psychological examination with a private psychologist
was a failure to accommodate his disability, type-2 diabetes. It
is well settled that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act “do[] not
cover every individual with an impairment who suffers an adverse
employment action.” Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 860
(D.C. Cir. 1999). Rather, they prohibit employers from
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Defendants assert that plaintiff did not address the substance
of their arguments and ask that the Court treat their motion as
conceded. See Reply at 1-2. The Court need not treat unopposed
arguments as conceded, however, and declines to do so here given
Mr. Edwards’s repeated opposition to defendants’ motion.
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discriminating “against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(prohibiting discrimination “by reason of [an individual’s]
disability”). Accordingly, while a plaintiff may prove
discrimination by showing that his employer failed to provide a
“reasonable accommodation[]” of his disability, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A), an employer need only provide an accommodation
that is “responsive to and tailored to a specific disability.”
Coleman-Adebayo v. Leavitt, 326 F. Supp. 2d 132, 143 (D.D.C.
2004); see also, e.g., Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 944 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (“When an employee seeks a workplace accommodation,
the accommodation must be related to the limitation that
rendered the person disabled.”) (quotation marks omitted); Jones
v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2012).
Neither Mr. Edwards’s complaint nor any of his oppositions to
the defendants’ motion explain how his type-2 diabetes is
connected to his request to visit a private psychologist for a
Department-ordered examination. Mr. Edwards alleges that he
suffers from degenerative-disc disease and hypertension, Fifth
Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 9, but does not connect these
conditions to his request either. Mr. Edwards’s assertions that
he “reserved his rights because of his medical condition
(Diabetes),” and that “[t]here is a causal connection between
the termination and the reserved rights,” Suppl. Opp. at 4, do
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not answer the relevant question: how is diabetes related to Mr.
Edwards’s desire to visit a private psychologist? Because the
Court cannot answer this question, Mr. Edwards’s failure-toaccommodate claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act must
be dismissed.
B.

Plaintiff Stated a Claim Under Title VII.

To bring an actionable discrimination claim under Title VII,
Mr. Edwards must establish that “(1) [he] is a member of a
protected class, (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action,
and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination.” Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (quotation marks omitted); see also Nguyen v. Mabus, 895
F. Supp. 2d 158, 174 (D.D.C. 2012). Although it is well
established that “‘an employment discrimination plaintiff is not
required to plead every fact necessary to establish a prima
facie case to survive a motion to dismiss,’” Rodriguez v.
Donovan, 922 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Jones v.
Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 642 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2011), a
plaintiff must nevertheless “plead sufficient facts to show a
plausible entitlement to relief.” Id.
It is undisputed that Mr. Edwards alleged the first two
elements of a prima facie case by asserting that he “is a . . .
Black American” and that he was “terminated by DCFD.” Fifth Am.
Compl., Dkt. No. 9 ¶¶ 2, 3. Defendants contend that Mr. Edwards
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failed to support an inference of discrimination because he
asserted only that the officers who took action against him were
white and that he was treated differently than other
firefighters. See Mot. at 9. The Court need not address whether
that alone raises an inference of discrimination, however,
because plaintiff made additional allegations which help to
support such an inference.
Plaintiff’s complaint describes a series of events that paint
a plausible picture of Department officers singling him out for
unfair discipline, culminating in his termination. First, Mr.
Edwards was ordered to take a fitness-for-duty physical soon
after he filed an equal-employment-opportunity complaint against
a supervisor. Fifth Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 ¶¶ 11-12. Then, after
being injured on the job, he was removed from performance-ofduty sick leave and his salary was withheld. Id. ¶¶ 14, 21-22,
41. Next, his request to see a private psychologist in
connection with a Department-ordered examination was denied. Id.
¶¶ 34(a), 34(b). Finally, he was terminated from employment. Id.
¶ 42. This discipline, Mr. Edwards alleges, deviated from the
defendants’ treatment of other firefighters. See id. ¶ 50. He
also alleges that each event was driven by white officers whose
actions “were racially motivated.” Id. ¶¶ 39, 51. While Mr.
Edwards does not fully explain the circumstances of each event,
the Court must accept his allegations as true at this stage.
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A liberal reading of Mr. Edwards’s pro se complaint inevitably
leads to the conclusion that he is also asserting that the
firefighters who received better treatment were members of a
different race. Indeed, if plaintiff was mistreated by racially
motivated white officers and other firefighters were treated
better, it follows that the others were either members of a
different race or were supervised by different officers. Cf.
Montgomery v. Omnisec Int’l Sec. Servs., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2013
WL 4427194, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013) (in ruling on a motion
to dismiss a pro se complaint, the court may read separate
allegations together where doing so “leads to the undeniable
conclusion that plaintiff believes the two facts were . . .
linked”). Either way, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he
received disparate treatment for racially discriminatory
reasons, and supports that allegation with sufficient factual
detail to state a plausible claim. This is sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Jones v. Ottenberg’s Bakers, __
F. Supp. 2d __, 2013 WL 6119322, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2013)
(because “an allegedly racially motivated deviation from
standard procedure may raise an inference of discrimination at
the motion-to-dismiss stage,” plaintiff stated a claim by
alleging that his employer targeted him for racially
discriminatory discipline that deviated from its standard
response); Winston v. Clough, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C.
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2010) (plaintiff stated a claim for racial discrimination by
alleging that he was subject to discipline that “was motivated
by [his] race and color” and “that other co-workers outside of
[his] protected class” engaged in the same behavior for which he
was disciplined “yet none was suspended or disciplined for it”).
The Court emphasizes that its role at this stage of the
proceedings is to review Mr. Edwards’s pro se complaint
liberally to determine whether it contains factual allegations
sufficient to make out “a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679. While the complaint is not the model of
clarity, it contains sufficient factual content to support an
inference of discrimination at this stage. Accordingly,
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Title VII
discrimination claim is denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is
hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.

Signed:

Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
December 20, 2013

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