RODRIGUEZ v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION to the Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Gladys Kessler on 2/4/14. (CL, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FLORENTINO RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF
AMERICA HOLDINGS, d/b/a
LabCorp,

Civil Action No. 13-675 (GK)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Florentino Rodriguez
brings

this

Holdings

action

( "LabCorp"

fraudulent
negligence,

against
or

Laboratory

"Defendant")

misrepresentation,
breach of

(~Rodriguez"

contract,

or "Plaintiff")

Corporation

for

of

declaratory

America

judgment,

misrepresentation,

negligent

and breach of

the

covenant

of

Motion

to

good faith and fair dealing.
This
Dismiss

matter
[Dkt.

Opposition
record

No.

[Dkt.

herein,

is

No.
and

Motion is granted.

before
16].

Upon

17],
for

the

Court

LabCorp' s

consideration

and Reply

the

on

reasons

[Dkt.
stated

No.

of
19],

below,

the

Motion,

the entire
Defendant's

I .

BACKGROUND

Factual Background1

A.

Rodriguez was employed by the District of Columbia as an
Urban

Park

Ranger.

FAC

~

During

6.

his

eleven

years

of

employment in this capacity, he had "an exemplary record with no
history of

disciplinary problems

illegal drugs."

FAC

~~

or personal

involvement

with

6, 7.

In or about April 2010, Rodriguez was randomly selected to
submit a urine sample for drug testing pursuant to the District
of

Columbia's

Mandatory Drug

Safety-Sensitive Positions
see 6-B D.C.M.R.

§

and Alcohol

Testing

Program

subsequently terminated from his employment.
does

not

~

8;

Rodriguez's test results were

3901 et seq.

positive for the presence of marijuana metabolites,

Rodriguez

FAC

("Drug Testing Program") .

for

allege

that

his

~~

FAC
test

and he was
21, 23.

results

were

inaccurate, or that he had not used marijuana prior to providing
his urine sample.

Instead, he alleges that LabCorp, who tested

his urine and reported the result,
mandated procedures in doing so,

failed to follow government-

thereby improperly causing his

positive result to be reported to his employer.
Rodriguez relies on certain provisions
District

of

Columbia

Municipal

1

Id.

~~

9-23.

in Title 6 of

Regulations,

and

the

the

United

Except where otherwise noted, the facts set forth herein are
taken from the First Amended Complaint ( "FAC") [Dkt. No. 15] and
accepted as true.
-2-

States

Department

therein,

which

connection

D.C. M. R.

District

its

or

3 9 01

§

Transportation

the

with

"regulations"

of

Drug

"quality

et

seq. ;

of

regulations

Columbia

Testing
control

incorporated

has

adopted

(collectively,

Program

6-B

See

regulations").

4 9 C. F. R.

in

The regulations

Part 4 0.

require a testing laboratory to conduct both an initial screen
and

a

confirmatory

positive.
To

6-B D.C.M.R.

conduct

the

initial

enzyme-multiplied
D.C.M.R.

test

3906.4;

§

screen,

immunoassay

3906.4.

§

before

If

the

reporting

a

drug

see also 49 C.F.R.
the

laboratory

technique
initial

must

is

as

40.87.

§

use

test.

("EMIT")

screen

test

positive,

an
6-B
the

laboratory must then use a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry
("GCMS")

test

to confirm the positive result

precise concentration of drug metabolites.
The
determine

regulations

set

whether

initial

the

"cutoff

§

and

confirmatory

See 49 C.F.R.

test result is below the cutoff,
Id.

Id.

concentrations,"

screen

should be reported as positive.

as negative.

and quantify the

40.87(b)-(c).

§

40.87(a).

which
test
If a

the laboratory must report it
If a

test

result is at or

above the cutoff concentration, the laboratory must report it as
positive.

Id.

§

40.87(b)-(c).

In the case of a marijuana test,

the relevant cutoff concentrations are 50 ng/mL for the initial
screen and 15 ng/mL for the confirmatory test.

-3-

Id.

§

40.87 (a).

Rodriguez contends that "there is absolutely no evidence or
information in the report provided to the District of Columbia
indicating that

he

had a

over 50 ng/mL."

FAC

~

positive

12.

initial

urine

screen,

i.e.

Therefore, he argues LabCorp was not

legally permitted to conduct a confirmatory test,

or to report

his test results as positive to the District of Columbia's Human
Resources Department.
that

LabCorp

~~

FAC

performed

the

13, 14, 21. 2
wrong

type

Rodriguez also claims
of

testing

because

it

administered a "qualitative test," and not the test specified in
6-B D.C.M.R.

§

maintains that

3906.
he

FAC

~~

15-16.

"was denied a

On these grounds, Rodriguez

fair

test

District of Columbia government procedures."
B.

in compliance with
FAC

~

17.

Procedural Background

On April 19,

2 013,

in the

Superior Court

claims

against

LabCorp

breach of contract.

Rodriguez filed his original Complaint
for
for

the District
negligence,

On May 10,

to this Court pursuant

Columbia,

gross

bringing

negligence,

and

2013, LabCorp removed the case

to 28 U.S. C.

2

of

§§

1332,

1441,

and 1446.

LabCorp did not report Rodriguez's result directly to the
District of Columbia's Human Resources Department.
Instead, it
first forwarded the results to Dr. Charles Moorefield, a Medical
Review Officer ( "MRO"), whose responsibility it was to "verify
that the testing procedure was conducted properly."
FAC ~ 20;
see also 49 C.F.R. § 40.123.
Rodriguez alleges that Dr.
Moorefield
failed
to
properly
review
LabCorp's
testing
procedures.
FAC ~ 21.
However, he has not named Dr. Moorefield
as a defendant in the case.
-4-

[Dkt .

No .

1] .

LabCorp

Complaint

[Dkt.

after

parties

the

No.

claims

August

moved

to

dismiss

Rodriguez's

subsequently withdrew
to

permit

Rodriguez

its
to

motion
file

an

[Dkt. No. 13].

2,

against

but

stipulated

amended complaint.
On

9] ,

then

2013,

Rodriguez

LabCorp

for

filed

his

FAC,

asserting
fraud,

judgment,

declaratory

negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract, and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
See generally FAC

[Dkt. No.

The FAC also includes claims

15].

against "John Doe" Defendants for intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage and intentional interference with
business relations.
On

August

pursuant
Procedure.

to

FAC ~~ 64-85. 3

23,

Rule
[Dkt .

2013,
12(b) (6)
No.

filed his Opposition.
LabCorp filed its Reply.

II.

LabCorp

16] .
[Dkt.

of

moved

the

Federal

On September
No.

17] .

to

5,

dismiss
Rules
2 013,

the
of

FAC
Civil

Plaintiff

On September 24,

2013,

[Dkt. No. 19].

STANDARD OF REVIEW

3

The "John Does" are described as employees of LabCorp who were
involved in the testing and reporting of Rodriguez's drug test
results.
See FAC ~ 5.
Although Rodriguez identifies one of
these individuals in his Opposition as Kamlesh Patel, Pl.'s
Opp'n at 3, there is no indication that Rodriguez has attempted
to serve Mr. Patel, or any person other than LabCorp, with his
complaint.
-5-

To survive a motion to dismiss,
sufficient factual matter,

a complaint "must contain

accepted as true,

to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
556 U.S.
550

662,

u.s.

678

544,

akin to a

(2009)

570

to

'state a

Ashcroft v.

claim
Iqbal,

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)).

"The plausibility standard is not

'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully."

A

mere

pleading

that

offers

"labels

and

conclusions"

Id.
or

a

"formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will
not

suffice;

factual

to

raise

Twombly,

Id.

a

assertions

The

to

at

555,

determining

550

factual

relief

inference that

the misconduct alleged."

devoid

(quoting Twombly,

right

550 U.S.

draw the reasonable

"In

"naked

punctuation omitted).

enough

level,"

will

enhancement."

(internal
be

nor

of
U.S.

further
at

allegations

above

the

and to permit
the defendant

557)
"must

speculative

the Court

"to

is liable for

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

whether

a

complaint

states

a

claim,

the

court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents
attached thereto or incorporated therein,
it may take judicial notice."
F.3d 169,
also

173

consider

referred

to

(D.C.

Cir.

documents
in

the

Stewart v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 471

2006)
of

and matters of which

(citation omitted).

undisputed

complaint

-6-

and

A court may

authenticity
are

integral

that

"are

to"

the

plaintiff's claims.
Cir. 2004)

Kaempe v.

Myers,

367 F.3d 958,

965

(D.C.

(citation omitted).

The court
allegations as

is required to accept
true and give a

the complaint's

plaintiff

factual

"the benefit of all

inferences that can reasonably be drawn from such allegations."
Kaempe,

367 F.3d at 963

However,

(citation omitted).

the court

need not accept plaintiff's legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations.
2013).
such

Jacobs v.

Vrobel,

Nor must it accept
inferences

complaint,"

724

F.3d 217,

(D.C.

Cir.

"inferences drawn by plaintiffs if

are

unsupported by the

by

other

or

221

documents

facts

properly

set

out

in the

considered

in

Kaempe, 367 F.3d at 963

connection with the motion to dismiss.
(citations omitted) .
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Materials Considered in This Motion to Dismiss

In support of its Motion, LabCorp has submitted excerpts of
the

Report

These

it

prepared

excerpts,

dispute,
"Specimen

the

include

pages

Test

connection

authenticity of

Summary,"

"Confirmation

in

labeled

"Initial

Data

which

Rodriguez's
Rodriguez

"Specimen
Test

Section."

Steiner in Support of LabCorp' s Reply
[Dkt. No.

with

Data
See

Decl.

Test

test.

does

Results,"
and

Section,"
of

not

Robert

("Steiner Decl. ") ,

I.

Ex. A

19-1].

Rodriguez refers to these pages repeatedly in

his FAC; indeed,

they provide the sole factual underpinning for
-7-

his contention that LabCorp failed to comply with the quality
control

regulations.

See

~~

FAC

12,

15,

16,

18

& n.1.

Accordingly,

they are both incorporated by reference in the FAC

and

to

central

Rodriguez's

claims.

The

Court

may

Court

therefore

to

consider them in deciding the Motion.
B.

Declaratory Judgment

In

Count

Rodriguez

1,

asks

the

"declaratory judgment that defendant
and

obligation

Columbia

to

fully

government

contract with
to do so."

[the]

FAC

~

comply with

drug

testing

enter

LabCorp was under a
federal

procedures

and

duty

District

pursuant

a

to

of
its

District of Columbia government and failed

35.

LabCorp seeks to dismiss this claim on the grounds that it
is duplicative of Rodriguez's other claims.
Rodriguez

contends

that

dismissal

is

Def.'s Mot. at 8-9.

improper

because

the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "permit[] parties to 'set forth
two

or more

statements

hypothetically,'

and

of

to

defenses as the party has

a

claim or defense

'state

as

many

alternately or

separate

claims

regardless of consistency. '"

or

Pl. Is

Opp'n at 14-15 (citing Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526
U.S. 795, 805 (1999)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (e) (2))).

The Declaratory Judgment Act,

2 8 U.S. C.

§

2 2 01,

provides

that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction
any court of the United States,
-8-

upon the

filing of an

appropriate

pleading,

may declare

the

rights

and other

relations of any interested party seeking such a

declaration,

whether or not further relief is or could be sought."
§

2201 (a).

legal

28 U.S.C.

This language "has long been understood 'to confer

on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding
Medimmune,

whether to declare the rights of litigants.'"
v. Genentech,

Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136

Seven Falls Co.,
Mansour,

474

515 U.S.

U.S.

64,

277,

72

(1985)

statute is an enabling Act,
courts

rather

than

an

286

Inc.

(2007)

(quoting Wilton v.

(1995));

see also Green v.

("[T]he

declaratory

judgment

which confers a discretion on the

absolute

right

upon

the

litigant.")

(citation omitted) .
Although Rodriguez is correct that he is allowed to plead
in

the

alternative,

he

has

not

articulated

any

reason

to

maintain the declaratory judgment claim as a separate cause of
action.

The

claim

does

not

present

any

legal

or

factual

theories that are not already subsumed in his other claims.
Swartz v.
extent

KPMG LLP,

[plaintiff]

476 F. 3d 756,

766

(9th Cir. 2007)

seeks a declaration of defendants'

See

("To the
liability

for damages sought for his other causes of action, the claim is
merely

duplicative

and

was

properly

dismissed.")

Further,

Rodriguez does not identify any way in which his future actions
are likely to be affected by the declaratory relief he seeks.
See Schulman v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt.,
-9-

Inc.,

35 F.3d 799,

812

(3d Cir.

1994)

the parties'

("Even if a declaratory judgment would clarify

legal rights,

it should ordinarily not be granted

unless 'the parties' plans of actions are likely to be affected
by a

declaratory judgment.

11

)

Accordingly,

•

Count

1 shall

be

dismissed.
C.

In

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Count

2,

Rodriguez

brings

a

claim

for

fraudulent

misrepresentation.

To plead a prima facie claim for fraudulent

misrepresentation,

a

representation

in reference

(2)

plaintiff

with knowledge of its falsity,
(5)

action

taken

in

must
to
(4)

a

allege
material

" ( 1)

a

fact,

false

(3)

made

with intent to deceive,

reliance

upon

the

representation.

Atraqchi v. GUMC Unified Billing Servs., 788 A.2d 559, 563
2002) . 4

and
11

(D.C.

A false representation "is an assertion that is not in

accord with the facts.

11

Saucier v.

A.3d 428, 438-39 (D.C. 2013)

Countrywide Home Loans,

64

(citations and internal punctuation

marks omitted) .
Because fraud claims are subject to a heightened pleading
standard

under

Procedure,
of

the

Rule

9(b)

of

the

Federal

a plaintiff "must state the time,

false

misrepresentations,

4

the

fact

Rules

of

Civil

place and content
misrepresented

and

The parties agree that District of Columbia substantive law
applies to Plaintiff's claims.
See Def.'s Mot. at 10 (citing
District of Columbia law as source of applicable standard);
Pl.'s Opp'n at 5 (same).
-10-

what was obtained or given up as a consequence of the fraud."
United States
(D.C.

Cir.

ex rel.

1981).

Joseph v.

Cannon,

F.2d 1373,

knowledge,

1385

and

other

conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally."

Fed.

However,

"intent,

642

R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Rodriguez's fraud claim is deficient

in several respects.

First, he fails to identify any particular misrepresentation by
LabCorp.

His sole allegation pertaining to this element is that

LabCorp's employees "failed to disclose accurate information and
made false representations to the District of Columbia and the
plaintiff
test."

regarding results and procedures used in
~

FAC

conclusory

to

This

satisfy

allegation
Rule

is

9(b)'s

too

drug

generalized

heightened

and

pleading

It fails to specify the time, place, or content of

requirement.
LabCorp's

39.

[his]

employees'

misrepresentations.

As

previously

noted,

Rodriguez does not allege that his test results were factually
inaccurate. 5
testing

Instead, his theory is that LabCorp used improper

procedures.

contention

is

premised

However,
entirely

5

as
on

discussed
LabCorp's

below,
own

this
Report.

In its Motion to Dismiss Rodriguez's original Complaint,
LabCorp pointed out that "Plaintiff does not allege that his
test results were inaccurate or that he had not engaged in
marijuana use prior to providing his urine sample; he simply
claims that LabCorp should not have performed the confirmatory
test arid then reported the results to the MRO." See Def.'s Mot.
to Dismiss [Original Compl.] at 2 [Dkt. No. 9].
Rodriguez had
the opportunity to address this point in his FAC, but did not do
so.
-11-

Accordingly,

it is entirely unclear what specific statement or

other communication by LabCorp was false or misleading.
Second,

plaintiff

" [a]

may

recover

for

a

defendant's

fraudulent statement only if the plaintiff took some action in
reliance

on

2001 v.

that

Fame

statement."

Jeans

Inc.,

Aktieselskabet

525

F. 3d 8,

22-23

AF

21.

(D.C.

November

Cir.

2008)

(citing Va. Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Grp. Hosp. & Med.
Servs.,
does

Inc.,

not

878 A.2d 1226,

claim

that

he

1237-38

himself

(D.C.

relied

Rodriguez

2005)).

on

LabCorp's

Report.

Instead, he contends that he may recover for fraud based on the
District of Columbia's reliance.

However, he cites no District

of Columbia case to support this contention,

and our Court of

Appeals has rejected the argument that a third party's reliance
satisfies the reliance element of common-law fraud.
23

(affirming

dismissal

of

common-law

fraud

See id. at

claim

because

"[r] ather than suggesting its own reliance,

[plaintiff] says the

PTO

misrepresentation")

relied

The~efore,

on

[defendant's]

alleged

Rodriguez has not made out the element of reliance. 6

6

Plaintiff cites Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S.
639, 655-57 (2008) for the proposition that third-party reliance
satisfies the reliance element of fraud.
Pl.'s Opp'n at 17-18.
In Bridge, the Supreme Court considered third-party reliance in
the context of a civil RICO claim premised on violations of the
federal mail fraud statute.
The Court observed that "it may be
that first-party reliance is an element of a common-law fraud
claim," but emphasized that the case before it concerned a
"statutory offense that is distinct from common-law fraud."
Id.
at 656 (both emphases added) .
Since Rodriguez brings a claim
-12-

Third,
fraud,

beyond

Rodriguez

a
has

formulaic
not

recitation of

alleged

any

the

facts

elements

suggesting

of

that

LabCorp or any of its employees knew or believed the Report was
inaccurate, or intended to deceive Rodriguez, or anyone else, by
providing false information.
For each of these reasons, Rodriguez fails to state a claim
for fraudulent misrepresentation.
D.

In

Count 2 shall be dismissed.

Negligent Misrepresentation

Count

3,

misrepresentation.

Rodriguez

brings

a

claim

for

negligent

The elements of negligent misrepresentation

are similar to the elements of
element of fraudulent

fraud,

intent.

Thus,

but do not

include the

"[t] o establish negligent

misrepresentation by a defendant, a plaintiff must show that:
The
defendant
information [,]

2.

The defendant intended or should have recognized that
the plaintiff would likely be imperiled by action
misrepresentation[,]
taken in reliance upon
[the]
[and]

3.

Hall

The
plaintiff
reasonably
relied
upon
information to his [or her] detriment.

v.

Ford

Enters.,

negligently

Ltd.,

445

(citing Restatement of Torts 2d
§

§

A.2d

communicated

false

1.

610,

612

the

false

(D.C.

1982)

311 (1965); W. Prosser, Torts,

107, at 704-10 (4th ed. 1971)).

for common law fraud under District of Columbia law, not a claim
under the civil RICO provisions, Bridge is inapposite.
-13-

Rodriguez

fails

to

make

out

the

elements

of

negligent

misrepresentation for largely the same reasons that he fails to
state a claim for fraud,
false

namely,

that he has not identified any

information communicated by LabCorp,

and does not claim

that he himself relied on such information.

Therefore, Count 3

shall be dismissed.
E.

Negligence

In Count 4,

Rodriguez brings a claim for negligence.

elements of negligence are

the existence of

breach

injury

of

breach."
2007)

that

duty,

Odemns v.

and

"a duty of care,

proximately

Dist. of Columbia,

The

caused

by

930 A.2d 137, 143

that
(D.C.

(citation and quotations marks omitted) .
The parties address a significant portion of their papers

to the issue of whether LabCorp owed Rodriguez a duty of care.
See Def.'s Mem.
3-7.

at 12-14; Pl.'s Opp'n at 6-14; Def.'s Reply at

Whether a defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care is a

question of

law to

be

decided by the

court,

with an eye

to

whether "injury to [the plaintiff] was reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant" at the time of the accident.
Stevens Co.,
also

consider

645 A.2d 1095,
whether

create such a duty.

any

Odemns,

1098

(D.C.

applicable

Haynesworth v. D.H.

1994).
statutes

930 A. 2d at 143

The court must
or

(citing Jarrett v.

Woodward Bros., Inc., 751 A.2d 972, 980 (D.C. 2000)).

-14-

regulations

Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not
addressed whether a commercial laboratory owes a duty of care to
drug-testing

subjects,

existence of such a
Am.

Holdings,

overall

duty.

Inc.,

trend

is

many

See,

150

for

other

F.3d

courts

e.g.,

376,

courts

to

have

recognized

Cooper v.

379

(4th

recognize

Lab.

Cir.

the

the

Corp.

1998)

of

("The

existence

of

a

limited duty on the part of the laboratory to employees who are
the

subject

Inc.,
to

of

618 F.

Supp.

recognize

individuals
recourse

for

2d 1223,
duty]

an

laboratory
accordingly,

Iowa

employee as a

to

it

to

they
tests

(finding

anticipate

result of

[its]

although

LabCorp

2007)

deprive

may

or

("To

receive

any

duty

because

harm

could

due

erroneous

460

employee

[decline
of

LabOne,
a

Vision,

thousands

suffer

producing

testing
that

Compass

challenge

Chapman v.

was

v.

Cal.

would mean

2006)

aware

could

(S.D.

laboratory

results.");

"was

1230

repercussions

performed

(S.D.

Quisenberry

opportunity

the

inaccurate test
1001

tests.") ;

such a
from

negligently

989,

the

F.

Supp.

to
or
2d

defendant

samples,

and

come

the

to

negligent behavior in processing

the sample").
In

fact,

contends

that

it

did

not

owe

Rodriguez a duty of care, .at least two of the cases it cites to
support its position hold that drug testing laboratories do owe
such a duty.
App.

1992)

See Nehrenz v. Dunn,
(sustaining negligence
-15-

593 So.
claim of

2d 915,

918

(La. Ct.

terminated employee

against laboratory); Elliott v.
2d

175,

176

(La.

Ct.

App.

Lab.

1991)

Specialists,
("The

risk

Inc.,

of

588 So.

harm

in

our

society to an individual because of a false-positive dr:ug test
is so significant that any individual wrongfully accused of drug
usage by his employer is within the scope of protection under
the law."), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (La. 1992).
As these cases have recognized,
that an employee who submits a
suffer

adverse

effects

to

it is entirely foreseeable

specimen for drug testing will

his

or

her

employment

if

the

The District

laboratory erroneously reports a positive result.

of Columbia's regulations expressly provide for termination of
employment following a positive drug test.
3907.1

("The

following

employment .
. ") .

be

grounds

for

termination

§

of

(a) A confirmed positive drug test result .

Moreover,

Department

shall

See 6- B D. C. M. R.

of

the District of Columbia and the United States
Transportation

have

both

enacted

regulations

requiring drug testing laboratories to implement quality control
procedures, presumably to protect against the danger of a false
positive.
Subpart

See 6-B D.C.M.R.
F.

principles

Thus,
and

Court does hold,

the

it

is

§

3901 et seq.;

fully

tendency of

consistent
the

courts

49 C.F.R.
with
to

that commercial laboratories,

Part 40,

general

hold,

and

tort
this

such as LabCorp,

owe a duty of care to drug testing subjects, such as Rodriguez.

-16-

However,

as discussed,

Rodriguez has not alleged that his

test results were inaccurate,
certain

procedural

only that LabCorp' s violation of

requirements

caused

erroneously reported to his employer.
Rodriguez

included

requirements,

strict

results

the

be

Whether LabCorp's duty to

compliance

with

plaintiff,

such as

and whether a

to

these

procedural

Rodriguez,

demonstrate proximate causation where he does not

can

allege that

his test results were inaccurate, are open questions. 7

However,

the Court need not reach these questions because there is a more
fundamental

problem with

Rodriguez's

negligence

claim,

namely

that the FAC does not support the "reasonable inference," Iqbal,

u.s.

556

at

that

678,

LabCorp

violated

any

procedural

requirement.
As

previously

discussed,

Rodriguez

alleges

that

LabCorp

breached its duty to comply with the quality control regulations
in

two

respects,

first,

by

not

obtaining

a

positive

screen prior to conducting a confirmatory test,

initial

and second,

not using the immunoassay methodology required by 6-B D.C.M.R.
3906.

With

respect

to

the

first

7

theory,

the

sole

by
§

factual

The Court notes that the quality control regulations require a
laboratory to store a urine specimen, and if the specimen is
confirmed positive, to notify the employee of his or her right
to send the stored sample to another certified laboratory for
confirmation of the positive result.
See 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3906.5.
There is no evidence Rodriguez ever availed himself of this
right.
-17-

allegat.ion to support it is in paragraph 12 of the FAC,

which

contends:
[T] here is absolutely . no evidence or information in
the report provided to the District of Columbia
indicating that [Rodriguez] had a positive initial
screen, i.e., over 50 ng/mL.
No where [sic] in the
report from LabCorp is it indicated that the initial
test met or exceeded the 50 ng/mL cutoff level.
FAC

~

12.
However,

the

Report

states

in

two

separate

places

that

LabCorp did conduct an initial screen of Rodriguez's specimen,
and that
ng/mL.
Report
the

such screen exceeded the
First,

on a

lists both a

"Screening

collective

page titled
"screening"

Cutoff"

results

of

as

50

the

concentration cutoff of
"Specimen Test Results,"

and a
ng/mL,

"confirm"
and

"screening"

indicates
and

the

defines
that

"confirm"

conducted on Rodriguez's specimen were "POSITIVE."
Decl., Ex. A at 6.

test,

50

the
tests

See Steiner

Second, on a page titled "Specimen Summary,"

the Report states:
Initial
Test
Results
positive for Cannabinoid

(Immunoassay)

Confirmation
Test
Results
(GC/MS)
Marijuana Metabolite: 48 ng/ml

Presumptive
Positive

for

Id. at 1.
In

short,

Rodriguez's

contention

that

"[t]here

absolutely no evidence or information in the report"

is

that his

specimen had a positive initial screen is squarely contradicted

-18-

by the Report itself.

Consequently, the Court cannot accept the

allegations in Paragraph 12 of the FAC as true.
With respect to Rodriguez's second theory as to how LabCorp
breached its duty of care, he contends:
It is
clear that LabCorp performed the wrong
kind of test, i.e., it did not administer the enzyme
multiple immunoassay technique (EMIT) test as required
by D.C. municipal regulation 6-B D.C.M.R. § 3906.
The
test administered by LabCorp, in its own words, was a
'qualitative'
test which 'should not be used to
determine the concentration of drug or drug metabolite
present in specimens.'
FAC

~ 16.

Rodriguez quotes directly from the "Initial test Data
See FAC

Section" of the Report to support this allegation.

~

16, n.l.

Again,

Rodriguez's

allegations

about

the

The Report states

directly contradicted by the Report itself.
in at

least three different places that LabCorp first used an

immunoassay test,

which is a

initial

and

screen,

quantit'ative
the

precise

test,

then

qualitative test,
used

a

GCMS

concentration

of

drug

See Steiner Decl.,

This is what the regulations require.
("[T]he

vendor

shall

multiplied immunossay
test

shall

to conduct the

test,

to confirm the positive result

Rodriguez's sample.

EMIT

are

Report

be

split
[sic]

each
(EMIT)

confirmed

-19-

which

Ex. A at 1,

present
2,

See 6-B D.C.M.R.
and

a

and measure

metabolites

sample

is

perform

7,

in
16.

3906.4

enzyme-

A positive

testing
using

the

gas

chromatography/mass spectrometry
Skinner

v.

Ry.

("While

drug

Labor

screens

Execs.
may

(GCMS)

Ass'n,

be

methodology.");

489

conducted

U.S.
by

602,

see also

610

(1989)

immunoassays

positive drug findings are confirmed by gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry.

These

presence of

drugs

great accuracy.")
Manual:

if

properly conducted,

in the biological

identify the

samples tested with

(quoting United States Dep' t

of Transp.

Field

Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad Operations

(1986)

B-12

tests,

(quotation

marks

and

brackets

omitted));

Nat'l

Treasury Employees Union v. U.S. Customs Serv., 27 F.3d 623,
(D.C.

Cir.

1994)

("The

laboratory to which specimens

will first employ an immunoassay test;
positive

will

then

be

tested

the

Plaintiff's
proceedings,
contradicts

Court

factual
his
the

would

allegations
conclusions

gas

as

be

true

rely on a
he

chromatography/mass

(citation omitted) . 8

ordinarily

allegations

draws

required

at

this

document

from

it.

to

stage
that

accept
of

730

367 F.3d at

(4th

Cir.

963

2002)).

(citing Veney v.
Further,

8

Wyche,

Therefore,

without

any

293

the

expressly

Court is not required to accept such allegations as true.
Kaempe,

sent

any sample identified as

using

spectrometry (GC/MS) techniques.")
While

are

625

the
See

F.3d 726,

other

factual

The Report does not specify that LabCorp used an "enzymemultiplied" immunoassay technique, as opposed to a different
type of immunoassay.
However, Rodriguez does not allege that
LabCorp performed the wrong type of immunoassay test, and the
Report does not suggest as much.
-20-

allegations to support his claim that LabCorp breached its duty
of care, or any contention that the test result was erroneous or
inaccurate,

Rodriguez's

negligence

claim does

plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal.

not

satisfy the

Accordingly,

Count

4 shall be dismissed.
F.

In

Intentional Interference Claims

Counts

intentional

Five

and

interference

Six,

Rodriguez

with

brings

prospective

claims

advantage

for
and

intentional interference with business relations.
LabCorp did not address these claims in its moving papers,
and Rodriguez contends,
dismissed.

therefore,

that such claims may not be
LabCorp counters in its Reply

P l . ' s Opp' n at 5-6 .

brief that it was not required to seek dismissal of Counts 5 and
6 because the FAC brings them against the "John Doe" Defendants
only,

and not against LabCorp.

further

argues

that

Counts 5 and 6,

even

if

LabCorp

Def. 's Reply at
was

it

12.

defendant

named

as

a

in

the claims should be dismissed for failure to

state a cause of action.

Id. at 13-15.

The Court agrees.

LabCorp is correct that the intentional interference claims
state that they are brought against the "John Does" and do not
mention LabCorp.

Rodriguez now contends

LabCorp' s

that

Motion)

LabCorp

is

(in his Opposition to

vicariously

liable

for

the

conduct of the John Does, none of whom have been served with the
FAC.

Pl.'s Opp'n at 5-6.

The FAC does not assert this theory
-21-

in Counts 5 and 6,

and therefore LabCorp was not required to

address those counts in its moving papers.
Even
Counts

5

if

Rodriguez

and

he

6,

had

has

named

not

LabCorp

stated

a

as

a

cause

defendant
of

action

in
for

intentional interference with prospective economic advantage or
intentional interference with business relations.

To establish

either claim, a plaintiff must allege facts setting forth:

(1)

the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy;
(2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship or expectancy;
the

( 3)

defendant's

relationship
NCRIC,

Inc.

A.2d 890,

or
v.

900

intentional

expectancy;

and

Columbia Hosp.
&

n.l8

(D.C.

(4)

with

interference
resulting

for Women Med.

damages.
Ctr.,

Inc.,

2008); Casco Marina Dev.,

the
See
957

L.L.C. v.

D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 834 A.2d 77, 84 (D.C. 2003).
There

is

not

a

single

factual

plausibly suggesting that LabCorp
interfere

with

Rodriguez's

District of Columbia.

allegation

(or anyone else)

employment

in

the

FAC

intended to

relationship

with

the

The mere awareness that Rodriguez could

be adversely affected by a positive test result is insufficient.
As our Court of Appeals has observed:
As its name would suggest; intentional interference
requires an element of intent.
[A] general
intent to interfere or knowledge that conduct will
injure
the
plaintiff's
business
dealings
is
insufficient to impose liability.

-22-

Bennett Enterprises,
499

(D.C.

Cir.

Inc. v. Domino's Pizza,

1995)

(emphasis

quotation marks omitted) .
that LabCorp,
purpose

to

in

shall dismiss the

(citation

original)

and

Because there are no facts suggesting

or any of its employees,

interfere

Inc., 45 F.3d 493,

with

acted with a desire or

Rodriguez,s

intentional

employment,

the

interference claims at

Court

Counts

5

and 6. 9
G.

In

Breach of Contract

Count

7,

contract.

A

elements:

"(1)

Rodriguez

claim
a

for

valid

brings

breach

contract

a

of

claim

for

contract

between

the

breach

includes

parties;

of
four

(2)

an

obligation or duty arising out of the contract;

(3)

that duty;

Tsinolas Realty

and

(4)

damages caused by breach.

Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009)

11

a breach of

(citation omitted).

Rodriguez contends that LabCorp s contract with the District of
1

Columbia

required

regulations.

compliance

with

the

control

quality

He further claims that he has standing as a third-

party beneficiary to enforce this aspect of the contract, which
LabCorp disputes.

See Def. s Mot. at 14-17; Pl. s Opp n at 201

1

1

22.
9

Having so concluded, the Court does not reach LabCorp,s
alternate contention that an "at-will employment contract, such
as the one between Rodriguez and the District of Columbia,
cannot, as a matter of law, satisfy the first element of an
intentional interference claim.
Def., s Reply at 14 (citing
Zelaya v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 587 F. Supp. 2d 277, 286-87 (D.D.C.
2008)) .
11

-23-

Whatever the merits of Rodriguez's third-party beneficiary
theory, his breach of contract claim,

like his other claims,

is

predicated on the contention that LabCorp violated the quality
control

regulations.

As

already

noted,

he

pleads

no

facts

plausibly suggesting LabCorp violated any of these provisions.
Accordingly, even assuming that the contract between LabCorp and
the

District

regulations,
enforce
claim

Columbia

and that

this

for

of

a

drug

requirement,

breach

of

required

testing subject

Rodriguez

contract.

with

compliance

still

has

would

Therefore,

Count

the

standing to
not
7

state
shall

a
be

dismissed.
H.

Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Finally, at Count 8, Rodriguez brings a claim for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Columbia

law,

every

contract

contains

"Under District of

within

it

an

implied

covenant of both parties to act in good faith and damages may be
recovered

for

Choharis v.
(D.C.

2008)

its

State

breach
Farm Fire

(citation

as
&

part

of

Cas.

Co.,

omitted) .

This

a

contract

action."

961 A. 2d 1080,

1087

covenant

that

means

"neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to_ receive
the fruits of the contract."
194, 201 (D.C. 2006)

Allworth v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d

(citations omitted).

"To state a claim for

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a
-24-

plaintiff

must

allege

either

arbitrary and capricious."

bad

faith

or

conduct

that

is

Wright v. Howard Univ., 60 A.3d 749,

754 (D.C. 2013)
Rodriguez

was

not

a

party

to

District of Columbia and LabCorp.
have

been

one

of

thousands

of

the

contract

between

The mere fact
beneficiaries

quality control provision contained in that

the

that he may

of

a

specific

contract does not

mean that LabCorp generally owed him a contractual duty of good
faith and fair dealing.

Further, there are no facts in the FAC

suggesting that LabCorp or any of its employees operated in bad
faith

or

in an

arbitrary and capricious

manner

at

any time.

Accordingly, Count 8 shall be dismissed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

Defendant's Motion is granted,

and the FAC shall be dismissed.

An Order shall accompany this

Memorandum Opinion.

February 4, 2014
United States District Judge
Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF

-25-