YOUNGER v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS et al

Filing 90

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 9/7/2018. (DAS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________________
)
CAMILLA YOUNGER,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC
)
SCHOOLS, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 13-1296 (RMC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) moves—just before the
fourth rescheduled trial date, in a case that has been pending since 2013, and over a year after the
Court entered its order on DCPS’s Motion for Summary Judgment—to dismiss the sole
remaining claim as moot because Plaintiff Camilla Younger is not entitled to any compensatory
damages on the remaining claim. DCPS argues that Ms. Younger is only entitled to a jury trial if
she has a claim for damages.
I. FACTS
The facts have been laid out in detail in three prior opinions in this case and will
only be briefly summarized here. See Younger v. DCPS (Younger I), 60 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D.D.C.
2014); Younger v. DCPS (Younger II), No. 13-1296, 2017 WL 3129733 (D.D.C. July 21, 2017);
Younger v. DCPS (Younger III), No. 13-1296, 2018 WL 3995875 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2018). Ms.
Younger served DCPS as a dual-certified art teacher and attendance officer from 1992 to 2010.
Due to physical altercations that occurred while she was teaching at Woodson Ninth Grade
Academy, a DCPS school, Ms. Younger took extended leave in early October 2009 and stopped
reporting for work at the Academy; however, she continued to teach at Roosevelt STAY, another
1

DCPS school, during the evening. Ms. Younger did not return to the Woodson Ninth Grade
Academy for the remainder of the 2009-2010 school year.
During the summer of 2010, Ms. Younger applied and was interviewed for a parttime position as an art teacher at the Youth Engagement Academy, a DCPS school. Ms.
Younger alleges that after her interview with Principal Tanisha Williams-Minor of the Youth
Engagement Academy, she was offered a part-time position as art teacher there. Ms. Younger
further alleges that Principal Williams-Minor withdrew the transfer offer after she learned Ms.
Younger’s age. DCPS argues that Ms. Younger was never offered a position at the Youth
Engagement Academy.
On August 16, 2010, Ms. Younger received a notice of termination from the
Director of Labor Management and Employee Relations at DCPS, which stated that she would
be terminated effective August 27, 2010. See Ex. 6, Mot. for Summ. J., Notice of Termination
[Dkt. 58-1].
Other than her claim of age discrimination in the failure to transfer her to the
Youth Engagement Academy, all of Ms. Younger’s claims have been dismissed. See Younger I,
60 F. Supp. 3d 130; Younger II, 2017 WL 3129733. This matter was initially scheduled for trial
in January 2018 and was continued four times at the parties’ various requests until it was set for
trial on September 11, 2018. After briefing on DCPS’s Motion in Limine, the Court issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Order on August 21, 2018 and held that Ms. Younger is not entitled
to compensatory damages for any violation of her rights that may be found on the failure to
transfer. See Younger III, 2018 WL 3995875.
DCPS now moves to dismiss this last remaining claim as moot because no
damages are available. See Def. District of Columbia’s Trial Br. [Dkt. 89]. Ms. Younger

2

expressed her opposition in open court and filed an opposition, which will be filed on the docket.
The motion is ripe for review.
II. ANALYSIS
Younger II concluded that genuine disputes of material facts prevented a ruling on
the papers concerning the denial of Ms. Younger’s requested transfer and DCPS’s motion for
summary judgment was denied on that claim. See Younger II, 2017 WL 3129733. Younger III
held that Ms. Younger was not entitled to compensatory damages even if she prevailed at trial on
her failure to transfer claim. See Younger III, 2018 WL 3995875. DCPS now moves for the
Court to find that this remaining claim is moot because Ms. Younger is not entitled to damages
and, therefore, is not entitled to a jury trial.
DCPS cites a few cases for the proposition that an Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2012), claim is mooted when a plaintiff has
no compensatory damages. The Court finds that none are dispositive of Ms. Younger’s right to a
trial. For instance, McLaren v. Emory Univ., 705 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ga. 1988), held that the
plaintiff, who suffered no lost wages from the alleged discrimination, was not entitled to recover
“damages in lieu of liquidated damages” and, therefore, was not entitled to a jury trial. Id. at
568; see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (“[A] person shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of
fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing as a result of a violation of [ADEA],
regardless of whether equitable relief is sought by any party in such action.”). The McLaren
court reasoned that because ADEA does not permit damages for non-pecuniary losses, such as
pain and suffering, the plaintiff could not be awarded some other amount of damages in lieu of
liquidated damages. McLaren, 705 F. Supp. at 566-67; see also Comm’r of Internal Revenue v.
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1995) (“ADEA does not permit a separate recovery of
compensatory damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress.”). Additionally, McLaren
3

found that permitting other non-pecuniary damages would “[d]estroy[] the incentive to
conciliate” because employers could not predict a possible loss amount at trial. McLaren, 705 F.
Supp. at 567.
This Court agrees that an ADEA plaintiff is not entitled to non-pecuniary
compensatory damages, but clearly, equitable damages are available, such as declaratory
judgment, a verdict, or nominal money damages. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 326; 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(c)(2). However, the Court does not agree that such an award would destroy the parties’
incentives to conciliate. Assuming an employer knows the total backpay potentially owed to a
plaintiff, the possibility of an additional “nominal” amount of damages being awarded would not
alter the incentives to reach a settlement agreement. McLaren does not stand for the proposition
that without money damages a plaintiff is not entitled to any trial or that her claim is mooted, but
only holds that such a plaintiff is not entitled to a trial by jury.
DCPS also cites Johnson v. District of Columbia, an unpublished 2017 decision
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 688 F. App’x 4 (D.C.
Cir. 2017). DCPS argues that Johnson decided that an ADEA claim is mooted when no damages
are available. The Circuit found, however, that a plaintiff’s claim was not mooted when
“additional remedies” were available, “including, for example, liquidated damages.” Id. at 7.
The Circuit did not list all the potential “additional remedies” that might be available and did not
specifically address the availability of a favorable verdict or nominal damages. The Circuit also
did not address the possibility of a bench trial in instances where no amounts are owed, which
appears to be contemplated by the statute itself.1

1

Meyers v. I.B.M. Corp., 335 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), also cited by DCPS, found its
plaintiff’s ADEA claim mooted because “the Plaintiff has not suffered any economic damage.”
Id. at 412. This Court respectfully disagrees.
4

ADEA states that a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial when there are “amounts
owing.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2). Nominal damages are not “amounts owing” because they are
awarded only when a plaintiff has no actual damages. As this Court previously held, Ms.
Younger is not owed any amounts of back pay; therefore, she is not entitled to a jury trial, but
will be permitted to proceed with her claim via a bench trial as scheduled to begin September 11,
2018.
DCPS would also have the Court find that nominal damages are not permitted in
ADEA cases. Although the statute does not specifically list nominal damages as a potential
remedy, some courts have permitted nominal damages awards in ADEA cases. See, e.g., Berg v.
Auto Nation, Inc., 212 F. App’x 668, 669 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming award of nominal damages
and attorney fees in ADEA case); Petrunich v. Sun Bldg. Sys., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204
(M.D. Pa. 2008) (awarding “nominal damages of $1.00”); Poland v. Chertoff, 559 F. Supp. 2d
1127, 1131-32 (D. Or. 2008) (finding “the vindication of [plaintiff’s] right to be free from such
discrimination justifies an award of nominal damages”); Grimes v. City of Fort Valley, 773 F.
Supp. 1536, 1538 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (awarding “nominal damages and attorney’s fees as required
by the ADEA”). This Court will permit an award of nominal damages if Ms. Younger prevails
after a bench trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court will grant in part and deny in part DCPS’s motion. The trial beginning
on September 11, 2018 will be converted from a jury trial to a bench trial. A memorializing
Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: September 7, 2018
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge
5