MUSGROVE v. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION et al

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Amy Berman Jackson on 4/14/2015. (lcabj3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, et al.,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________)
ZINA P. MUSGROVE,

Civil Action No. 13-1794 (ABJ)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
On January 30, 2015, the Court granted the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed
by defendants TIAA-CREF and the Brookings Institution, and dismissed plaintiff Zina P.
Musgrove’s complaint. Order (Jan. 30, 2015) [Dkt. # 24]. At that time, however, the Court did
not rule on the counterclaim and cross-claim advanced by defendant TIAA-CREF in its response
to the complaint. See Corrected Answer, Countercl. & Cross-Cl. [Dkt. # 15] at 10–18. On April
10, 2015, TIAA-CREF filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of these claims pursuant to Rule
41(a)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) Mot. for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice [Dkt. # 26]
(“Mot.”). TIAA-CREF notes that it was unable to obtain the consent of Zina Musgrove to dismiss
its claims with prejudice, and so it seeks to dismiss its claims without prejudice. Mem. of Law in
Supp. of Mot. [Dkt. # 26-1] at 3.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 provides that the Court may dismiss an action at the
request of a plaintiff (or, in this case, a counterclaim/cross-claim plaintiff) “on terms that the court
considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). “A court applying Rule 41(a)(2) must consider
(1) whether the plaintiff seeks the motion for voluntary dismissal in good faith, and (2) whether

the dismissal would cause the defendant ‘legal prejudice.’” Mittakarin v. InfoTran Sys., Inc., 279
F.R.D. 38, 41 (D.D.C. 2012), citing In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 198 F.R.D. 296, 304 (D.D.C.
2000); see also Guttenberg v. Emery, No. 13-2046 (JDB), 2014 WL 4698128, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept.
23, 2014). “The purpose of the provision authorizing the Court to dismiss a case ‘on terms that
the court considers proper’ is to protect a defendant from any prejudice or inconvenience that may
result from a plaintiff’s premature dismissal.” Mittakarin, 279 F.R.D. at 41.
In this case, the Court has already dismissed all claims advanced by counterclaim/crossclaim defendant Zina Musgrove. See Order (Jan. 30, 2015). Under these circumstances, the Court
finds that Zina Musgrove will not be prejudiced or inconvenienced by the dismissal of TIAACREF’s counterclaim and cross-claim, and that TIAA-CREF’s request to dismiss its claims is not
“premature.” Moreover, the Court finds that TIAA-CREF’s motion to voluntarily dismiss its
claims is made in good faith. Therefore, the Court will grant TIAA-CREF’s motion. A separate
order will issue.

AMY BERMAN JACKSON
United States District Judge
DATE: April 14, 2015

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