GLAVIANO et al v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 12/27/2013. (KD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
FRANK GLAVIANO, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
)
et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)

Civil Action No. 13-2049 (RMC)

OPINION
Plaintiffs Frank and Pauline Glaviano, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint
challenging the foreclosure of their property located at 1528 Vandagriff Way, Corona, CA
92883-7653. See Compl. [Dkt. 1]; id., Ex. 1 (Deed of Trust) [Dkt. 1-1]; id., Ex. 3 (Notice of
Trustee’s Sale) [Dkt. 1-1]. They sued JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.; EMC Mortgage
Corporation; Ameriquest Mortgage Company; and The Bank of New York Mellon (collectively,
Defendants). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants do not have “possession of the note” or a
“documented property interest in the Note and Mortgage or Deed of Trust,” Compl. at 4, that the
“Deed of Trust is void and ineffective due to fraud,” and that the Trustee’s foreclosure sale is
“void because the alleged beneficiary . . . never had standing to substitute the trustee,” id. at 6-7.
They further claim that the sale of their property at a foreclosure sale violates their due process
rights under the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 59. 1 Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs seek an

1

Plaintiffs also erroneously claim that the foreclosure sale of their property is prohibited by the
Consent Orders issued in United States v. Bank of America, Civ. No. 12-361(RMC). Compl. at
4. Plaintiffs were not parties in United States v. Bank of America, which dealt with mortgage
1

injunction against the foreclosure sale. See Mot. for Injunction [Dkt. 2]; Compl. at 59-60
(seeking a cease and desist order). Because this Court lacks jurisdiction, the case must be
dismissed.
Even though pro se complaints are construed liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) and United States v. Byfield, 391 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2004), this Court
must have jurisdiction in order to adjudicate a claim. A complaint can be dismissed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which may be
done by a court sua sponte at any time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see, e.g., Jerez v. Republic of
Cuba, 777 F. Supp. 2d 6, 15 (D.D.C. 2011). When determining whether a case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a court reviews the complaint liberally,
granting the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. Barr
v. Clinton, 370 F. 3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, “the Court need not accept
factual inferences drawn by plaintiffs if those inferences are not supported by facts alleged in the
complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff’s legal conclusions.” Speelman v. United States,
461 F. Supp. 2d 71, 73 (D.D.C. 2006). Further, in deciding whether it has jurisdiction, a court
may consider materials outside the pleadings. Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098,
1107 (D.C. Cir. 2005). No action of the parties can confer subject matter jurisdiction on a
federal court because subject matter jurisdiction is an Article III and statutory requirement.
Akinseye v. Dist. of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The party claiming subject
matter jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that such jurisdiction exists. Khadr v.
United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

servicing, origination, and certification in general and did not involve Plaintiffs’ mortgage or any
other particular mortgage.
2

Under the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine, the Court lacks jurisdiction to
hear what amounts to the Plaintiffs’ challenge to decisions of California state courts. This
doctrine, named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), provides that a federal district court has no
jurisdiction over actions which essentially seek “appellate review of the state judgment in a
United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself
violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994); see
also Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Rooker-Feldman prohibits federal
courts from “hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state
court”). Federal district courts do not have the “authority to review final judgments of a state
court in judicial proceedings,” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, or to decide federal constitutional
claims that are so “inextricably intertwined with the state court decision that the district court is
in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.” Id. at 483.
In a case similar to the one at hand, Tremel v. Bierman & Geesing, LLC, 251 F.
Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 2003), the plaintiff was a mortgagor who challenged a state court’s decision
to ratify the foreclosure sale of his residence. He sought possession of his residence and
damages, alleging a due process violation, fraud, and discrimination. Tremel, 251 F. Supp. 2d at
46 n.8. Since the plaintiff sought the equivalent of appellate review of state court rulings, the
district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 45–46.
Plaintiffs here also ask the federal district court to review state court rulings. As in Tremel, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to do so under Rooker-Feldman.

3

Accordingly, the Complaint will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the
motion for injunction will be denied as moot due to dismissal of the case. A memorializing
Order accompanies this Opinion.

Date: December 27, 2013

/s/
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge

4