MURRAY et al v. AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION et al

Filing 75

Memorandum Opinion re 74 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 9/2/16. (lcjeb2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANICE MURRAY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No. 14-378 (JEB)

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
“Courts do not usually raise claims or arguments on their own. But federal courts have
an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and
therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or
elect not to press.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). And so,
despite all of the ink spilled to date in multiple prior Opinions, the Court now finds itself
questioning its subject-matter jurisdiction in this long-running labor dispute.
The nub of the case concerns a contested union-officer election held by Local 1300 of the
Amalgamated Transit Union in June 2013. Plaintiffs Janice Murray and Tim (Alnett) Queen ran
for President and Vice President respectively and won the election. The disappointed runner up
for presidency, incumbent David McClure, challenged these results. He argued that Murray and
Queen were not “in good standing” with the Union – a requirement under the ATU Constitution
to be eligible for office – because they both owed outstanding debts to the Union. The ATU
ultimately agreed that such debts rendered them ineligible for office and thus invalidated the
election, causing the Local to hold a re-run election, which McClure won. Plaintiffs then sued
the ATU for violating the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA)
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and for breaching their contract rights under the ATU Constitution. They requested a range of
remedies that included reinstatement as duly elected officers, a declaration of invalidity
regarding the ATU’s decision and the subsequent rerun election, and damages for wages lost,
emotional distress, and reputational harm.
The suit has now proceeded through a motion for a temporary restraining order, a motion
for a preliminary injunction, two periods of discovery, two summary-judgment motions, and one
reconsideration motion. On resolving the most recent round, the Court observed potential
jurisdictional defects in the suit – an issue that might well have saved considerable time and
money had it been raised at the outset. As “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited subject-matter
jurisdiction,” this Court must assure itself through all stages of the litigation that it has such
jurisdiction “even if the parties . . . are willing to assume it.” Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d
315, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The Court raised the jurisdictional question with the parties and
permitted Defendant to file a Motion to Dismiss, which is now ripe. Concluding that Congress
has not given federal courts jurisdiction over a dispute such as this one, the Court will grant
Defendant’s Motion and dismiss the case.
I.

Background
The particulars of this dispute are not tremendously important in resolving the

jurisdictional question posed here. A few key facts will do the trick, and the reader may refer to
the Court’s second summary-judgment decision for a more thorough treatment of the case’s
factual and procedural backdrop. See Murray v. Amalgamated Transit Union (Murray III), No.
14-378, 2016 WL 1664775 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2016).
The dispute centers on Local 1300’s triennial election of officers (and, at least for some
positions, ex officio delegates to the national ATU Convention) in which Murray and Queen ran

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together for President and Vice President and won the vote. Murray III, 2016 WL 1664775, at
*1, 4. David McClure, Local 1300’s President from 2007 to 2013, also ran for President but
came in second. Id. at *1-2. Dissatisfied with the outcome, and believing that neither Murray
nor Queen was eligible to run for office, McClure challenged the election, going first to the
Local. He argued that because both Plaintiffs had failed to pay an outstanding debt to the Union
of $175.50 (for travel reimbursements that they should not have received), they were not
members “in good standing” and thus could not properly run for office under rules established by
the ATU Constitution. See id. at *4; ATU Const., § 14.2 (good-standing requirement); id.,
§ 21.9 (specifying that member is no longer in “good standing” when she fails to pay dues or any
other “monies owed the Union” and the arrearage continues for a period of time).
Local 1300 denied McClure’s challenge. Murray III, 2016 WL 1664775, at *4. He then
appealed to the ATU, filing a letter with its President, Larry Hanley, in August 2013. Id. After
conducting an investigation, Hanley issued a decision in February 2014 concluding that Murray
and Queen both failed the “good standing” requirement and thus had been, at the time of the June
2013 election, ineligible to run for office. Id. That conclusion invalidated the June 2013 election
results, stripped Plaintiffs of their offices, and necessitated that the Local hold a re-run election
in early 2014, which McClure won. Id. Hanley took no other allegedly “disciplinary” action
against them.
Plaintiffs filed suit here shortly thereafter in March 2014 against both the ATU and Local
1300. The Court denied their motion for a temporary restraining order – in which they primarily
sought to invalidate the rerun election – on March 18, 2014. See Murray v. Amalgamated
Transit Union (Murray I), No. 14-378, 2014 WL 11281392, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2014) (first

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summary-judgment Opinion). Plaintiffs then filed an Amended Complaint that included only
two counts asserted against the ATU.
Count I alleges a violation of Title I of the LMRDA. Section 101(a)(5) of that statute, 29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(5), prohibits “labor organization[s]” from “fin[ing], suspend[ing], expel[ling], or
otherwise disciplin[ing]” its members, “except for nonpayment of dues,” without providing
notice and a hearing. Plaintiffs contend that Hanley’s February 2014 decision constitutes
“discipline[ against] Murray and Queen by deeming them to be . . . members not in good
standing and ineligible to run for Local officer positions.” Am. Compl., ¶ 37. In Count II,
Plaintiffs claim that Defendant breached its contractual duties under the ATU Constitution by
improperly deeming them ineligible for office, thereby stating a claim under either state contract
law or § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. While both counts were thus pled
under distinct sources of law, each was tethered to the question of whether the ATU had
improperly vacated the election results on account of Plaintiffs’ outstanding debts and wrongly
deemed Plaintiffs ineligible to participate in the rerun election.
Defendant declined to file a motion to dismiss, and in summer 2014 the parties filed
early-stage cross-motions for summary judgment, focusing on the merits of the dispute and
Plaintiffs’ eligibility for office. The Court denied both cross-motions in December 2014. See
Murray I, 2014 WL 11281392, at *9-13. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the Court denied in April 2014. See Murray v. Amalgamated Transit Union (Murray II), 99 F.
Supp. 3d 149, 158 (D.D.C. 2015). After discovery, Defendant filed a second motion for
summary judgment targeted at both liability and damages. The Court granted in part and denied
in part that motion in April 2016, eliminating Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages but

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otherwise concluding that genuine issues of fact precluded the award of summary judgment in
Defendant’s favor. See Murray III, 2016 WL 1664775, at *6-14.
During consideration of this last motion, however, the Court developed a concern about
its authority to hear the case. It issued an Order on May 2, 2016, in which it asked the parties
whether section 403 of LMRDA’s Title IV – which provides as the “exclusive” “remedy . . . for
challenging an election already conducted” a complaint to the Secretary of Labor, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 483 – stripped the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s suit. See ECF No. 64
(Order of May 2, 2016). After holding a hearing on May 12, 2016, the Court gave Defendant
leave to file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Minute Order of
May 12, 2016. That briefing is now complete.
II.

Legal Standard
Federal courts possess only limited subject-matter jurisdiction, and “[i]t is to be presumed

that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests
upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Where, as here, the Court is “faced
with what a party characterizes as a Rule 12(h)(3) motion, [it] should treat the motion as a
traditional Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Harbury v. Hayden, 444
F. Supp. 2d 19, 26 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 905-06 (D.C. Cir.
1987)). In so doing, the Court “is not limited to the allegations of the complaint,” Hohri v.
United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64
(1987), but “may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253

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(D.C. Cir. 2005). “[P]laintiffs are not limited to evidence that meets the standards of
admissibility required by the district court. Rather, they may rest their argument on their
pleadings, bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.”
Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
III.

Analysis
Defendant’s jurisdictional challenge is premised on a concept peculiar to the labor-

relations world known as “Title IV preemption.” See Casumpang v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &
Warehousemen’s Union, Local 142, 269 F.3d 1042, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court will first
provide a digest of this form of preemption and then apply it to the challenge at issue.
A. Title IV Preemption
The LMRDA “was Congress’s first major attempt to regulate the internal affairs of labor
unions.” Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 528 (1984); see 29
U.S.C. § 401(c) (statement of congressional purpose noting that LMRDA was enacted in part “to
eliminate or prevent improper practices on the part of labor organizations”). It is a “complex
statutory scheme” consisting of seven titles, see Crowley, 467 U.S. at 529, and two of them –
Titles I and IV – play leading roles here.
Title I, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15, provides a “Bill of Rights” for union members,
which is “designed to guarantee every union member equal rights to vote and otherwise
participate in union decisions, freedom from unreasonable restrictions on speech and assembly,
and protection from improper discipline.” Crowley, 467 U.S. at 536-37; see 29 U.S.C. § 411;
Molina v. Union de Trabajadores de Muelles y Ramas Anexas, Local 1740, 762 F.2d 166, 168
(1st Cir. 1985) (“The typical Title I claim involves an allegation of unequal treatment among
union members.”) (citing Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964)). Title IV, in contrast,

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codified at §§ 481-83, “regulates the conduct of elections for union officers, and therefore
protects many of the same rights as does Title I.” Crowley, 467 U.S. at 539. It gives “every
member [of a union] in good standing” the right to “be eligible to be a candidate and to hold
office (subject to . . . reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) . . . without being subject to
penalty, discipline, or improper interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any
member thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 481(e).
Each Title, significantly, also provides a distinct mechanism for enforcement. Title I
grants a federal cause of action to individual members, who may bring suit to vindicate their
Title I rights in federal district court. See id. § 412. Title IV, in turn, “provides an elaborate
postelection procedure aimed solely at protecting union democracy through free and democratic
elections, with primary responsibility for enforcement lodged with the Secretary of Labor.”
Crowley, 467 U.S. at 528. The remedy contemplated by Title IV involves a union member’s
filing a complaint with the Secretary, who may then sue the union directly in district court if it
decides that the complaint warrants its intervention. See 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)-(c). Importantly,
Congress in Title IV also included “an exclusivity provision,” which explains when and under
what circumstances a Title IV remedy will preempt a plaintiff’s ability to seek overlapping relief
under other state laws (like torts or contracts) or other federal laws (like Title I of the LMRDA).
See Crowley, 467 U.S. at 540. That provision provides in relevant part:
Existing rights and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws
of a labor organization with respect to elections prior to the conduct
thereof shall not be affected by the provisions of this subchapter.
The remedy provided by this subchapter for challenging an election
already conducted shall be exclusive.
29 U.S.C. § 483 (emphases added).
In interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended a

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“suit by the Secretary [to be] the ‘exclusive’ post-election remedy for a violation of Title IV.”
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 531 (1972) (emphasis added) (quoting
§ 483); see Crowley, 467 U.S. at 541 (“[T]he exclusivity provision included in [§ 483] of Title
IV plainly bars Title I relief when an individual union member challenges the validity of an
election that has already been completed.”). Reading that provision alongside Title I’s limitation
that district courts may only award “appropriate” relief, 29 U.S.C. § 412, the Court also
concluded that Congress “would not have considered a court order requiring and judicially
supervising a new election to be ‘appropriate’ relief under Title I,” meaning courts lack
jurisdiction over such claims. Crowley, 467 U.S. at 543, 546.
Crowley also suggests, however, that Title IV need not always divest courts of
jurisdiction to hear election-related challenges, and it identified a possible exception to that
general rule, albeit phrased in hypothetical rather than concrete terms. Specifically, it noted that
§ 483 might allow courts to entertain Title I or other federal- or state-law claims that are merely
tangential to an already-completed election. As a result, the Court’s conclusion that “§ [483] of
Title IV plainly bars Title I relief when an individual union member challenges the validity of an
election that has already been completed”
. . . does not necessarily mean that § [483] forecloses the availability
of all postelection relief under Title I. The exclusivity provision of
Title IV may not bar postelection relief for Title I claims or other
actions that do not directly challenge the validity of an election
already conducted. See, e.g., Ross v. International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, 513 F.2d 840 (CA9 1975) (common-law tort
claim); Amalgamated Clothing Workers Rank and File Committee
v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Philadelphia, Joint
Board, 473 F.2d 1303 (CA3 1973) (Title I claim).
Id. at 541 & n.16 (emphasis added). The Court did not further elaborate on what it meant by
“Title I claims or other actions that do not directly challenge the validity of an election,” id., but

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it is possible to discern something from the two cases it cited in support of that concept.
The first one, Ross, clarifies that a cause of action arising in the course of a challenged
election, and whose resolution does not require the court to touch on the validity of the election
itself, is not preempted by Title IV. The plaintiff in that case, Glynn Ross, brought a multi-count
suit against both his local union and an individual named Raymond Duke, the local’s incumbent
president. Ross, who had run for the position of financial secretary and business manager,
asserted that the union had acted improperly in executing the election of its officers, which
included certain tortious conduct carried out by Duke. See 513 F.2d at 841-42 & n.2. In the
counts lodged against the local, Ross sought injunctive relief relating to the holding of a new
election. Id. at 841. Those counts were mooted, however, by Ross’s ultimate electoral victory.
Id. The only live claim that remained, then, was his common-law tort claim against Duke, which
the Court concluded was not preempted by Title IV.
In explaining its reasoning, the Court made clear that although Ross’s damages claim
arose from conduct that took place during a contested election, the election itself was no longer
at issue. Ross had already “won his election” and had not in any way “challenge[d] it or s[ought]
any relief which would interfere with operation of the Local pursuant to the election” during
which Duke’s tortious conduct arose. Id. at 842-43. This was because the tort claim was
asserted against Duke alone: “Only Duke [wa]s alleged to have engaged in tortious conduct and
relief is sought only from him.” Id. at 843. As a result, “[t]he Local would not in any way be
affected by [a] judgment.” Id. The court thus had no trouble concluding that Title IV’s
exclusive remedial scheme for post-election challenges did not come into play, meaning it had
jurisdiction to entertain his claim. Id. at 842-43.
The second case, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, similarly highlights that non-Title IV

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claims relating to a contested election may not be preempted where the relief sought has no
bearing on the validity of the election itself. In that case the plaintiffs brought a Title I claim,
asserting that certain eligibility rules set forth in a union’s bylaws violated their free-speech and
assembly rights. See 473 F.2d at 1307. Importantly, although the suit pertained to electionrelated rules, the Court made note that the plaintiffs had brought “essentially a preelection suit,”
as they “have applied for no judicial relief relative to the completed election. They request only
that the union’s bylaws be declared violative of the LMRDA.” Id. at 1305-06. In other words,
Plaintiffs sought only a declaratory remedy that would have had no effect on the validity of an
already-completed election. See id. at 1305-06.
Both Ross and Amalgamated Clothing Workers, then, offer scenarios in which the claims
lodged by the plaintiffs − along with the specific relief sought − would have had at most a
negligible impact on a union election. For that reason, Title IV did not deprive those courts of
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Molina, 762 F.2d at 168 (noting that “neither [Ross nor
Amalgamated Clothing Workers] involve[d] changing the outcome of an election, either by
validation or invalidation”).
To summarize: Title IV, and specifically § 483, divests federal courts of subject-matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims brought after a completed union election that, in substance, seek
to challenge the election itself. See Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 138 (“[J]urisdiction under [Title I, 29
U.S.C. § 412] can[not] be upheld by reliance in whole or in part on allegations which in
substance charge a breach of Title IV rights.”); Crowley, 467 U.S. at 544 (“Congress clearly
intended to lodge exclusive responsibility for post-election suits challenging the validity of a
union election with the Secretary of Labor.”); see id. at 541 n.16.
With these broad preemption principles in mind, the Court now turns to the specific

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claims raised by Plaintiffs and decides whether, as Defendants insist, it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over the entire suit. The Court also points out that Plaintiffs do not dispute
Defendants’ argument that if Count I is preempted, their claims under Count II must fall away as
well.
Before diving in, though, the Court notes that it has received little help from Plaintiffs in
this round of briefing. At all other times, Plaintiffs’ briefing has been thorough, containing
thoughtful presentations of both fact and law. Less so here. The legal issue is undeniably
complicated, and perhaps Plaintiffs can see the writing on the wall, but their brief here contains
scant reference to or discussion of legal authorities. “It is not enough merely to mention []
possible argument[s] in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the
ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones. . . . Judges are not expected to be
mindreaders.” Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
B. Application
The Court will break its application of the law here into two sections, roughly based on
the arguments Plaintiffs raise in countering the ATU’s Motion. First, does Plaintiffs’ suit
“directly challenge the validity of an election already conducted” under Crowley, 467 U.S. at
541 n.16? Second, if so, did Title IV actually apply to this Union’s election? If either answer is
no, as Plaintiffs maintain, then its exclusivity provisions should not preempt their suit.
1. Challenge to Election’s Validity
The first step in deciding Defendants’ jurisdictional challenge is determining whether
Queen and Murray have “directly challenge[d] the validity of an election already conducted.” Id.
If so, then the subject matter falls within the scope of Title IV and is presumptively covered by
that Title’s exclusivity provisions. Before going to that question, however, a preliminary

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concession deserves mention. Plaintiffs wisely make no argument that, because they seek to
reinstate the June 2013 election results and challenge only Hanley’s invalidation decision and the
subsequent rerun election, their suit is not a challenge to an “election already conducted,” as that
term is used in § 483. Defendant cites to ample authority holding that such a position would be
unfounded. See Mot. at 13; Molina, 762 F.2d at 168 (plaintiff’s complaint, which “seeks to
reverse the union’s invalidation” of the original election and to “overturn the later two [follow on
or rerun] elections” counts as an election challenge under § 483). For that reason, the only
question is whether Plaintiffs’ suit “directly challenge[s]” that contested election and its ultimate
outcome.
A good place to begin is with the relevant election-related rights covered by Title IV,
followed by an inquiry into whether the claims asserted by Plaintiffs in Counts I and II comprise
claims that “in substance charge a breach of Title IV rights.” Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 138.
As a reminder, Title IV protects, in relevant part, the right of “every member [of a union]
in good standing [to] be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to . . . reasonable
qualifications uniformly imposed) . . . without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper
interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 481(e). As the Supreme Court in Calhoon succinctly explains, “[D]isputes . . . basically
relating . . . to eligibility of candidates for office[] fall squarely within Title IV of the Act and are
to be resolved by the administrative and judicial procedures set out in that Title.” 379 U.S. at
141.
Given that understanding, the conclusion that Plaintiffs seek to vindicate rights that fall
under Title IV appears inexorable. In rendering a decision, the Court must look beyond the
statutory bases Plaintiffs invoke in the Complaint and decide if the two counts “in substance”

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charge rights protected by Title IV. See id.; accord, e.g., Davis v. United Auto. Workers of Am.,
390 F.3d 908, 912 (6th Cir. 2004) (“‘[T]he substance of the claim is controlling.’”) (quoting
McGuire v. Grand Int’l Div. of Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 426 F.2d 504, 508 (6th Cir.
1970) (“If an individual member could bring suit by the simple expedient of framing a claim
under Title I, where the substance of the claim falls under Title IV, the comprehensive
administrative and procedural provisions of Title IV would be rendered meaningless.”)); Bradley
v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 962 F.2d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 1992) (similar); Kraska v. United
Mine Workers of Am., 686 F.2d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 1982) (essential inquiry is whether “the
underlying complaint . . . is . . . more easily characterized as a Title I[] or as a Title IV[] issue”).
Here, the two Counts undoubtedly do.
On its face, Count I pleads a violation of the right to be free from improper discipline
under Title I, § 411(a)(5). See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 34-38. But the gist of Plaintiffs’ dispute is not
improper discipline per se, but rather that the “ATU disciplined Murray and Queen by deeming
them to be . . . members not in good standing and ineligible to run for Local officer positions.”
Am. Compl., ¶ 37 (emphasis added). The “discipline” matters, in other words, only insofar as it
had election- and eligibility-related consequences for Murray and Queen, and thus the dispute is
plainly one that “relat[es] . . . to eligibility of candidates for office.” Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 141.
Similarly, Count II states breach-of-contract claims under either state common law or the
Labor Management Relations Act. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 39-42. But the essence of the count is
that the ATU “breached [the Constitution] by . . . determining, without any basis, that each
plaintiff was ineligible . . . for election to a Local officer position . . . .” Id., ¶ 42. This is
similarly a direct challenge to the validity of an election, and the fact that Count II is pled under
state common law (or, in the alternative, LMRA § 301) does not remove it from the ambit of

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Title IV’s exclusivity provisions. See Davis v. UAW, 392 F.3d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 2004) (statelaw wrongful-discharge claim preempted by Title IV where its resolution would require judicial
pronouncement on validity of disputed election), overruled on other grounds by Blackburn v.
Oaktree Capital Mgmt., LLC, 511 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2008); Bermingham v. Castro, No. 9815859, 1999 WL 644342, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 1999) (unpublished) (Title IV precludes
breach-of-constitution claim brought under LMRA § 301 as “the damages that he seeks for lost
income and benefits attributable to the [officer] position [he was deprived of] effectively
challenge the validity of the election already conducted”); Brown v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 717
F. Supp. 195, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same); Wolfson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union of
N.Y. & Vicinity, 713 F. Supp. 700, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same).
The remedies sought by Plaintiffs also reinforce the notion that they directly challenge
the validity of an election. Under both counts they seek (a) rescission of the ATU’s February
2014 invalidation decision and the Local’s March 2014 rerun election, (b) reinstatement to the
officer positions they would have held had the original election results not been disturbed, and
(c) damages, including back pay for the wages they would have earned as officers. See Am.
Compl. at 9-11 (Prayers for Relief). In sum, both claims are inextricably bound up in a dispute
over the “eligibility of candidates for office” and thus “fall squarely within Title IV.” Calhoon,
379 U.S. at 141; see Opp. at 9 (agreeing that damages claims “flow[] from the fact that [the]
ATU deemed them ineligible to run for office”).
The Court’s inquiry is not quite over, as Plaintiffs also appear to argue that Title IV
preemption does not bar an election-related Title I claim where the plaintiff charges the union
with discriminatory application of an election-eligibility rule. See Opp. at 8 (incorporating by
reference Sec. Summ. J. Opp. at 23). As a general matter, they are right that Calhoon offered

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some solace to plaintiffs whose claims follow this pattern, since the non-discrimination right
enumerated in Title I (§ 411(a)(1)) is not clearly protected by Title IV. See Calhoon, 379 U.S. at
139. It is nonetheless hard for the Court to see the relevance of this exception here.
Discriminatory application of election-eligibility rules in the LMRDA context means that
the union “applied the applicable provisions” of the constitution or bylaws “unequally to two
persons . . . similarly situated.” Fisher v. Wash. Teachers’ Union, 350 F. Supp. 2d 69, 76
(D.D.C. 2004). This potential escape hatch thus offers no relief to Plaintiffs, as their Amended
Complaint contains not a single reference to discriminatory application of the ATU’s electioneligibility rules. Indeed, Plaintiffs eschewed reliance on Title I’s non-discrimination provision,
§ 411(a)(1), and have never contended in any of their briefs that the ATU engaged in such
discrimination. Instead, in contesting President Hanley’s ineligibility conclusion and their
exclusion from the rerun election, Plaintiffs challenge only the ATU’s “interpretation of the
applicable provisions of the [its] Constitution and Bylaws” – a claim that “must be raised under
Title IV.” Fisher, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (D.D.C. 2004); accord Davis, 390 F.3d at 912 (“[T]he
allegations made by [plaintiff] do not establish that members of Region 2 were denied electionrelated privileges enjoyed by UAW members in other regions. Absent discrimination of this
kind, [plaintiff] may not maintain an action under Title I.”).
Seeking to dodge the preemption bullet, Plaintiffs next make a series of cascading
arguments in the alternative, working hard to expunge from their Complaint any remedy that
might plausibly be interpreted as constituting a direct challenge to the 2013 election. See Opp. at
8-9. They begin by “withdraw[ing] their prayers for reinstatement” – which is no skin off their
backs since that remedy was mooted when the three-year term to which they were elected ended
on June 30, 2016. See Sec. Summ. J. Opp. at 24. But the fact that time has rendered a

15

reinstatement remedy obsolete does not detract from the fact that Plaintiffs “in substance charge
a breach of Title IV rights.” Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 138 (emphasis added); see also O’Doherty v.
Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 618 F.2d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1980) (Title I claim preempted if
complaint raises issues governed “predominantly” by Title IV); Driscoll v. Int’l Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 139, 484 F.2d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 1973) (in deciding whether Title IV
preempts plaintiffs’ claims, court should conduct “a close analysis of the basic thrust of the
complaint,” as a party cannot “obtain jurisdiction by merely alleging the denial of Title I rights
when Title IV rights were essentially involved”).
In any event, the same conclusion would obtain even if Plaintiffs sought only back pay
from the get-go. This is because an award of back-pay damages here necessarily requires a
judicial pronouncement that the challenged election – or here, the invalidity decision and
subsequent rerun election – was, in fact, invalid. See Davis, 392 F.3d at 839 (dismissing as
preempted plaintiff’s “state-law claims . . . including his requested remedy of back pay” where
such claims “logically hinge on his assertion that he was lawfully elected”); Molina,762 F.2d at
167, 168 n.6 (Title I claim preempted even where plaintiffs “ask only for damages”; “[t]o award
even damages in this case” would still require court “to address the validity of the elections to
determine whether Castro Molina was entitled to the union presidency. . . . [T]hat appellants do
not seek reinstatement . . . is of little consequence.”) (emphasis added); Calciano v. United Bhd.
of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., No. 92-5715, 1993 WL 138827, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1993)
(“Plaintiffs can only prevail on Count 3, the claim for back pay, if the court determines that the
election was improper and defendants have improperly taken their offices.”). Plaintiffs cannot
save their suit by slicing away their injunctive remedies to leave only their request for back pay.
In a last-ditch effort, Plaintiffs trim back their remedial request even further to include

16

damages only for “injury to reputation and non-economic damages flowing from the fact that
[the] ATU deemed them ineligible to run for office in the June 2013 election.” Opp. at 8-9. But
even those damages, as Plaintiffs concede, would require the Court to pass on the validity of the
ATU’s decision, as they expressly state that the harms “flow[] from the fact that [the] ATU
deemed them ineligible to run for office . . . .” Id. at 9. By admission, these damages also fall
squarely within the scope of Title IV’s exclusivity provisions.
In sum, looking at Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint as a whole, the Court concludes that
they mean to pursue a direct challenge to an election already completed. For that reason, as long
as that election is governed by Title IV, their suit falls squarely within its “exclusive” remedial
scheme. See 29 U.S.C. § 483.
2. Title IV Applied to Election
Plaintiffs’ second argument is a bit more original, but it meets with the same fate. In
essence, they contend that because the challenged election at issue “Was Not Governed by Title
IV[,] . . . Title IV Exclusivity Does Not Deprive This Court Of Jurisdiction.” Opp. at 6. This
takes some careful unpacking, as the argument Plaintiffs make in countering Defendants’
position that Title IV does cover the challenged election is a narrow one indeed.
Before getting there, however, a little background will give some much-needed context to
these dueling positions. Generally speaking, the LMRDA does not apply to unions – be they
locals, intermediate bodies, or parents – whose membership consists entirely of public-sector
employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 402(e), (i) (defining main subject of statute – i.e., “labor
organization[s]” – by reference to “employer,” and excluding “the United States” and “any State
or political subdivision” from definition of “employer”); Hester v. Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs, 818 F.2d 1537, 1542 n.12 (11th Cir. 1987) (explaining congressional justification for

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excluding wholly public-sector unions from LMRDA coverage), vacated on other grounds, 488
U.S. 1025 (1989). That neat distinction between LMRDA-covered and non-covered bodies does
not entirely hold, however, when it comes to “mixed” unions, which include parent bodies, like
the ATU, comprising both private- and public-sector locals. See Murray I, 2014 WL 11281392,
at *6 (explaining LMRDA statute does “protect members of [government-only] locals in their
dealings with a parent union that is subject to the LMRDA”) (citing Wildberger v. Am. Fed’n of
Gov’t Employees, 86 F.3d 1188, 1192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
For such mixed unions, Title IV does apply to non-covered locals’ elections where such
elections also result in the selection of persons who, by virtue of their office in the local, also
serve as delegates to a mixed parent convention. In other words, where someone is
simultaneously elected as a local’s officer and an ex officio delegate to a mixed parent’s
convention, Title IV regulates the election.
Longstanding Department of Labor regulations bear this out: when it comes to a publicsector local or other unit that falls under a mixed-parent umbrella, even if it “do[es] not meet the
definition of a labor organization,” to the extent that it “participate[s] in the election of officers
of a national or international labor organization . . . through delegates to the convention” of the
parent body, “the provisions of title IV are, nevertheless, applicable to the election of such
delegates.” 29 C.F.R. § 452.124 (emphasis added); see also § 451.3(a)(4) (“[T]he locals which
are composed entirely of government employees [are not] subject to the [LMRDA], although
elections in which they participate for national officers or delegates [are] so subject.”); § 452.12
(similar).
Of course, a few conditions must be satisfied here before Title IV kicks in. First, the
parent’s constitution must provide for the election of delegates ex officio. See 29 C.F.R.

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§ 452.120 (allowing for election of ex officio delegates if “so provide[d]” by parent constitution);
Theodus v. McLaughlin, 852 F.2d 1380, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming rule as reasonable).
The parties here agree that, theoretically speaking, the ATU Constitution so provides. See Mot.
at 1-2 (citing ATU Constitution and General Laws, or “CGL,” § 6.7); Opp. at 2 (“[B]oth the
ATU Constitution and Local 1300’s Bylaws also provide that, if certain criteria are satisfied, the
persons elevated to certain Local 1300 officer positions serve ex officio as delegates to ATU’s
triennial Convention.”). Second, the local union’s bylaws need to similarly authorize election of
ex officio delegates. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.120. Once again, the parties agree that Local 1300’s
bylaws do just that – at least as they relate to the office of the President. See Mot. at 3; Opp. at
3; ECF No. 56-8 (Local 1300 Bylaws), § 7.
Keeping all of this in mind, Defendants maintain that Title IV governed the election
dispute here – a position that is supported by the caselaw. See, e.g., Chao v. Amalgamated
Transit Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, 141 F. Supp. 2d 13, 16 (D.D.C. 2001) (“If . . . a non-LMRDA
local union elects delegates to attend a [mixed parent] convention . . . , and such delegates have
the power to nominate and vote for officers of that international organization, then the process by
which the non-LMRDA local unions elect delegates is regulated by the Act.”); Teamsters For A
Democratic Union v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, 810 F.2d 301, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[A]ppellants
are essentially challenging delegate eligibility requirements for national conventions to elect
union officers under Title IV[;] . . . [a]ccordingly, the appellants are limited to the post-election
remedies provided in . . . § 482); Averhart v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., No. 10-6163, 2016
WL 2625326, at *3 (D.N.J. May 9, 2016) (“[W]hen a public sector-only union like Local 1033
conducts an election for delegates to a parent union’s convention, and that parent union is
covered by the LMRDA . . . then the LMRDA’s procedural requirements for electing delegates

19

applies.”). 1
Plaintiffs do not contest this general principle – i.e., that Title IV covers officer elections
for government-only locals when those same elections provide for the selection of ex officio
delegates to a mixed parent’s convention. See Opp., Attach. 1 (Affidavit of Paul Evelius), ¶ 4.
Instead, they claim that certain facts specific to this election wrest their challenge from the
clutches of Title IV. None of their attacks, however, proves persuasive.
Murray and Queen first argue that even though Local 1300’s bylaws provided for the
election of ex officio delegates, no such delegates were in fact elected. This was because the
ballots cast in the June 2013 election erroneously failed to comply with the ATU Constitution’s
requirement that “the ballot must state ‘and Convention Delegate’ or ‘and Alternate Delegate’, as
appropriate, after each such office.” Opp. at 7 (quoting CGL § 6.7). This error – which
Defendant “does not dispute” occurred, see Reply at 2 – created quite a stir in the run-up to the
ATU’s 2013 convention and ultimately ended with Local 1300’s delegation being credentialed at
the convention as “guests[] instead of [as] delegates.” Opp. at 3-5 (citing Opp., Attach. 2
(Affidavit of Janice Murray)).
Plaintiffs thus argue that, since the 2013 election did not produce functional ex officio
delegates, the Secretary had no Title IV authority to intervene in that particular election dispute.
They offer no citations to statutes, regulations, or cases to back this argument up, choosing to
rely instead on the persuasiveness of their own syllogism that because “the ballot used for the
June 2013 election did not state ‘and Convention Delegate’ or ‘and Alternate Delegate,’ . . . Title
IV did not govern the June 2013 election.” Opp. at 7.

1

In cursorily dealing with this issue without briefing from the parties, the Court erred in previously stating that Title
IV did not govern the election of Local 1300 officers. See Murray I, 2014 WL 11281392, at *6.

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Defendant, in response, considers all of these details rather beside the point, arguing that
the Secretary’s Title IV authority turns only on whether the two conditions stated in existing
Department of Labor regulations were satisfied, not on whether an otherwise-covered election
was flawed in its execution. Defendant has the better argument on this point.
The Secretary’s regulations clearly state:
Officers of labor organizations who have been elected by secret
ballot vote of their respective memberships may, by virtue of their
election to office, serve as delegates to conventions at which officers
will be elected, if the constitution and bylaws of the labor
organization so provide.
29 C.F.R. § 452.120 (emphasis added); accord § 452.12 (LMRDA does not govern “locals
composed entirely of government employees not covered by the Act, except with respect to . . .
the election of delegates to a convention of such parent organization, or to an intermediate body
to which the requirements apply”). Both the ATU Constitution and the Local 1300 bylaws “so
provide[d]” for the election of ex officio delegates. Those are the only two conditions that must
be satisfied.
Other language in § 452.120 reinforces this point, as the rule specifically goes out of its
way to note that “[i]n such cases” – i.e., when officers are also elected as delegates ex officio –
“it is advisable to have a statement to this effect included on the ballots.” Id. (emphasis added).
The rule thus expressly declines to require that locals’ ballots include the notice language
missing from the June 2013 ballots, even if the Secretary believes that doing so is a good idea.
To be sure, the ATU Constitution does make such notice mandatory – a point on which
the parties agree. But it makes no sense to argue, as Plaintiffs do, that the “ATU’s Constitution
‘provides’ [for election of ex officio delegates] only if the ballots used in that election include the
Delegate Phrase.” Sur-Reply at 2. Plaintiffs cannot invent an additional regulatory prerequisite

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to the exercise of LMRDA jurisdiction. In any event, the ATU Constitution does not, as
Plaintiffs suggest, make its grant of authority – i.e., that an ATU local “may provide in local
bylaws” for ex officio election of delegates, see ATU Constitution § 6.7 – conditional upon the
effective inclusion of notice on electoral ballots. On the contrary, the Constitution’s notice
requirement is distinctly removed from that delegation of authority and, in fact, presumes that the
local has already exercised it: “Where [local] bylaws provide that local officers and executive
board members may be delegates to Conventions of the ATU by virtue of their office, the ballot
must state ‘and Convention Delegate’ or ‘and Alternate Delegate’, as appropriate, after each such
office.” Id. (emphasis added).
In addition, Plaintiffs’ reading would subject the Secretary’s authority to the factual
vagaries of each and every election. Government oversight of a given election could be
precluded, for instance, by a slip up at the printing press or by the decision of an unscrupulous
individual overseeing the balloting process. Plaintiffs’ argument, moreover, would not be
limited to just this type of balloting error; under their theory, any chain of events that resulted in
officers’ being deprived of a delegate role at the convention would preclude Title IV coverage.
Plaintiffs’ logic, which would hold the Secretary’s jurisdiction in abeyance until a Court first
nailed down the unpredictable and messy facts of every contested election, has no mooring in the
language of either Title IV or the Department of Labor’s regulations, and no basis in the caselaw
or the Secretary’s decisions. The Court declines to adopt it here.
Plaintiffs’ next move is to concede that if Murray’s election challenge falls under Title
IV, Queen’s does not. See Opp. at 9 (“[R]egardless of whether or not Title IV applied to that
aspect of the June 2013 election [concerning Murray], it did not apply to that aspect of the
election in which Plaintiff Queen sought the Vice President position.”). They make this

22

argument because Local 1300’s bylaws expressly provide that while the President serves as an ex
officio delegate, the Vice President is not given such a role. See Local 1300 Bylaws § 7. From
this premise, Plaintiffs imply that because Queen was never intended to be elected as an ex
officio delegate, it must mean that Title IV was inapplicable as to him.
This is purely a straw-man argument, for it depends on the assumption that some portions
of a given election might be covered by Title IV while others would not be. And from this
assumption, Plaintiffs then make the dubious inference that Queen would thus have been denied
access to a Title IV remedy. Such positions have no basis in law.
Title IV remedies do not toggle on or off depending on the status of a given candidate; on
the contrary, they apply to an election as a whole. See 29 U.S.C. § 483 (“The remedy provided
by this subchapter for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive.”) (emphasis
added). Indeed, Title IV speaks of elections as a unified event. An individual who believes there
has been an irregularity in “the election” may challenge it by complaining to the Secretary, who
may, if he thinks it necessary, file suit “to set aside the invalid election.” See id. § 481(a), (b). If
a district court agrees with that assessment, it may “declare the election, if any, to be void and
direct the conduct of a new election under supervision of the Secretary.” Id. § 481(c); accord 29
C.F.R. §§ 452.135, 452.136. The Supreme Court in Crowley, moreover, explained that such
unified treatment of elections was by congressional design:
Congress made suit by the Secretary under Title IV the exclusive
postelection remedy for challenges to an election “(1) to protect
unions from frivolous litigation and unnecessary judicial
interference with their elections, and (2) to centralize in a single
proceeding such litigation as might be warranted with respect to a
single election.” Thus, exclusive postelection enforcement by the
Secretary serves “as a device for eliminating frivolous complaints
and consolidating meritorious ones.”
Crowley, 467 U.S. at 549 (quoting Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 532, 535).
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More importantly, when Title IV governs an election, any member of the union may
lodge a complaint with the Department of Labor to set the Title IV procedures in motion. See id.
§ 482(a); 29 C.F.R. § 452.135(a) (“Any member of a labor organization may file a complaint . . .
alleging that there have been violations of requirements of the Act concerning the election of
officers, delegates, and representatives . . . .”). “Any member,” of course, includes Queen, who
could have lodged a complaint with the Secretary after receiving either the ATU’s February 2014
invalidation decision or after learning the results of the March 2014 re-run election. See, e.g.,
Chao v. Local 743, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 467 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A]ny
member of a union who believes that Title IV has been violated, and who has first exhausted the
remedies available to him or her under the labor organization’s constitution or bylaws may file a
complaint with the Secretary . . . .”). Because Queen had access to a Title IV remedy, then, it
makes no sense to argue, as Plaintiffs do, that he must be entitled to press on under Title I, as
“[t]o hold otherwise would result in a ‘whip-saw’ effect whereby plaintiffs would be denied a
remedy under either Title I or Title IV.” Knisley v. Teamsters Local 654, 844 F.2d 387, 391 (6th
Cir. 1988). On the contrary, neither Title IV nor its implementing regulations suggest that
because Queen himself was never intended to be elected delegate, his access to a Title IV
remedy vanishes.
For this reason, the only three cases Queen cites – Knisley, 844 F.2d 387, BLE Int’l
Reform Comm. v. Sytsma, 802 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1986), and Fiori v. Truck Drivers Union Local
170, 130 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Mass. 2001) – are inapposite. He relies on them for the proposition
that where Title IV does not apply to a given election, its exclusivity provision is not activated.
See Opp. at 9. But, as the Court has just explained, Plaintiffs’ election challenge – all of it –
does fall under Title IV, meaning neither Queen nor Murray was prevented from pursuing a Title

24

IV remedy.
In any event, the cited cases do not support the proposition Plaintiffs advance. In Kinsley
and Fiori, for instance, the plaintiffs had already lodged complaints with the Secretary, who had
also already concluded that Title IV did not apply in each case. Both courts held that Title IV
did not preclude the plaintiffs’ other election-related claims “[b]ecause the Secretary ha[d]
determined that Title IV d[id] not apply.” Knisley, 844 F.2d at 388, 391 (“[W]e conclude that
plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed with their Title I claims against the Union where the
Secretary has previously determined that Title IV does not apply.”); see Fiori, 130 F. Supp. 2d at
155 (“When the Secretary determines that a particular union office is not covered by Title IV, the
exclusivity provision of Title IV does not apply . . . .”). BLE International is similarly distinct.
In that case, the plaintiffs complained about the manner in which their union had carried out the
recall of the parent union’s president. But it was clear from the face of the Secretary’s own
regulations that recall elections were not covered by Title IV. Compare BLE International, 802
F.2d at 191, with Chao, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (election of ex officio delegates covered by Title
IV).
The conclusion that the challenged election is subject to Title IV makes sense for another
reason. If Title IV were wholly inapplicable to the election dispute at issue here because it
pertained only to a non-“labor organization” election – i.e., one held by a public-sector union – it
would seem inevitable that Plaintiffs’ Title I claim, too, must fall by the wayside, as it arises
from the same election-related conduct. The provision that Plaintiffs invoke in Count I,
§ 411(a)(5), guarantees a right to be free from improper discipline only to “member[s] of any
labor organization.” It would be nonsensical to conclude that “labor organization” means one
thing under Title I but something different under Title IV, where the statute, caselaw, and

25

regulations make no such distinction. See § 402(e) (excluding from the definition of “labor
organization” “the United States . . . or any State or political subdivision thereof”); 29 C.F.R.
§ 451.3(a)(4); cf. Wildberger, 86 F.3d at 1193 (“‘[I]f a union is subject to the LMRDA, then all
of its members, whether employed by the private or public sector, are protected by the Act’s bill
of rights.’”) (quoting Hester, 818 F.2d at 1542 n.13).
As a last-ditch argument, Plaintiffs ask that the Court grant them the opportunity “to
conduct discovery before the Court rules on [the] ATU’s motion,” Opp. at 1, believing that
additional facts would help shore up their argument that the officers elected during the 2013
election process were not, in fact, properly elected as ex officio delegates. See Evelius Aff., ¶¶ 45. But the Court’s conclusion that Title IV applied to the election at issue here does not require
resolution of any factual issues. Nor does Defendant even dispute that the ballots failed to
contain the necessary notice language as required by the ATU Constitution, or that Murray was
not seated as a delegate by the ATU (whether properly or not).
In sum, Title IV of the LMRDA deprives this Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
challenge to the ATU’s 2013 election-invalidation decision and the subsequent re-run election,
and because Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery is immaterial to resolution of this
issue, the Court will deny it.

26

IV.

Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge

Date: September 2, 2016

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