STRANGE et al v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly on 4/8/2014.(lcckk3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STRANGE, et al,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No. 14-435 (CKK)

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(April 8, 2014)
Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ [3] Motion to Transfer Case Pursuant to Rule
57.13(a). Plaintiff moves the Court to transfer the above-captioned matter to another district
judge “in light of the ongoing litigation between Plaintiffs’ counsel and this District Court
Judge.” Pls.’ Mot. at 1. Plaintiffs contend that “in the interest of fairness and to avoid the
appearance that any decisions by the district court judge in the above styled case could be
influenced by the ongoing litigation,” this matter should be transferred to another district court
judge. Id. Defendants did not file a response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Transfer.
Although not styled as such, Plaintiffs’ Motion is effectively a Motion for Recusal. The
disqualification of a federal judicial officer is governed by 28 U.S.C. §455, which provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

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(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1).
In assessing section 455(a) motions for recusal, the D.C. Circuit applies an “objective”
standard: “Recusal is required when ‘a reasonable and informed observer would question the
judge’s impartiality.’” S.E.C. v. Loving Spirit Found., Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 952 (2001)). Further, a party moving for recusal pursuant to Section 455(a) “must
demonstrate the court’s reliance on an ‘extrajudicial source’ that creates an appearance of
partiality or, in rare cases, where no extrajudicial source is involved, . . . a deep-seated favoritism
or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Middlebrooks v. St. Coletta of
Greater Washington, Inc., 710 F. Supp.2d 77, 78 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 2011 WL 1770464 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 4, 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 243 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). A party moving for recusal pursuant to Section 455(b) must likewise demonstrate
“actual bias or prejudice based upon an extrajudicial source.” Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
Importantly, a judge is not required to recuse him or herself merely because a party files suit
against him. See In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (“There is no rule that requires
a judge to recuse himself from a case, civil or criminal, simply because he was or is involved in
litigation with one of the parties.”); In re Hipp, Inc., 5 F.3d 109, 116 (5th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Watson, 1 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940
(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977).
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of judicial bias other than the existence of separate
litigation involving the undersigned District Court Judge. Nor have Plaintiffs identified any

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extrajudicial acts by this Court that demonstrate pervasive bias or prejudice against Plaintiffs.
See Middlebrooks, 710 F. Supp.2d at 78. Granting a motion to recuse solely because a party has
sued the judge would transform such motions to recuse into vehicles for judge shopping. See In
re Taylor, 417 F.3d at 652; see also United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that section 455 “is not intended to give litigants a veto power over sitting judges, or
a vehicle for obtaining a judge of their choice”). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ Motion
is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall DENY Plaintiffs’ [3] Motion to Transfer. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

____/s/________________________
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge

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