WORKMAN v. ASTRUE

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION: Re Plaintiff's 12 MOTION for Judgment of Reversal/MOTION to Remand: 14 Defendant's MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Tanya S. Chutkan on 9/1/2016.(lctsc3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GARY D. WORKMAN
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, in her official
capacity as Acting Commissioner, Social
Security Administration
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 14-cv-00438 (TSC)(AK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Gary Workman seeks reversal of a June 8, 2012 decision by an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) denying him both Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income benefits (“SSI”). This action was assigned to Magistrate Judge Kay for full
case management, and after reviewing Plaintiff’s motion for judgment of reversal, as well as
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Judge Kay issued a Report and
Recommendation (“Report”), recommending that the court grant both motions in part and deny
them in part. Plaintiff timely objected to the Report. Upon consideration of the record in this
case, the Report, and the objections and responses thereto, the Court hereby adopts the
Magistrate Judge’s Report. The Court further accepts Judge Kay’s Recommendation, and denies
Plaintiff’s appeal of the Report.
I.

BACKGROUND

1

Plaintiff first applied for DIB and SSI on December 20, 2007. (Administrative Record
(“AR”) 258, 266). Both of these applications were denied. (Id. 160, 163). Plaintiff then
requested reconsideration, and appeared before an ALJ on May 24, 2010. (Id. 92-132). The ALJ
issued a decision on July 11, 2010, finding Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. (Id. 137-153). Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which vacated the ALJ’s
decision on October 28, 2011, and remanded both the DIB and SSI applications to the ALJ. (Id.
155-57, 2015).
Plaintiff had a second hearing on May 17, 2012, and the ALJ denied both applications in
a June 8, 2012 decision. (Id. 41-60). Plaintiff again appealed to the Appeals Council, which
denied Plaintiff’s request for a second rehearing. (Id. 1-4). After the second denial, Plaintiff
filed a new application for SSI, which included evidence he had not previously provided; that
application was ultimately approved. (Pl. Mot. to Reverse at 2).
Plaintiff’s suit challenged the June 8, 2012 adverse ruling, arguing that had he been found
to be disabled as of December 31, 2009, his benefits would have been tied to earning records
from that date, resulting in a significantly higher monthly income. (Id.). He claimed that the
ALJ erred on two grounds. First, the ALJ’s determination of his Residual Functional Capability
(“RFC”) was erroneous because: (1) the ALJ did not properly evaluate evidence of Plaintiff’s
trigger fingers; (2) the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could not perform light work was not
supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the Appeals Council improperly disregarded
additional evidence supporting a more restrictive RFC. (Id. at 1). Second, he argued that the
ALJ erred by failing to accurately describe Plaintiff’s finger and hand limitations in the
hypothetical questions posed to the Vocational Expert. (Id.).
2

Judge Kay’s Report found that the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s trigger fingers was
unsupported by substantial evidence, since the ALJ did not address, nor give controlling weight
to, the findings by two of Plaintiff’s treating physicians that Plaintiff had abnormal functioning
in his upper extremities and fingers. (Report at 11). Judge Kay recommended that the case be
remanded solely for further factual development of the impact Plaintiff’s trigger fingers would
have on any disability finding, but denied the rest of Plaintiff’s motion for reversal, finding the
ALJ did not err in his other determinations, or in his questioning of the Vocational Expert. (Id.
at 12-18). Judge Kay also denied Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the
trigger fingers issue, but granted it as to Plaintiff’s remaining issues. (Id. at 18).
Plaintiff now challenges the Report on three bases. First, he argues that Judge Kay’s
findings regarding his trigger fingers require a finding of disability, not a remand to the Agency
for further factual development. Second, he argues that Judge Kay’s recommendation upholding
the ALJ’s findings with respect to Plaintiff’s knee impairments is unsupported by substantial
evidence. Third, he argues that Judge Kay misconstrued the standard under which new evidence
can be received by the Appeals Council. Plaintiff does not challenge Judge Kay’s finding that
the hypotheticals the ALJ posed to the Vocational Expert were not deficient and did not
prejudice Plaintiff.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
When a Magistrate Judge issues a recommendation for a dispositive motion, the “district

judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been
properly objected to.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). The judge may then “accept, reject, or modify

3

the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate
judge with instructions.” Id.
In order to receive disability benefits, a claimant must prove that he or she is unable “to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A).
The disability must be so severe that the claimant “is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him,
or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” Id. § 423 (d)(2)(A). “The claimant must
support his claim of impairment with ‘[o]bjective medical evidence’ that is ‘established by
medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.’” Espinosa v. Colvin, 953 F.
Supp. 2d 25, 31 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)).
The Social Security Administration’s evaluation of a disability claim follows a five step
inquiry: (1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful work? (2) Does the claimant have a
severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment equate to a listed disability in 20 C.F.R., Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1? (4) Is the claimant able to return to their relevant past work, despite
suffering the impairment? (5) Can the claimant perform any other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy? Brown v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 703, 705-706 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
“Between the third and fourth step, the SSA uses the entire record to make a determination of the
claimant's residual functional capacity (‘RFC’), which is ‘the most [the claimant] can still do
4

despite [the] limitations’ caused by the impairment.” Espinosa, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 31. If, during
the fourth step, the Plaintiff’s RFC indicates that they are able to “return to their relevant past
work”, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. Similarly, if, during the fifth step, the claimant’s
RFC shows they can adapt to “other work that exists in the national economy,” then they are not
disabled. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1545(a)(5)(ii)). “During these first
four steps, the claimant bears the burden of proof. At the fifth and final stage, the burden shifts
to the Secretary to show that the individual, based upon his or her age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, is capable of performing gainful work.” Brown,
794 F.2d at 705–06.
“'In a disability proceeding, the ALJ ‘has the power and the duty to investigate fully all
matters in issue, and to develop the comprehensive record required for a fair determination of
disability.’” Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotations
omitted). Therefore, a reviewing court will not overturn the findings of the Commissioner if
they are “supported by substantial evidence and [are] not tainted by an error of law.” Smith v.
Bowen, 826 F.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence
“is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Butler, 353 F.3d at 999 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)). A reviewing court in a substantial-evidence case must engage in “careful scrutiny of the
entire record.” Brown, 794 F.2d at 705 (internal citation omitted).
III.

ANALYSIS

a. Trigger Finger Findings

5

Plaintiff argues that since Judge Kay found that the ALJ erred by not giving controlling
weight to the treating physicians’ opinions, the only possible outcome consistent with this
finding is that Plaintiff is disabled. Therefore, the case should be reversed and remanded for
payment of benefits, not remanded for further factual development. Defendant responds that
since factual questions still exist regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s impairment, the case must
be remanded.
The Administrative Record shows that Doctors King and Manning directly treated
Plaintiff, and under our Circuit’s treating physician rule, “[a] treating physician's report is
‘binding on the fact-finder unless contradicted by substantial evidence.’” Butler, 353 F.3d at
1003 (citing Williams v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). An ALJ who rejects a
treating physician’s opinion must explain his or her reason for doing so. Id. Here, the ALJ
failed to give the treating physicians’ reports the weight to which they were entitled with regard
to Plaintiff’s trigger fingers, and the court agrees with Judge Kay’s finding that the ALJ’s
decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
The court also agrees that the case should be remanded for further factual determination,
and not reversed and remanded for a determination of benefits. “A remand solely for the award
of benefits is appropriate ‘where the evidence on the record as a whole is clearly indicative of
disability and additional hearings would serve no purpose other than to delay the inevitable
receipt of benefits[.]’” Espinosa, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 35-36 (citing Hawkins v. Massanari, No.
00–2102, 2002 WL 379898, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2002)). Even giving the treating physicians’
opinions controlling weight, the court finds that the record does not clearly indicate that Plaintiff
is disabled, since the ALJ highlighted other possible causes of Plaintiff’s hand/finger
6

impairments, as well as other physicians’ opinions which concluded that Plaintiff could perform
light work. (AR 47-54). Thus, based on the record before it, the ALJ could still find that
substantial evidence does not support a finding of a disability.
Plaintiff argues in his Objections that the Vocational Expert’s response to his final
question on the impact of having trigger fingers clearly established that he is disabled. However,
the court finds that the question posed to the Vocational Expert went further than the limitations
described in Dr. King’s affidavit, and therefore does not form a basis to remand the case for
payment of benefits. Dr. King declared that Plaintiff’s hand and finger impairments prevent him
from lifting or carrying more than ten pounds on a sustained basis, or “performing any job
requiring sustained handling, seizing, holding, grasping or turning, or any job requiring
fingering, picking, pinching, or other fine manipulation,” but King did not state that Plaintiff
could not engage in any light work. (AR 714-715). However, Plaintiff’s counsel asked the
Vocational Expert if an individual could find employment if he had the limitations described in
Dr. King’s affidavit, which precluded that individual from performing any “light level” jobs.
(AR 89). Thus, counsel instructed the Vocational Expert to assume that the limitations
described in the King affidavit precluded Plaintiff from performing any light work jobs; the King
affidavit did not find that Plaintiff was precluded from light work.
For these reasons, as well as the ones cited in the Report, the court finds that there remain
outstanding factual issues with regard to Plaintiff’s trigger fingers, and the case will be remanded
for further factual findings. On remand, the ALJ must determine how the treating physicians’
opinions factor into the RFC analysis, and whether and to what extent Plaintiff’s ability to work
is impacted by his trigger fingers.
7

b. Plaintiff’s knee and foot impairments
Plaintiff argues that Judge Kay erred in upholding the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could
perform light work despite his knee and foot impairments, because the ALJ’s finding was
unsupported by substantial evidence. The court disagrees, and concurs with Judge Kay that the
ALJ, in accordance with this Circuit’s treating physician rule, properly explained his findings
with regard to Plaintiff’s knee impairments. (Report at 14). The court agrees that there is
support in the record for the ALJ’s findings that Plaintiff was exercising despite his alleged
impairments, and that the record is generally devoid of knee pain complaints after Plaintiff’s
March 2009 knee surgery. Further, while the ALJ’s note that Plaintiff only saw Dr. King
sporadically in 2010 and 2011 is contradicted by the record, which indicates more frequent visits,
the court agrees that this discrepancy amounts to harmless error since Dr. King was not the
primary treatment provider for Plaintiff’s knee ailments then. (Id. at 14-15). The court therefore
finds that the ALJ’s determination “is supported by substantial evidence and is not tainted by an
error of law,” and the court agrees with the Report’s recommendation regarding Plaintiff’s knee
and foot conditions. Smith, 826 F.2d at 1121.
c. Whether the Appeals Council should have considered new evidence regarding Plaintiff’s
knee condition
Plaintiff argues that Judge Kay also erred in upholding the Appeals Council’s decision to
not consider new evidence regarding his July 18, 2013 knee surgery. He argues that this new
evidence was material because it might have changed the proceeding’s outcome. However,
under 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b), the Appeals Council “shall consider the additional evidence only
where it relates to the period on or before the date of the administrative law judge hearing
decision.” Id. The ALJ evaluated the period prior to June 8, 2012, and Plaintiff’s knee surgery
8

occurred over a year later. The Appeals Council therefore properly excluded the evidence, and
the court agrees and adopts the reasoning of the Report and will not order the ALJ to consider the
evidence of Plaintiff’s July 18, 2013 surgery.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Appeal of the Magistrate Judge’s Report is

DENIED. A corresponding order will issue separately.

Date: September 1, 2016

Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge

9