AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, INC. et al v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.
Filing
85
AMICUS BRIEF by REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. (td) Modified date filed on 2/17/2016 (td).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
ASSOCIATION, INC., AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, INC.,
and NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
MEASUREMENT IN EDUCATION, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 1:14-cv-00857-TSC-DAR
v.
PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.,
Defendant.
PROPOSED BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT-COUNTERCLAIMANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION
Bruce D. Brown (D.C. Bar No. 457317)
Counsel of record for Amicus Curiae
Gregg P. Leslie (D.C. Bar No. 426092)
REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS
1156 15th Street NW, Ste. 1250
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 795-9301
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF AMICUS CURIAE ..................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 3
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 4
I.
Journalists’ efforts to inform the public of laws that affect them are hindered
when copyright is used to restrict private third parties from posting standards that
have been incorporated by reference. ..................................................................... 4
A.
Incorporation by reference is a common practice under which the public may
have to pay to read the law. ................................................................................ 4
B.
The role of the news media is frustrated when third parties are prohibited from
posting standards that have been incorporated by reference. ............................. 7
II.
The exclusive rights granted to copyright holders cannot be used to overcome the
First Amendment right to disseminate the 1999 Standards. ................................... 9
A.
The idea/expression dichotomy and fair use are “built-in First Amendment
accommodations” that are necessary to accommodate the tension between the
First Amendment and copyright law................................................................. 11
B.
The 1999 Standards constitute an “idea,” and using copyright law to prevent
their communication would infringe upon the First Amendment rights of
anyone seeking to disseminate their content. .................................................... 14
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 17
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888) ........................................................................ 7
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World
Corp., 230 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................. 16
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)....................................................................... 3, 12
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) ............................... 14, 15
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) .................................................................. 3, 11, 12
Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) ...................... 9, 10, 12, 15
Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887 (1971) ................................................................................... 12
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) ................................................................................... 9
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) .............................................................................. 7
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) ................................. 10
National Insulation Transp. Comm. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 683 F.2d 533 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................................................... 16
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)............................................... 7
Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) ................................................................... 7
Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986) ..................................... 10
Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla.
1978), aff’d on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) ..................................... 11
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).......................... 9, 14, 15
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834)............................................................................... 7
ii
Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357 (1927) ................................................................................. 3
Statutes
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ........................................................................................................ 9, 14
17 U.S.C. § 106 ................................................................................................................. 11
17 U.S.C. § 107 ................................................................................................................. 10
Regulations
29 C.F.R. § 1910.179(b)(1)................................................................................................. 8
34 C.F.R. § 668.141(a) ....................................................................................................... 6
34 C.F.R. § 668.146 ...................................................................................................... 6, 15
34 C.F.R. § 668.148 ............................................................................................................ 6
49 C.F.R. § 192.7(b) ........................................................................................................... 5
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. I ......................................................................................................... 11
Other Authorities
5 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (2015) ......................... 11
Bradley Scott Shannon, Action is an Action is an Action is an Action, 77 Wash. L. Rev.
65 (2002) ....................................................................................................................... 16
Doug Lederman, Lacking the ‘Ability to Benefit,’ Inside Higher Ed (Sept. 22, 2009),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/09/22/gao ................................................. 9
Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 131 (2013) ......................................................................................... 4, 5, 8
Emily S. Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public Law, 63 Kan. L. Rev. 279
(2015) .......................................................................................................................... 5, 8
iii
H. Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary Property (1944) ................................................. 10
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 Colum. J.L. & Arts 429 (2007)........ 13
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and
the Case of Accounting, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (2005). .............................................. 16
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147 (1998) .................................................................... 11
Michael Herz et al., Comment of the Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice, Am.
Bar Ass’n, Public.Resource.Org (June 1, 2012), https://law.resource.org/pub/us/cfr/
regulations.gov.docket.01/0900006481025ea4.pdf ........................................................ 8
Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v.
Holder, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1082 (2013). ....................................................................... 13
Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control Over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal
Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 737 (2014) ........................... 5
Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970) ..... 11
Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 Wm. & Mary Bill
of Rts. J. 497 (2013)........................................................................................................ 5
Standards Incorporated by Reference (SIBR) Database/Regulatory SIBR (P-SIBR)
Statistics, Standards.gov, https://standards.gov/sibr/query/
index.cfm?fuseaction=rsibr.total_regulatory_sibr .......................................................... 5
iv
IDENTITY OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (the “Reporters Committee”)1
is a voluntary, unincorporated association of reporters and editors that works to defend
the First Amendment rights and freedom of information interests of the news media. The
Reporters Committee has provided representation, guidance, and research in First
Amendment and Freedom of Information Act litigation since 1970. Because the
Reporters Committee believes that the exclusive rights granted under the Copyright Act
should not be used to prevent the dissemination of the “law,” its interest in the current
litigation is high. The authority to file derives from LCvR 7(o).2
INTRODUCTION
In this case, the court must address the important question of whether copyright
law can be used to prevent the dissemination of a category of information fundamental to
the workings of government – the actual codification of the law. The defendant,
Public.Resource.Org (“Public Resource”), is a non-profit corporation that distributes
public domain information on the Internet. Its efforts include promoting “the
dissemination of statutes, regulations, and other material that constitutes the law.” Def.’s
Mem. of P. & A. 3, ECF No. 69-1. In 2012, as part of its efforts to encourage access to
the text of laws, Public Resource began posting copies of standards incorporated by
reference into law. Id. at 8. Under the incorporation by reference process, legislatures
1
Amicus curiae the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is an unincorporated
association of reporters and editors with no parent corporation and no stock.
2
Counsel for the amicus curiae declare that they authored this brief in total with no
assistance from the parties, and that no individuals or organizations other than the amicus
made a monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief.
1
and administrative agencies refer, in the text of statutes and administrative regulations, to
standards and specifications published elsewhere, often by private parties. The
referenced material becomes part of the resulting law, without actually appearing in the
text of the statute or regulation. In 2014, Plaintiffs brought an action for injunctive relief
against Public Resource on the ground of copyright infringement after Public Resource
posted on its website a copy of the 1999 Standards for Educational and Psychological
Testing (“1999 Standards”). Id. at 9. Plaintiffs claim they are joint owners of the
copyright in the 1999 Standards. Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. 12, ECF No. 60-1. The 1999
Standards, which are incorporated into various parts of the Code of Federal Regulations,
are “designed to apply to professional test developers, sponsors, publishers, and users by
providing criteria for the evaluation of tests, testing practices, and the effects of test use.”
Compl. 8-9, ECF No. 1.
The importance of this case extends well beyond the facts presented. It is vital
that the news media and public be able to report on the text of the law without incurring
copyright liability. It is similarly important that third-party websites like
Public.Resource.Org be uninhibited in their efforts to disseminate the law. In order for
the news media to inform the populace of matters of public importance, and for citizens
to fulfill their civic duties, the law must be available to the public. A lack of such access
could negatively affect American democracy by reducing public knowledge of significant
laws. As Justice Brandeis wrote, “[Those who won our independence believed] that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty;
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.” Whitney v.
Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
From the perspective of the news media, which informs citizens on matters of
public interest, it is important that copyright law not be used to limit the availability of
standards that have been incorporated by reference into law. At the federal level, hard
copies of standards incorporated by reference are required to be kept in public offices in
or around the Washington, D.C., area. For a journalist who lives outside the Washington,
D.C., area, the consequence of such a regime is that he or she must turn to the
organization that owns the copyright in the standard to obtain access. These
organizations, as Plaintiffs do, often charge significant amounts of money for the right to
read their standards. Without free and immediate access to the standards, journalists may
find their ability to report on the law frustrated, which accordingly harms the public.
The news media and public have a First Amendment right to communicate the
1999 Standards in their entirety, which is a right that copyright law cannot overcome.
Copyright law contains two “built-in First Amendment accommodations” – the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use principles. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
219 (2003); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012). The idea/expression dichotomy
and fair use are necessary to accommodate the inherent tension between First
Amendment rights and copyright law, and to ensure that copyright law does not run afoul
of the First Amendment. Using copyright law to enjoin or punish distribution of the 1999
Standards would impermissibly limit protected expression.
3
ARGUMENT
I.
Journalists’ efforts to inform the public of laws that affect them are hindered
when copyright is used to restrict private third parties from posting
standards that have been incorporated by reference.
With just a few clicks of a computer mouse, journalists today have the ability to
access a seemingly unlimited number of judicial decisions, statutes, and administrative
regulations. While government-operated websites often provide free access to these
various pieces of law, journalists routinely visit websites operated by private third parties,
such as Public.Resource.Org and Cornell University’s Legal Information Institute, to
view the text of laws.
However, third-party standards that have been incorporated by reference into
statutes and regulations are not as readily available. Unlike other statutes and
regulations, such standards are often subject to copyright restrictions to prevent private
third parties from distributing them, creating a lack of transparency in a category of law
that touches nearly every facet of American life.
A.
Incorporation by reference is a common practice under which the
public may have to pay to read the law.
Incorporation by reference is a process under which legislatures and
administrative agencies turn materials that have been published elsewhere into legally
binding standards by referring to the material in the text of a regulation or statute. See
Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 131, 133 (2013). Although many standards incorporated by reference are
derived from the rules and regulations of other federal agencies and state governments,
thousands are developed by private organizations, like the Plaintiffs, that create various
types of technical and professional standards. At the federal level, standards developed
4
by private organizations and incorporated by reference into the Code of Federal
Regulations (“C.F.R.”) affect a myriad of areas, “ranging from toy safety to Medicare
prescription-drug-dispensing requirements to nuclear power plant operation.” Nina A.
Mendelson, Private Control Over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory
Use of Private Standards, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 737, 740 (2014).3
Although incorporating standards by reference has the benefit of reducing the
complexity of the federal register and is more cost-effective for agencies than creating
their own standards, Bremer, Incorporation by Reference, supra, at 140, the material
incorporated by reference is typically copyrighted by the organization that created the
standard, Emily S. Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public Law, 63 Kan. L.
Rev. 279, 286 (2015). At the federal level, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that
hard copies of material incorporated are typically only made available for public
inspection in government depositories located in or around Washington, D.C., and the
government is not required to post incorporated standards on the web for all to see. Peter
L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 Wm. & Mary Bill of
Rts. J. 497, 507 (2013) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 192.7(b) (1993)). Thus, for someone who
does not live in the Washington, D.C., area, the only realistic way to view a standard that
has been incorporated into federal law is to purchase the information from the
organization that owns its copyright at the price that organization dictates. Id.
3
See also Standards Incorporated by Reference (SIBR) Database/Regulatory SIBR (PSIBR) Statistics, Standards.gov, https://standards.gov/sibr/query/
index.cfm?fuseaction=rsibr.total_regulatory_sibr (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (stating that,
as of late January 2016, there were 15,591 records of standards incorporated by reference
in the C.F.R.).
5
The materials at issue in this case, the 1999 Standards, have been incorporated
into federal law at 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.146 and 668.148. As seen in the regulations, the
1999 Standards are used to ensure that various types of tests are adequately developed
and constructed, and indirectly play a role in determining to whom federal student aid can
be dispersed. For instance, under 34 C.F.R. § 668.141(a), a student who has neither a
high school diploma nor a GED certificate may receive federal student aid if she achieves
a passing score on an “ability to benefit” (“ATB”) test that has been approved by the
Secretary of Education. In turn, 34 C.F.R. § 668.146 states that the Secretary will
approve an ATB test only if the test “meet[s] all standards for test construction provided
in the 1999 edition of the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing . . . .”
Considering the important role the 1999 Standards play in our educational and
governing system, they should be easily obtainable. However, the principle regulation at
issue, 34 C.F.R. § 668.146(b)(6), states that the 1999 Standards can be viewed in one of
three ways: (1) by physically visiting the Department of Education – Office of Federal
Student Aid in Washington, D.C.; (2) by physically visiting the National Archives and
Records Administration in Washington, D.C.; and (3) by obtaining a copy from the
American Educational Research Association (“AERA”). If one chooses to obtain a copy
from AERA, the non-member price for the 1999 Standards is currently set at $45.95 plus
$7.00 for shipping and handling. See 1999 Standards, American Educational Research
Association, http://www.aera.net/Publications/Books/Standards(1999Ed)/Tabid/
16144/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2016). To make matters worse, citizens lacked
the ability to purchase the 1999 Standards directly from AERA for nearly a year. Def.’s.
Mem. 9. After Plaintiffs published an updated edition of the standards in August 2014,
6
they stopped selling the 1999 Standards altogether – only reinitiating sales in July 2015
after Public Resource noted that the 1999 Standards, which remain incorporated into
federal law, could no longer be acquired. Id. Considering this general lack of
availability, it is undeniable that Public Resource’s posting of the 1999 Standards vastly
improved access to these important government rules.
B.
The role of the news media is frustrated when third parties are
prohibited from posting standards that have been incorporated by
reference.
From the perspective of journalists, a lack of access to the law is deeply troubling.
This type of information has always been understood to be free from copyright
restrictions, see, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834); Banks v. Manchester,
128 U.S. 244, 253-254 (1888). The citizens of our nation “depend on the press for
information concerning public institutions.” Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 864
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). “In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an
agent of the public at large,” ensuring that “the people receive that free flow of
information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government.” Id. at 863. In line with
its role of informing the public, the news media further serves as a necessary and needed
“check” on governmental power. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)
(“[T]he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of
power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping
officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to
serve.”); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (stating that the press received constitutional protection “so that it could bare
the secrets of government and inform the people”).
7
Naturally, the news media’s ability to inform the public and check governmental
power is limited when access to information is restricted. If journalists cannot examine
standards incorporated by reference, the public may have no way of knowing whether a
regulation incorporated is arbitrary, dangerously outdated, or the result of undue
influence by special interest groups.4 In the context of outdated standards, the watchful
eye of the professional news media and citizen journalists would be particularly valuable.
Because agencies must identify specific versions of standards to be incorporated by
reference, material incorporated can become outdated, meaning that a new version of the
standard is available. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference, supra, at 137; Bremer, Cost
of Private Standards, supra, at 317. References to outdated standards can pose a danger
to the public, as newer standards are more likely to be safer. Bremer, Incorporation by
Reference, supra, at 137. For instance, the regulations of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration still reference crane standards developed in the 1960s. Id. (citing
29 C.F.R. § 1910.179(b)(1) (2012)).
Likewise, prompt access to the 1999 Standards can be crucial. In the past,
journalists have reported on government allegations that a branch of a for-profit college
gave answers to, and altered answers given by, individuals taking ATB tests. See Doug
Lederman, Lacking the ‘Ability to Benefit,’ Inside Higher Ed (Sept. 22, 2009),
4
See Michael Herz et al., Comment of the Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice,
Am. Bar Ass’n, Public.Resource.Org (June 1, 2012), https://law.resource.org/pub/us/cfr/
regulations.gov.docket.01/0900006481025ea4.pdf (writing that “[t]ransparency regarding
the content of material incorporated by reference is particularly important when that
material has been prepared, in the first instance, by private organizations rather than
governmental agencies – as when, for example, natural gas pipeline safety rules and
offshore oil drilling rules incorporate standards drafted by the American Petroleum
Institute or when motor vehicle safety standards incorporate standards drafted by the
Society of Automotive Engineers.”).
8
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/09/22/gao. If similar allegations were made
in the future (that is, allegations that an organization is not complying with proper testing
procedure), a journalist’s ability to obtain the 1999 Standards could be critical. A
journalist seeking to inform the public as to the circumstances surrounding the dispute
would need to read the literal requirements of the 1999 Standards. However, without
prompt, free availability on a website like Public.Resource.Org, the journalist may find
them difficult to access. Thus, the journalist’s reporting on a matter of public importance
– whether a test that plays a role in determining who can receive student aid is compliant
with federal regulations – stands to suffer.
II.
The exclusive rights granted to copyright holders cannot be used to overcome
the First Amendment right to disseminate the 1999 Standards.
One of the many arguments Public Resource puts forth for why the Court should
rule in its favor is that, once a standard is adopted into law, that standard becomes a
“fact” or, to use a different term, an “idea.” Def.’s. Mem. 18 (citing Veeck v. S. Bldg.
Code Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002)). That something would be considered a
fact or idea is significant because copyright protection does not “extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”
17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547
(1985) (“[N]o author may copyright facts or ideas.”). Rather, copyright “protection is
given only to the expression of the idea . . . .” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)
(emphasis added). This principle – that copyright law protects the expression of an idea,
but never the underlying idea itself – is referred to as the idea/expression dichotomy.
Similarly, Public Resource argues that the Court should rule in its favor due to the
“merger doctrine.” Def.’s. Mem. 18-19. “Under the copyright law doctrine of merger, a
9
close cousin to the idea/expression dichotomy, copyright protection will be denied to
even some expressions of ideas if the idea behind the expression is such that it can be
expressed only in a very limited number of ways.” Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787
F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). The doctrine serves a valuable
purpose, as it is “designed to prevent an author from monopolizing an idea merely by
copyrighting a few expressions of it.” Id.; see also Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (finding that, under the merger doctrine, copyright
protection does not extend to the rules of a contest because those rules could only be
expressed in “a mere handful of forms”).5
If those and the other arguments it puts forth fail, Public Resource asserts that its
conduct is protected by lawful fair use – “‘a privilege in others than the owner of the
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent.’”
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (quoting H. Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary
Property 260 (1944)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating that fair use “is not an
infringement of copyright” and listing four statutory factors that courts must consider
when making the determination of whether a use is fair).
As discussed below, the idea/expression dichotomy, merger doctrine, and fair use
exist in part to ensure that copyright law does not run afoul of the First Amendment.
Thus, in addition to constituting clear and justifiable reasons why the Court should rule in
Public Resource’s favor, the Court should invoke these doctrines to ensure that the First
5
As a separate argument, Public Resource contends that, even before incorporation, 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) dictates that the 1999 Standards are primarily uncopyrightable because
the standards are “procedures, systems and principles for production of fair and valid
tests.” Def.’s. Mem. 31-34.
10
Amendment rights of Public Resource, the news media, and the general public in
communicating the 1999 Standards in their entirety remain unabridged.
A.
The idea/expression dichotomy and fair use are “built-in First
Amendment accommodations” that are necessary to accommodate the
tension between the First Amendment and copyright law.
A tension exists between the First Amendment and copyright law. This tension
derives from the reality that the Copyright Act grants copyright owners with various
exclusive rights that can be used to restrict the dissemination of information, see 17
U.S.C. § 106, while the First Amendment commands that “Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” see U.S. Const. amend. I; see also 5
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 19E.01 (2015). The
apparent contradiction between the First Amendment and copyright law has been
recognized in case law, see Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012) (“[S]ome
restriction on expression is the inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright.”);
Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 881-882
(S.D. Fla. 1978), aff’d on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The Copyright
Act, since its inception, has spawned a subtle tension within the protective environment
surrounding the freedom of speech.”), and in the academic literature, see Mark A.
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property
Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 165-166 (1998) (“Copyright law restricts speech: it restricts you
from writing, painting, publicly performing, or otherwise communicating what you
please.”); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983,
983 (1970) (“Copyright is the uniquely legitimate offspring of censorship.”).
11
The United States Supreme Court has explored this tension on numerous
occasions. In these opinions, the Court has stressed the important role of the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use in maintaining First Amendment protected
speech. For instance, in Harper & Row, the Court noted that “copyright’s
idea/expression dichotomy [strikes] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still
protecting an author’s expression.” 471 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
It further emphasized that a “copyright owner’s monopoly” cannot be used “as an
instrument to suppress facts” or ideas. Id. at 559. See also Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887,
893 (1971) (Douglas J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The arena of public debate
would be quiet, indeed, if a politician could copyright his speeches or a philosopher his
treatises and thus obtain a monopoly on the ideas they contained. We should not
construe the copyright laws to conflict so patently with the values that the First
Amendment was designed to protect.”).
More recently, the Court addressed the First Amendment and copyright law in
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) and Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). In
both cases, the Court considered amendments to the Copyright Act that increased the
rights and terms of copyright holders. In rejecting First Amendment challenges to the
amendments, the Court stressed that copyright law contains “built-in First Amendment
accommodations.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890. Those
accommodations, which it referred to as the “traditional contours of copyright
protection,” are the idea/expression dichotomy and the “fair use” defense. Id. According
to the Court, as long as copyright legislation “leaves undisturbed the ‘idea/expression’
12
distinction and the ‘fair use’ defense,” there is no need to evaluate whether a particular
aspect of copyright law violates the First Amendment. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890-91.
Because the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use are necessary to prevent
copyright law from running afoul of the First Amendment, it follows that courts should
apply these doctrines in a way that fosters First Amendment values. In regard to the
idea/expression dichotomy, this means that courts, when making the determination of
what constitutes idea and what constitutes expression, should “err on the side of finding
that the defendant has copied ideas, not expression.” Neil Weinstock Netanel, First
Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1082,
1107 (2013). Likewise, when making the determination of whether a use is fair, courts
should err on the side of finding fair use. In copyright law, “[a]s in the constitutionalized
laws of defamation, privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trademark, and
others, courts must provide breathing space for the dissemination of ideas and
information . . . .” Id. Courts that do not provide this breathing space will inevitably and
unacceptably end up chilling First Amendment protected expression and abridging the
freedom of speech in the process. See also Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing
Space, 30 Colum. J.L. & Arts 429, 429-30 (2007) (“If we accept the Supreme Court’s
statement in Eldred that these doctrines [the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use] play
a critical role as First Amendment safety valves, it follows that the chilling effect
of uncertainty in these doctrines has a constitutional dimension . . . . [E]nsuring that
copyright law does not infringe upon free speech rights requires careful attention, not
only to the theoretical availability of free speech ‘safety valves,’ but to the actual effect
these doctrines have on speech.”).
13
B.
The 1999 Standards constitute an “idea,” and using copyright law to
prevent their communication would infringe upon the First
Amendment rights of anyone seeking to disseminate their content.
It is initially important to recognize that the 1999 Standards can be deemed an
“idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”
17 U.S.C. § 102(b). As such, they are not protected under copyright law. Even if there is
some element of expression in the collection of the information, however, at least one
federal circuit has held that any copyright protection should have ended once the 1999
Standards were incorporated by reference into law and transformed into an “idea.”
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, explored the interaction between the
idea/expression dichotomy, merger doctrine, and third party material adopted into law in
Veeck, 293 F.3d 791. There, the court addressed whether the operator of a noncommercial website could be held liable for copyright infringement after he posted the
building codes of two small towns that had adopted the 1994 edition of the Standard
Building Code, a model code created by Southern Building Code Congress International,
Inc. Id. at 793. Peter Veeck, the individual who posted the codes, asserted the
idea/expression dichotomy and merger doctrine as defenses to the infringement suit. Id.
at 800.
The court agreed. Treating “facts” as synonymous with “ideas,” 6 the court
asserted that the codes, once adopted, were “transformed into the ‘fact’ and ‘idea’ of the
towns’ building codes.” Id. at 802. It wrote: “the U.S. Constitution is a fact; the Federal
6
The practice of associating “facts” with “ideas” is common. See e.g., Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 560 (discussing the “Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable
expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (using the terms “‘idea/expression’ dichotomy” and
“‘fact/expression’ dichotomy” interchangeably).
14
Tax Code and its regulations are facts; the Texas Uniform Commercial Code is a fact.
Surely, in principle, the building codes of rural Texas hamlets are no less ‘facts’ than the
products of more August legislative or regulatory bodies.” Id. at 801. Therefore, as
“ideas” and “facts,” the codes could not be protected under the idea/expression
dichotomy. Addressing the merger doctrine, the court added that, upon adoption into
law, whatever protectable expression remained in the codes could no longer be separated
from the “idea” of the local law. The law, which must be discussed with absolute
precision, “can be expressed in only one way.” Id. at 801, 802.
In reaching these conclusions, the court repeatedly stressed the important role the
idea/expression dichotomy, and copyright law in general, plays in promoting free speech.
It noted that “‘the idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional balance between the
First Amendment and the Copyright Act,’” id. at 801 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 556), and emphasized that copyright law “‘encourages others to build freely upon the
ideas and information conveyed by a work,’” id. at 800 (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)).
The case at hand presents a similar scenario. At the time the 1999 Standards were
incorporated into federal law, they became the idea of the standards for test construction
and development that must be met as provided for in 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.146 and 668.148.
Accordingly, copyright law cannot be used to prevent the dissemination of the 1999
Standards without running afoul of the First Amendment.
The merger doctrine further prevents copyright law from being used to punish or
enjoin the dissemination of the 1999 Standards. For an individual to communicate the
idea of the 1999 Standards, she must use the Standards’ exact wording. In the law, words
15
have specific meanings and the use of synonymous language will not be sufficient to
convey those meanings. See, e.g., Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Different
words in a statute . . . should be given different meanings unless the context indicates
otherwise.”); National Insulation Transp. Comm. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 683
F.2d 533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[W]e presume that the use of different terminology
within a statute indicates that Congress intended to establish a different meaning.”);
Bradley Scott Shannon, Action is an Action is an Action is an Action, 77 Wash. L. Rev.
65, 81 (2002) (“[T]here is something of a linguistic presumption that a change in
terminology implies a change in meaning, however subtle.”). Thus, even if the 1999
Standards contain some form of limited expression after the incorporation process, the
distinction between idea and expression has disappeared. When this occurs, as noted, the
merger doctrine mandates that copyright law “treat[] the result as an idea, not an
expression.” Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright,
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 291, 308 (2005). And, with
the expression treated as an idea or a fact, the subsequent dissemination becomes
protected under the First Amendment.
16
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Public Resource’s motion for
summary judgment and deny Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction.
Dated: February 11, 2016
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Bruce D. Brown
Bruce D. Brown (D.C. Bar No. 57317)
THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
1156 15th St. NW, Ste. 1250
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone: (202) 795-9303
Email: bbrown@rcfp.org
17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on February 11, 2016, the foregoing document was filed
electronically with the Clerk of the Court through the Court’s CM/ECF system, which
will automatically serve all counsel of record.
Dated: February 11, 2016
/s/ Bruce D. Brown
Bruce D. Brown (D.C. Bar No. 57317)
THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
1156 15th St. NW, Ste. 1250
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone: 202.795.9303
Email: bbrown@rcfp.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
18
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