SLATE v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 2/10/2015. (KD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________
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GREGORY SLATE,
)
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Civil Action No. 14-1116 (RMC)
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
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Defendants.
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_________________________________
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Regarding Medical Faculty Associates’ Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 24]; Federal Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 25]; Howard University Hospital’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 29]
On April 10, 2014, Plaintiff Gregory Slate filed a 333-paragraph Complaint in the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging twenty-two different claims against more
than twenty defendants. The case was removed to this Court, and Mr. Slate filed a 441paragraph Amended Complaint on October 1, 2014, alleging twenty-eight claims against more
than twenty-three Defendants. 1 Most of the Defendants have some relationship, however
tangential, to Mr. Slate’s encounters with officers of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department
when he was documenting and filming alleged police harassment. Among other claims, Mr.
Slate alleges illegal arrests by MPD officers, warrantless searches of his property, destruction of
his film tapes, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and wrongful incarceration.
Medical Faculty Associates, Inc. and Howard University Hospital move to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. In addition, the United States moves to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. As explained below, these motions will be granted.
1

An exact count of the Defendants is not possible, as they include various unidentified police
officers, correctional officers, and deputy marshals.
1

I. FACTS
Mr. Slate asserts that he is “an Emmy award winning investigative journalist
whose work focuses on police misconduct and corruption.” Am. Compl. [Dkt. 22] ¶ 1. 2 He
claims that he filmed police harassment on October 26 and 28, 201, id. ¶¶ 23-27, and since that
time, he has been subject to numerous instances of police harassment. 3 See e.g., id. ¶¶ 28-30, 3440, 45-60.
Mr. Slate alleges that on December 10, 2011, 4 Mr. Slate called 911 to report a
disturbance at the property he leases in the 1700 block of Kilbourne Place NW, Washington D.C.
Id. ¶ 32. MPD officers allegedly forced their way into his residence and, without a warrant,
searched the first floor and Mr. Slate’s office on the third floor. Id. ¶¶ 34-39. MPD Officer
James Boteler, a named Defendant, then arrested Mr. Slate for felony assault with a deadly
weapon and unlawful possession of ammunition, which Mr. Slate alleges are bogus charges. Id.
¶ 40. When told he would be arrested, Mr. Slate suffered a severe panic attack and was

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Mr. Slate filed the original complaint in Superior Court for the District of Columbia on April
10, 2014. The case was removed to this Court. He filed the Amended Complaint on October 1,
2014. Because Mr. Slate filed the Amended Complaint without first obtaining leave of Court as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), Medical Faculty Associates moved to strike
it. See Mot. to Dismiss or Strike [Dkt. 24]. In light of the fact that Mr. Slate has provided good
cause for amendment, see Opp’n [Dkt. 11] ¶ 4, the Court will allow the Amended Complaint and
deny the motion to strike. As a result, motions to dismiss the original Complaint filed by
Medical Faculty Associates, Howard University Hospital and the District of Columbia, see Dkts.
4, 18, 20, will be denied without prejudice. The Defendants already refiled each of these
motions to dismiss as to the Amended Complaint, see Dkts. 24, 25, 31, and the first two of these
are addressed in this Opinion.
3

The details of Mr. Slate’s alleged mistreatment by D.C. Metropolitan Police Department
(MPD) officers and D.C. Department of Corrections officials are not relevant to the pending
motions and will not be detailed here, except as necessary.
4

Paragraph 32 of the Amended Complaint erroneously states that this event occurred on
December 10, 2013. The Amended Complaint recounts events chronologically and subsequent
paragraphs make it clear that the date in paragraph 32 should read “December 10, 2012.”
2

transported to George Washington University Hospital (GW Hospital) for treatment. Id. ¶ 41.
Treatment was provided by one or more physicians associated with Medical Faculty Associates,
also known as the George Washington Medical Faculty Associates. Mr. Slate told GW Hospital
that he did not want treatment because he was uninsured, and the hospital allegedly told him that
the District of Columbia would pay for his treatment because he was in custody. Id. ¶ 42.
Unidentified MPD officers then forced Mr. Slate to sign forms without letting him read what he
was signing. Id. ¶ 43. Subsequently, Mr. Slate was billed by Medical Faculty Associates for
physician services he received from the doctor(s) who cared for him at GW Hospital. Mr. Slate
was held in D.C. Jail for one night and released on personal recognizance. Id. ¶ 44.
Six days later, on December 16, 2011, D.C. Metropolitan Police (MPD) officers
executed a search warrant of Mr. Slate’s property on Kilbourne Place N.W. Id. ¶ 47. The
officers allegedly forced entry, destroyed personal property, and falsely charged him with
possession of methamphetamines. Id. ¶¶ 47-60. Upon hearing that he would be charged, Mr.
Slate suffered a severe panic attack; he was transported to Howard University Hospital. Id. ¶ 61.
Mr. Slate told Howard University Hospital that he did not want treatment because he was
uninsured, and like GW Hospital, Howard University Hospital allegedly told Mr. Slate that
because he was in police custody, the District of Columbia would pay for his treatment. Id. ¶ 62.
After receiving treatment, unidentified MPD officers forced Mr. Slate to sign various forms,
which had not been filled out; they did not allow Mr. Slate to read what he was signing. Id. ¶ 63.
Mr. Slate was held in custody and released seven days later on personal recognizance. Id. ¶ 66.
On January 4, 2012, MPD Officer John Carruthers, a named Defendant, together
with unidentified MPD officers and unidentified U.S. Marshal Service deputies, allegedly kicked

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down the door of property Mr. Slate leases at 35 Bryant Street, N.W. and entered without a
warrant. Id. ¶ 69. Mr. Slate alleges further:
70. While inside 35 Bryant Street, NW an unidentified USMS
Marshal told Plaintiff’s tenant that Plaintiff was engaged in
financial fraud and to close the bank account from which Plaintiff
deducted the tenant’s rent.
71. Plaintiff has never engaged in or been charged with financial
fraud and as a result of Defendant Unnamed Marshal’s and MPD
officer’s knowing misrepresentation Plaintiff’s tenants at 35
Bryant Street NW stopped paying rent and moved out causing
Plaintiff to lose the rental income he would have otherwise earned
but for the Marshal’s representation.
Id. ¶¶ 70-71. The officers arrested Mr. Slate on two counts of felony contempt of court. Id. ¶ 72.
Mr. Slate had another severe panic attack. Id. ¶ 72. This time he was transported to Washington
Hospital Center, also known as MedStar Washington Hospital Center. As he had on prior
occasions, Mr. Slate told the hospital that he did not want treatment because he was uninsured;
the hospital assured him that the District of Columbia would pay for his treatment because he
was in police custody; and unidentified MPD officers forced Mr. Slate to sign various forms,
without permitting him to read the forms. Id. ¶¶ 73-74. Mr. Slate remained in MPD custody.
The next day, January 5, MPD transported Mr. Slate to Howard University
Hospital due to high blood pressure. Id. ¶ 76. Mr. Slate asked the hospital to bill the MPD since
he was in custody, and the hospital agreed to do so. Id. ¶ 77. As before, unidentified MPD
officers forced Mr. Slate to sign various forms, without permitting him to read the forms. Id.
¶ 78. Mr. Slate was returned to MPD custody. A bail hearing was held on January 17, 2012, and
named Defendant Assistant U.S. Attorney Jin Park served as the prosecutor. Id. ¶ 80. Mr. Slate
alleges that during an interview of a potential witness at the bail hearing, AUSA Park told the
witness that Mr. Slate had done “very very bad things.” Id.

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Mr. Slate was denied bail and was held in the D.C. Department of Corrections
(DOC) for the next four months. Id. ¶ 79. Mr. Slate complains that conditions at DOC were
“inhumane” and he claims that he was subjected to repeated strip searches, violence, and sexual
assaults by DOC officers. Id. ¶¶ 81-206.
A trial jury acquitted Mr. Slate on all firearms-related charges and both counts of
contempt of court on April 23, 2013. Id. ¶¶ 207. Previously, the Superior Court had dismissed
all the drug charges against Mr. Slate. Id. ¶ 208.
When he was released in April 2013, Mr. Slate discovered that the District of
Columbia had not paid his medical bills and that GW Hospital, Howard University Hospital, and
Washington Hospital Center demanded that he pay their invoices. Id. ¶ 213 (“When he was
released from incarceration Plaintiff learned that the District of Columbia has not (sic) paid for
any of the medical treatment Plaintiff received while in custody and that Defendants George
Washington University Hospital, Howard University Hospital, and Washington Hospital Center
were demanding several thousand dollars in payment.”). Mr. Slate attempted to obtain credit but
was denied because these hospitals, as well as Medical Faculty Associates, had placed
delinquency notices on his credit report. Id. ¶¶ 215-216.
As relevant to the motions addressed in this Opinion, the Amended Complaint
alleges the following claims:
Count XII alleges that unidentified U.S. Marshal Service deputies
violated Mr. Slate’s Fourth Amendment rights by searching his
home without a warrant on January 4, 2012, see Am. Compl.
¶¶ 290-293; 5
Count XIV alleges that an unidentified U.S. Marshal Service
deputy tortiously interfered with Mr. Slate’s contract with his
5

Count XII and Count XV also charge MPD Officer Carruthers and unidentified MPD officers
with violating the Fourth Amendment and with trespass.
5

tenant(s) by falsely telling tenant(s) that Mr. Slate was engaged in
financial fraud causing them to stop paying rent and move out, see
id. ¶¶ 304-314;
Count XV alleges that unidentified U.S. Marshal Service deputies
committed trespass when they entered 35 Bryant Street N.W., see
id. ¶¶ 315-318;
Count XIX alleges that AUSA Park committed libel by stating that
Mr. Slate did “very very bad things,” see id. ¶¶ 340-49;
Count XXI alleges that Medical Faculty Associates violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et
seq. by filing delinquent credit ratings and by pursuing Mr. Slate
for a debt that was not owed to Medical Faculty Associates, see id.
¶¶ 358-364; and
Count XXII alleges that Howard University Hospital similarly
violated the FDCPA by filing delinquent credit ratings and by
pursuing Mr. Slate for a debt that was not owed to Howard
University Hospital, see id. ¶¶ 365-373.
The Attorney General has certified that AUSA Park and the unidentified United
States Marshals Service employees (collectively, the Federal Defendants) were acting within the
scope of their federal employment at the time of the alleged incidents. See Am. Certification
[Dkt. 25-1]. As a result, the United States was substituted as Defendant for the Federal
Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), which provides “[u]pon certification by the Attorney
General, . . . [the] civil action . . . shall be deemed an action against the United States . . . and the
United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.”
Federal Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against them in their official
capacities 6 because the Court lacks jurisdiction over such claims under Federal Rule of Civil

6

The initial Complaint sued all Federal Defendants in their official capacities only. See Compl.
[Dkt. 1]. The Amended Complaint names the individual defendants in their official and personal
capacities. There is no record that the Amended Complaint has been served on these putative
defendants in their personal capacities. The Federal Defendants’ motion neither addresses, nor
does the Court decide, any such personal capacity claims.
6

Procedure 12(b)(1) due to sovereign immunity. Medical Faculty Associates and Howard
University Hospital move to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Failure to State a Claim
Complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), but even
pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.
Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). The Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss filed by Medical Faculty
Associates and Howard University Hospital challenge the adequacy of the Amended Complaint
on its face.
A complaint must be sufficient “to give a defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (internal citations omitted). Although a complaint does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff=s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Id. A court must treat the complaint=s factual allegations as true, “even if doubtful
in fact,” id., but a court need not accept as true legal conclusions set forth in a complaint, see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on
its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A complaint must allege sufficient facts that would allow
the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may

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consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or
incorporated by reference, and matters about which the court may take judicial notice. Abhe &
Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
B. Lack of Jurisdiction
The United States, on behalf of the Federal Defendants in their official capacities,
moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) due to sovereign immunity. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1), a
plaintiff must plead grounds for the court’s jurisdiction. When reviewing a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must review the complaint liberally, granting the
plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. Barr v. Clinton,
370 F. 3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, “the court need not accept factual
inferences drawn by plaintiffs if those inferences are not supported by facts alleged in the
complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff=s legal conclusions.” Speelman v. United States,
461 F. Supp. 2d 71, 73 (D.D.C. 2006). To determine whether it has jurisdiction over the claim,
a court may consider materials outside the pleadings. Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d
1098, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2005). No action of the parties can confer subject matter jurisdiction on a
federal court because subject matter jurisdiction is an Article III and a statutory requirement.
Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The party claiming
subject matter jurisdiction, here Mr. Slate, bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction
exists. Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

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III. ANALYSIS
A. Howard University Hospital
Count XXII of the Amended Complaint alleges that Howard University Hospital
violated the FDCPA. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 365-373. Howard University Hospital moves to
dismiss because it did not act as a “debt collector” when it attempted to collect its own debt. See
Howard Univ. Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. 29]. FDCPA defines a “debt collector” to be “any person
who uses . . . the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any
debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). In other words, the FDCPA applies
to those who collect debts owed to another. “The FDCPA is not applicable to creditors who are
in the business of collecting their own debts.” Mazza v. Verizon Washington D.C., Inc., 872 F.
Supp. 2d. 28, 37 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Gould v. ClaimAssist, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1022
(S.D. Ill. 2012) (a debt collector is someone who collects debts for another).
Mr. Slate failed to file a response to Howard University Hospital’s motion to
dismiss. Local Civil Rule 7(b) requires an opposing party to file an opposition brief within
fourteen days or by such other date set by the court. Howard University Hospital filed its motion
to dismiss on October 22, 2014. The Court issued an Order requiring Mr. Slate to file an
opposition no later than November 24, 2014, and indicating that he would risk dismissal if he
failed to file a response. See Order [Dkt. 30]. When an opposing party fails to timely respond to
a motion to dismiss, the Court may treat the motion as conceded. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Because Mr. Slate has not opposed the motion to
dismiss filed by Howard University Hospital, the Court treats the motion as conceded; the
motion to dismiss will be granted and Count XXII will be dismissed.

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B. Medical Faculty Associates’ Motion to Dismiss
Mr. Slate also asserts an FDCPA claim against Medical Faculty Associates. See
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 358-364 (Count XXI). Medical Faculty Associates moves to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. See Medical Faculty Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. 24].
Count XXI fails to state a claim because it fails to provide any factual support for
the claim that Medical Faculty Associates is a “debt collector” covered by the FDCPA. See
Mazza, 872 F. Supp. 2d. at 37 (FDCPA does not apply to creditors who collect their own debts;
FDCPA applies only to debt collectors who collect debts owed to another). The Amended
Complaint makes very little mention of Medical Faculty Associates. It misidentifies it as a
hospital, see Am. Compl. at 5, when Medical Faculty Associates in fact is a non-profit physician
practice corporation. The Amended Complaint alleges that “in the course of attempting to obtain
credit Plaintiff was advised that Defendants George Washington University Hospital, Medical
Faculty Associates, Howard University Hospital, and Washington Hospital Center had placed a
delinquent credit rating in her [sic] credit report.” See id. ¶ 215 (emphasis added). The
Amended Complaint then alleges in conclusory fashion that Medical Faculty Associates is both a
creditor and a debt collector and that it violated FDCPA by filing delinquent credit ratings and by
pursuing Mr. Slate for a debt that was not owed to Medical Faculty Associates. See id. ¶¶ 358364.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. The Court need not accept as true the asserted bald legal conclusion that Medical Faculty
Associates is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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In response to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Slate makes a new allegation, this time
claiming that Medical Faculty Associates acted as a debt collector for “George Washington
Hospital Center.” 7 Opp’n [Dkt. 34] at 2. Mr. Slate offers no facts whatsoever to support this
latest assertion. This allegation is not “plausible on its face.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
There is no entity called “George Washington Hospital Center,” 8 and Mr. Slate provides no
support for his claim that Medical Faculty Associates, a group of physicians whose business is to
provide health care, sought to collect debts from him that are owed to another entity.
Because Mr. Slate has failed to assert plausible factual allegations in support of
his claim, the motion to dismiss filed by Medical Faculty Associates will be granted and Count
XXI will be dismissed.
C. Federal Defendants
Mr. Slate has sued unidentified U.S. Marshal Service deputies for violating the
Fourth Amendment (Count XII), tortious interference with contract (Count XIV), and trespass
(Count XV). He sues AUSA Park for libel (Count XIX). The United States is substituted for
these defendants insofar as Mr. Slate sues them in their official capacity.
Suit against the United States is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity
unless Congress has specifically waived such immunity. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Congress has not waived sovereign immunity for constitutional claims.
See Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 103-05 (D.C.Cir.1984) (constitutional claims solely
7

Further, “[i]t is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a
motion to dismiss.” Arbitraje Casa de Cambio, S.A. de C.V. v. United States Postal Serv., 297 F.
Supp. 2d 165, 170 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Coleman v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 94 F. Supp.
2d 18, 24 n. 8 (D.D.C. 2000)). Thus, the Court does not treat this allegation as part of the
Amended Complaint.
8

Mr. Slate might be referring to George Washington University Hospital or Washington
Hospital Center, also known as MedStar Washington Hospital Center.
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for monetary damages against federal official in his official capacity are barred by sovereign
immunity).

As to tort claims, Congress has waived sovereign immunity in a limited way via
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2675, 2679-80. The FTCA
allows suits for money damages against the United States for claims against federal employees
that allege “negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The FTCA
expressly excludes certain claims from its coverage; in particular, § 2680(h) expressly retains
sovereign immunity from suit on “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights.” See also Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d
1151, 1154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (FTCA does not waive immunity from claims of tortious
interference with contract); Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(FTCA does not waive immunity from claims of libel).
While a claim for trespass might be brought under the FTCA, a plaintiff must
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an FTCA claim to federal court. McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The exhaustion
requirement is jurisdictional. GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In other words, unless a plaintiff has followed the administrative process to its conclusion, the
Court cannot entertain his lawsuit. To exhaust administrative remedies, a plaintiff must have
presented the agency with “(1) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the
agency to begin its own investigation and (2) a sum-certain damages claim,” and the agency

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must have either denied the claim in writing or failed to provide a final disposition within six
months of the filing of the claim. Id. at 905. A plaintiff’s failure to exhaust cannot be remedied
by amending a premature complaint at a later date, after the requirements have been satisfied.
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112 (1993); Edwards v. District of Columbia, 616 F.
Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D.D.C. 2009).
A plaintiff must plead grounds for the Court’s jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(1), and thus in an FTCA case a plaintiff must plead administrative exhaustion. Colbert v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 831 F. Supp. 2d 240, 243 (D.D.C. 2011). Mr. Slate has failed to allege that he
exhausted administrative remedies, and thus he has failed to allege jurisdiction over his trespass
claim, Count XV.
Sovereign immunity bars Counts XII (Fourth Amendment violation), XIV
(tortious interference), and XIX (libel) as against the unidentified U.S. Marshal Service deputies
and AUSA Park in their official capacities. Further, Mr. Slate has not alleged exhaustion of
administrative remedies regarding Count XV (trespass). Accordingly, the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over all claims against the Federal Defendants in their official capacities and
those claims will be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Medical Faculty Associates’ motion to strike [Dkt.
24] will be denied, the Court will grant leave to file the Amended Complaint [Dkt. 22] nunc pro
tunc to its filing date, October 1, 2014. As a result, the following motions to dismiss the original
Complaint will be denied without prejudice: Medical Faculty Associates motion to dismiss [Dkt.
4]; Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Dkt. 18]; and District of Columbia’s motion to
dismiss [Dkt. 20]. Further, the following motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint will be

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granted: Howard University Hospital’s motion to dismiss [Dkt. 29]; Medical Faculty
Associates’ motion to dismiss [Dkt. 24]; and Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Dkt. 25].
As a result, Counts XXI and XXII of the Amended Complaint will be dismissed and the
following defendants will be dismissed as parties to this suit: Howard University Hospital;
Medical Faculty Associates, Inc.; and the United States. Assistant U.S. Attorney Jin A. Park and
unidentified John Doe U.S. Marshal Service employees are dismissed as parties in their official
capacities. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: February 10, 2015

/s/
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge

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