HOLMAN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 1/28/2016. (lcrmc1)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RAQUEL HOLMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 14-1836 (RMC)
OPINION
Raquel Holman, a special education student who is now over the age of 18,
complains that the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) denied her a free appropriate
public education (FAPE) in violation of the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
as modified by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 et seq. An Independent Hearing Officer found that DCPS failed to provide Ms. Holman
her prescribed specialized instruction for her last year of high school and that DCPS excluded
Ms. Holman and her guardian from certain meetings concerning Ms. Holman’s education.
Despite these findings, the Hearing Officer refused to order compensatory education as a remedy
because Ms. Holman had graduated from high school and, therefore, he concluded that DCPS’s
actions did not cause her any harm.
Ms. Holman now moves for summary judgment and asks the Court to award her
compensatory education. See MSJ [Dkt. 9]. DCPS filed a timely opposition to the motion, to
which Ms. Holman replied. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Ms. Holman’s
motion for summary judgment and reverse in part the Hearing Officer’s decision as contrary to
the evidence and the law.
1
I. FACTS
A. Statutory Framework
In general, IDEA “aims to ensure that every child has a meaningful opportunity to
benefit from public education.” Boose v. District of Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054, 1056 (D.C. Cir.
2015). The statute ensures that “all children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent
living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Under IDEA, school systems must promptly identify,
locate, and evaluate every child with disabilities residing in the district who is in need of special
education and related services. Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A). Once a disabled child is identified, the
child’s parents, teachers, school officials, and other professionals collaborate in an “IEP team” to
develop an individualized education program (IEP) to meet the child's unique needs. See id.
§§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d)(1)(B).
The IEP is a written statement that is reviewed annually and includes goals and
instructional objectives for the student’s education, services to be provided, projections regarding
the dates on which such services are to be offered, and criteria for evaluating whether
instructional objectives are met. Id. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d)(1)(A); see also Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 311 (1988). The IEP team may determine that in order to benefit from special
education, the student requires “related services” — i.e., non-educational, supportive services
such as physical and occupational therapy and psychological counseling. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(B);
34 C.F.R. § 300.24(a). “[T]he IEP must, at a minimum, provide personalized instruction with
sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction . . . .”
Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2005). IDEA also
requires that “[a]s soon as possible following development of the IEP, special education and
2
related services are made available to the child in accordance with the child’s IEP.” Honig, 484
U.S. at 311.
To determine whether a FAPE has been provided, courts must determine whether:
(1) the school complied with the IDEA’s procedures; and (2) the IEP developed through those
procedures was reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits.
Loren F. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003). While the District of
Columbia is required to provide a FAPE to disabled students, it is not required to, and does not
guarantee, any particular outcome or any particular level of academic success. See Bd. of Educ.
of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982); Dorros v. District
of Columbia, 510 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D.D.C. 2007).
IDEA is “violated when a school district deviates materially from a student’s
IEP.” Wilson v. District of Columbia, 770 F. Supp. 2d 270, 275 (D.D.C. 2011) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted). “A material failure occurs when there is more than a minor
discrepancy between the services a school provides to a disabled child and the services required
by the child’s IEP.” Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th
Cir. 2007); see also Turner v. District of Columbia, 952 F. Supp. 2d 31, 40 (D.D.C. 2013).
Moreover, “the materiality standard does not require that the child suffer demonstrable
education harm in order to prevail.” Wilson, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822). Instead, “it is the proportion of services mandated to those
provided that is the crucial measure for purposes of determining whether there has been a
material failure to implement.” Turner, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Wilson, 770 F. Supp. 2d at
775).
3
If a parent objects to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a
disabled child, or whether she is receiving a FAPE, the parent may seek a due process hearing
before a D.C. Hearing Officer, who issues a determination known as a Hearing Officer Decision.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), 1415(f)(1)(A). If a party is dissatisfied with that decision, it may
appeal to a D.C. court or federal district court. See id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). In terms of a remedy or
relief, “[w]here a school system fails to provide special education or related services, a student is
entitled to compensatory education.” Walker v. District of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30
(D.D.C. 2001) (citations omitted). Compensatory education consists of prospective services
“reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from
special education services the school district should have supplied in the first place.” Reid, 401
F.3d at 524.
B. Background
Ms. Holman was at all relevant times a DCPS student eligible for special
education under IDEA. See Administrative Record [Dkt. 8] (AR) at 114 (May 30, 2013 IEP
Team Meeting). She attended Dunbar High School in her sophomore (2012-2013) and junior
(2013-2014) years in high school. Id. Tracy Holman, Ms. Holman’s grandmother, was her
guardian and participated in meetings concerning Ms. Holman’s education. In the spring of
2013, Ms. Holman was also represented by Attorney Nicholas Ostrem.
DCPS had provided Extended School Year (ESY) education to Ms. Holman over
the course of one or more summers at unspecified times before she entered high school. On
April 19, 2013, Dr. Courtney Davis, Dunbar’s special education coordinator, contacted Mr.
Ostrem by email about scheduling a meeting to discuss ESY education for Ms. Holman during
the summer of 2013. See id. at 208. He suggested three dates for a meeting. Id. On April 23,
2013, Mr. Ostrem expressed some doubt regarding the need for ESY services for Ms. Holman
4
and told Dr. Davis that he did not think a meeting was necessary, but that he would talk to Ms.
Holman and her grandmother to see whether Ms. Holman “would benefit from ESY.” Id. Mr.
Ostrem and Dr. Davis continued to exchange e-mails to discuss whether a meeting and ESY
education were necessary.
On April 26, 2013, Mr. Ostrem informed Dr. Davis that Tracey Holman “believes
[Raquel] does require ESY services (although she’s not 100% sure that she will be able to take
advantage of them given her summer schedule). That being the case, please amend the IEP to
add ESY services, and then send me a copy.” Id. at 211 (April 26 E-mail). That was not the end
of the matter. Dr. Davis responded that he needed “to schedule a meeting with the team as ESY
services may be deemed unnecessary for the student” and told Mr. Ostrem to “choose an
identified date and time.” Id. Mr. Ostrem was incredulous and answered: “Why would she not
qualify for ESY –– it was on her IEP last year?” Id. Mr. Ostrem also indicated that, while he did
not think a meeting was necessary, he was not available on the identified dates and times and
proposed alternative dates for the meeting. Id. On May 7, 2013, DCPS convened a meeting
without the presence of Ms. Holman, her grandmother, or Mr. Ostrem. Id. at 99 (May 7, 2013
IEP Team Meeting). During the meeting, DCPS amended the IEP and determined that Ms.
Holman did not need ESY services for the summer of 2013. Id.
On May 30, 2013, DCPS held a second meeting without any representative of Ms.
Holman present. See May 30th IEP Team Meeting. In that meeting, DCPS declined to prescribe
ESY education in the new 2013-2014 IEP. Id. at 124 (ESY in IEP). As part of the new IEP,
DCPS continued to prescribe 13.3 weekly hours of specialized instruction in a general education
setting. Id. at 121 (Services in IEP). However, DCPS failed to provide the specialized
instruction in school year 2013-2014 as required. Instead, DCPS scheduled a special education
5
teacher to be present in Ms. Holman’s classroom only for one class every other day for a total of
3.75 hours per week. See Tr. of Due Process Hearing [Dkt. 8-8] (Hearing Tr.) at 100-104. Ms.
Holman has shown without opposition that the teacher missed at least one class per week and
when she was there, the teacher failed to stay for the entire class. Id. In addition, the teacher
failed to check if Ms. Holman needed extra help and did not provide help when Ms. Holman
requested it. Id.
Despite these failures, Ms. Holman passed all of her classes and graduated from
high school in three years, at the end of the 2013-2014 academic year. See AR at 386-391
(Diploma and Report Cards). She graduated with a cumulative grade point average of 2.23 and a
ranking of 60th in a class of 130 students. Id. However, Ms. Holman’s reading and writing skills
ranged from the first-grade level to less than the seventh-grade level. See id. at 169 (2014 Psych.
Evaluation); id. at 201-203 (Testing Summary). Also, between May 17, 2013 and June 16, 2014,
without real special education assistance, Ms. Holman’s academic skills declined in five of six
areas. Compare id. at 165 (WJ-III 2013 Test Scores) with id. at 182 (WJ-III 2014 Test Scores).
According to Ms. Holman’s DCPS teachers, at her high school graduation, Ms. Holman was “at
the [4th] grade reading level.” Id. at 376 (DCPS Progress Summary).
On May 20, 2014, Ms. Holman filed a due process complaint under the IDEA
alleging that DCPS failed to implement her IEP and did not give her the opportunity to
participate in certain meetings. Id. at 4-9 (Due Process Complaint). On July 16, 2014, Ms.
Holman had her due process hearing and presented three witnesses. See Hearing Tr. at 3. DCPS
did not present any witnesses. Id. On August 4, 2014, the Hearing Officer issued his decision
that acknowledged DCPS’s failure to implement Ms. Holman’s IEP, but held that DCPS did not
deny Ms. Holman a FAPE. See AR at 428-439 (HOD). Specifically, the Hearing Officer held
6
DCPS harmless because Ms. Holman had already graduated and there was no indication that Ms.
Holman required ESY or that she “regress[ed] . . . during the last school year.” Id. at 437. The
Hearing Officer also found that DCPS’s failure to implement the IEP as prescribed was only a de
minimis error and did not constitute a denial of FAPE. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer denied
all relief, including compensatory education. Ms. Holman filed the Complaint at bar to appeal
the Hearing Officer’s Decision and seek compensatory education. See Compl. [Dkt. 1]. She
now moves for summary judgment.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall
be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Moreover, summary judgment is properly
granted against a party who “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion . . . fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable
inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor and accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Since “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of inferences and
the drawing of inferences from the facts are jury functions,” the court must deny summary
judgment to the extent that reasonable minds could differ over the import of the evidence. Id. at
250-51, 255.
In an IDEA case, a court must review the administrative record and it may hear
additional evidence at the request of a party; the court bases its decision on the preponderance of
the evidence, granting such relief it deems appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii). A court
7
gives “due weight” to the Hearing Officer decision and does not substitute its own view of sound
educational policy for that of the hearing officer. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. Moreover, the
burden of proof is with the party challenging the administrative determination, who must “at
least take on the burden of persuading the court that the hearing officer was wrong.” Reid, 401
F.3d at 521 (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). If neither party
requests that the court hear additional evidence, then the court may determine the case based on
the administrative record on summary judgment. Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1052
(7th Cir. 1997). Here, neither party has requested that the Court hear additional evidence; thus,
the Court bases its decision on its review of the Administrative Record.
III. ANALYSIS
The Hearing Officer found that DCPS failed to implement Ms. Holman’s IEP
during the 2013-2014 academic year and that DCPS convened the May 7th and May 30th
meetings without the presence of Ms. Holman or her legal guardian. See HOD. According to
Ms. Holman, these findings compel a determination that DCPS denied her a FAPE in violation
of IDEA. Ms. Holman contends that the Hearing Officer’s decision denying her compensatory
education was wrong as a matter of law. DCPS opposes Ms. Holman’s position and asks the
Court to sustain the Hearing Officer’s decision.
A. DCPS’s Failure to Implement Ms. Holman’s IEP
DCPS concedes that Ms. Holman’s 2013-2014 IEP was not implemented as
prescribed. See Opp’n [Dkt. 10] at 6 (citing AR at 436). However, without much specificity or
explanation, DCPS claims that its failure to implement the IEP was de minimis. See id. The
Court disagrees.
The Supreme Court has described the IEP as “[t]he primary vehicle for
implementing the[] congressional goals” identified in IDEA. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311. It follows
8
that a school district’s adherence to the prescribed IEP is essential to a child’s educational
development under IDEA. IDEA “is violated when a school district materially deviates from a
student’s IEP.” Wilson, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). A
deviation is considered to be “material . . . when there is more than a minor discrepancy between
the services a school provides to a disabled child and the services required by the child’s IEP.”
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822. To determine “whether there has been a material failure to
implement” an IEP, courts must look at “proportion of services mandated to those provided.”
Turner, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Wilson, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 775) (emphasis added).
In the instant case, there is no question that DCPS materially deviated from Ms.
Holman’s 2013-2014 IEP. Ms. Holman’s IEP prescribed 13.3 weekly hours of special
instruction. See Services in IEP. It is undisputed that DCPS scheduled a special education
teacher to be present in Ms. Holman’s classroom only for one class every other day for a total of
3.75 hours per week. See Hearing Tr. at 100-104. Since the teacher missed at least one class
per week, it follows that DCPS only provided Ms. Holman with special instruction for 2.25 hours
per week, that is, 17% of the prescribed hours. See id. Since DCPS failed to provide 83% of the
required services, it cannot be seriously argued that its failure to implement the IEP was de
minimis.1 This is a material deviation from the 2013-2014 IEP. Cf. Savoy v. District of
Columbia, 844 F. Supp. 2d 23, 34 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding there was no material deviation from
the child’s IEP where the student received 97% of the prescribed hours).
DCPS agrees with the Hearing Officer that this failure did not amount to a denial
of FAPE because Ms. Holman graduated from high school and because there is “no evidence that
1
This calculation does not account for the fact that the special education teacher did not stay for
the entire 90-minute class. See Hearing Tr. at 100-104.
9
the failure to provide all of [Ms. Holman]’s specialized instruction caused her any harm.” Opp’n
at 6. DCPS misses the point. It is well-established that “the materiality standard does not
require that the child suffer demonstrable educational harm in order to prevail.” Wilson, 770 F.
Supp. 2d at 275 (emphasis in original) (quoting Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822). Since proof of
harm is not required under these circumstances, it follows that a material deviation from the
prescribed IEP is per se harmful under IDEA. See id. The “crucial measure” under the
materiality standard is the “proportion of services mandated to those provided” and not the type
of harm suffered by the student; thus, the Hearing Officer’s reliance on the fact that Ms. Holman
graduated from high school in three years is irrelevant. Turner, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 41. A
contrary holding would eviscerate the need for an IEP and the materiality standard because it
would allow DCPS to evade its duties and responsibilities by awarding a high school diploma to
every student. This concern is particularly relevant here where a child with only a “[4th] grade
reading level” was able to obtain a high school graduation diploma. See DCPS Progress
Summary.
The Hearing Officer’s decision is even more problematic because, as the record
shows, Ms. Holman’s academic achievement scores declined after she entered Dunbar High
School. The following table provides evidence of the material decline in many of her standard
scores as measured by a Woodcock Johnson III Test of Achievement (WJ-III Test):
10
Academic Skill
WJ-III 2010 Test
Scores
5/10/2010
(Grade Level
Equivalency)
WJ-III 2013 Test
Scores
5/17/2013
(Grade Level
Equivalency)
WJ-III 2014 Test
Scores
06/16/2014
(Grade Level
Equivalency)
Letter-Word Identification
64 (2.8)
54 (3.2)
58 (3.1)
Reading Fluency
76 (3.6)
73 (4.4)
70 (3.7)
Calculation
85 (5.7)
77 (5.5)
81 (5.9)
Math Fluency
86 (6.5)
89 (8.3)
78 (6.7)
Spelling
81 (4.4)
73 (4.7)
71 (4.1)
N/A
82 (6.0)
62 (3.3)
Writing Fluency
These results prove that the failure to implement Ms. Holman’s 2013-2014 IEP was harmful to
her. During her last year, Ms. Holman regressed in every area but one, in which she improved
only by less than half a grade level.2 See id. In light of the DCPS’s material deviation from the
IEP and the evident decline in Ms. Holman’s test results, it is perplexing that the Hearing Officer
did not find a denial of a FAPE for Ms. Holman. The Court holds that the Hearing Officer’s
decision was contrary to law and the evidence.
Since the Court has already found that DCPS violated IDEA when it materially
deviated from Ms. Holman’s prescribed IEP, it need not determine whether Ms. Holman’s
exclusion from the May 7th and May 30th meetings also violated the statute. DCPS’s failure to
implement the 2013-2014 IEP by itself amounted to a denial of a FAPE.
2
The Court also notes on May 17, 2013, at the end of her second year of high school, Ms.
Holman received a psychological assessment. The assessment yielded a low full scale
[Intelligence Quotient (IQ)] score of 67. See AR at 166 (2013 Psych. Evaluation).
11
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Ms. Holman’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Dkt. 9. Judgment will be entered in favor of Ms. Holman as follows: The
Court will reverse the HOD that DCPS’s failure to implement Ms. Holman’s IEP was not a basis
for a remedy. The Court will order DCPS to convene one or more meetings of the
multidisciplinary team as necessary to develop an individual education plan for Ms. Holman,
who remains eligible for compensatory education under D.C. law until the age of 22.
A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: January 28, 2016
/s/
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?