UPSHAW v. FAUST

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Reggie B. Walton on 2/4/15. (ms, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________
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BERT UPSHAW,
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Petitioner,
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v.
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THOMAS FAUST,
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Respondent. )
___________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 14-2104 (RBW)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Markisha Streeter has brought this case on behalf of Bert Upshaw and represents that
Upshaw, a family member, was taken into custody on August 30, 2014, Petition (“Pet.”) ¶ 7, and
that, as of December 3, 2014, the United States Parole Commission neither had taken action nor
had informed him of the status of his case, id. ¶¶ 13-14 (Grounds One and Two). She is
“requesting injunctive relief from custody on Bert Upshaw’s behalf on the grounds that the
Parole Commission has failed to provide due process required by the 5th Amendment of the
Constitution through timely probable cause determination and adequate hearings.” Id. ¶ 15.
“Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power to deciding ‘Cases
and Controversies.’” In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1167 (2009). A party has standing for purposes of
Article III if her claims “spring from an ‘injury in fact’ -- an invasion of a legally protected
interest that is ‘concrete and particularized,’ ‘actual or imminent’ and ‘fairly traceable’ to the
challenged act of the defendant, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in the federal
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court.” Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Standing may be denied to a litigant who
seeks to assert the rights of a third party. Navegar, 103 F.3d at 998. Here, Ms. Streeter lacks
standing to assert the purported denial of rights of Bert Upshaw and, therefore, the petition will
be dismissed. See Alamo v. Clay, 137 F.3d 1366, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of
habeas petition filed by church seeking its pastor’s release from custody “because the injuries
alleged by Alamo Church fail to satisfy the well-established requirements for standing under
Article III of the U.S. Constitution”). Furthermore, dismissal is warranted because Ms. Streeter
does not appear to be an attorney, and there is no basis from which to conclude that she
otherwise is competent to bring this action on Upshaw’s behalf. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012) (“In all
courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein.”); see Daigle v. Karnes, No. 10-1264, 2010 WL 3294069, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2010)
(denying amended habeas petition filed by lay person on another person’s behalf); see also
United States ex. rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17 (D.D.C. 2003)
(noting that “federal courts have consistently rejected attempts at third-party lay representation”)
(citing Herrera-Venegas v. Sanchez-Rivera, 681 F. 2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1982)).
An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/
REGGIE B. WALTON
United States District Judge

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