SHAW v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION DISMISSING case without prejudice. See attached document for details. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 08/18/2015. (lckbj1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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PLAINTIFF,
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v.
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OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et )
al.,
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DEFENDANTS.
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RICHARD E. SHAW,

Civ. No. 14-cv-2203 (KBJ)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se plaintiff Richard E. Shaw (“Plaintiff”), a resident of South Carolina, has
filed a complaint against Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital, Inc. (“Defendants”). 1 Although the underlying facts are
exceedingly murky, Plaintiff’s complaint appears to concern Georgia state court
foreclosure proceedings for property in Georgia that Plaintiff owned. (See Original
Civil Compl. (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, at 2-3 (“The matter in general seeks to adequately
challenge the foreclosure on a mortgage of [certain] property described in Case No.
2013-CA-009541 for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, FAYETTE County, STATE OF
GEORGIA[.]”).) The dearth of factual allegations and the lack of specified counts in
Plaintiff’s complaint, as described below, compels this Court to conclude that the
complaint must be DISMISSED sua sponte under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)
and 12(b)(6).

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According to the caption of the complaint, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC is located in Florida, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. is located in South Carolina, and Morgan Stanley ABS Capital, Inc. is located in New
York.

DISCUSSION
“Ordinarily, the sufficiency of a complaint is tested by a motion brought under
Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim” upon which
relief can be granted. Bauer v. Marmara, 942 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). However, if the complaint’s failure to
state a claim for the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) “is patent, it is practical and fully
consistent with plaintiffs’ rights and the efficient use of judicial resources for the court
to act on its own initiative and dismiss the action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Moreover, under Rule 8(a), a court is authorized to dismiss a
complaint that does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility “is
not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The plausibility standard is satisfied “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted).
To be sure, pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal interpretation. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “However, this consideration does not constitute a
license for a plaintiff filing pro se to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
expect the Court to decide what claims a plaintiff may or may not want to assert.”
Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). District courts have discretion
to dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte where there is simply “no factual or

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legal basis for alleged wrongdoing by defendants,” such that it is “patently obvious that
the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.” Perry v. Discover
Bank, 514 F. Supp. 2d 94, 95 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
Sua sponte dismissal is plainly warranted in this case. Simply stated, there are
no clear allegations of fact to support, or even to illuminate, the nature of Plaintiff’s
claim. Nor does the complaint contain any counts or make any specific references to
the actions of any individual Defendant. Instead, Plaintiff generally states that he
brings his complaint “for Civil Demand of ($USD175,900.00) that deals in Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) cancelled debt and this IRS Federal 871 Tax Suit; Cause cited
as 26:7609 as an IRS Petition to Quash IRS Summons to require Defendant to produce
bona fide proof of an Execution of Assignment to offset claims of fraud and civil
demands and judgments.” (Compl. at 1.) Try as it might, this Court cannot begin to
decipher exactly what Plaintiff means by this, much less what his cause of action might
be. The notation in Plaintiff’s Civil Cover Sheet that his cause of action is “For an
Independent State Audit and Federal Investigation on [sic] Defendant[s] for accounting
fraud[,]” (Civil Cover Sheet, ECF No. 1-1, at 2) further underscores that Plaintiff has
failed to state any plausible cause of action, as does the closing line of his complaint,
which states that “[a]ll answers hereafter will be made directly to the United States
Government, or the United States Attorney General and the United States Department
of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation[,]” (Compl. at 8). Thus, far from
providing a short and plain statement of the claim as the Federal Rules require,
Plaintiff’s complaint is a largely incomprehensible compendium of statements of law

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and citations to cases and statutes in a manner that does not “give adequate notice of the
alleged unlawful acts” that form the basis of his claim. Sinclair v. Kleindienst, 711
F.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Accordingly, pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6), Plaintiff’s complaint will be
DISMISSED without prejudice. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.

Date: August 18, 2015

Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge

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