BRAWNER v. THOMAS

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION accompanying final order issued separately this day. Signed by Judge Tanya S. Chutkan on 2/4/16.(ah)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANTHONY BRAWNER
also known as
ANTHONY D. BARBER,
Petitioner,
v.
J.E. THOMAS,
Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 15-0353 (TSC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus. He challenges his
2005 conviction in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on the grounds of
actual innocence, double jeopardy, and ineffective assistance of counsel. See Pet. for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ¶ 13 (ECF No. 1). 1 As the basis for
each ground, petitioner posits that D.C. Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the
charges of “carjacking-kidnapping” because the crime “took place in the State of
Maryland,” which charged petitioner with the same crime. (Id.) Petitioner seeks “to
reverse the judgment,” to “take back the guilty plea,” and to “remand the case for a
trial.” (Id. ¶ 15.) For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that it lacks
jurisdiction over the petition. Consequently, this case will be dismissed.

1

As a prisoner at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, petitioner
properly filed his § 2241 habeas application in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. That court, realizing that petitioner is challenging a District
of Columbia conviction, construed the petition as brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and
transferred it to this court. See Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 5). Because, as
will be discussed, petitioner has an adequate post-conviction remedy under District of
Columbia law to challenge his conviction, he cannot obtain relief under § 2254.
1

Unlike prisoners convicted in state courts or in a United States district court,
“District of Columbia prisoner[s] ha[ve] no recourse to a federal judicial forum unless
[it is shown that] the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.” Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal
footnote and quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[i]n order to collaterally attack his
sentence [or conviction] in an Article III court[,] a District of Columbia prisoner faces
a hurdle that a federal prisoner does not.” Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 37 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
District of Columbia prisoners may challenge their convictions collaterally by
filing a motion in Superior Court pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110, which has been
described as “a remedy analogous to 28 U.S.C. § 2255” for attacking a federal
conviction. Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See Byrd, 119
F.3d at 36-37 (explaining that “[s]ince passage of the Court Reform Act [in 1970], . . .
a District of Columbia prisoner seeking to collaterally attack his sentence must do so
by motion in the sentencing court- the Superior Court-pursuant to D.C. Code § 23
110”); accord Ibrahim v. United States, 661 F.3d 1141, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating
that “the availability of relief by motion under § 23-110 typically precludes the
challenger from seeking habeas relief in federal court”).
Section 23-110 of the D.C. Code states:
[an] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner
who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this
section shall not be entertained by . . . any Federal . . . court if it
appears . . . that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it
also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective
to test the legality of his detention.

2

D.C. Code § 23-110(g). The Court of Appeals has interpreted that language as
“divest[ing] federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by prisoners who
could have raised viable claims pursuant to § 23-110(a).” Williams v. Martinez, 586
F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The grounds supporting the instant petition are
specifically identified as grounds for relief under § 23-110, i.e., “(1) the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States” and “(2) the court was
without jurisdiction to impose the sentence.” Id. § 23-110(a). See Saunders v. United
States, 72 F. Supp. 3d 105, 109 (D.D.C. 2014) (“An ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim . . . is cognizable under § 23-110, as are claims [of trial error] arising
from alleged prosecutorial misconduct and imposition of an illegal sentence.”)
(citations omitted)). Consequently, petitioner has no recourse in this Court to
challenge his D.C. conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this case seeking a writ of habeas corpus is
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. An Order is issued separately.

Date: February 4, 2016

Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge

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