WILLIAMS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION to the Order granting Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Gladys Kessler on 3/30/16. (CL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)

RAY BERNARD WILLIAMS,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)

Civil Action No. 15-719 (GK)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
)

Defendant.

)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~->

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Ray Bernard Williams brings this action against the
Government
Metropolitan

of

the

Police

District
Officer

of

Columbia

Daniel

Merritt

Metropolitan Police Officer Cory Bines

("the

District") ,

("Merritt"),

and

("Bines")

(collectively,

"Defendants"), alleging violations of the Fourth,

Fifth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
well as numerous common law claims,

as

in relation to the February

22, 2014 arrest of Mr. Williams.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Partial
Motion to Dismiss Complaint

[Dkt. No.

6]. Upon consideration of

the Motion, Response [Dkt. No. 15], Reply [Dkt. No. 17], and the
entire record herein,

and for the reasons set forth below,

Motion shall be granted.

1

the

Background

I .

A.

Factual Overviewl

On the evening of February 22,
detained,

arrested,

2014,

Plaintiff was stopped,

and imprisoned by Defendant Officers Merritt

and Bines at the liquor store located at 1726 Columbia Rd NW,
Washington, D.C. See Compl.
detention,

arrest,

reasonable

suspicion,

Id.

~

and

~

in

10. Plaintiff alleges that the stop,

imprisonment

probable

cause,

were
or

not

legal

supported

by

justification.

11. Plaintiff also alleges that the officers used excessive

force in executing the detention and arrest, resulting in injuries
to Plaintiff that include but are not limited to: a broken nose,
two black eyes, and injuries to the sides of his head,
body. Id.

~~

After
Assaulting,
Id.

~

face,

and

Assault

and

12-13.

his

arrest,

Resisting

Plaintiff
or

was

Interfering

charged with
with

a

Police

Officer.

14. The Office of the United States Attorney entered a nolle

prosequi in the case on March 14, 2014. Id.

1

~

16.

For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the factual
allegations of the complaint must be presumed to be true and
liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Aktieselskabet AF
21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir.
2008); Shear v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., 606 F.2d 1251, 1253 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). Therefore, the facts set forth herein are taken from
Plaintiff's Complaint [Dkt. No. 1-2].
2

B.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff initially filed the present case in Superior Court
for the District of Columbia on February 19,

2015. 2 See Compl.

Defendants jointly removed the case to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia on May 12, 2015, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1441(a). See Joint Notice of Removal [Dkt. No. 1]. Plaintiff
alleges violations of the Fourth,

Fifth,

Eighth,

Amendments of the United States Constitution,
law

claims

imprisonment;

of:

assault

and

intentional

battery;

infliction

as well as common

false

of

and Fourteenth

arrest;

emotional

false

distress;

negligent infliction of emotional distress; negligence; negligent
supervision,

retention,

liability. See Compl.

~~

and

training;

and

respondeat

superior

19-68.

Defendants filed the present Partial Motion to Dismiss on May
26,

2015.

Plaintiff

filed

his

Response

on

June

18,

2015,

and

Defendants filed their Reply on June 26, 2015. On October 6, 2015,
without seeking leave of the Court,
Response

[Dkt. No.

24].

Plaintiff filed an Amended

Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the

Amended Response ("Mot. to Strike") on October 21, 2015 [Dkt. No.
2 8] .

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to Strike on

2

The time stamp by the Superior Court is dated February 19, 2014,
which appears to be in error. The signature date is February 19,
2015, and appears to be the correct date.
3

November 9,

2015

[Dkt. No.

29],

and Defendants filed a Reply in

Support of Motion to Strike on November 19, 2015 [Dkt. No. 31].
II.

Legal Standards
A.

Standard of Review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

a plaintiff

need only plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face" and to "nudge[ ] [his or her] claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible." Bell Atlantic Corp.

v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "[O]nce a claim has been stated
adequately,

it

may

be

supported

by

showing

any

set

of

facts

consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563.
Under the Twombly standard,

a

"court deciding a motion to

dismiss must not make any judgment about the probability of the
plaintiffs' success .

[,] must assume all the allegations in

the complaint are true

[,

(even if doubtful in fact)

and]

must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences
derived from the facts alleged." Aktieselskabet AF 21.

November

2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

(internal

quotation

marks

and

citations

omitted).

The

court

does

not,

however, accept as true "legal conclusions or inferences that are
unsupported by the facts alleged."
Inv.

in

omitted).

U.S.,

758

F.3d

Furthermore,

296,
a

Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign

315

(D.C.

complaint
4

Cir.

which

2014)
"tenders

(citation
'naked

assertion[s]'
suffice.

devoid of

Ashcroft v.

'further factual enhancement'" will not

Iqbal,

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)

556 U.S.

662,

678

(2009)

(quoting

(alteration in Iqbal).

III. Analysis
A.

Amended Response

As an initial matter, the Court grants Defendants' Motion to
Strike

Plaintiff's

Amended

("Amended

Response

Response") .

Defendants correctly point out that the Amended Response was filed
more than three months after the Partial Motion to Dismiss became
ripe for consideration,

and without leave of the Court. Mot.

to

Strike at 1. In any event, the arguments in the Amended Response
do not affect the merits or change the outcome of Defendants'
Partial Motion to Di$miss.
In response to Plaintiff's First Request for Production of
Documents, the District turned over a Use of Force Report based on
the underlying incident in this case. Amended Response at 2. The
Use of Force Report was completely blank.

Id.

that

Force Report

the

failure

to complete

the

Use

of

Plaintiff argues
"raises

serious concerns as to the training and supervision" of Officers
Merritt

and

Bines.

Id.

This

does

not

change

the

fact

that

Plaintiff's Complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to support
his negligent supervision, retention, and training claim. See Mot.
at 10; Compl.

~~

61-65.

5

In addition,

Plaintiff seeks to oppose dismissal of Count 7

in the Amended Response,

whereas

he had conceded dismissal

of

Count 7 in his initial Response. Amended Response at 5; Response
at

3.

The

reason for

this changed position is that "Plaintiff

originally mistakenly believed that he could not bring actions for
both assault and battery and negligence arising out of the same
set of facts." Amended Response at 5. Plaintiff cites to Harvey v.
Kasco, 109 F. Supp. 3d 173, 178 (D.D.C. 2015), an opinion that was
released one day before Plaintiff's Response was filed,
proposition that a

for the

Plaintiff may plead alternative theories of

liability. This proposition of law is not new. Indeed, the Harvey
court cites to a 2008 case for this exact proposition. Id.

(citing

Dingle v. Dist. of Columbia, 571 F. Supp. 2d 87, 99 (D.D.C. 2008)).
Plaintiff's

misunderstanding

of

the

law

is

not

sufficient

justification to permit amending the response.
B.

Claims

Plaintiff has affirmatively conceded several of Defendants'
arguments.

Given that they are uncontested,

the Court need only

discuss them briefly.

1.

Fourteenth Amendment

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment
claims

against

all

Defendants

fail

because

the

Fourteenth

Amendment applies only to the States. Mot. at 5-6. Plaintiff agrees

6

that the Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable to the District of
Columbia. Response at 2.
Plaintiff maintains

though,

that

the

Fourteenth Amendment

claim alleging excessive force and violations of substantive due
process is still applicable to Officers Bines and Merritt.

Id.

Plaintiffs do not explain why they concede that the District is
not covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, but maintain that Officers
Merritt

and

authority

Bines,

of

the

who

were

"acting

District,"

are

Amendment. Response at 2; Compl.

under

covered

color
by

the

of

law

and

Fourteenth

18.

~

The Fourteenth Amendment "applies only to the states," and
does not apply to the District of Columbia. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499
to

the

(1954). If the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply

District,

District.

then

Accordingly,

it

does

not

the portions

apply

to

employees

of

the

of Count 1 relying on the

Fourteenth Amendment are dismissed.
2.

Fifth Amendment

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim
is based entirely on his alleged detention and therefore must be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Mot.

at 6. A plaintiff may

make a substantive due process claim for police misconduct so long
as

his

claim

is

provision,

such as

Sacramento

v.

not
the

Lewis,

"covered

by

a

specific

constitutional

Fourth or Eighth Amendment." County of
523

U.S.
7

833,

843

(1998).

"[W]here

a

particular

Amendment

constitutional
government

provides

protection

behavior,

that

an

explicit

against
Amendment,

textual

particular

a

not

the

more

source
source

of
of

generalized

notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing
these claims." Id. at 842

(internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).
Plaintiff agrees with Defendants'
Therefore,

Plaintiff's

Fifth

argument.

Amendment

claim

Response at 2.
in

Count

1

is

dismissed.
3.

Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment's protections applies only to persons
"who are subject to punishment by the government, which the Supreme
Court has defined to mean persons against whom the government has
secured a

formal

adjudication of guilt

in accordance with due

process of law." Moreno v. Dist. of Columbia, 925 F. Supp. 2d 93,
100 (D.D.C. 2013)
(1979)

(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n. 16

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Plaintiff was never prosecuted or convicted for any crimes
stemming from the facts of this case, and thus, Defendants argue,
the Eighth Amendment does not apply. Mot. at 7. Plaintiff agrees.
Response at 2.

Therefore,

Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim in

Count 1 is dismissed.

8

4.

Municipal Liability

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient
facts to find municipal liability for constitutional violations.
Mot. at 7-8. A municipality may be held liable for a constitutional
violation only if the plaintiff alleges facts that indicate his or
her injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom. See Monell
v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 694

(1978).
Plaintiff agrees to dismiss the portion of Count 1 alleging
municipal liability against the District, Response at 3, and thus,
it is dismissed.
5.

Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Negligence and Negligent
Infliction of Emotional

Distress claims are duplicative of his

intentional

tort

and

particular,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff "merely repeats his

claims

should therefore

be

dismissed.

In

intentional tort claims, without identifying any separate duty that
would form the basis for a negligence claim." Mot. at 10

(citing

Cotton v. District of Columbia, 541 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209 (D.D.C.
2008)).

Plaintiff

agrees,

Response

at

3,

and

Counts

6

and

7

alleging Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligence
are therefore dismissed.

9

6.

Negligent Supervision, Retention, and Training

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts
in

the

Complaint

Supervision,
Complaint
itself.

support

Retention,

merely

Id.

to

his

Count

and Training.

restates

the

legal

8

Mot.

claim
at

of

10.

requirements

Negligent

Instead,
of

the

the

claim

Plaintiffs concede this argument in their Response.

Response at 3. Therefore, Count 8 is dismissed.

7.
Under

False Arrest and False Imprisonment
District

of

Columbia

law,

false

arrest

is

indistinguishable from the common law tort of false imprisonment.
Dormu v. District of Columbia, 795 F. Supp. 2d 7, 27 (D.D.C. 2011).
Defendants argue that these claims should be merged or the false
imprisonment claim dismissed. Mot. at 10-11. Plaintiff agrees that
the claims are duplicative and that the false imprisonment claim
should be dismissed. Response at 3. Accordingly, Count 4 alleging
false imprisonment is dismissed.

8.

Respondeat Superior

Count 9 of the Complaint alleges that the District is liable
for

the

actions

of Officers Merritt

and Bines

common law doctrine of respondeat superior. Compl.
the

District of

Columbia

recognizes

pursuant
~~

to

the

66-68. While

the doctrine of respondeat

superior liability, Defendants argue that it is not a stand-alone
tort. Mot. at 11. Rather, the District can be held liable only if
it is shown that its employees committed the torts pled in the
10

Complaint while working

in the

scope of their employment.

See

Convit v. Wilson, 980 A.2d 1104, 1114 (D.C. 2009).
Plaintiff

agrees

that

there

is

no

stand-alone

claim

for

respondeat superior and agrees to dismiss Count 9. Accordingly,
Count 9 is dismissed.
9.

Punitive Damages

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in his Complaint, see Compl.
at 15, but "there can be no recovery of punitive damages against
a municipality absent a statute expressly authorizing it." Mot. at
12 (quoting Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831, 832 (D.C.
1975)). There is no such statute in the District of Columbia. See
Caldwell v. Hammonds, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12
City of Newport v.

Fact Concerts,

Plaintiff

this

concedes

with

Inc.,

regard

to

(D.D.C. 1999)
453
the

U.S.

247

(citing
(1981)).

District,

while

reserving his punitive damages claim against the Officers, which
Defendants have not sought to dismiss. Response at 3. Therefore,
the request for punitive damages against the District,
Officers Bines and Merritt, is dismissed.

11

but not

IV.

Conclusion

For

the

foregoing

reasons,

Defendants'

Partial

Motion

to

Dismiss the Complaint shall be granted. An Order shall accompany
this Memorandum.

March 30, 2016
es District Judge

Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF

12