MCNAIR v. D.C. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's 60 Motion for Default Judgment, and granting Defendant D.C. Department of Employee Services' 65 Motion to Dismiss and Defendant District of Columbia's 66 Motion for Leave to File Answer. See the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order for additional details. Signed by Judge Amit P. Mehta on 05/16/2018. (lcapm1) Modified on 5/17/2018 to correct order type (zcdw).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_________________________________________ )

SAUNDRA M. MCNAIR,

Case No. 15-cv-00729 (APM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before court are three motions: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment,
ECF No. 60; (2) Defendant D.C. Department of Employment Services’ (“DOES”) Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 65; and (3) Defendant District of Columbia’s Motion for Leave to File Answer,
ECF No. 66. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is denied, and Defendants’ motions
are granted.
I.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment
More than 27 months after naming Defendant D.C. Department of Employment Services

(“DOES”) as a defendant in an Amended Complaint, see Am. Compl., ECF No. 12, and more than
four months after the close of discovery in this matter, see Minute Order, Nov. 2, 2017, Plaintiff
Saundra M. McNair moves for entry of default judgment against DOES for failure to answer her
amended pleading. See Pl.’s Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 60. Plaintiff’s motion falls squarely in
the category of “you can’t possibly be serious.”
Plaintiff does not dispute that DOES is a subordinate agency of the District of Columbia
that is non sui juris and therefore not subject to suit as a separate entity. See Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n

to Def. DOES’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 68 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss], at 3
(citing Kangethe v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 891 F. Supp. 2d 69, 72 (D.D.C. 2012)); cf. Pl.’s
Reply to Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 68-1 [hereinafter Pl.’s Reply
in Supp. of Default J.], at 2. Nor does she appear to seriously dispute that entry of default judgment
against a party against whom a claim cannot be made would be improper. See Saint-Jean v. D.C.
Pub. Sch. Div. of Transp., 815 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2011) (“A motion for default judgment
will be denied unless the allegations in the complaint are legally sufficient to make out a claim.”);
cf. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3; Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Default J. at 2–3.
Instead, Plaintiff insists that entry of default judgment is appropriate because DOES’
failure to answer “greatly impacted Plaintiff’s ability to defend her case and assert allegations
against the necessary party.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3. Come on, really? When she
amended her original Complaint, Plaintiff named the “necessary party,” the District of Columbia,
as a defendant.1 Since then, the District has actively litigated this matter, by filing a partial motion
to dismiss, participating in mediation, and engaging in discovery after settlement efforts failed.
Apparently, the irony of Plaintiff’s position is lost on her: The court sanctioned her for failing to
exercise diligence in litigating this matter. See Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 61. Plaintiff identifies
no tangible way in which DOES’ “absence” has adversely affected her case. See Pl.’s Opp’n to
Mot. to Dismiss; Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Default J. Her motion for default judgment is denied.
II.

DOES’ Motion to Dismiss
DOES moves to dismiss for the reason discussed above: as a subordinate agency of the

District of Columbia, DOES is non sui juris and therefore not subject to suit as a separate entity,
unless authorized by law. Def. DOES’ Mot. to Dismiss, Mem. of Points & Authorities in Supp.

1

The District filed an answer to Plaintiff’s original complaint before it was named as a defendant in her amended
complaint. See Answer, ECF No. 3.

2

of Def. DOES’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 65, at 2–3. As discussed, Plaintiff does not dispute that
DOES is non sui juris. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3; Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Default J.
at 2. Accordingly, DOES’ motion is granted because DOES is not subject to suit. See Kangethe,
891 F. Supp. 2d at 71–72 (“In this jurisdiction, as in others, non-corporate governmental bodies
cannot be sued as separate entities absent explicit statutory authorization. Hence, the D.C. Code
does not authorize suits for damages against DOES.” (citations omitted)); see also Perez v. D.C.
Dep’t of Emp. Servs., No. 17-cv-2086, 2018 WL 1701338, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2018) (dismissing
DOES as a defendant where the plaintiff not only failed to offer any response to case law holding
that DOES is non sui juris and thus not subject to suit absent explicit statutory authorization but
also failed to point to any statutory authorization for suit).
III.

The District’s Motion for Leave to File Answer
Finally, the court turns to the District’s Motion for Leave to File Answer. More than 14

days have passed since the District filed its motion, yet Plaintiff has filed no opposition nor sought
additional time. See Def.’s Mot. for Leave to File Answer, ECF No. 66 (dated April 19, 2018).
Thus, the court grants the District’s Motion “as conceded.” LCvR 7(b).

Dated: May 16, 2018

Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge

3