ROBINSON v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION regarding the defendant's 5 Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Signed by Judge Beryl A. Howell on March 8, 2016. (lcbah2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANTONIO ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 15-740 (BAH)
v.
Judge Beryl A. Howell
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff, Antonio Robinson, brings this suit against his former employer, the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA” or “the defendant”), alleging
constitutional and contractual injuries arising from WMATA’s decision not to restore the
plaintiff to his position as a Bus Operator following his termination in December 2011.
Contending that the defendant wrongfully withdrew its conditional commitment to reinstate the
plaintiff without adequate process, the plaintiff claims that WMATA violated both the collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between WMATA and the plaintiff’s union and a separate
settlement agreement between WMATA and the union arising under the CBA, as well as the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Compl., ECF No. 1. Pending
before the Court is the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim for which relief can be
granted. Def. WMATA’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 5.
For the reasons explained below, the defendant’s motion is granted.

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I.

BACKGROUND
The plaintiff was hired by WMATA as a Bus Operator in May 2008, and served in that

position until December 2011. Compl. ¶¶ 7–9, 17. On November 7, 2011, while returning from
his lunch break, the plaintiff was stopped by police in Maryland and arrested for allegedly
driving with a suspended, out-of-state license. Id. ¶ 9. After the plaintiff was taken into custody,
he was served with an arrest warrant issued by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Id. ¶ 10. The
Complaint does not indicate the charge or charges for which this warrant was issued, but the
plaintiff ultimately remained in the custody of the Prince George’s County police for nearly two
weeks before being extradited to Virginia, where he remained in custody for an additional two
weeks. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.
The plaintiff alleges that he contacted WMATA on an unspecified date while in custody
and left a voicemail message with an office manager, informing her of his delayed return to duty
as a result of his arrest. Id. ¶ 11. Subsequently, while the plaintiff remained in custody, his
mother twice communicated by telephone with WMATA, first on November 16, 2011, and again
on November 18, 2011. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. During these conversations, the plaintiff’s mother
informed WMATA management of the plaintiff’s arrest and impending extradition, as well as
the plaintiff’s confusion regarding the reason for his arrest and basis for his continued detention.
Id. These communications notwithstanding, on December 1, 2011, WMATA terminated the
plaintiff due to: (1) his failure to return to work on November 7, 2011; (2) his failure to notify
WMATA of his incarceration until November 18, 2011; (3) the resulting period during which the
plaintiff was Absent Without Official Leave; and (4) the plaintiff’s violation of unspecified
WMATA rules and regulations. Id. ¶ 17.

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After he was terminated, the plaintiff alleges that the source of his confusion regarding
his arrest became clear. On January 11, 2012, and January 18, 2012, the District of Columbia
Department of Motor Vehicles and Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration issued, respectively,
a clearance letter and certified copy of driver eligibility demonstrating that the plaintiff had a
valid license and that his driving record was clear of any revocations or suspensions. Id. ¶ 18.
Likewise, on January 24, 2012, the Commonwealth of Virginia dismissed the pending charges
against the plaintiff after concluding that he was arrested and held based on a mistaken identity.
Id. ¶ 19.
Nearly a year later, on January 14, 2013, the plaintiff filed a grievance through
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689 (“the Union”), contending that his arrest in November
2011 was due to his misidentification and requesting reinstatement to his prior position as a
WMATA Bus Operator. Id. ¶ 21. After WMATA identified potential adverse information
arising out of a background screening linked to the plaintiff’s requested reinstatement, which the
plaintiff disputed, WMATA and the Union entered into a Settlement Agreement (“the Settlement
Agreement”) under which the plaintiff would be reinstated upon meeting certain conditions. Id.
¶¶ 22–24. Under the terms of this agreement, any “future dispute arising from the interpretation
or implementation of the [Settlement Agreement would be] outside of the initial grievance and
must be grieved separately under the terms and conditions of Section 104 of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.” Compl., Ex. 1 (“Settlement Agreement”) at 2, ECF No. 1-1.
Among the conditions imposed on his reinstatement, the plaintiff was required to
complete a Return-to-Duty Physical. Compl. ¶ 24.a. Although not explicitly stated in the
Settlement Agreement, as an element of this physical, the plaintiff was required to obtain reports
from a device, called a Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (“CPAP”) machine, the plaintiff

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used to treat his sleep apnea. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Unfortunately, because the plaintiff lost his medical
insurance coverage following his termination in late 2011, he was unable to obtain a sleep report
from his own physician without paying out-of-pocket to generate the report. Id. ¶ 26. As a
result, at some point in December 2013, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, his girlfriend obtained a
report from the plaintiff’s CPAP machine through a separate provider. Id. ¶ 27. This report
included the plaintiff’s girlfriend’s name and date of birth, which the plaintiff later blacked-out
and replaced, by hand, with his own name, employee number, and date of birth. Id. ¶ 28.
According to the plaintiff, concerned that the report may be confusing, he visited the provider
that generated the report “to discuss his results and what happened with his treating physician.”
Id. Unfortunately, the plaintiff’s physician was unavailable and, upon recognizing that the report
had been altered, a staff member of the provider refused to return the report to the plaintiff and
informed the plaintiff that she would be required to submit the report to WMATA. Id.
On December 23, 2013, after learning of the altered report, WMATA informed the Union
that the plaintiff “presented fraudulent/falsified medical documentation relative to the required
CPAP compliance report.” Id. ¶¶ 30–31. Consequently, WMATA concluded that the plaintiff
failed to complete the required Return-to-Duty Physical required by the Settlement Agreement
and separately violated WMATA policies by falsifying the CPAP report. Id. ¶ 31; Compl., Ex. 2
(“Dec. 23, 2013 Letter Re: Settlement Agreement”), ECF No. 1-1. Accordingly, WMATA
informed the Union that “[a]ll efforts and processes started on behalf of [the plaintiff] to ensure
his timely reinstatement” were ceased. Compl., Ex. 2. Thereafter, the plaintiff attempted to
provide additional evidence demonstrating that the altered CPAP report was in fact a reflection
of his own sleep pattern, Compl. ¶ 32, and spoke with Union representations regarding how best

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to proceed, id. Following these discussions, however, the plaintiff apparently did not pursue any
formal grievance challenging WMATA’s decision to rescind his reinstatement.
Instead, nearly eighteen months later, the plaintiff filed the instant action on May 18,
2015. Alleging that WMATA rescinded his proposed reinstatement “without conducting an
investigation or contacting [the plaintiff] to obtain an explanation about the sequence of events,”
the plaintiff asserts that this decision violated: (1) the plaintiff’s rights under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (“Count I”), id. ¶¶ 34–47; (2)
the plaintiff’s for-cause termination protection under § 104(d) of the CBA between WMATA
and the Union (“Count II”), id. ¶¶ 48–61; and, (3) the terms of the Settlement Agreement
governing the plaintiff’s conditional reinstatement (“Count III”), id. ¶¶ 62–69. On July 13, 2015,
the defendant moved, pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss the
Complaint in its entirety, Def.’s Mot., and this motion is now ripe for consideration.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” to encourage brevity
and, at the same time, “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (ellipses in
original; internal quotations and citations omitted); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007). The Supreme Court has cautioned that although “Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . .
it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).

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To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
“‘complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Wood v. Moss, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2056, 2067 (2014) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that is more than “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability,” but allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57); see also Rudder v. Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 794
(D.C. Cir. 2012). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required to withstand a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must offer “more than labels and conclusions” or “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” to provide “grounds” of “entitle[ment] to
relief,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original), and “nudge[] [the] claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible,” id. at 570. Thus, “a complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (second alteration in the original).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to plead a claim on which relief can be
granted, the court must consider the complaint in its entirety, accepting all factual allegations in
the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Harris v. D.C. Water
and Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (in considering Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
“court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint” and “draw the
reasonable inference” therefrom “that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” but that
tenet “is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” (internal quotations and
citations omitted)).

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III.

DISCUSSION
In the present motion, WMATA asserts alternative grounds for dismissing each of the

plaintiff’s claims. First, WMATA argues that the plaintiff failed to file his claim within the sixmonth limitations period set out under § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),
29 U.S.C. § 160, and asserts that the Complaint must be dismissed entirely as untimely filed.
Def.’s Mem. Supp. Def.’s Mot. (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 3–5. Alternatively, WMATA asserts separate
grounds for dismissing each count of the Complaint. Specifically, WMATA contends that the
plaintiff’s constitutional claim should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to take advantage
of the comprehensive grievance procedure outlined in the CBA between WMATA and the Union
and, therefore, has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that WMATA’s decision to
rescind the plaintiff’s reinstatement constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 5–7.
Further, WMATA argues that the plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claims must be dismissed
because the plaintiff, having failed to pursue the available grievance procedures provided under
the CBA to resolve his claims, id. at 8–10, alleges no breach of the Union’s duty of fair
representation sufficient to excuse this failure to exhaust his available remedies, id. at 7–8.
Following a brief summary of the legal principles governing an individual employee’s
challenge to an employer’s conduct under a CBA, each of these arguments are addressed in turn
below.
A.

Legal Principles Governing Individual Employee Challenges Under a
Collective Bargaining Agreement

The Supreme Court has long recognized that an “individual employee may bring suit
against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.” DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163 (1983) (citing Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195
(1962)). In general, however, because the resolution of such a suit requires interpretation of the
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CBA, claims alleging breach of a CBA are governed by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. 1 See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162–63; see also
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405–06 (1988) (“[I]f the resolution of a
state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application
of state law (which might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state-law
principles as there are States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles-necessarily uniform
throughout the Nation-must be employed to resolve the dispute.”); Cephas v. MVM, Inc., 520
F.3d 480, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Section 301 completely preempts any action predicated upon
state law if that action ‘depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement.’”
(quoting Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405–06)). Under § 301, an employee alleging a breach of a CBA is
ordinarily “required to attempt to exhaust any grievance or arbitration remedies provided in the
collective bargaining agreement” before brining suit in federal court. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at
163 (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965)). Thereafter, “[s]ubject to very
limited judicial review, [the employee] will be bound by the result according to the finality
provisions of the [CBA].” Id. at 164 (citing authorities).
This general exhaustion requirement notwithstanding, however, the Supreme Court has
identified certain circumstances in which an employee may file a breach-of-CBA claim without
first seeking relief under the resolution processes outlined in the governing CBA. Specifically,
an employee need not exhaust a claim under § 301 where his or her employer has effectively
repudiated the grievance procedures outlined under the relevant CBA. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 185 (1967) (“An obvious situation in which the employee should not be limited to the

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This section provides, in relevant part: “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

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exclusive remedial procedures established by the [CBA] occurs when the conduct of the
employer amounts to a repudiation of those contractual procedures.”). Likewise, an employee
need not exhaust grievance procedures outlined under a CBA where the employee alleges both
that his or her employer has breached the terms of the CBA and that the “union representing the
employee in the grievance/arbitration procedure acts in such a discriminatory, dishonest,
arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach its duty of fair representation.” DelCostello, 462
U.S. at 164. “In such an instance, an employee may bring suit against both the employer and the
union, notwithstanding the outcome or finality of the grievance or arbitration proceeding.” Id.
(citing authorities). Often described as a “hybrid” claim, such a suit comprises two separate
causes of actionone against the employer under § 301 for breach of the CBA, and the second
against the union for breach of its duty to fairly represent its membersthat are “inextricably
interdependent.” Id. at 164–65 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v.
Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 64 (1981)). Thus, “[t]o prevail against either the company or the [u]nion,
. . . employee-plaintiffs must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but
must also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the [u]nion.” Id. at 165 (internal
quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 66–67).
Much as the nature of an employee’s allegations dictates the degree to which the
employee must exhaust his or her claim prior to filing an action in federal court, the plaintiff’s
allegations have substantial bearing on the limitations period applicable to the employee’s claim.
On one hand, the statute of limitations applicable to a straightforward breach of contract suit
under § 301 must “be determined, as a matter of federal law, by reference to the appropriate state
statute of limitations.” Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am.
(UAW), AFL-CIO v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701–05 (1966). In the District of

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Columbia, the three-year statute of limitations for a breach-of-contract action, D.C. Code § 12301, applies to such claims. Cephas, 520 F.3d at 482–83. By contrast, while not subject to the
general exhaustion requirement under § 301, a hybrid breach-of-CBA/breach-of-duty of fair
representation claim is subject to the shorter, six-month statute of limitations applicable to claims
arising under the LMRA. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163–72. Thus, an employee alleging both a
breach of a CBA and a concomitant breach of his or her union’s duty to fairly represent its
members need not exhaust his or her claim before bringing suit, but the employee must file his or
her claim more quickly that would otherwise be necessary under District of Columbia law.
Set against this background, WMATA’s alternative grounds for dismissing each of the
plaintiff’s claims are considered seriatim.
B.

The Plaintiff’s Claims are Not Barred by the Six-Month Limitations Period
Set Out in the LMRA

As an initial matter, WMATA argues that, because the plaintiff filed this action nearly a
year and a half after WMATA rescinded his reinstatement, each of the plaintiff’s claims are
barred under the six-month statute of limitations period under §10(b) of the NLRA and,
therefore, must be dismissed as untimely.
Specifically, WMATA suggests, without explanation or support, that each of the
plaintiff’s claims are, “in essence, a classic claim of a breach of the CBA/breach of duty of fair
representation case, which should have been filed well before May 18, 2015.” Def.’s Mem. at 3.
The plaintiff resists this characterization and argues instead that his claims are properly
understood as arising not out of a breach of the CBA, but instead as a breach of the Settlement
Agreement between WMATA and the Union. Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n WMATA’s Mot. Dismiss
(“Pl.’s Opp’n”) ¶¶ 27–28, ECF No. 6. Thus, according to the plaintiff, his claims are properly
understood as arising under a general provision of the WMATA Compact providing a right of
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action for parties alleging breach of contract by WMATA. Id. ¶ 27 (citing D.C. Code §91107.01(80)). So construed, the plaintiff argues, his claims are not governed by the six-month
limitations period applied to hybrid claims under §10(b) of the NLRA. Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
To determine which limitations period applies to the plaintiff’s claims, the Court must
first determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations against WMATA in fact constitute a hybrid
breach-of-contract/breach-of-duty of fair representation claim against WMATA and the Union.
Arguing that the six-month limitations period applies, the defendant points to two non-binding
decisions addressing claims of former WMATA employees challenging the circumstances of
their termination. Importantly, however, the plaintiff in each of these cases expressly alleged
both that WMATA breached the CBA in terminating them and that the Union failed to fairly
represent them in connection with their resulting grievance under the CBA. See Dove v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 402 F. Supp. 2d 91, 94–95 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, No. 05-7118, 2006
WL 7136123 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 13, 2006) (explaining that the plaintiff alleged “conspiracy, breach
of contract, and false representation by Local 689” and, even after voluntarily dismissing his
claims against the Union, did not dispute the applicability of the §10(b) limitations period); Price
v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 41 A.3d 526, 528 (D.C. 2012) (dismissing, as untimely, a
wrongful discharge claim brought by a former WMATA employee who also alleged that the
Union “arbitrarily refused to take his grievance against WMATA to arbitration”); see also Lewis
v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 8:11-CV-00997-AW, 2013 WL 3322292, at *4 (D. Md.
June 28, 2013) (describing as “hallmarks of a hybrid action” allegations “sounding [both] in
breach of contract and breach of the duty of fair representation”). As a result, consistent with the
Supreme Court’s holding in DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, each of these claims was governed by

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the six-month limitations period provided under § 10(b). Dove, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 96–97; Price,
41 A.3d at 532–33; Lewis, 2013 WL 3322292, at *4.
Here, by contrast, the plaintiff makes no allegation that the Union failed to represent the
plaintiff fairly in connection with WMATA’s decision not to rehire the plaintiff. Instead, the
Complaint indicates only that, following the rescission of his reinstatement, the plaintiff
“consulted with the Union again to determine how the matter could be resolved.” Compl. ¶ 32.
As WMATA itself notes, Def.’s Mem. at 7, the defendant alleges nothing further to suggest that
the Union thereafter declined, fairly or unfairly, to pursue a grievance, see generally Compl.
Moreover, to the extent that the Complaint itself leaves any lingering ambiguity, in response to
the defendant’s present motion, the plaintiff expressly disavows any claim that the Union failed
to represent him fairly under the CBA. Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 43 (“Alleging facts against Local 689 is
outside the scope of the Complaint.”). Given that the plaintiff has consistently declined to allege
any wrongdoing by the Union, WMATA’s efforts to cast this action as a hybrid claim against
WMATA and the Union are clearly misplaced. Instead, the plaintiff’s allegations are best
understood as pure breach-of-contract and due process claims against his former employer.
Since the plaintiff alleges no breach of his Union’s duty of fair representation, the general
three-year statute of limitations applicable under District of Columbia law applies to the
plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claims. 2 Since the plaintiff filed this action well within three years
of WMATA’s decision to rescind his reinstatement, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s complaint as untimely under the six-month limitations period set out in §10(b) of the

2

The parties do not indicate what limitations period would otherwise apply to the plaintiff’s claim arising
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See generally Def.’s Mem.; Pl.’s Opp’n. The plaintiff does
not explicitly style this claim as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but, so construed, the limitations period
applicable to such an action in the District of Columbia is also three years. Earle v. District of Columbia, 707 F.3d
299, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Singletary v. District of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 529 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).

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NLRA is denied. Accordingly, to resolve the present motion, the allegations supporting each of
the plaintiff’s individual claims are examined to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a
claim for which this Court may grant relief.
C.

The Plaintiff Fails to Plead Sufficient Facts to Allege a Due Process Violation

Turning first to the plaintiff’s constitutional claim, the plaintiff contends that WMATA
deprived him of due process by ceasing efforts to reinstate him following his submission of an
altered CPAP report. As discussed below, set against the legal framework applicable to the
plaintiff’s due process claim, his allegations against WMATA are insufficient to support this
claim.
1.

Legal Principles Governing Procedural Due Process Claims

The procedural component of the Due Process Clause is intended to “impose[] constraints
on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests.”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Three basic elements are required for a
procedural due process claim: (1) deprivation by the government; (2) of life, liberty, or property;
(3) without due process of law. Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 273 F.R.D. 314, 319 (D.D.C.
2011) (citing Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
Assessment of procedural due process claims proceeds by determining, first, whether the
plaintiff was deprived a liberty or property interest by the government. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr.
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). To establish a protected liberty or property interest, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the Constitution or a federal or state statute grants him a protected
right. Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[T]he interests that
are comprehended within the meaning of either liberty or property, as covered by the due process
clause of the Constitution, are those interests which have ‘attain[ed] constitutional status by

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virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized or protected by state law’ or federal
law.”) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) (internal citations omitted)). Thus, “[t]o
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972).
Where the plaintiff demonstrates entitlement to a constitutionally protected interest, the
court must next examine “whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were
constitutionally sufficient.” Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460. In general, due process requires “the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” when an individual is
deprived of liberty or property interests. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Thus, “at minimum, . . . the government [must]
provide notice and some kind of hearing.” Propert, 948 F.2d at 1331 (discussing deprivation of
property interests); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982) (“[I]t has
become a truism that ‘some form of hearing’ is required before the owner is finally deprived of a
protected property interest.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original); Gray Panthers v.
Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (the “core requirements” of due process require
“adequate notice” and “a genuine opportunity to explain.”).
This requirement, however, is not “a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). Rather, “due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. (citation omitted). “The precise
form of notice and the precise kind of hearing required depends upon a balancing of the

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competing public and private interests involved.” Propert, 948 F.2d at 1332. Balancing of these
interests requires evaluation of the three factors identified by the Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge: “(1) the significance of the private party’s protected interest, (2) the government’s
interest, and (3) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 117 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
2.

The Plaintiff Fails to Allege that He was Deprived of a Constitutionally
Protected Interest Without Due Process

Assuming as true the factual allegations set out in the Complaint, the plaintiff has failed
to allege sufficient facts to support his claim that he was denied adequate process in connection
with WMATA’s decision not to reinstate him following his submission of an altered CPAP
report.
Relying on the for-cause removal protection outlined in the CBA between WMATA and
the plaintiff’s union, the plaintiff alleges that he “had a property interest in his employment” by
WMATA. Compl. ¶ 37. In light of this asserted interest, the plaintiff contends that due process
required “a notice and some kind of hearing prior to” WMATA’s decision to rescind his
reinstatement, at which hearing the plaintiff would have had “an opportunity to present reasons,
either in person or in writing why the proposed action should not be taken.” Id. ¶ 36 (citing
Solomon v. Office of Architect of Capitol, 539 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350 (D.D.C. 2008)). In
particular, the plaintiff maintains that he was prepared to explain the apparent discrepancies in
his CPAP report and alleges that WMATA’s failure “to conduct an investigation, provide notice,
[or] afford [the plaintiff] an opportunity to be heard on the matter, prior to deprivation of his
employment interests,” deprived him of due process. Id. ¶¶ 41–45. In response, assuming for
purposes of the present motion that the plaintiff maintained a constitutionally protected interest
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in connection with WMATA’s commitment to reinstate him, the defendant argues that the
comprehensive grievance process outlined under the CBA, and incorporated by reference into
the Settlement Agreement, provided the plaintiff with sufficient opportunity to contest
WMATA’s decision to rescind his reinstatement. Def.’s Mem. at 5–6.
At the outset, though WMATA does not contest the plaintiff’s asserted interest in forcause removal protection, the factual allegations set out in the Complaint demonstrate that any
constitutionally protected interest at stake in the instant case is far narrower than the plaintiff
suggests. In fact, the plaintiff’s factual allegations make clear that, during the relevant period,
the plaintiff was not employed by WMATA but was instead engaged in an effort to be reinstated
to his prior position as a Bus Operator. See Compl. ¶¶ 17 (alleging that WMATA issued a
termination letter to the plaintiff on December 1, 2011), 20 (indicating that the plaintiff
subsequently “worked with different Union representatives to obtain reinstatement of his
employment”), 21 (alleging that the plaintiff thereafter filed a grievance through the Union
“requesting reinstatement to his former position”), 24 (explaining that this grievance resulted in
the Settlement Agreement underlying the present dispute). Taking the Complaint as a whole,
these factual claims are at odds with the plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that he “had a right to
continued employment” by WMATA. Id. ¶ 39. 3 This disconnect is particularly apparent in the
plaintiff’s allegation that, due to his asserted interest in his continued employment, he “could
only be terminated for good and sufficient cause.” Id. ¶ 37 (citing authorities). Indeed, the
plaintiff nowhere challenges his termination in December 2011. 4 Instead, the plaintiff claims

3

The plaintiff’s alleges that, in June 2012, a state administrative law judge found the plaintiff eligible for
state unemployment benefits in light of the dismissal of all charges against him stemming from his November 2011
arrest. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 39. Again, even assuming this allegation to be true, the plaintiff’s entitlement to certain state
benefits in connection with his continued unemployment does nothing to suggest that the plaintiff again enjoyed the
full for-cause dismissal protection previously afforded to him as a WMATA employee.
4
As explained below, any challenge to his termination was resolved by the Settlement Agreement, and the
plaintiff is therefore precluded from renewing this earlier challenge in this Court. See infra note 6.

16

that WMATA’s decision not to reinstate him under the terms of the Settlement Agreement
violated the Due Process Clause. See id. ¶ 40 (alleging that the plaintiff “was deprived of
reinstatement of his employment without notice or a hearing”).
In this regard, any protected constitutional interest implicated by the plaintiff’s present
claim arises not from the for-cause termination protection afforded under the CBA governing his
prior employment by WMATA, but must instead derive, if at all, from the subsequent agreement
governing the terms of his proposed reinstatement. Thus, to demonstrate that he was deprived of
a constitutionally protected interest, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that he
maintained a “‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ to some benefit that is protected by independent
state-law rules, relevant contractual language [or] applicable . . . regulations.” Toxco, Inc. v.
Chu, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted)). Absent such a legitimate
expectation, rescission of the plaintiff’s proposed reinstatement implicates no constitutionally
protected interest and cannot support a valid claim under the Due Process Clause. See Ifill v.
New York State Court Officers Ass’n, 655 F. Supp. 2d 382, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing, for
failing to state a claim, a former state employee’s claim that the denial of his request to be
reinstated to his prior position, where such reinstatement was purely discretionary, violated his
due process rights). The plaintiff alleges no basis for such an expectation beyond the Settlement
Agreement. See generally Compl. Thus, to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged
sufficient facts to establish a constitutionally protected property interest, the Court must look to
the terms of the Settlement Agreement governing the plaintiff’s conditional reinstatement. Cf.
Clukey v. Town of Camden, 717 F.3d 52, 57–59 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding a protected property
interest where the CBA between the defendant municipality and the plaintiff’s union stated that

17

laid-off employees had a right to be recalled to their former positions within a year of being laid
off).
The plaintiff alleges that, under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, WMATA
committed to reinstate the plaintiff “contingent upon his successful completion of conditions
explicitly stated in the Agreement.” Compl. ¶ 24. Thus, the only legitimate claim of expectation
alleged by the plaintiff in connection with this agreement was the promise of reinstatement if,
and only if, the plaintiff met the conditions outlined in the agreement. Taking this allegation as
true, the plaintiff’s claim that he was deprived of this interest without due process stands on
uncertain ground. In fact, when WMATA ceased its efforts to reinstate the plaintiff, he had not
yet met all of the conditions under which he would be entitled to reinstatement because, having
not yet obtained and submitted a CPAP report demonstrating his fitness to return to duty, he had
not yet completed his Return-to-Duty Physical. Id. ¶ 26. Given that he had not satisfied each of
the conditions subsequent to his reinstatement, any legitimate expectation the plaintiff had in his
reinstatement at the time WMATA chose not to rehire him is far from certain.
In any event, even assuming arguendo that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to
demonstrate that he was deprived of a cognizable property interest, his allegations make clear
that he was afforded clear notice of the ample process available to him to contest WMATA’s
decision to cease efforts to reinstate him. In particular, by clearly incorporating the grievance
procedures outlined under the CBA, the Settlement Agreement provided an opportunity for the
plaintiff to challenge WMATA’s determination that he knowingly submitted a falsified CPAP
report. Id., Ex. 1 at 2. The plaintiff does not allege that the grievance procedures outlined under
the CBA failed to provide sufficient process, and alleges nothing to support an inference that
these procedures may be constitutionally deficient. See generally Compl. Much the same, the

18

plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that WMATA, upon learning of the altered report, “had a duty to
thoroughly investigate the matter to obtain the facts,” id. ¶ 41, is unavailing. In opposing the
present motion, the plaintiff points to no authority, binding or otherwise, for the proposition that
due process necessitated an “official investigation” beyond that which WMATA conducted
before choosing to rescind the plaintiff’s reinstatement. Pl.’s Opp’n at 10–11.
While the plaintiff claims that WMATA failed to provide him with notice of its decision
to rescind his reinstatement, id., the plaintiff’s factual allegations belie any inference that he was
deprived of adequate notice of his ability to contest this decision. Taking the plaintiff’s factual
allegations as true, he received notice, on December 23, 2013, that WMATA viewed his
submission of the altered CPAP report as a failure to complete the required Return-to-Duty
Physical. Compl. ¶ 31. As a result of his apparent non-compliance with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement, WMATA notified the plaintiff that efforts to prepare for his timely
reinstatement would cease. Id. Having received notice of WMATA’s intention not to reinstate
him, the plaintiff nowhere alleges that he was unaware of his ability to challenge this decision
through a new grievance. See generally Compl. Quite the opposite, the plaintiff alleges that he
consulted with the Union to determine how best to resolve the burgeoning dispute, id. ¶ 32,
which strongly suggests that the plaintiff was fully aware that the Settlement Agreement
provided an avenue for the plaintiff to contest WMATA’s findings regarding the altered CPAP
report. In sum, nothing in the record suggests that the plaintiff was unaware of the procedures
afforded to him under the Settlement Agreement, or that he was precluded or otherwise
prevented from contesting the rescission of his reinstatement through a new grievance.
“The due process inquiry does not focus on the correctness of outcomes, but rather on the
adequacy of the process afforded; indeed, there is no guarantee against ‘incorrect or ill-advised

19

personnel decisions.’” Int’l Union, United Gov’t Sec. Officers of Am. v. Clark, 706 F. Supp. 2d
59, 70 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976)). Thus, even taking as
true the plaintiff’s allegation that he intended to explain the apparent alterations to the CPAP
report and was prepared to offer additional evidence that he was in fact fit to return to duty,
Compl. ¶ 32, the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts that the process available to him under
the Settlement Agreement failed to comport with constitutional requirements.
Finally, the plaintiff’s suggestion that he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be
heard before any deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights, see, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n at 11,
is inconsistent with binding precedent in this Circuit. While the D.C. Circuit has recognized that
“due process normally requires pre-termination proceedings of some kind prior to the discharge
[of a career government employee],” Thompson v. District of Columbia, 428 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (quoting Wash. Teachers’ Union Local # 6 v. Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 774, 780 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), the Court has recognized that “post-deprivation hearings suffice in ‘extraordinary
situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing
until after the event,’” Wash. Teachers’ Union Local # 6, 109 F.3d at 780 (quoting United States
v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993)). Here, as previously noted, the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining reinstatement differed significantly from the interest enjoyed by
current public employees in their continued employment. Nonetheless, even assuming
deprivation of the plaintiff’s asserted interest would normally necessitate pre-termination
process, WMATA’s compelling interest in ensuring that its employeesparticularly those who
operate large vehicles on crowded city streetsare fit for duty, coupled with the extensive posttermination process afforded under the Settlement Agreement, undermine any claim that the
plaintiff was denied due process in connection with his failed effort to obtain reinstatement.

20

Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot possibly win relief on his due process claim, and Count
I is therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
D.

The Plaintiff Must Exhaust Available Remedies Under the CBA Before
Pursuing His Contract Claims in this Court

Having concluded that the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support his due
process claim, the Court next considers whether the plaintiff’s allegations underlying his
remaining contract claims are similarly lacking. As explained below, because the plaintiff does
not allege that he has exhausted his breach-of-contract claims through the grievance procedures
available to him under the CBA and the Settlement Agreement, he is precluded from bringing
these claims in this Court.
The plaintiff alleges two separate breach-of-contract claims arising out of WMATA’s
decision not to reinstate him. First, the plaintiff alleges that, by failing to rehire him, WMATA
breached § 104(d) of the CBA, which requires WMATA to have “sufficient cause” to
“discharge, suspend, or otherwise discipline” a “covered employee.” Compl. ¶ 50. 5 Second, the
plaintiff alleges that, “[i]n light of [his] successful completion of all required conditions
precedent,” WMATA breached its contractual duty under the Settlement Agreement to reinstate
the plaintiff to his prior position as a Bus Operator. Id. ¶ 65. In support, the plaintiff again
alleges that he did not intend to submit the altered CPAP report under false pretenses and
intended instead to explain the apparent discrepancies included on the report. Id. ¶¶ 54–55, 67.
Thus, the defendant claims that WMATA’s decision not to reinstate him violated both the for-

5
While not addressed by the parties, the degree to which the plaintiff qualified as a “covered employee”
during the period in question is far from clear. As previously noted, supra Part III.C.2., at the time of the
defendant’s alleged breach, the plaintiff was not employed by WMATA. Whether the defendant was “discharge[d],
suspend[ed], or otherwise discipline[d]” in connection with the decision to cease reinstatement efforts is similarly
unclear. Nonetheless, because the Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his breach-of-CBA claim,
these issues need not be resolved definitively to dispose of the instant motion.

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cause protections provided to employees under the CBA, id. ¶¶ 60–61, and the terms of the
Settlement Agreement under which the plaintiff sought reinstatement, id. ¶¶ 63–67.
In response, WMATA proposes separate grounds for dismissing each of the plaintiff’s
breach-of-contract claims. First, again characterizing the plaintiff’s breach-of-CBA claim as a
hybrid breach-of-CBA/breach-of-duty of fair representation, WMATA argues that the plaintiff
must allege both that WMATA breached the CBA and that the Union failed to fairly represent
him to make out a claim under the LMRA. Def.’s Mem. at 7–8. Since the plaintiff makes no
such allegation against the Union, see supra Part III.B., the defendant contends that his “hybrid”
claim must be dismissed. Id. Second, with regard to the plaintiff’s claim that WMATA
breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s failure
to pursue this claim under the grievance procedures provided under the CBA precludes him from
bringing this claim in this Court. Id. at 8–10.
Though WMATA frames these respective grounds for dismissing the plaintiff’s breachof-contract claims as distinct, they are in fact two sides of the same proverbial coin. As
previously explained, supra Part III.A., plaintiffs alleging a hybrid breach-of-CBA/breach-ofduty of fair representation claim against their employer and/or union need not exhaust their
claims before bringing suit, but are required to bring suit within six months of the alleged
violation. By contrast, plaintiffs who allege only a breach-of-CBA claim against their employer
have far longer to file their claim under District of Columbia law, but must first exhaust any
grievance procedures available under the CBA. Id. In this light, the plaintiff’s failure to allege
any breach of his Union’s duty to fairly represent him in connection with his present breach-ofCBA claim does not necessarily doom this claim before this Court on timeliness grounds. By the
same token, however, because this claim turns on the interpretation the CBA between WMATA

22

and the plaintiff’s union, this claim is governed by § 301 of the LMRA. Cephas, 520 F.3d at
484; see also Davis v. Bell Atl.-W.V., Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A] purportedly
state law claim, the resolution of which depends substantially upon the analysis of a collectivebargaining agreement's terms, must either be treated as a claim under § 301 or be dismissed as
preempted under federal labor law.” (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220
(1985))). As such, to survive the present motion, the plaintiff must point to sufficient factual
allegations demonstrating that the plaintiff has exhausted any available remedy provided under
the CBA. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163. 6
For much the same reason, though the plaintiff casts his breach-of-CBA claim as distinct
from his claim that WMATA breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement, this latter claim
must also be exhausted before the plaintiff may pursue his claim in this Court. Indeed, under
“settled [D.C. Circuit] law, . . . WMATA employees who fail[] to exhaust the grievance and
arbitration proceedings, available to them, may not seek redress in court on claims that could and
should have been grieved.” Sanders, 819 F.2d at 1158; see also McMillan v. Wash. Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 898 F. Supp. 2d 64, 69 (D.D.C. 2012) (“This rule amounts to a form of collateral
estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibiting non-grieved complaints from being brought when, as
here, Plaintiff had the opportunity and the obligation to do so.”). As the Supreme Court has
explained, allowing aggrieved employees to pursue unexhausted claims in federal court would
“deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for
orderly settlement of employee grievances.” Republic Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at 653; see also

6

To the extent that the plaintiff’s claim alleging breach of the CBA stems from his initial termination in
December 2011, this claim is precluded by the Settlement Agreement resolving any dispute arising from the
plaintiff’s termination. Sanders v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 819 F.2d 1151, 1157–58 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(explaining that settlement agreements resolving grievances pursued under a CBA by WMATA employees generally
preclude those employees from later renewing their claim in federal court); see also Chester v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 335 F. Supp. 2d 57, 62 (D.D.C. 2004) (“If plaintiff objected to the settlement, he could have
refused it and taken his grievance to arbitration.”).

23

Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Kurtz, 636 F.2d 411, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“The general rule
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable to labor-management disputes
where the issue is subject to a contractual grievance and arbitration procedure.”). As noted
above, supra Part I, the Settlement Agreement incorporated the grievance procedures provided
under the CBA, providing that all disputes “arising from the interpretation or implementation of
the [Settlement Agreement] . . . must be grieved separately under the terms and conditions of
[the CBA].” Under this Court’s binding precedent, because the plaintiff had the opportunity and
obligation to exhaust this available avenue for relief, failure to do so would bar the plaintiff from
bringing his claim in this Court.
With this in mind, despite the plaintiff’s repeated assertion that he was prepared to
explain any discrepancies in the CPAP report, he makes no allegation that he made any effort
whatsoever to challenge WMATA’s decision to rescind his reinstatement. See generally Compl.
Instead, after receiving notice that WMATA had ceased its efforts to reinstate him and “eager to
clear the misunderstanding,” the defendant alleges that he obtained two additional sleep reports
and attempted to provide these reports to the provider who accepted the initial, altered CPAP
report. Id. ¶ 32. Yet, even armed with evidence purporting to demonstrate his fitness to return to
duty, and even after consulting with the Union “to determine how the matter could be resolved,”
the plaintiff does not allege that he filed any formal grievance under the CBA before, nearly a
year and a half later, filing the instant action. Id. Consequently, because the plaintiff fails to
allege that he has exhausted, or even attempted to exhaust, the grievance process available to him
under the CBA, which the parties incorporated by reference in the Settlement Agreement, each
of his breach-of-contract claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support any of his

present claims against WMATA and has therefore failed to state a claim for which relief by this
Court may be granted. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), is granted.

Digitally signed by Hon. Beryl A. Howell,
United States District Court Judge
DN: cn=Hon. Beryl A. Howell, United States
District Court Judge, o=U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, ou,
email=[e-mail]
v, c=US
Date: 2016.03.08 18:29:28 -05'00'

Date: March 8, 2016

__________________________
BERYL A. HOWELL
United States District Judge

25