FLEMING v. MEDICARE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION GROUP et al
Filing
233
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 06/30/2023. (lcegs2)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RHONDA FLEMING,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. Action No. 15-1135
(EGS/GMH)
MEDICARE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION GROUP, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
Introduction
Ms. Rhonda Fleming (“Ms. Fleming” or “Plaintiff”), who
proceeds pro se, brought this action pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., seeking to
obtain records related to her criminal conviction. See Compl.,
ECF No. 1 at 1-3. 1 On November 26, 2019, the Court entered final
judgment for the Medicare Freedom of Information Group 2 and
against Ms. Fleming. See Fleming v. Medicare Freedom of Info.
Grp., No. CV 15-1135 (EGS), 2019 WL 6329262, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov.
26, 2019).
When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of
the filed documents.
2 Defendants have treated this suit as against the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”). Fleming, 2019 WL
2462814, at *1.
1
1
Ms. Fleming has since filed several motions seeking relief
from that judgment. See generally Docket for Civ. Action No. 151135. Now pending before the Court are the following: Ms.
Fleming’s Motion for Relief Pursuant to Federal Rule[] of Civil
Procedure, Rule 60(d)(1), see Pl.’s Mot. Relief Pursuant Fed. R.
Civ. P., R. 60(d)(1) (“Pl.’s Rule 60 Mot.”), ECF No. 208; Ms.
Fleming’s Motion for Relief Which is Unopposed by the
Government, see Pl.’s Mot. Relief Unopposed by Government
(“Pl.’s Mot. Relief”), ECF No. 212; Ms. Fleming’s Motion for
Leave to File Objections to Further Extensions and a Request for
Discovery, see Pl.’s Mot. Leave File Attached Mots. (“Pl.’s Mot.
Leave”), ECF No. 224; Ms. Fleming’s Motion for Leave to File a
Response, see Pl.’s Mot. Leave File Resp. (“Pl.’s Mot. Leave”),
ECF No. 229; Ms. Fleming’s Motion for Leave to File Additional
Documents, see Pl.’s Mot. Leave File Additional Docs. (“Pl.’s
Mot. Leave”), ECF No. 230; and Ms. Fleming’s Motion for
Additional Equitable Relief, see Pl.’s Mot. Additional Equitable
Relief (“Pl.’s Mot. Additional Relief”), ECF No. 232.
Upon careful consideration of the motions, oppositions, and
any replies; the applicable law; and the entire record herein,
the Court hereby DENIES Ms. Fleming’s motions.
2
II.
Background
A.
Factual
The Court will assume the parties’ familiarity with the
factual background of this case, which is set forth in
Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey’s previous Report and
Recommendation (“R. & R.”) and adopted in this Court’s
subsequent Memorandum Opinion. See R. & R., ECF No. 122 at 2-5;
Mem. Op., ECF No. 152 at 2-3. In short, in 2010, Ms. Fleming was
convicted by the District Court for the Southern District of
Texas on sixty-seven counts of Medicare-related health care
fraud and related offenses in connection with her submission of
fraudulent claims to Medicare. Fleming v. Medicare Freedom of
Info. Grp., 310 F. Supp. 3d 50, 51–52 (D.D.C. 2018). She was
later sentenced to 360 months in prison and ordered to pay $6.3
million in restitution. See Ex. 2, ECF No. 227-1 at 119, 122.
Ms. Fleming filed this Complaint in the District Court for
the District of Minnesota in 2015. Fleming, 310 F. Supp. 3d at
52. That court dismissed most of her claims and transferred the
case to this Court for resolution of her FOIA claim. See Notice
of Transfer, ECF No. 56. This Court thereafter dismissed Ms.
Fleming’s motions, see Mem. Op., ECF No. 152; and entered final
judgment against her, see Fleming, 2019 WL 6329262, at *1.
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B.
Procedural
Ms. Fleming filed this Rule 60 Motion on August 5, 2021.
See Pl.’s Rule 60 Mot., ECF No. 208. Defendants submitted their
brief in opposition on May 17, 2022. See Defs.’ Opp’n Pl.’s Mot.
Relief Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1) (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), ECF
No. 227. Ms. Fleming has since filed several other motions
objecting to extensions of time and requesting discovery and
other equitable relief. See Pl.’s Mot. Relief, ECF No. 212;
Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 224; Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 229;
Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 230; Pl.’s Mot. Additional Relief, ECF
No. 232. The motions are now ripe and ready for adjudication.
III. Legal Standard
A. Rule 60(d)(1) Motion
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d), a court may
“entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1). This
independent action is “available only to prevent a grave
miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38,
47 (1998). The moving party must show the following:
(1) the judgment should not, in equity
and good conscience, be enforced; (2) a
good defense exists; (3) fraud, accident,
or mistake prevented him from obtaining
the benefit of his defense; (4) the
absence of fault or negligence on his
part; and (5) the absence of any adequate
remedy at law.
4
Sieverding v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 n.1
(D.D.C. 2006) (citing Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423
F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970)).
This standard is demanding. Rimi v. Obama, 60 F. Supp. 3d 52, 57
(D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 608 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
B. Pro Se Litigants
“[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in
all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress,
No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR), 2006 WL 1877014, at *2 (D.D.C. July 5,
2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The
pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally
construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even
so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658
F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 656
F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply
with federal and local rules. See Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239;
Roosevelt Land, 2006 WL 1877014, at *2.
III. Analysis
Ms. Fleming “moves the Court to reopen the case and grant
the requested relief pursuant to” Rule 60(d)(1). Pl.’s
Rule 60
Mot., ECF No. 208 at 1. She argues that this remedy is
appropriate because “[r]ecently, [she] became aware” that Albert
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Balboni (“Mr. Balboni”), the lead prosecutor in her criminal
case, is no longer licensed to practice law and was ordered to
resign from his position as an Assistant United States Attorney
(“AUSA”). Id. at 2. She contends that Mr. Balboni was not
mentally fit to practice law due to a “cognitive disability.”
Id. at 5. She argues that, because of this impairment, Mr.
Balboni violated her due process rights and “other
constitutional norms,” failed to produce exculpatory evidence,
and committed “fraud on the court.” Id. at 3-4.
Ms. Fleming seeks sweeping relief to account for these
violations. See generally id. at 1-6. Specifically, she argues
that judgments in cases prosecuted by Mr. Balboni should not be
enforced. See id. at 4. For authority, she cites Committee for
Public Counsel Services v. Attorney General, 108 N.E.3d 966
(Mass. 2018), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ordered that thousands of convictions involving evidence from a
drug lab scandal be vacated and dismissed with prejudice. See
id. at 2, 5 (citing 108 N.E.3d at 993). Ms. Fleming argues that
she and other defendants in cases assigned to Mr. Balboni merit
the same remedy. See id. at 2, 5 (also noting that this relief
“requires the approval of the Attorney General or a court order
from a district judge with jurisdiction over AG Merrick
Garland”).
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Defendants first argue that the Court should deny Ms.
Fleming’s Rule 60(d)(1) Motion because she “has not complied
with the plain language of” the Rule. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 227
at 5. The Court agrees with this argument. Rule 60(d)(1) “does
not limit a court’s power to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(d)(1). Ms. Fleming has not filed an independent
action but has instead filed another motion in her closed civil
case. See Pl.’s Rule 60 Mot., ECF No. 208; see generally Docket
for Civ. Action No. 15-1135. The failure to file a separate
action is fatal to her motion. Cf. Rimi, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 54
(plaintiff brought “independent action” under Rule 60(d)(1)).
Moreover, even if Ms. Fleming had filed the Motion in an
independent action, she has not met the high bar necessary for
relief under Rule 60(d)(1). “[A]n independent action [under this
Rule] should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of
justice.” Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 47. However, “[a] party cannot
use an independent action as a vehicle for the relitigation of
issues.” Klayman v. Jud. Watch, Inc., No. 19-2604 (TSC), 2021 WL
602900, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting In re Salas, No. 18-00260, 2020 WL 6054783, at
*22 (Bankr. D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2020)), aff’d, 851 F. App’x 222
(D.C. Cir. 2021).
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Ms. Fleming has not met the demanding standard to bring an
independent action because the issues she raises in the instant
motion are the same as the issues she raised in previous
motions. As Defendants state in their Opposition, Ms. Fleming
raised the issue of Mr. Balboni’s “mental impairment” in her
2014 Motion to Vacate in the District Court for the Southern
District of Texas. See Ex. 3, ECF No. 227-1 at 126 (Motion to
Vacate). There, she argued that Mr. Balboni “knew he suffered
with memory loss, yet continued to practice law, thus making
false or inaccurate statements defrauding the Court.” Id. She
made the same argument again in her 2014 Motion for a New Trial,
contending that “[f]rom preindictment to the present, a
government attorney with a serious mental impairment has
represented the Government in a manner which has violated [her]
right to a fair trial.” Ex. 4, ECF No. 227-1 at 133 (Motion for
a New Trial and other relief). That court rejected her argument
both times. See Ex. 4, ECF No. 227-1 at 146-48 (Order).
Ms. Fleming has also raised the issue of Mr. Balboni’s
mental fitness to this Court. Most recently, in 2018, she moved
the Court to set aside her criminal conviction and the civil
judgment against her because “these two judgments were procured
through fraud on the court.” Fleming v. Medicare Freedom of
Info. Grp., No. 1:15-CV-01135 (EGS/GMH), 2018 WL 8577960, at *2
(D.D.C. July 24, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No.
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CV 15-1135 (EGS), 2019 WL 2462814 (D.D.C. June 13, 2019). The
Court rejected this argument. See 2019 WL 2462814, at *3. And in
the R. & R. later adopted by the Court, Magistrate Judge Harvey
noted that Ms. Fleming made this same argument in her Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and that the Court had already rejected
her claims. See id.
In sum, Ms. Fleming now presents an argument 3 that she has
raised repeatedly and unsuccessfully since 2014. The history of
this litigation and the underlying cases against Ms. Fleming
show that she “had adequate remedies at law, and indeed took
advantage of them.” Klayman, 2021 WL 602900, at *6. She
therefore is barred from bringing an independent action under
Rule 60(d)(1). Id. at *5-6. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Ms.
Fleming’s Rule 60(d)(1) Motion. 4
The remainder of Ms. Fleming’s motions all relate to her
Rule 60 Motion. See Pl.’s Mot. Relief, ECF No. 212; Pl.’s Mot.
Leave, ECF No. 224; Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 229; Pl.’s Mot.
Leave, ECF No. 230; Pl.’s Mot. Additional Relief, ECF No. 232.
As such, the Court DENIES these motions as moot. See Jackson v.
Ms. Fleming’s request that the judgments against her and all
others prosecuted by Mr. Balboni be vacated does not change the
nature of her argument—namely, that Mr. Balboni’s mental
impairment deprived her of a fair trial and constituted fraud on
the court. See Pl.’s Rule 60 Mot., ECF No. 208 at 3-5.
4 The Court need not reach Defendants’ arguments that it should
construe Ms. Fleming’s Rule 60(d)(1) Motion as a Motion Under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 227 at 9-11.
3
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Ivens, No. CV 01-559-LPS, 2019 WL 4604027, at *5 (D. Del. Sept.
23, 2019) (denying as moot motions for discovery and relief upon
denying Rule 60(d)(3) motion); United States v. Raifsnider, No.
CRIM.A. 04-10255-01, 2013 WL 1137479, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 7,
2013) (denying as moot motion for discovery upon denying Rule
60(d)(1) motion), aff’d, 533 F. App’x 862 (10th Cir. 2013).
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Ms. Fleming’s
motions. See Pl.’s Rule 60 Mot., ECF No. 208; Pl.’s Mot. Relief,
ECF No. 212; Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 224; Pl.’s Mot. Leave,
ECF No. 229; Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 230; Pl.’s Mot.
Additional Relief, ECF No. 232. An appropriate Order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed:
Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
June 30, 2023
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