SIMON v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM OPINION denying 17 Plaintiff's Motion for Disqualification; granting 4 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; and denying as moot 2 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 3 Plaintiff's Notice of Default, 7 Pla intiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 9 Plaintiff's Motion to Expedite Issuance of the Preliminary Injunction, 11 Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, and 13 Plaintiff's Motion Demanding Immediate Action. See document for details. Signed by Judge Rudolph Contreras on 02/03/2016. (lcrc2)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHARLES SIMON,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.
Defendants.
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Civil Action No.:
15-cv-1310 (RC)
Re Document Nos.:
2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11,
13, 17
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS; DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,
NOTICE OF DEFAULT, MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, MOTION TO EXPEDITE
ISSUANCE OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS, AND
MOTION DEMANDING IMMEDIATE ACTION.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Charles Simon has filed a complaint against the United States
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(“Court of Appeals”), Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (“FPI”), and Steve Schwalb, 1 an individual
formerly employed by FPI. Mr. Simon attempts to re-litigate the compensation award he
received pursuant to the Inmate Accident Compensation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4126 et seq., for a back
injury he sustained while incarcerated in 1987. See Compl. at 1–6, ECF No. 1. In 1998, the
D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of Mr. Simon’s petition for a writ of mandamus,
holding that his “award of compensation was properly calculated under the Inmate Accident
Compensation Act and its implementing regulations,” that there was “no merit to [his] challenge
1
In his complaint, Mr. Simon has misspelled Mr. Schwalb’s name. The Court uses the
spelling used in Mr. Schwalb’s January 1995 letter to Mr. Simon. See Compl. Ex. B.
to the validity of the inmate compensation system,” and that he “ha[d] not shown that he is
entitled to medical treatment after his release.” Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 159 F.3d 637
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision). In recent years, Mr. Simon has continued to file
similar actions in this district against FPI, Schwalb, and various other defendants. Those actions
have been dismissed as barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion and collateral estoppel. See
Simon v. Bickell, 737 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14–15 (D.D.C. 2010); Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc.,
No. 09-0692, 2009 WL 2618349, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009). Additionally, Mr. Simon has
filed similar cases against FPI and other agencies or instrumentalities of the United States around
the country. See, e.g., Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., No. 03-10792-JLT, 2003 WL
26128191, at *1 (D. Mass. Jul. 15, 2003); see also Simon v. Robinson, 196 F. App’x 54, 55 n.1
(3d Cir. 2006) (noting that Mr. Simon has “filed suit and lost in the United States District Courts
for the District of Wisconsin, the District of Massachusetts, the Southern District of New York,
the District of Columbia, and the District of New Jersey”). Mr. Simon has again filed meritless
pleadings in this Court in his ongoing campaign against Defendants concerning the same
compensation for an inmate work injury.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. Simon’s latest suit. As an initial matter, the Court
denies Plaintiff’s meritless motion for disqualification. The Court further concludes that claim
preclusion bars Mr. Simon’s claims against FPI and its former employee Mr. Schwalb, while the
doctrine of collateral estoppel bars his claims against DOJ and the Court of Appeals. In the
alternative, the Court finds that the time period in which Mr. Simon could have litigated the
compensation amount he received for his back injury has far lapsed and that his claims are, thus,
time-barred. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denies Mr.
Simon’s other pending motions as moot.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Simon commenced this action in August 2015, challenging the monetary award he
received as a result of a back injury he suffered while incarcerated more than two decades ago.
See Compl. at 1–6. In 1994, as compensation for this inmate work injury, Mr. Simon was
awarded $73.57 per month, an amount to be adjusted in line with increases in the federal
minimum wage. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss & Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Defs.’
Mot.”) Ex. 2 at 12, 13, 17, 18, ECF No. 4-1. 2 Following an administrative appeal to Mr.
Schwalb, at that time FIP’s Chief Operating Officer, Mr. Simon acknowledged and accepted the
award as a “full and final settlement.” Id. at 15–17.
In the present suit, although Mr. Simon’s complaint is hard to follow, it appears that Mr.
Simon once again claims that the settlement award he received was insufficient and unfair. See
generally Compl. Mr. Simon bases this claim on purported violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act,
and the Constitution. See Compl. at 1–2. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint on
two grounds. First, Defendants argue that Mr. Simon’s claim is barred by the related doctrines
of claim preclusion and collateral estoppel. See Defs.’ Mot. at 3–5. Second, Defendants argue
that Mr. Simon’s claims are time-barred. See id. at 5–6. For his part, Mr. Simon has filed a
variety of others motions, including one requesting that the undersigned disqualify himself. See
Pl.’s Mot for Disqualification, ECF No. 17.
Because Mr. Simon has failed to raise any issue requiring disqualification or making such
disqualification advisable, the Court denies that motion. In addition, because the Court agrees
2
Because the DOJ has not provided page numbers on its exhibits, the Court cites to the
page numbering provided by ECF.
3
that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the related doctrines of claim preclusion and collateral
estoppel, and are also time-barred, the Court will dismiss Mr. Simon’s complaint in its entirety.
Consequently, the Court denies as moot Mr. Simon’s various other motions.
III. MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
As best the Court can discern, Mr. Simon’s basis for requesting disqualification appears
to be his dissatisfaction with this Court’s denial of his motion for a pretrial settlement
conference, see Dec. 15, 2015 Order, ECF No. 16, and his claims that there has been “undue
delay . . . attend[ing] these proceeding[s]” and that the Court has exhibited “deep-seated [b]ias”
and “favoritism” toward the Defendants, Pl.’s Mot for Disqualification at 1–2. These arguments
are frivolous. First, “judicial rulings” like the Court’s denial of Mr. Simon’s motion for a pretrial
settlement conference “alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (noting that judicial rulings “can only
in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required”). Second,
beyond his dissatisfaction with the pace of litigation, Mr. Simon fails to articulate any intelligible
basis for his belief that this Court has shown bias or favoritism. That five months have elapsed
since Mr. Simon filed his complaint does not demonstrate that the undersigned “has a personal
bias or prejudice either against [Mr. Simon] or in favor of any adverse party” requiring recusal.
28 U.S.C. § 144. In addition, to succeed on a motion for disqualification, a party is required to
file “a timely and sufficient affidavit” that “state[s] the facts and the reasons for the belief that
bias or prejudice exists.” Id. Here, Mr. Simon has not filed an affidavit accompanying his
motion. See Potter v. Toei Animation Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 49, 57 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing a
pro se litigant’s motion for disqualification because the litigant failed to file an affidavit).
Accordingly, Mr. Simon’s motion for disqualification is denied.
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IV. MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds
upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff’s ultimate
likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Brewer v. District of Columbia, 891 F. Supp. 2d 126, 130
(D.D.C. 2012). A court considering such a motion presumes that the complaint’s factual
allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., United States
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). It is not necessary for the
plaintiff to plead all elements of his prima facie case in the complaint. See Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–14 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28–29 (D.D.C.
2010).
Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). This means that a plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (citations and footnote omitted).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements,” are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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A court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume
the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations, see Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555.
A pro se complaint is held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even pro se litigants “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the
court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588,
596 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Atherton v. D.C. Office of the
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). Moreover, “[a] pro se complaint, like any
other, must present a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d
1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
B. Claim Preclusion & Collateral Estoppel
1. Claim Preclusion Bars Simon’s Claims Against FPI and Schwalb
Mr. Simon’s claims against Defendants FPI and its former employee, Mr. Schwalb, are
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, which forecloses “successive litigation of the very
same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.”
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)). Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a claim
“will be barred if there has been prior litigation (1) involving the same claims or cause of action,
(2) between the same parties or their privies, and (3) there has been a final, valid judgment on the
merits, (4) by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 192
(D.C. Cir. 2006). The Court addresses each requirement in turn.
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First, Mr. Simon’s complaint against FPI and Mr. Schwalb involves the same claims or
cause of action as his complaint against the same defendants in a previous suit lodged in this
Court. See Simon, 2009 WL 2618349, at *1 (summarizing previous cases in this district and
dismissing Mr. Simon’s complaint against FPI and Schwalb as “plainly barred by the doctrine of
res judicata”); accord Simon, 2003 WL 26128191, at *2 (noting that the case constituted “at
least the seventh attempt” to bring claims against FPI and the fifth attempt to bring claims
against Schwalb). In assessing whether two cases share the same claims or cause of action, a
court must determine “whether they share the ‘same nucleus of facts,’” that is, “whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation.” Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir.
2002); I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg. Co., 723 F.2d 944, 949 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1983)). In his 1997 lawsuit, Mr. Simon also challenged the sufficiency of the settlement amount
he received as a result of his inmate work injury. See Simon, 159 F.3d at 637 (describing Mr.
Simon’s claims as challenging whether his “award of compensation was properly calculated” and
whether “he is entitled to medical treatment after his release”). Here, Mr. Simon’s claims are
substantially the same; his complaint does not assert any new cause of action. See Compl. at 3–4
(referring to Mr. Simon’s monthly compensation and a government physician’s recommendation
of “future medical treatment and back surgery”). Because Mr. Simon’s complaint asserts the
same claim or cause of action as a previous case lodged in this district, the two cases share the
same “nucleus of facts,” Apotex, 393 F.3d at 217 (quoting Drake, 291 F.3d at 66), and thus
involve the “same claims or cause of action,” Smalls, 471 F.3d at 192.
Second, Mr. Simon has brought claims against the same parties as he did in his prior
lawsuits. In this case, Mr. Simon has sued FPI and its former employee Mr. Schwalb. See
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Compl. 1. In his 1997 lawsuit in this district, Mr. Simon similarly brought claims against FPI
and Mr. Schwalb. Simon, 159 F.3d at 637 (listing “Federal Prison Industries, Inc.” and “Steve B.
Schwalb, Chief Operating Officer” as defendant-appellees). Mr. Simon’s claims against FPI and
Mr. Schwalb in this case and his claims against those defendants in his previous case thus
involve the “same parties” for purposes of claim preclusion. Smalls, 471 F.3d at 192.
Third, because a court in this district previously entered, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, a
merit-based ruling for Defendants on the same issue, the adverse judgment was a final and valid
judgment on the merits. See Simon, 159 F.3d at 637.
Finally, a United States district court is a court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes
of claim preclusion. See Thunder v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, No. 14-1596(EGS), 2015 WL
5692876, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2015) (finding a district court to be a court of competent
jurisdiction for res judicata purposes). Therefore, all four elements of claim preclusion are
satisfied and claim preclusion bars Mr. Simon’s claims against Defendants FPI and Mr. Schwalb.
Accord Simon, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 14–15 (finding Mr. Simon’s claims barred by the same 1997
case); Simon, 2009 WL 2618349, at *1 (same).
2. Collateral Estoppel Prevents Mr. Simon from Litigating the Amount of his
Compensation Award Against the Other Named Defendants
To the Court’s knowledge, Mr. Simon has not previously brought claims against
Defendants DOJ and the Court of Appeals, at least in this district. Although those claims might
nonetheless be barred by claim preclusion based on Mr. Simon’s cases in other districts, see, e.g.,
Simon v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 89 F.3d 823 (1st Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision), they are,
in any event, certainly barred by the related doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, “once a court has decided an issue of fact or law
necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a
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different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94
(1980). As just explained, Mr. Simon’s claims regarding the validity of his inmate work injury
award have been litigated prior to the present case. See Simon, 159 F.3d at 637; Simon, 2009
WL 2618349, at *1. In those cases, courts have held that Mr. Simon’s inmate accident
compensation award was calculated appropriately. See Simon, 159 F.3d at 637 (affirming district
court’s merits-based judgment). Thus—even if ostensibly asserted against new defendants—to
the extent that Mr. Simon continues to challenge his inmate work injury compensation or the
validity of the inmate compensation system, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars his claims.
Mr. Simon cannot continue to squander judicial resources with “repeated litigation of the same
issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out.” Blonder-Tongue Labs v. Univ. of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to the remainder of the
defendants that were not previously sued.
C. Mr. Simon’s Claims are Time-Barred
In the alternative, and to the extent Mr. Simon attempts to assert a cause of action based
on new theories under the Constitution, Title VII, or any of the innumerable legal provisions his
complaint nonsensically lists, 3 his claims are time-barred.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), “every civil action commenced against the United States
shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first
accrues.” Defendants’ motion argues that Plaintiff’s claims against the United States are
3
Mr. Simon has nonsensically referred to the Constitution, Title VII, the Administrative
Procedure Act, and a hodgepodge of other statutes, cases, and legal theories. See, e.g., ECF Nos.
1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 11. Because the bases for these theories are not adequately explained, the Court will
not address them further.
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untimely because they were not brought within six years of their accrual date. Mr. Simon failed
to respond to this argument. As a result, Mr. Simon has conceded it. See Singh v. District of
Columbia, 55 F. Supp. 3d 55, 66 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The rule in this circuit is clear that when a
plaintiff fails to respond to an issue raised in a dispositive motion, the Court may treat that
argument as conceded.”).
Going beyond Mr. Simon’s concession and reaching the merits of the argument, the
Court easily concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. As Mr. Simon himself concedes,
he has been aware of the injury he suffered while incarcerated and the amount of the inmate
work injury settlement award he received since at least twenty-one years ago, when he litigated
this case in the first instance. Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 9, ECF No. 7 (“Plaintiff [has]
litigated this case for twenty one (21) years.”). Indeed, Mr. Simon attached to his complaint a
1995 letter from Mr. Schwalb, then the Chief Operating Officer of FPI, ruling on Mr. Simon’s
administrative appeal of his original award. See Compl. Ex. B. That letter, and the D.C.
Circuit’s affirmance of his 1997 lawsuit, both plainly indicate that Mr. Simon has long been
aware of his cause of action. Therefore, the six year period during which he could have brought
suit against the United States and its agencies or employees has long ago lapsed. Mr. Simon’s
claims against Defendants are time-barred and the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted on
this basis as well as to all claims. Accord Simon, 2003 WL 26128191, at *2 (citing § 2401(a)
and noting that “[t]o the extent that plaintiff is seeking judicial review under the APA of his
initial award or his purported inability to have the fees for his back surgery compensated after his
release, his claims are subject to dismissal because plaintiff has not alleged . . . that his claims for
review are timely given that plaintiff allegedly received an award in 1994”).
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for disqualification is DENIED,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Simon’s complaint is GRANTED, and Mr. Simon’s various
other motions are DENIED AS MOOT. 4 An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion
is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: February 3, 2016
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
4
These motions are: motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 2); notice of
Defendants’ default (ECF No. 3); motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 7); motion to
expedite issuance of the preliminary injunction (ECF No. 9); motion for Rule 11 sanctions (ECF
No. 11); and, motion demanding immediate action (ECF No. 13).
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