JORIE WIMBISH et.al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 05/3/2017. (lcegs3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
________________________________
)
JORIE WIMBISH, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
) Civil Action No. 15-1429 (EGS)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________)
)
JORIE WIMBISH, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
) Civil Action No. 15-2182 (EGS)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is plaintiff Jorie Wimbish’s
motion for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the attorneys’
fees provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Ms. Wimbish seeks to
recover attorneys’ fees and costs arising from her successful
obtainment of a “stay-put” order from this Court. That stay-put
order mandates that the District of Columbia fund the entirety
of the costs arising from Ms. Wimbish’s minor daughter, J.W.,
attending the Stuart Hall School during the pendency of an

1

underlying IDEA case between Ms. Wimbish and the District of
Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”).
Upon consideration of the motion, the response and reply
thereto, the parties’ supplemental briefs, the entire record,
and for the reasons stated below, Ms. Wimbish’s motion is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court finds that the
“reasonable hourly rates” proposed by Ms. Wimbish are
appropriate, but will not, at this juncture, order reimbursement
for her attorneys’ preparation of the instant motion for
attorneys’ fees; Ms. Wimbish has indicated that she plans to
file a supplemental motion related to “fees-on-fees” litigation.
Accordingly, the Court ultimately awards Ms. Wimbish $50,795.85.
I.

Background
The factual background of this case is set out in Wimbish

v. District of Columbia, 153 F. Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2015) and
will not be rehashed in full again here. In most relevant part,
prior to the 2014-2015 school year, Ms. Wimbish enrolled J.W.——
who had been deemed eligible for special education services
under the IDEA——at Stuart Hall School, a private boarding school
in Staunton, Virginia. 153 F. Supp. 3d at 7. On January 5, 2015,
Ms. Wimbish filed an IDEA administrative due process complaint
with the Office of Dispute Resolution of DCPS alleging that DCPS
had failed to develop an appropriate individualized education
program (“IEP”) for J.W. for the 2014-2015 school year and had
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failed to propose an adequate school placement. Id. The
complaint sought reimbursement from DCPS for J.W.’s cost of
attendance at Stuart Hall. Id.
In a March 29, 2015 decision, an administrative Hearing
Officer concluded that DCPS had denied J.W. a free appropriate
public education (“FAPE”) for the 2014-2015 school year and
ordered DCPS to fund 50% of Stuart Hall expenses for that school
year. Id. at 8. The Hearing Officer relied on alternative bases
to conclude that J.W. had been denied a FAPE. First, if J.W.’s
most recent IEP——one that the parties had developed at a June
2014 meeting and one that Ms. Wimbish believed was not a mere
draft but rather was a final, operative IEP, id. at 7——was
operative, it was improper because it provided J.W. with an
inappropriately restrictive program. Id. at 8. Alternatively, if
the June 2014 IEP was just a “draft” IEP, as DCPS had argued,
then J.W. had improperly not been provided an IEP for the 20142015 school year. Id. at 8. The Hearing Officer also found that
Ms. Wimbish’s enrollment of J.W. at Stuart Hall was proper, but
only mandated that DCPS cover 50% of the Stuart Hall expenses
because, following the June 2014 IEP meeting, Ms. Wimbish had
refused to meet with DCPS to rewrite or revise the IEP that had
been prepared at the June 2014 meeting. Id. at 8.
After the 2014-2015 school year ended, DCPS contacted Ms.
Wimbish to schedule a meeting to prepare J.W.’s IEP for the
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2015-2016 school year. Id. But at their August 18, 2015 meeting,
DCPS informed Ms. Wimbish that J.W. was no longer eligible for
special education services. Id. Accordingly, DCPS explained that
the meeting would not result in an updated IEP but rather would
be aimed at developing a plan for accommodations under § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at 8-9. Surprised by this
turn of events, Ms. Wimbish asked that the meeting be adjourned,
but DCPS continued the meeting in her and her counsel’s absence
and developed a § 504 plan for J.W. Id. at 9.
On August 20, 2015, Ms. Wimbish filed an administrative due
process complaint challenging J.W.’s removal from special
education services. Id. at 9. Upon learning that DCPS did not
intend to fund any portion of J.W.’s placement at Stuart Hall
during the pendency of this IDEA case, Ms. Wimbish filed a
motion for a stay-put injunction in this Court on September 1,
2015. Id. The IDEA’s “stay-put provision” requires a local
educational agency to maintain a child in his or her “current
educational placement” during the pendency of IDEA
administrative and judicial proceedings. Id. at 9-10 (citing 34
C.F.R. § 300.518(a)). This Court granted Ms. Wimbish’s motion,
as it determined that Stuart Hall is J.W.’s “current educational
placement” and that the District is obligated to fund 100% of
J.W.’s attendance at Stuart Hall, retroactive to the
commencement of the 2015-2016 school year, during the pendency
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of all administrative and judicial proceedings arising from Ms.
Wimbish’s August 20, 2015 administrative due process complaint.
Id. at 10-13.
On November 16, 2015, a Hearing Officer issued a decision
concerning Ms. Wimbish’s August 20, 2015 due process complaint,
and Ms. Wimbish’s partial appeal of that decision, filed in this
Court on December 16, 2015, remains pending following the
conclusion of briefing on February 9, 2017. 1 See id. at 9 n.4.
Meanwhile, in January 2016, Ms. Wimbish filed a motion for
attorneys’ fees and costs related to the stay-put portion of
this litigation. See Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees, ECF No. 17. That
motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.
II.

Analysis
The IDEA provides that a court “in its discretion, may

award reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . to a prevailing party who
is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(B)(i). Although this Court has yet to rule on Ms.
Wimbish’s partial appeal of the Hearing Officer’s November 16,
2015 decision, the District does not dispute that Ms. Wimbish is
“a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a
disability” as concerns the stay-put portion of this IDEA

The Court consolidated Ms. Wimbish’s partial appeal of the
Hearing Officer’s decision with the case in which her motion for
a stay-put injunction had earlier been filed. Wimbish, 153 F.
Supp. 3d at 9 n.4.
1

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litigation. See generally Def.’s Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for
Attorneys’ Fees (“Def.’s Opp.”), ECF No. 18 (omitting any
argument that Ms. Wimbish is not a “prevailing party”); see also
Douglas v. District of Columbia, 67 F. Supp. 3d 36, 41-42
(D.D.C. 2014) (holding that a party that obtained a stay-put
order was a “prevailing party”); Laster v. District of Columbia,
No. 05-1875, 2006 WL 2085394, at *2-3 (D.D.C. July 25, 2006)
(same). The dispute here thus narrows to whether the attorneys’
fees that Ms. Wimbish seeks from the stay-put litigation
constitute “reasonable attorneys’ fees.”
That “reasonable attorneys’ fees” determination depends on
a three-part analysis: “First, the court must determine the
number of hours reasonably expended in litigation. Second, it
must set the reasonable hourly rate. Finally, it must determine
whether use of a multiplier is warranted.” Eley v. District of
Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). The District does not challenge
the hours that Ms. Wimbish’s attorneys devoted to the stay-put
litigation, see generally Def.’s Opp., ECF No. 18, and the IDEA
prohibits application of any multiplier. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(C). Accordingly, the dispute here narrows further
still: All that needs to be determined is the attorneys’
“reasonable hourly rate.”

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“Whether an hourly rate is reasonable turns on three subelements: (1) the attorney[s’] billing practices, (2) the
attorney[s’] skill, experience, and reputation and (3) the
prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Eley, 793
F.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted). All that is in
dispute here is the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community. See generally Def.’s Opp., ECF No. 18; Pl.’s Reply,
ECF No. 19. Ms. Wimbish contends that she is entitled to be
reimbursed at the rates provided for her attorneys under the
Laffey Matrix maintained by the United States Attorney’s Office
for the District of Columbia (“USAO Laffey Matrix”).2 Pl.’s Mem.
in Supp. of Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Pl.’s Mem.
Supp.”), ECF No. 17-1 at 6-11. The District, on the other hand,
contends that the rates sought are unreasonably high and
proposes 75% of the USAO Laffey Matrix as the reasonable hourly
rates. Def.’s Opp., ECF No. 18 at 6-11.
Ms. Wimbish, the fee applicant here, bears the initial
burden of justifying the reasonableness of the rates that she
proposes. Eley, 793 F.3d at 100. She may meet that burden “upon
either of two showings”: First, she can “demonstrate that IDEA

“The Laffey Matrix is ‘a schedule of charges based on years of
experience developed in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572
F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 472 U.S. 1021, 105 S. Ct. 3488,
87 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1985).’” Merrick v. District of Columbia, 134
F. Supp. 3d 328, 332 n.1 (D.D.C. 2015).
2

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proceedings qualify as ‘complex federal litigation,’ to which
Laffey rates presumptively apply.” Second, alternatively, she
“may demonstrate that rates customarily charged by IDEA
practitioners in the District are comparable to those provided
under the US[AO] Laffey Matrix.” Flood v. District of Columbia,
172 F. Supp. 3d 197, 210 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Reed v.
District of Columbia, 843 F.3d 517, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(describing these “two separate, but inter-related, approaches
to providing evidence of prevailing market rate”).
The Court finds that Ms. Wimbish has made the second of
these two showings.3 That showing required her to “produce
satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line
with those prevailing in the community for similar services by
lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and
reputation.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The evidence relevant to this inquiry includes
“attorneys’ fee matrices,” like the USAO Laffey Matrix,

Because Ms. Wimbish has made the showing that lends itself to
scrutiny of an evidentiary record, the Court has no need to
assess whether she has made the alternative showing, which would
require the Court to go down the rabbit hole of trying to
determine whether Ms. Wimbish has demonstrated that IDEA
litigation is “complex federal litigation.” See Reed, 843 F.3d
at 528 (Tatel, J., concurring) (explaining that whether IDEA
litigation is “complex” is “a legal question that cannot depend
. . . on whether one lawyer has met her burden of proof”).
Accordingly, the parties’ arguments concerning whether IDEA
litigation is “complex federal litigation” will go unaddressed.
3

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supplemented by “surveys to update them; affidavits reciting the
precise fees that attorneys with similar qualifications have
received from fee-paying clients in comparable cases; and
evidence of recent fees awarded by the courts or through
settlement to attorneys with comparable qualifications handling
similar cases.” Id. at 100-01 (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted).
Here, in addition to affidavits from her attorneys, Ms.
Wimbish has submitted nine affidavits from IDEA practitioners in
this jurisdiction that support a finding that full USAO Laffey
rates are the prevailing rates in the community for IDEA
litigation. See V.S. of Douglas Tyrka, ECF No. 17-11 ¶ 5
(stating that Tykra & Associates “has always exclusively charged
rates matching those in the adjusted Laffey matrix” and, even
though “Tyrka & Associates has historically primarily
represented clients who cannot afford representation, the firm
has had several clients who pay the firm [Laffey] rates
directly”); V.S. of Diana M. Savit, ECF No. 17-12 ¶¶ 13-14
(explaining that her IDEA practice is restricted to paying
clients and that she would not take a case unless she
“reasonably expect[ed] to be awarded an hourly rate of at least
$500, far above the ‘75% of USAO Laffey’ rate”); Decl. of Emily
B. Read, ECF No. 17-9 ¶ 6 (“In its decision on our fees motion,
the Court in [Blackman] awarded me the full Laffey rate . . . .
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All Bazelon Center attorneys billing time on the due process
proceedings and the subsequent federal litigation received the
full Laffey rate . . . .”); Decl. of Elizabeth T. Jester, ECF
No. 17-13 ¶ 12 (“My rate of $520 per hour is equivalent to the
rates set forth in the Laffey matrix for attorneys with 20+
years of experience.”); V.S. of Maria G. Mendoza, ECF No. 17-14
¶ 12 (explaining that it is “impossible” to maintain an IDEA
practice when there is a risk that courts will award 75% of USAO
Laffey rates); V.S. of Domiento C.R. Hill, ECF No. 17-15 ¶ 14
(asserting that “the ‘75% USAO’ rate” is “unreasonably low and
below market rates”); V.S. of Alana Hecht, ECF No. 17-16 ¶ 16
(explaining that a below-Laffey $270 per hour rate is
insufficient to maintain an IDEA firm); Decl. of Pierre
Bergeron, ECF No. 17-17 ¶ 13 (“I seek rates congruent with the
rates prevailing in the community based on the USAO Laffey
Matrix.”); V.S. of Nicholas Ostrem, ECF No. 17-10 ¶ 4 (“The
Ostrem Firm has always matched its hourly rates to those in what
is commonly known as ‘the adjusted Laffey matrix’ . . . .”). A
finding that full USAO Laffey rates are the prevailing rates in
the community for IDEA litigation is bolstered by recent, postEley cases that Ms. Wimbish points to where courts in this
District have awarded full USAO Laffey rates. See, e.g., Flood
v. District of Columbia, 172 F. Supp. 3d 197, 214 (D.D.C. 2016)
(Howell, C.J.) (“[A] review of recent IDEA fee awards indicates
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fairly broad support among Judges on this Court for
reimbursement at or above full USAO Laffey rates.”); Merrick v.
District of Columbia, 134 F. Supp. 3d 328, 340 (D.D.C. 2015)
(Berman Jackson, J.). These affidavits and these cases, taken
together, sufficiently demonstrate that full USAO Laffey rates
constitute the prevailing market rates for IDEA litigation in
this jurisdiction.
Because Ms. Wimbish has carried her burden, the burden
shifts to the District to “‘provide specific contrary evidence
tending to show that a lower rate would be appropriate.’” Flood,
172 F. Supp. 3d at 203 (quoting Covington v. District of
Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). The District
has not carried that rebuttal burden. The District cites
numerous pre-Eley cases where courts in this District applied
75% USAO Laffey rates, Def.’s Opp., ECF No. 18 at 7 n.3, 8 n.4
(collecting cases), and even cites some recent, post-Eley cases
that have done the same. Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Suppl. Br.
(“Def.’s Resp.”), ECF No. 44 at 3-4 (citing Taylor v. District
of Columbia, 205 F. Supp. 3d 75 (D.D.C. 2016) (Walton, J.);
Wilhite v. District of Columbia, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016)
(Contreras, J.)). But as another court in this District has
explained, “[a]t the end of the day, the Court is left with
cases on both sides of the Laffey divide, but significantly more
concrete evidence from Plaintiff in support of applying standard
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Laffey rates.” Copeland v. District of Columbia, 208 F. Supp. 3d
255, 258 (D.D.C. 2016) (Cooper, J.) (applying full USAO Laffey
rates). That concrete evidence presented by Ms. Wimbish comes in
the form of the recent cases and practitioner affidavits that,
together, demonstrate that full USAO Laffey rates are prevailing
rates in this jurisdiction for IDEA litigation. The District’s
citation to just cases fails to meet its rebuttal burden of
putting on “equally specific countervailing evidence.”
Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109 (emphasis added).
The District attempts to preempt any consideration as to
whether it has carried its rebuttal burden by essentially making
two arguments as to why Ms. Wimbish has not carried her initial
burden. The first is that Ms. Wimbish has not put on evidence
that full USAO Laffey rates prevail in stay-put litigation
specifically; instead, the affidavits and cases that she relies
on concern IDEA litigation generally. See Def.’s Opp., ECF No.
18 at 5 (citing Douglas v. District of Columbia, 67 F. Supp. 3d
36 (D.D.C. 2014) (awarding 75% USAO Laffey rates to a party that
obtained a stay-put order)); Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 44 at 3
(distinguishing Chief Judge Howell’s recent decision in Flood to
apply full Laffey rates on the basis that the proceedings in
Flood “did not involve a ‘stay-put’ order”). But this attempt to
carve out a sub-sub-market within the sub-market that is IDEA
litigation ignores that the IDEA attorneys’ fees inquiry focuses
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on “IDEA cases generally, without regard to the unique features
of an underlying IDEA proceeding in a particular case.” Flood,
172 F. Supp. 3d at 206; see also Reed, 843 F.3d at 526 (noting
that the D.C. Circuit has “yet to determine whether all aspects
of an IDEA litigation should be treated as a unified whole,
subject to the same prevailing market rate,” but affirming a
District Court that took a uniform approach to discrete portions
of an IDEA litigation). Accordingly, that Ms. Wimbish relies on
affidavits and cases concerning IDEA litigation generally,
rather than stay-put litigation specifically, does not prevent
her from carrying her initial burden.
The District’s second argument as to why Ms. Wimbish fails
to meet her initial burden focuses on the practitioner
affidavits that Ms. Wimbish has submitted. The District argues
that these affidavits do not specify how many of the affiants’
IDEA fee-paying clients “actually pay Laffey rates.” Def.’s
Opp., ECF No. 18 at 9. The District emphasizes that other courts
in this District have taken issue with affidavits very similar
to the ones submitted in this case because they “only provide[ ]
evidence of the fees the practitioners routinely sought rather
than the precise fees they actually received.” Def.’s Resp., ECF
No. 44 at 3 (citing Taylor, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 85-86); see also
Wilhite, 196 F. Supp. 3d at 7-9; Platt v. District of Columbia,

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168 F. Supp. 3d 253, 266 (D.D.C. 2016) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). The
Court finds this argument unavailing.
Douglas Tyrka states in his submission that his firm “has
had several clients who pay the firm [Laffey] rates directly.”
V.S. of Douglas Tyrka, ECF No. 17-11 ¶ 5. Although another court
in this District has called this same statement “general” and
“unsubstantiated,” Platt, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 266, this Court,
respectfully, is of the view that this statement avers “precise
fees” that an attorney has “received from fee-paying clients”
for IDEA litigation. See Eley, 793 F.3d at 101. Similarly, Diana
M. Savit, in her submission, states that she only takes feepaying clients and indicates that those clients pay “an hourly
rate of at least $500, far above the ‘75% of USAO Laffey’ rate.”
V.S. of Diana M. Savit, ECF No. 17-12 ¶¶ 13-14. And Emily B.
Read, in her submission, states that in Blackman she and other
attorneys were awarded full Laffey rates. Decl. of Emily B.
Read, ECF No. 17-9 ¶ 6. Other courts in this District have
afforded Ms. Read’s statement limited weight in their analyses
because they have reasoned that Blackman “was not a routine IDEA
matter, but instead was a ‘complex case’ that required a number
of ‘skilled litigators’ to ‘research many novel questions of law
under tight time constraints.’” Platt, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 266;
see also Taylor, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 85-86; Wilhite, 196 F. Supp.
3d at 8. This Court, again, respectfully takes a different view:
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The fees that Ms. Read was awarded in Blackman should not be
discounted due to Blackman’s “complexity.” As stated above, for
purposes of the attorneys’ fees analysis, IDEA cases should be
assessed in a categorical fashion, without distinctions
concerning the “unique features” of one case as compared to
another. Flood, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 206. Thus, Ms. Read’s
averment concerning the full Laffey rates she was awarded in
Blackman constitutes powerful evidence of “recent fees awarded”
by a court in IDEA litigation. See Eley, 793 F.3d at 101. And,
in any event, to the extent that distinctions should be drawn
between IDEA cases based on their “complexity,” this case is
sufficiently similar to Blackman to find Ms. Read’s declaration
quite compelling. Like Blackman, the stay-put litigation here
involved “skilled litigators,” see, e.g., Decl. of Carolyn
Houck, ECF No. 17-5 ¶ 8 (“I have successfully represented
hundreds of clients in more than 1600 due process hearings or
settlement agreements to enforce their rights under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act . . .
.”), “tight time constraints,” see Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj.,
ECF No. 3 (filed September 1, 2015); Minute Entry of October 9,
2015 (granting stay-put injunction following hearing and
ordering supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the
District is required to fund 50% or 100% of J.W.’s cost of
attendance at Stuart Hall), and “novel questions of law.” See
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Wimbish, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 12-13 (holding that the District is
required to fund 100% of J.W.’s cost of attendance at Stuart
Hall during the pendency of all administrative and judicial
proceedings in this case even though both parties were unable to
identify “an analogous case in support of their position[s]”).
In short, this Court finds that Ms. Wimbish has submitted
more than enough evidence to carry her initial burden of
demonstrating that full USAO Laffey rates prevail in this
jurisdiction. And, for the reasons stated above, the District
has failed to carry its burden in rebuttal. Accordingly, full
USAO Laffey rates are warranted for Ms. Wimbish’s attorneys’
work on the stay-put litigation in this case.
III. Conclusion
Full USAO Laffey rates are warranted for Ms. Wimbish’s
attorneys’ work on the motion for a stay-put injunction in this
matter. Accordingly, the Court awards attorneys’ fees at an
hourly rate of $568 for attorney Charles Moran, $504 for
attorney Carolyn Houck, and $315 for attorney Stevie Nabors. 4
Mr. Moran billed a total of 16.5 hours, but 10 of those
hours were dedicated to preparing the instant motion for
attorneys’ fees. Statement of Account and Costs, ECF No. 19-2.

The applicable USAO Laffey Matrix is the one that prescribes
rates for June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2016. See USAO Attorney’s Fees
Matrix –— 2015-2016, ECF No. 19-1.
4

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Because Ms. Wimbish indicates that she will file a supplemental
motion for “fees-on-fees,” Pl.’s Mem. Supp., ECF No. 17-1 at 11,
reimbursement for the hours dedicated to preparation of the
instant fee motion is better reserved for when the Court
considers the supplemental motion. Accordingly, Mr. Moran’s
total fee for the stay-put litigation equals $3,692 [$568/hour *
6.5 hours].
Ms. Houck billed a total of 62.7 hours. Statement of
Account and Costs, ECF No. 19-2. 2.1 of those hours were
dedicated to the motion for attorneys’ fees and, for the reason
stated immediately above, will not be factored into the award at
this juncture. Two other hours were dedicated to travel time
which, as the parties agree, only warrants reimbursement at half
of the applicable hourly rate. See Def.’s Opp., ECF No. 18 at
11; Statement of Account and Costs, ECF No. 19-2. Accordingly,
Ms. Houck’s total fee for the stay-put litigation equals
$30,038.40 [($504/hour * 58.6 hours) + (252/hour * 2 hours)].
Mr. Nabors billed a total of 60.6 hours. Statement of
Account and Costs, ECF No. 19-2. 8.2 of those hours were
dedicated to the motion for attorneys’ fees and, for the reason
stated above, will not be factored into the award at this
juncture. Accordingly, Mr. Nabors’ total fee for the stay-put
litigation equals $16,506 [$315/hour * 52.4 hours].

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As a result, after $559.45 in uncontested litigation costs
are included, Statement of Account and Costs, ECF No. 19-2, the
District shall pay Ms. Wimbish $50,795.85 as a total award for
the stay-put litigation in this matter.5 An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed:

Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
May 3, 2017

The Court has no need to address Ms. Wimbish’s argument that
the Court should “apply 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(G) and decline to
reduce [Ms. Wimbish’s] attorneys’ fees.” Pl.’s Suppl. Br., ECF
No. 42 at 1. Section 1415(i)(3)(G) states that “[t]he provisions
of [§ 1415(i)(3)(F)] shall not apply in any action or proceeding
if the court finds that the State or local educational agency
unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or
proceeding or there was a violation of this section.” Because
the Court concludes that the provisions of § 1415(i)(3)(F) are
not implicated, the Court has no need to prevent the application
of those provisions by means of § 1415(i)(3)(G). In any event,
Ms. Wimbish’s argument——that the District has “unreasonably
protracted” this litigation——is wholly without merit.
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