JOHNSON v. PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC.

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on March 29, 2018. (lcegs2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________
)
DENNIS JOHNSON,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
Civil Action
)
No. 15-1851(EGS)
v.
)
)
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC., et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Dennis Johnson, a retired law enforcement
officer, claims that he was improperly detained and harassed
after he entered an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
facility with a handgun. He has sued the private security
contractors — MVM, Inc. (“MVM”) and Paragon Systems,
Inc.(“Paragon”) — allegedly responsible for security at that ICE
facility, along with Federal Protective Services (“FPS”) and one
of its employees, Christopher Addams (collectively, “Federal
Defendants”). Pending before the Court are MVM and the Federal
Defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint. For the
reasons articulated below, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions
and dismisses Mr. Johnson’s complaint.
I.

BACKGROUND
On October 31, 2012, Mr. Johnson arrived at an ICE facility

and entered the building with a loaded handgun in his briefcase.
1

Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶ 10. 1 As a retired federal law
enforcement officer, Mr. Johnson asserts that he is entitled to
carry a firearm on federal property at any time. Id. ¶ 10.
Nonetheless — perhaps because Mr. Johnson inadvertently
entered the ICE facility through the visitors' entrance and not
the employees' entrance — Mr. Johnson was immediately detained
by security guards allegedly employed or supervised by
defendants. Id. ¶¶ 10-13. According to Mr. Johnson, even though
he promptly displayed his law-enforcement badge to the security
guards, and even though the security guards were allegedly
notified that Mr. Johnson was entitled to bring his weapon into
the building, the security guards "handcuffed Plaintiff for over
two hours." Id. ¶¶ 13-15.
Mr. Johnson further alleges that Christopher Addams — a FPS
employee who supposedly supervised "either a Paragon Systems
employee or MVM employee" — threatened to initiate criminal
proceedings against Mr. Johnson for his conduct. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
Mr. Addams purportedly continued to threaten Mr. Johnson with
legal action for a period of over two months after the incident,
through December 2012. Id.

1

When citing electronic filings in this opinion, the Court
cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the filed
document.
2

Based on these allegations, Mr. Johnson filed suit on
October 31, 2015 against Paragon. See Compl., ECF No. 1. In that
complaint, Mr. Johnson asserted four causes of action: (1) a
"Civil Rights Violation" pursuant to section 1983; (2) assault
and battery; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and (4) common-law negligence. Id. ¶¶ 18-35.
On July 1, 2016, the Court granted Paragon's partial motion
to dismiss, dismissing Mr. Johnson's claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress after concluding that Mr.
Johnson had failed to sufficiently allege that his injury
resulted from "extreme and outrageous conduct." See Johnson v.
Paragon Sys., Inc., 195 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2016).
Almost a year after initially filing suit, on October 21,
2016, Mr. Johnson filed an amended complaint that omitted his
previously-dismissed claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and added MVM, FPS, and Mr. Addams as codefendants. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 12. On September 27, 2017,
the Court granted Paragon summary judgment after finding that
Mr. Johnson had failed to adduce evidence suggesting that
Paragon took any action that caused Mr. Johnson’s alleged
injuries. See Johnson v. Paragon Systems Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 1
(D.D.C. 2017).
Both MVM and the Federal Defendants now move to dismiss Mr.
Johnson’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
3

Procedure 12. Specifically, MVM argues that the amended
complaint should be dismissed for insufficient service of
process, because Mr. Johnson’s claims are barred by the relevant
statutes of limitations, and because Mr. Johnson fails to state
a claim for negligence. See MVM Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss
(“MVM Mot.”), ECF No. 22-1 at 5-13. The Federal Defendants move
to dismiss Mr. Johnson’s complaint for insufficient service of
process, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, qualified
immunity, lack of personal jurisdiction, and for failure to
state a claim. See Fed. Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss
(“Fed. Mot.”), ECF No. 23-1 at 6-18. For the following reasons,
the Court GRANTS those motions and dismisses Mr. Johnson’s
amended complaint. 2
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1) – Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
"A federal district court may only hear a claim over which

[it] has subject-matter jurisdiction; therefore, a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion for dismissal is a threshold challenge to a court's
jurisdiction." Gregorio v. Hoover, 238 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D.D.C.

2

The Court does not address defendants’ compelling serviceof-process arguments because “the interest of judicial economy
is served by reaching the merits of [plaintiff’s] claims against
[defendants] at this time, rather than delaying the inevitable
by allowing [plaintiff] to file another lawsuit against those
Defendants containing the same meritless claims.” McManus v.
District of Columbia, 530 F. Supp. 2d 46, 68 (D.D.C. 2007).
4

2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To
survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing that the court has jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a
court's ability to hear a particular claim, "the court must
scrutinize the plaintiff's allegations more closely when
considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than
it would under a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)."
Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65
(D.D.C. 2011). In so doing, the court must accept as true all of
the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but the court need not
"accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal
conclusions that are cast as factual allegations." Rann v. Chao,
154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
the court "may consider such materials outside the pleadings as
it deems appropriate to resolve the question whether it has
jurisdiction to hear the case." Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections
& Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Jerome
Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food and Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249,
1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Faced with motions to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), a court should first consider the
5

Rule 12(b)(1) motion because "[o]nce a court determines that it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further."
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90
(D.D.C. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A
complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss [pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint." Atherton v.
D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the court must
give the plaintiff the "benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged." Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16
F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
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on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is
facially plausible when the facts pled in the complaint allow
the court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The standard does not
amount to a "probability requirement," but it does require more
than a "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against MVM Are Time-Barred.
MVM moves to dismiss all the claims asserted against it on
the grounds that they are barred by the relevant statutes of
limitations. See MVM Mot., ECF No. 22-1 at 6-9. The Court agrees
that Mr. Johnson’s claims against MVM are time barred.
An affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations
“may be raised by pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b).” SmithHaynie v. Dist. of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Because statute-of-limitations issues often depend on contested
questions of fact, “a defendant is entitled to succeed on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss brought on statutes of limitations
grounds only if the facts that give rise to this affirmative
defense are clear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint.”
Lattisaw v. Dist. of Columbia, 118 F. Supp.3d 142, 153 (D.D.C.
2015).
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“When deciding state-law claims under diversity or
supplemental jurisdiction, federal courts apply the choice-oflaw rules of the jurisdiction in which they sit.” Ideal Elec.
Sec. Co. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 143, 148 (D.C. Cir.
1997). “Because the District of Columbia treats the statute of
limitations as a procedural issue rather than a substantive one,
the law of the forum state applies, as it does with respect to
all procedural matters.” Gaudreau v. Am. Promotional Events,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, District of Columbia law provides
the limitations periods for Mr. Johnson’s claims.
Under District of Columbia law, Mr. Johnson’s section 1983
claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations period.
See Earle v. D.C., 707 F.3d 299, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“We apply
the three-year residual statute of limitations to a section 1983
claim.”). Likewise, Mr. Johnson’s negligence claim is subject to
the District of Columbia’s three-year residual statute of
limitations. See D.C. Code § 12—301(8); Griggs v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 232 F.3d 917, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(claim sounding in negligence subject to a three-year statute of
limitations). Finally, a one-year statute of limitations period
applies to Mr. Johnson’s claim for assault and battery. See D.C.
Code § 12—301(4) (one-year limitations period applies to assault
and battery claims); King v. Barbour, 240 F. Supp. 3d 136, 139
8

(D.D.C. 2017) (“The statute of limitations for civil assault
claims in the District of Columbia is one year.”).
The statutory period begins to run “from the time the right
to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12–301. The cause
of action accrues “when the plaintiff knows or through the
exercise of due diligence should have known of the injury.” See
Dist. of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C. 1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Munoz v. Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 427 Fed. Appx. 1, 3 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (section 1983 claim accrued when the alleged wrongful
conduct occurred).
Here, the alleged wrongful conduct that forms the basis of
Mr. Johnson’s claims occurred on or about October 31, 2012 and
continued through December 31, 2012. Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶¶
10-11, 16. 3 Mr. Johnson did not file his complaint against MVM
until October 21, 2016, almost four years after his claims
against MVM accrued and well past the expiration of the relevant
statutes of limitations.

3

Mr. Johnson’s Amended Complaint alleges that the incident
underlying his claims occurred, alternatively, “on or about
October 24, 2012” and “on or about October 31, 2012.” See Am.
Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 10, 11. Mr. Johnson’s original complaint
refers only to the October 31, 2012 date. See Compl., ECF No. 1
¶¶ 9, 10, 16. Whether the incident occurred on October 24 or
October 31 does not change the result, however, because, as
explained more fully below, Mr. Johnson filed his lawsuit
against MVM more than a year after the latest limitations period
had expired.
9

Mr. Johnson makes two arguments in support of his
contention that his claims against MVM should be deemed timely.
Neither argument saves his case.
First, Mr. Johnson asserts that his claim for a “Civil
Rights violation” against MVM is not time-barred because that
claim appeared in the original complaint, which was filed on
October 31, 2015, and therefore falls within the three-year
statute of limitations for section 1983 claims. Pl.’s Opp. to
MVM Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s MVM Opp.”), ECF No. 28 at 6. 4 Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), an amended complaint
adding a new defendant “relates back” to the original complaint
only when, inter alia, the newly added defendant received notice
of the action “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for
serving the summons and complaint” and “knew or should have
known that the action would have been brought against it, but
for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” In other
words, “relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the
party to be added knew or should have known.” Krupski v. Costa
Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010). Consistent with the
rule, “[a] potential defendant who has not been named in a

4

Although Mr. Johnson does not appear to make this same
argument with respect to his negligence claim – which is also
subject to a three-year statute of limitations period and which
was also alleged in his original complaint – the same analysis
applies.
10

lawsuit by the time the statute of limitations has run is
entitled to repose – unless it is or should be apparent to that
person that he is the beneficiary of a mere slip of the pen, as
it were.” Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
Mr. Johnson offers no argument in support of the contention
that MVM knew or should have known of the claims asserted in the
original complaint. Nor is there any indication that Mr. Johnson
merely made “a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity”
in its original complaint. See Krupski, 560 U.S. at 554 (holding
that district court erred in denying relation back under Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) where newly-added corporate defendant was a
closely-related entity represented by the same counsel and had
“constructive notice” of plaintiff’s complaint within the Rule
4(m) time period). For example, Mr. Johnson does not allege that
the defendant named in the original complaint, Paragon, is
related to MVM in any way. Accordingly, Mr. Johnson cannot rely
on the relation back doctrine to save his negligence or section
1983 claims. 5

5

Moreover, even if Mr. Johnson’s section 1983 claim was not
barred by the statute of limitations, dismissal of that claim
would still be required because MVM does not act under the color
of state law and thus a section 1983 claim cannot be maintained
against it. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 5, 7, 19 (alleging
that MVM is a contractor with the federal government); MVM Mot.,
ECF No. 22-1 at 9; see also Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d
412, 414-16 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
11

Second, Mr. Johnson argues that his tort claims are not
time-barred because “[t]he extent of the injury wasn’t
discovered until later when plaintiff continued to experience
pain and was referred to a specialist who diagnosed the extent
of the injuries.” Pl.’s MVM Opp., ECF No. 28 at 5. 6 The law is
well-settled, however, that a “tort cause of action accrues, and
the statute of limitations commences to run, when the wrongful
act or omission results in damages. The cause of action accrues
even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or
predictable.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added).
“Were it otherwise, the statute would begin to run only after a
plaintiff became satisfied that he had been harmed enough,
placing the supposed statute of repose in the sole hands of the
party seeking relief.” Id.; see also, e.g., Baker v. A.H. Robins
Co., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 994, 996 (D.D.C. 1985) (fact that
plaintiff did not “comprehend the full extent of all possible
sequalae does not matter, for the law of limitations requires

6

In his opposition brief, Mr. Johnson points to pages in an
exhibit that purportedly support this argument. See Pl.’s MVM
Opp., ECF No. 28 at 6. Mr. Johnson did not, however, file an
exhibit with his opposition, and the Court could not locate any
relevant exhibit elsewhere on the docket. In any event, because
the amended complaint makes clear that Mr. Johnson knew of his
injuries by the end of 2012, the additional information would
not change the Court’s result.
12

only that she have inquiry notice of the existence of a cause of
action for personal injury”) (emphasis in original).
Mr. Johnson alleges that he endured “physical pain and
humiliation” at the time he was detained on October 31, 2012,
and that defendants’ actions continued to cause him “undue
stress” until December 2012. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 1011, 15-16. His assault-and-battery and negligence claims are
both premised on those injuries. See id. ¶ 27 (alleging that
defendants assaulted or aided in the “assault and battery of
plaintiff, intending to threaten or cause harm to Plaintiff and
to cause apprehension of imminent harm or frivolous criminal
charges from on or about October 31, 2012 and continuously
through December 31, 2012”); id. ¶ 34 (“Defendants [sic]
employees breached the duty of care to Plaintiff by keeping
Plaintiff handcuffed for over 2 hours after determining
Plaintiff was legally entitled to bring a handgun into the ICE
facility and then threatening to start criminal proceedings
against Plaintiff for over 2 months after the event[.]”).
Accordingly, his claims accrued, at the latest, on December 31,
2012, rendering his tort claims untimely.
In sum, because all of the claims asserted against MVM are
barred on statute-of-limitations grounds, the Court GRANTS MVM’s
motion to dismiss.

13

B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the Federal Defendants Also
Fail.
1.

The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Over Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claim Against
the Federal Defendants.

Mr. Johnson purports to assert a claim against both FPS and
Mr. Addams in his official capacity for a “Civil Rights
Violation” based on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 18-25. The Court agrees
with the Federal Defendants that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over this claim.
Sovereign immunity bars lawsuits for damages against the
United States, its agencies, and its employees sued in their
official capacities absent a waiver. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign
immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from
suit.”); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (“an
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to
be treated as a suit against the entity” of which the officer is
an agent). A waiver of sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally
expressed in statutory text” and “will be strictly construed, in
terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Pena,
518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
Here, Mr. Johnson’s amended complaint seeks damages from
FPS and Mr. Addams acting in his official capacity for their

14

“deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the
Plaintiff.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶ 20. Mr. Johnson does not
point to any statute waiving the sovereign immunity of FPS or
Mr. Addams in his official capacity for such a claim. Indeed,
“[s]ection 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under
color of federal law.” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d
1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Moreover, although federal
constitutional claims are cognizable under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), those claims only run against individual government
officials in their personal capacity — not agencies or their
agents in their official capacities. See Loumiet v. United
States, 828 F.3d 935, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
It is not clear whether Mr. Johnson alleges a Bivens claim
against Mr. Addams in his individual capacity in his amended
complaint. Compare Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 (making no mention of
Bivens or of claims asserted against Mr. Addams in his
individual capacity), with Pl.’s Opp. to Fed. Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss (“Pl.’s Fed. Opp.”), ECF No. 29 at 2 (stating that the
claims are alleged against Mr. Addams “in his individual and
official capacity”). In any event, such a claim would fail. For
one, it is well-settled that “[g]overnment officials may not be
held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v.
15

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Therefore, “a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the primary
allegation that pertains to Mr. Addams’ role in any purported
constitutional violation indicates that Mr. Addams “supervised
either a Paragon Systems employee or MVM employee at all
relevant times.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶ 17. Accordingly, Mr.
Johnson may not move forward on his claim for damages for an
alleged violation of his constitutional rights. 7
2.

Plaintiff’s Tort Claims Must Be Dismissed
Because He Failed to Exhaust His Administrative
Remedies.

Mr. Johnson also alleges claims for negligence and assault
and battery against the Federal Defendants. The Court construes
these tort claims as ones brought against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which is the
“exclusive remedy for persons seeking recovery for damages for
any ‘negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of

7

To the extent Mr. Johnson seeks “declaratory” and
“injunctive relief,” see Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶ 35, the
amended complaint does not specify the form of declaratory or
injunctive relief sought, and Mr. Johnson does not offer any
further description of what he seeks in his opposition brief.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the amended complaint fails to
meet the specificity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(3) with respect to any claims for specific
relief. See Ward v. Kennard, 133 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C.
2000).
16

the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment.’” Tripp v. Executive Office of the President, 200
F.R.D. 140, 147 (D.D.C. 2001).
The FTCA waives sovereign immunity in limited
circumstances, permitting a plaintiff to sue the United States
for torts in situations in which “the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Sloan v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Before filing suit under the
FTCA, a plaintiff must first present his alleged claims “to the
appropriate Federal agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a mandatory, jurisdictional
prerequisite to filing such a lawsuit in federal court. See
Jones v. United States, 296 Fed. Appx. 82, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 370–71 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
To exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA, a
plaintiff must have presented the agency with “(1) a written
statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the
agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum-certain
damages claim.” GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 905
(D.C. Cir. 1987). Further, the agency must have either denied
the claim in writing or failed to provide a final disposition
within six months of the filing of the claim. Id. Importantly,
17

an individual submitting an administrative claim to an agency
must do so within two years of discovery of “both his injury and
its cause.” Sexton v. United States, 832 F.2d 629, 633 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111,
119(1979)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
Mr. Johnson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
with respect to his tort claims. The amended complaint makes no
mention of submission of Mr. Johnson’s claims to FPS, and Mr.
Johnson’s opposition brief does not even address the Federal
Defendants’ exhaustion-related arguments. See Pl.’s Fed. Opp.,
ECF No. 29. Moreover, because it is undisputed that Mr. Johnson
knew of his alleged injuries by December 2012, see supra, he was
required to present his claim to the agency by December 2014.
Accordingly, Mr. Johnson will be unable to exhaust his
administrative remedies because his claims are time-barred.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court grants MVM and

the Federal Defendants motions to dismiss Mr. Johnson’s amended
complaint. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed:

Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 29, 2018

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