JOHNSON v. PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC.

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on July 1, 2016. (lcegs4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_______________________________
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DENNIS JOHNSON,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Civ. Action No. 15-1851 (EGS)
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PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC.
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Defendant.
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)
MEMORANDUM OPINON

On October 31, 2012 Plaintiff Dennis Johnson (“Mr. Johnson”)
arrived at an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
facility and unintentionally entered the facility through the
visitor entrance instead of the employee entrance with a loaded
handgun in his briefcase. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 9, 10. Although
Mr. Johnson was contracted to provide law enforcement services
to ICE, he was immediately placed in handcuffs when his weapon
was detected. Id. ¶ 11. Mr. Johnson was detained for over two
hours during which he allegedly suffered physical pain and
humiliation. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.
Mr. Johnson filed suit on October 31, 2015 against Defendant
Paragon Systems, Inc. (“Defendant”), an ICE security service
provider. Mr. Johnson alleges four counts: a Civil Rights
Violation (Count I), Assault and Battery (Count II), Intentional

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Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count III), and Common Law
Negligence (Count IV). Id. ¶¶ 4-6. On February 1, 2016,
Defendant filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss, seeking to have Mr.
Johnson’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
dismissed. Def.’s Partial Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 6 at 6. For the
reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
I. Background
Mr. Johnson is a retired federal law enforcement officer who
claims he is entitled to carry a firearm on federal property at
any time. Compl. ¶¶ 6-9. Mr. Johnson traveled to the ICE
facility on October 31, 2012 to attend a training session. Id.
Mr. Johnson was detained and handcuffed after the security
scanner revealed his weapon. Id. ¶ 11. Shortly after being
handcuffed, Mr. Johnson displayed his badge to employees of
Defendant. Id. ¶ 14. Eventually, ICE officials informed
Defendant’s staff of Mr. Johnson’s right to bring a weapon into
the building. Id.
Mr. Johnson alleges that he suffered physical pain and
humiliation due to Defendant’s decision to keep handcuffs on him
for more than two hours, even after ICE officials informed
Defendant’s staff that Mr. Johnson was approved to carry a
firearm in the building. Id. ¶ 14. Mr. Johnson also alleges that
for two months after the incident, Paragon employee Chris Adams

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threatened to start criminal proceedings against Mr. Johnson.
Id. ¶ 16.
II. Standard of Review
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In
considering such a motion, the complaint is “construed liberally
in the plaintiff['s] favor”, and the Court must grant plaintiff
“the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the
facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1994)). “However, the [C]ourt need not accept
inferences drawn by [the] plaintiff[ ] if such inferences are
unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Id.
Although there is no formulaic method, Rule 12(b)(6) requires
enough factual matter be pled to find that the claim is
plausible, not just possible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1941 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). This determination is limited to facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint and should cast
aside legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Twombly,
550 U.S. at 563.
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that Mr. Johnson’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim should be dismissed as a matter of law
because the injury alleged did not result from extreme or

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outrageous conduct on the part of Defendant’s employees and
because Mr. Johnson does not describe his alleged injury in
sufficient detail. 1 An intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim must allege “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct
on the part of the defendant, which (2) intentionally or
recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.”
Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C.
1982). To meet the first element, the conduct must be “so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064, 1075 (D.C. 1991).
Establishing the third element requires the plaintiff to show a
“serious, verifiable emotional injury.” Hudson v. D.C., 558 F.3d
526, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Only the first and third elements are
at issue in this motion.
First, Defendant correctly asserts that the Complaint is
“entirely devoid of the factual basis necessary to support an

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Defendant also argues that Mr. Johnson failed to make a plain
statement of his claim because it is “limited to a single
sentence, [is] purposefully vague and merely recites the legal
elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.” A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court will
not discuss this argument in detail because Mr. Johnson’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fails as a
matter of law.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress claim . . . [which]
can hardly be seen as the type of extraordinary conduct
necessary to substantiate a claim of this nature.” Def.’s
Partial Mot. Dismiss at 5. Defendant points to Harris v. D.C.,
where this Court held that the plaintiff’s claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress failed as a matter of law
because his arrest by twelve officers at gunpoint in front of
“the very schoolchildren he was assigned to protect” was not “so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree” to state a
claim. 696 F. Supp. 2d 123, 137-38 (D.D.C. 2010).
The facts of this case are far less severe. First, Mr. Johnson
alleges that he was handcuffed for up to two hours. Compl. ¶ 14.
Handcuffing suspects is a normal detention practice that cannot
be considered outrageous. See Cotton v. D.C., 541 F. Supp. 2d
195, 206 (D.D.C. 2008). Second, Mr. Johnson alleges that Paragon
employee Chris Adams threatened criminal action for up to two
months following the incident. Id. ¶ 16. This allegation also
fails to rise to the level of conduct so extreme in degree “as
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” See Stewart v.
Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891, 894 (D.D.C. 1982).
Mr. Johnson’s only response to Defendant’s 12(b)(6) argument
is that “[t]hreatening and embarrassing a retired law
enforcement officer in public for non-illegal behavior is
outrageous behavior.” Pl.’s Opp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 2. Mr.

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Johnson cites Waldon v. Covington to support this proposition.
415 A.2d 1070, 1076 (D.C. 1980). However, Waldon does not
support Mr. Johnson’s argument. In Waldon, the widow of a
deceased university professor maintained an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim after his
death. Id. at 1072. The D.C. Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of intentional
infliction of emotional distress because reassigning her husband
to teach outside of his area of expertise, among other reasons,
did not constitute outrageous conduct. Id. at 1077-78. Thus, not
only does Mr. Johnson fail to allege facts that support a
finding of outrageous behavior, the case law he cites undermines
his own argument.
Even if Mr. Johnson’s allegations of outrageous conduct were
sufficient to meet the first element of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, Mr. Johnson’s claim
still fails because he does not allege facts showing that his
humiliation exceeded the level of embarrassment associated with
ordinary custodial detentions. In order to qualify as severe
emotional distress, the complaint must describe distress of a
nature so acute that “harmful physical consequences might be not
unlikely to result.” Chen v. D.C., 256 F.R.D. 267, 272-73
(D.D.C. 2009) (citing Sere, 443 A.2d at 37). For example in
Chen, the court held that the plaintiff’s complaint did not fail

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as a matter of law because the plaintiff allegedly developed an
abiding fear of police officers, became scared to go outside at
night, and experienced difficulty performing work duties. Id. at
273.
Unlike the plaintiff in Chen, who described specific effects
on her work and daily routine, Mr. Johnson does not provide any
concrete or articulable effects of psychological or physical
trauma as a direct cause of Defendant’s conduct. Rather, Mr.
Johnson confines his description of his injuries to general
statements such as “undue stress” and “humiliation.” Compl. ¶¶
15, 16. These allegations are insufficient to state a claim.
Accordingly, Mr. Johnson’s intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim fails as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Partial Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.

Signed:

Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
July 1, 2016.

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