COMMON PURPOSE USA, INC. v. OBAMA et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION to the Order granting the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Gladys Kessler on 12/30/16. (CL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Common Purpose USA, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

v.
Barack Obama, et al.,

Civil Action No. 16-345 {GK)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff,
alleges

that

Common

Purpose

Defendants,

the

USA,
United

("Common

Inc.

States,

the

Purpose") ,
District

of

Columbia, and various officials of both governments, have violated
the due process rights of Plaintiff's members by allowing them to
be

subject

violence.
will

to past gun violence and the

threat of

future

gun

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, which it believes

eliminate

the

threat

of

future

gun violence

against

its

members.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants'
Motions

to

Oppositions,
evident

that

Dismiss.

Upon

and Replies,
the

Court

consideration

and the entire

lacks

of

respective

the

Motions,

record herein,

jurisdiction to hear

Complaint, and the Motions to Dismiss are granted.

it

is

Plaintiff's

I.

BACKGROUND

Common

Purpose

Complaint at 5.

is

a

domestic

non-profit

organization.

Its members are direct or indirect victims of gun

violence in the United States, including the District of Columbia.
Id.

However, Common Purpose has not identified a single member of

the group.

See Id.

A paraphrased statement of its mission is

that it seeks to advance an understanding of the United States'
Constitution that reduces gun violence.

Complaint at 5.

Plaintiff brings this action against President Barack Obama,
Loretta Lynch, Attorney General of the United States, Vanita Gupta,
Principal

Deputy

Assistant

Attorney

General,

Thomas

Brandon,

Deputy Director of the U.S. Department of Justice and head of the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives

("ATF"),

all in their official capacities, and the United States of America
(collectively "Federal Defendants"),. as well as the District of
Columbia and Cathy Lanier,

in her official capacity as Chief of

the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia,
(collectively "District Defendants").
Common
rights

Purpose

alleges

that

its

members'

have been violated by gun violence

unfettered right to bear arms."
Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 5]

constitutional

resulting from

"the

Opposition to Federal Defendants'

("Fed. Opp'n"); Complaint at 2-5.
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It

attributes this violence to the manner in which Federal Defendants
enforce and implement the various laws of the United States, Opp'n
at 10, and to the District's laws and regulations authorizing the
concealed carrying of firearms.

Complaint at 3-4.

Plaintiff's Complaint presents seven claims or issues to the Court:

"Issue 1. Do the Federalist Papers and in particular
Federalist Paper No. 2 9 and the practices and use of
militias in the early years of this country's republic,
establish that the "right to bear arms" was intended to
be limited to a "well-regulated militia," subject to
both state and Congressional regulation?
Issue 2. Must interpretation of the Second Amendment
adhere to and apply the basic principle that a statute,
a fortiori, the Constitution, must be read in its
entirety?
Issue 3. If the answer to Issue 2
the interpretation of the "right to
Second Amendment strike a proper
among other Articles and Amendments
lest such Articles and Amendments
Constitution?

is affirmative, must
bear arms" under the
balance between and
to the Constitution,
be read out of the

Issue 4. In light of the presentations made and reviewed
in Issue 3, must the "right to bear arms" be balanced
against other constitutional powers and guarantees?
Issue 5 If the "right to bear arms" includes the right
to modern weapons, such as attack weapons, against what
foreign or domestic persons, entities, organizations may
the right be exercised and who decides against whom and
if and when to exercise such right?
Issue 6. If the "right to bear arms" includes the right
to use modern weapons, such as attack weapons, against
domestic persons, entities, and/or organizations, does
that create an environment conducive to anarchy?
-3-

Issue 7: Does the District's Concealed Carry
interfere with the enforcement of federal laws?" 1

The Complaint contains several other issues,
construes to be sub-parts of Issue 7:
1

laws

which the Court

"(B) Whether the amendments to the Firearms Control Act
of 1975 (D.C. Official Code 16 §7-2501), as adopted by
the District of Columbia (22 D.C. Code §22-4504.01, "DC
Carry Law") must be interpreted consistent with the
interpretation of the Second Amendment made in reference
to the authorities enumerated in (A) preceding; ( C)
Whether if the provisions of the D.C. Carry Law are found
to be in conflict with the interpretation of the Second
Amendment
made
in
reference
to
the
authorities
enumerated in (A) preceding, such provisions would be
conflict with Constitutional guarantees and federal
regulation of guns and gun ownership (see pages 29-31
following) making them subject to preemption under the
supremacy clause of Article VI (U.S. Const. art. VI)
(hereinafter references will be made to "Article" or
"Amendment" when citing to these provisions of the
Constitution); D) Whether the rules and regulations
("Concealed Carry Rules") adopted by the Chief of Police
of the Metropolitan Police Department ("DC Chief of
Police") authorizing the issuance of permits to carry
concealed firearms (''Concealed Carry Permits") interfere
with or prevent the enforcement of federal laws
("Federal Laws");
(E) Whether, if the decision in
response to (D) preceding is in the affirmative, the
Concealed Carry Rules and Permits are subject to
preemption under the supremacy clause of Article VI of
the Constitution; (F) Whether the DC Carry Law and
Concealed Carry Rules and Permits deny United States
citizens that reside in, work in or visit the District
of Columbia due process and equal protection of the law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (G)
Whether the DC Carry Law and the Concealed Carry Rules
and Concealed Carry Permits should be enjoined from
interfering with or preventing the enforcement of
Constitutional rights and applicable Federal Laws?"
Complaint at 3-4.
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Complaint at 6-7.
First

In essence the Complaint raises two sets of claims.

are the "Constitutional Claims": Issues 1-6, asking the Court to
interpret the Second Amendment; and those parts of Issue 7 that
ask the Court to declare that the District's concealed carry laws
are unconstitutional.

Second are the "Preemption Claims," those

parts of Issue 7 asking the Court to declare that the District's
concealed carry laws are preempted by federal law.
Plaintiff brings these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
28 U.S.C.

§§

§

1331,

2201, 2202 ("the Declaratory Judgment Act"), and the

judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C.

§§

701 et seq.

See Complaint at 4-6.

Federal Defendants brought a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that,
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6),
the Court lacks jurisdiction and Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim.

Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 4-1]

("Fed. Mot. to Dismiss").

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Federal Defendants' Motion,
Fed. Opp'n,

and the Federal Defendants filed a Reply.

Support of

Federal Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss

[Dkt.

Reply in
No.

8]

("Fed. Reply") .
The District Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss,
which

they

joined

the

Federal
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Defendants'

arguments

in
and

additionally argued

for

dismissal

process pursuant to Rules
Columbia's
Dismiss").

Motion

due

12 (b) (2)

to Dismiss

[Dkt.

to

improper

and 12 (b) (5).
No.

9]

service

of

District of

("District Mot.

to

Plaintiff filed an Opposition, Plaintiff's Memorandum

in Opposition to the District of Columbia's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt.
No.

10]

Reply.

("District Opp' n"),
District of

and the District Defendants filed a

Columbia's Reply

[Dkt.

No.

11]

("District

Reply") .

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12{b) (1)

As

courts of

only those powers

limited jurisdiction,

federal

courts possess

specifically granted to them by Congress or

directly by the United States Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See
Shuler v. United States,
deciding

whether

to

531 F.3d 930,

grant

a

motion

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1),

932
to

(D.C. Cir.
dismiss

for

2008). In
lack

of

the court must "accept all of

the factual allegations in [the] complaint as true." Jerome Stevens

I
i

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253

-6-

I

I

54

(D.C. Cir.

2005)

(quoting United States v. Gaubert,

499 U.S.

315, 327 (1991)).
Nonetheless,

" [t] he plaintiff's factual allegations in the

complaint will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b) (1) motion
than in resolving a 12(b) (6) motion for failure to state a claim."
Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp.
2d 9,

13-14

outside

(D.D.C.

the

2001).

pleadings,

The Court may also consider matters

and may

resolution of disputed facts. 2

rest

its

decision

on

its

own

See Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sci.,

974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because Plaintiff Lacks Standing
and Because There Is no Case or Controversy
1. Standing Is a Jurisdictional Requirement of Article
III

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of
federal courts to certain "Cases" and "Controversies." See U.S.
Const. art. III,
judiciary' s

2

§

proper

2.

"[N]o principle is more fundamental to the

role

in our

system of

government

than

the

As discussed below, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this
case,
and therefore,
resolution of the Federal Defendants'
arguments that Common Purpose has failed to state a claim and the
District Defendants' argument that the they were not properly
served
are
unnecessary
to
disposition
of
these
Motions.
Accordingly, the relevant standard of review under Rules 12(b) (2),
12(b) (5), and 12(b) (6) have been omitted for the sake of brevity.
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constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual
cases or controversies." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct.
113 8,
the

114 6

( 2 013)

(internal citations omitted) .

case-or-controversy

requirement

is

establish that they have standing to sue."

"One element of

that

plaintiffs

must

Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted) .
"[T] he

irreducible

constitutional

contains three elements. First,

minimum

of

standing

the plaintiff must have suffered

an injury in fact . . . which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and

(b)

actual

or

imminent,

not

conjectural

or

hypothetical.

Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and
Third,

the conduct complained of
opposed to merely speculative,

it must be

likely,

as

that the injury will be redressed

by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555,

560-61,

(1992)

(internal

quotation marks,

citations,

and

footnotes omitted) .
Ordinarily, an organizational plaintiff may attempt to show
standing

in

one

"organizational
behalf

in order

of

two

ways.

standing,"

1996).

to protect

Alternatively,

under

the

an organization may sue
its

Employees Union v. United States,
Cir.

First,

own interests.
101 F.3d 1423,

under the theory of
-8-

theory

of

on its own

Nat' 1

Treasury

1427-28.

(D.C.

"associational

standing," an organization may sue on behalf its members to protect
their

interests.

Hunt

v.

Washington

Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343

State

Apple

Adverti9ing

(1977); Air Transp. Ass'n v. Reno,

80 F.3d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
2. Common Purpose Lacks
Associational Standing

both

Organizational

In order to establish organizational standing,

and

a plaintiff

must show that it satisfies each of the traditional three prongs
of

the

standing

redressability.

inquiry

injury

in

fact,

causation,

Nat' 1 Treasury Employees Union at 1427.

and
The

alleged injury must be a "concrete and demonstrable injury to [the
organization's] activities."
. Common Purpose

argues

Id. at 1427-28 .
that

it has

suffered the

requisite

injury in fact because, if it is not granted standing, it will be
hindered in its future ability to attract support and membership.
Fed.

Opp' n at 8.

This argument is defective for many reasons.

First, the alleged harm is not an injury for purposes of Article
III because a plaintiff cannot manufacture an injury based on harms
that result from its prosecution of the lawsuit itself.

See PETA

v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Additionally,

Common Purpose's alleged injury "hinge [s]

on

the independent choices" of third parties not before the Court,
its current and prospective members.
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National Wrestling Coaches

Assn' v. Dept. of Education, 366 F.3d 930, 938

(D.C. Cir. 2004).

What these individuals might or might not do in response to a
ruling

of

therefore,

this

Court

is

"mere

unadorned

speculation,"

and

Common Purpose cannot establish either causation or

redressability.

Id.

Consequently,

it

lacks

organizational

standing.
In order to establish associational standing a Plaintiff must
show that:

1)

at

least

one

of

the organization's members has

standing to sue in her own right; 2) the interests the organization
seeks to protect in its lawsuit are germane to the organization's
purpose;

and

3)

"neither

the

claim

asserted

nor

the

relief

requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit."

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,

432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Air Transp. Ass'n v. Reno, 80 F.3d 477,
483 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Common Purpose's Complaint fails to identify a single member
whatsoever, and failed to allege facts that would establish that
any

identifiable

member

has

standing

in

her

own

right.

Accordingly, it cannot satisfy the first prong of Hunt, and lacks
associational standing.

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B. The Complaint Contains only Generalized Grievances that Do
Not Present any Case or Controversy

Common Purpose's Complaint contains a flaw more fundamental
than its inability to check one of these two doctrinal boxes.

It

represents the kind of general complaint about the administration
of the law that the courts have long held to be inappropriate for
judicial resolution.
Article

III

standing

particularized injury."
560-61

(1992)

requires

a

"concrete

and

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S; 555,

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A

party challenging a governmental action must show that it has been
directly injured by the action;

it is not enough for a party to

show an undifferentiated, "general interest common to all members
of the public."
77 (1974)

United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-

(quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 636 (1937)).

Courts "have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only
a generally available grievance about government -- claiming only
harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly
and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large -- does
not state an Article III case or controversy."
549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007)

Lance v. Coffman,

(internal quotations marks omitted).

-11-

Common Purpose's Complaint is the quintessential generalized
grievance.
specific

It is devoid of any concrete allegations,
actions

of

the

various

Defendants

or

such as

specific

suffered by Common Purpose or any one of its members.

harms

Instead,

the Constitutional Claims are simply a request that this Court, in
a

factual

vacuum,

render

Constitutional provisions.
not

demonstrate

that

an

interpretation

Similarly,

Common

of

various

the Preemption Claims do

Purpose

has

any

individualized

interest in this litigation other than a desire to see the District
of Columbia's concealed carry laws changed.
"The motion papers disclose no interest upon the part of the
petitioner

other

insufficient."

than

that

Schlesinger v.

War, 418 U.S. 208, 219-20 (1974)
marks omitted) .

Accordingly,

of

a

citizen

That

is

Reservists Committee to Stop the
(internal citations and quotation
this lawsuit presents no case or

controversy within the meaning of Article III, and therefore this
Court lacks jurisdiction.3

3 As Common Purpose cannot establish Article III standing, it is
unnecessary to address its argument that it has third party, or
jus tetri, standing.
See Sands v. NLRB, 825 F.3d 778, 784 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) ("[plaintiff] must show that he has standing under
Article III, and that he satisfies third party, or jus tertii,
standing requirements.").
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C. Remaining Arguments Unnecessary

As the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims,
it

is

unnecessary to address

Defendants'

argument

that

Common

Purpose has failed to state a claim and the District Defendants'
argument that it failed to properly serve them.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.

Date:

Gladys
sler
United States District Judge

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